



AFL-CIO's Secret War against Developing Country Workers

Solidarity or Sabotage?



Kim Scipes

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This book is dedicated to Fred Hirsch, who has taught me and so many others what it means to be an *internationalista* in the labor movement,

AND

To the memory of the late Ka Bel, Crispin Beltran, former National Chairperson, *Kilusang Mayo Uno* (KMU) Labor Center of the Philippines. Mabuhay, Ka Bel!

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Abbreviations

Labor-created “institutes” and where they operate: the first four operated under the AFL-CIO presidencies of George Meany and Lane Kirkland, and were disbanded by AFL-CIO President John Sweeney in 1997. Sweeney established ACILS in 1997, which continues to date:

AAFLI	Asian American Free Labor Institute, AFL-CIO: Asia
AALC	African American Labor Center, AFL-CIO: Africa
AIFLD	American Institute for Free Labor Development, AFL-CIO: Latin America
FTUI	Free Trade Union Institute, AFL-CIO: Southern Europe
ACILS	American Center for International Labor Solidarity, AFL-CIO—also known as the “Solidarity Center”: globally

U.S. Government-created agencies:

ACLD	Advisory Committee on Labor and Diplomacy to the U.S. Secretary of State
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
CIA	U.S. Central Intelligence Agency
NED	National Endowment for Democracy

Preface

This is a book that has been very difficult for me to write. I am a strong believer in collective action, and especially collective action by working people, so as to improve their wages, working conditions, and the general conditions of their lives. Also, I am a strong believer in unions. I currently am a member of a union, the National Writers Union (NWU), and have previously been a member of the Graphic Communications International Union (GCIU), the National Education Association (NEA), and the American Federation of Teachers (AFT); each but the NEA is affiliated with the AFL-CIO.

Yet the subject of this book—the AFL-CIO’s foreign policy program—is a direct threat to working people, and to labor movements around the globe and in the United States. AFL-CIO foreign policy leaders support and have worked to extend the U.S. Empire. Besides attacking workers and unions around the world who challenge U.S. corporate investment and/or their respective nation’s slavish acceptance of U.S. foreign policy as detailed herein, the AFL-CIO’s foreign policy program can exist in the United States only by attacking labor democracy within the U.S. labor movement itself. And working to maintain and extend the U.S. Empire has meant that the AFL-CIO leaders have been unable to provide effective leadership for unions and workers in this country, which have been under escalating attack by corporations and the U.S. Government since the early 1970s.

Labor’s foreign policy program began almost one hundred years ago, although its operations have varied over time, often with vagaries within the labor movement. Yet in all that time, Labor’s foreign policy leaders—including the top elected officials in the labor movement—have *never* given an honest report to their members of what they have been doing around the world and why they have been doing it. In fact, they not only have failed to report these projects, but they have actively resisted efforts to understand them when members have gotten curious—and they have resisted “opening the books” even when formally requested by their largest State affiliate, the California State AFL-CIO.

I have been studying AFL-CIO foreign policy off and on since I first learned about it in the Fall of 1983—and my closest compañero, Fred Hirsch, has been doing so since at least 1974—and yet there is still much not known about AFL-CIO operations around the world: only a small part of their operations have been uncovered. However, when we know for certain that AFL-CIO

foreign policy leaders collaborated in laying the groundwork to overthrow democratically-elected governments in countries such as Guatemala (1954), Brazil (1964) and Chile (1973)—in each case, leading to decades of rule by dictatorship, oppression of entire societies, and deaths of thousands of human beings—then we know that, despite any small efforts that might assist workers here or there, the overall project is toxic, and must be dug out root and branch, and replaced by a genuine program of international labor solidarity.

Unfortunately, however, laying the groundwork to help overthrow democratically-elected governments is only the tip of the iceberg. The AFL-CIO foreign policy leadership has also consciously supported labor movements that were set up by dictatorships—in Brazil, Chile, Indonesia, the Philippines, South Africa, and South Korea—to ensure that the workers, along with the rest of civil society, would never be able to coalesce and restore popular democracy in these particular countries. We also know for certain that in at least one case—that of the largest affiliate of Trade Union Congress of the Philippines (TUCP), itself affiliated with the AFL-CIO's Asian American Free Labor Institute (AAFLI)—leaders literally joined with a death squad against an opposing union to try to get their way; and this, as shown in chapter 2, is not an exaggeration.

And we know that the AFL-CIO has joined with the Reagan-initiated but U.S. Congress-financed National Endowment for Democracy (NED), an organization that is the antithesis, the opposite, of what it claims to be: it works semi-independently of the U.S. Government, yet in collaboration, to ensure the continued domination of the U.S. Empire. The AFL-CIO helped establish the organization, and has worked with it since its founding in 1983. Other “core institutes” of the NED, besides the AFL-CIO's “Solidarity Center,” include the National Democratic Institute (the international wing of the Democratic Party—currently headed by former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright), the International Republican Institute (international wing of the Republican Party—currently headed by U.S. Senator John McCain), and the Center for Private Enterprise (the international wing of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce). We know for certain that the NED was deeply involved in helping to lay the groundwork for the attempted coup against democratically-elected Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez in April 2002, and that the AFL-CIO's so-called Solidarity Center itself was involved with the right-wing labor leadership of the CTV (*Confederación de Trabajadores Venezolanos*), a key leader of the coup attempt itself before it got betrayed by political and military leaders of the coup.

Unfortunately, the story of the AFL-CIO foreign policy program is even worse, although it is told as completely as possible at this time in this book. Yet, as is also known, our story is only the tip of the iceberg. Hopefully, however, this will encourage researchers and writers around the world to delve even deeper to expose and end these operations.

It is also believed, though, that most American trade unionists will be agghast to learn of this abhorrent story, especially with it being done “in our name” but without our informed consent—or even uninformed consent. These operations are a direct dagger at the heart of trade union democracy, and that means that members are unable to control their very own organizations. In fact, it is a threat to popular democracy in the United States itself.

It is argued that if American trade unions are ever going to be able to represent working people in this country in a real sense, then they must destroy this cancer eating at their very essence. Members must rise up within every union, and be persistent and determined enough to demand an immediate end to the AFL-CIO foreign policy program—and we have to make it happen.

However, the struggle is even larger than this: the very understanding of trade unionism in this country must be transformed. Our current form of trade unionism must be changed from one that basically only advances members' interests, even at the possible expense of other working people, to one where the unions fight for the interests of all working people, in the U.S. and around the globe.

Thus, while it makes me sad to have to write about the treachery of top level AFL-CIO foreign policy leaders, I hope that this will inspire workers across the United States to fight for what is right, radically reform our trade union movement, and work to join the growing global movement for social and economic justice.

Chicago, 2010.

Acknowledgements

There have been a number of people over the years who have encouraged and supported me in the researching of this subject and the writing of this book. It is my pleasure to publicly acknowledge some who have been especially crucial in this process.

Most important, and why this book is dedicated to him, is my *compañero*, Fred Hirsch. Fred is a plumber by trade, and Vice President of Plumbers and Fitters Local 393 in San Jose, California. He exposed the AFL-CIO's efforts through AIFLD (American Institute for Free Labor Development) to help lay the groundwork for the 1973 military coup in Chile—and he did this in 1974. He subsequently got the South Bay Labor Council, AFL-CIO, to formally condemn AIFLD's operations in Chile. Fred has been and continues to be near the center of almost every progressive effort by Labor in California, and especially around efforts to build international labor solidarity with workers around the world. We first met in the late 1980s in the San Francisco Bay Area, working together in the Committee in International Solidarity for Trade Union Rights or CISTUR. We have worked together over the years—and Fred has kept me in line when I've gotten too outrageous or over-the-top—and he has inspired me and others throughout the labor movement over many years in our efforts to reform the AFL-CIO's foreign policy program. His dedication to this cause was physically exhibited during the 2005 AFL-CIO National Convention in Chicago, when he persevered despite barely being able to walk on a knee that was later replaced. And there has been little so inspiring or rewarding than to get his phone calls and hear him say that he likes something I've recently written: extremely high praise from a man who I respect so much. Fred has taught me and many other people about being an *internationalista* in the labor movement.

Others have played strong supportive roles over the years. These include Judy Ancel, Tina Ann, Michael Barker, Carol Burbank, Gerrit Buwalda, Helene Buwalda, Jeanne Diller, Michael Eisenscher, Frank Emspak, James Jordan, David Nack and Peter Waterman. I want to specially thank Betty Balanoff, who I have shared successes and set-backs since we met in 2002, for our weekly phone calls discussing the state of the world as I've traveled from Chicago to work in Northwest Indiana.

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Xiangmen Chen, currently Dean and Director for Urban and Global Studies at Trinity College in Hartford, Connecticut, has had an important influence in my academic life. Not only did he teach four excellent courses that I took while I was in graduate school at the University of Illinois at Chicago (UIC), but he (along with John Walsh) ably advised and got me through the dissertation process. Xiangming has continued to keep up on my career since we've both left UIC, and his timely intervention with Michael Sisskin at Lexington Books helped get me the encouragement and contract to do this book.

Another scholar who has been very important to me is Jan Nederveen Pieterse, currently the Mellichamp Professor of Global Studies and Sociology at the University of California at Santa Barbara. I met Jan when I attended the Institute of Social Studies in The Hague in the very early 1990s; his 1989 book, *Empire and Emancipation*, is simply the best book on imperialism than I've read; his intellectual impact on me will be obvious. He served as the second reader on my MA paper, and we've subsequently become friends. Jan has been very supportive throughout my subsequent academic career, and continues to challenge my thinking and demand I push myself even further than I do on my own.

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I want to thank the Marin Interfaith Taskforce on the Americas—based in Mill Valley, California—for their partial scholarship, enabling me to travel to Venezuela for 10 days in June 2006. And special thanks to Lisa Sullivan for her excellent introduction to her adopted country!

While in South Africa in July and early August 2006—to attend the International Sociological Association's World Congress of Sociology in Durban—I spent several weeks with a marvelous group of South African sociologists/researchers/activists based in Johannesburg, mostly in the Department of Sociology at the University of the Witwatersrand. I especially want to thank Sakhela Buhlungu, Dinga Sikwebu, Lucien van der Walt, and Eddie Webster. Additionally, I got to renew my ties with two people who initially introduced me to labor struggles in South Africa—Deanne Collins and Jeremy Daphne—while we were students at the Institute of Social Studies in The Hague, The Netherlands, in 1991 and very early 1992. And I want to thank all of the South Africans who made my first visit to their country so memorable.

I also want to thank my colleagues at Purdue University North Central (PNC) in Westville, Indiana, where I have been teaching sociology since Fall 2004. I

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And I want to thank my students at PNC. Many of them have come to see the world in a much different way in my classes, and I so appreciate their willingness to be open to what I've been teaching, and their demanding even more from me. Their collective honoring me as "Full-time Teacher of the Year in the College of Liberal Arts" for 2006-07 was an unexpected yet very appreciated award. I want to especially thank Nicole Miller and Chris Overbey for traveling with me to Venezuela in June 2006, and special thanks to Aaron Bibler, Erin Bluhm, Vince Emanuele, Derek Giffin, Sergio Kochergin and Cheri Lundstrom for bringing something special to the world and to our classrooms.

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And I must not forget my discussion partners and my dancing friends: to those who join in at Galveston's on the occasional Thursday nights and at Rosa's Lounge on the occasional Saturday nights—well, you know who you are—thank you. Thanks to the many bands who have brought me so much musical pleasure—especially at Rosa's.

Most importantly, however, has been the love and personal support I've been given by my wife, Johanna "Hans" Buwalda, and our two children, Malaya and Leander. They have sustained me, put up with me, and challenged me in ways I can never adequately acknowledge. All I can say to each of them is a simple "thank you."

Introduction¹

The issue of democracy is one that runs throughout American—in reality, United States—history. We see ourselves as controlling our own lives, ruling ourselves as a free people in our own country, feeling we are blessed by the Divine.

Yet, something is not right. Most of us feel we have very little power to help shape the future of our country, and feel like we have little control over the larger social contexts of our lives. We see our economy crumbling, our futures challenged if not destroyed, and our friends, children, partners and parents sent around the world to fight imperial wars of one sort or the other. Times—this is being completed in early 2010—are troubling to many if not most Americans.

Having survived eight years of George W. Bush as our “leader,” we are forced to confront such issues as “how did things get this way?” While immense hope was generated by the election of Barack Obama to the U.S. presidency, progress so far under his administration has been limited, at best. The reality is that things did not just go to hell under the Bush Administration, and they will not be overcome by Obama’s, although it would be nice to see some determined steps toward addressing them by the new administration.

These problems are too big for any one person, or his administration, to solve. We need, as President Obama himself has pointed out on numerous occasions, the collective engagement of the American people.

However, to develop and maintain this collective engagement, it is argued that this can only be sustained on the basis of collective control over our political institutions and social organizations. In other words, when people exert themselves for a greater good/higher purpose than just their own individual well-being, they will get engaged and stay engaged only when they are convinced that their contributions mean something to the larger society, and that they can have a meaningful say in how their institutions and organizations operate. To put it another way, people want to democratically control their own lives.

The question undergirding this work, however, points to a larger issue that we must collectively and democratically address if we are to have a chance to address these large social problems: how can people maintain control over organizations and institutions that have been created to serve their interests? What is to keep these institutions/organizations from developing in a manner that differs from or even counters their members’ collective interests?

Answering these questions for the entire social order is going to require ad-

dressing them from numerous social positions; there is not one social location from which all answers will emerge.

This study, which builds on and adds to extensive work already completed over the past fifty years, is an effort to examine these questions from the position of organized labor. It focuses on the foreign policy program of the AFL-CIO, the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations, the organization that is central to what is generally referred to within the United States as the "labor movement." This is not, however, a study of the AFL-CIO itself, but rather confines itself to the AFL-CIO's foreign policy program.

The question of member control is perhaps least expected to be needing to be asked regarding the labor movement: after all, labor unions are generally seen as voluntary organizations, and are dependent upon member consent. Why even examine them?

Scholars writing in the 1960s discovered and began writing that the labor movement was acting in concert with the U.S. Government in a number of "developing countries" around the world, and they tried to understand what was taking place. Questions began being raised about what was being done by the U.S. labor movement in these other countries. Scholars then realized that these activities were being done by labor *leaders*, behind the backs, and without the consent, of the members. In other words, labor leaders were acting in the name of their members, but without the knowledge and informed consent of the members. Additionally, most of the money to support these activities came from the U.S. Government, so that labor union members did not even have financial control over these activities. In short, labor leaders had created a Frankenstein monster, operating in the members' name, without members' knowledge or approval, and without any membership control over these activities.

If that was not bad enough in principle—subverting the very ethos of democratic member control—then it was made worse in that these activities were done against other workers. Labor leaders were acting against fellow workers, initially in Latin America and then later around the world.

As a small number of activists in and around the labor movement became aware of these activities, they were forced to try to understand them. How could the U.S. labor movement work against other workers, behind the back of their own members, and not be accountable to their own members? This questioning was emerging alongside the increasing knowledge of the real role of the United States Government in the "third world."²

Critical scholars began to understand that the United States was *not* a benign force in the third world as had been long claimed by leaders of the U.S. Government, but that it was exploiting and oppressing the peoples of these countries; that the United States was, in fact, an imperialist country.³ This recognition developed alongside the growing understanding of the horrible things the United States military was doing in Vietnam.

The labor operations that had been discovered in a number of developing countries—and this understanding exploded with the revelations by Fred Hirsch, a plumber in San Jose, California, about AFL-CIO related activities in Chile that helped lay the groundwork for the September 11, 1973 military coup in that

country—were seen as part of imperialist U.S. Government operations around the world. Basically, it was thought that “the government”—often, particularly the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency)—was either forcing or enticing the labor movement to engage in these unsavory activities, and therefore, unionists had to get the government out of the labor movement. In other words, that the government was *subverting* the labor movement.

A 1989 article by this author (Scipes, 1989), and afterward joined by four other studies conducted independently (Filipelli, 1989; Andrews, 1991; Carew, 1998; and Nack, 1999), changed our understanding: it has been confirmed that these labor operations, particularly in the Global South, have been initiated by foreign policy leaders of the AFL-CIO, although these labor operations have often operated in tandem with the U.S. Government and its operatives. In other words, the *foreign policy program of the AFL-CIO has emerged from forces internal to the labor movement*, and not from external forces such as the U.S. Government, the White House and/or the CIA.

Accordingly, it becomes even more important to understand this foreign policy program, and it is this understanding that the present study seeks to explicate and develop. Ultimately, this study urges trade unionists to reclaim and reassert their power over their own movement, and to re-orient Labor’s global operations from being imperialist and oppressive to actively and consciously building support among workers to get them to join the global movement for economic and social justice as active participants, individually and, most importantly, collectively.

Literature Review

Although the subject is not well known generally, there actually have been a considerable number of studies published on Labor’s foreign policy over the years, although rarely have they been combined in a single accessible volume. The literature critically examining Labor’s foreign policy (critical labor foreign policy studies) has gone through three stages. These have included both exposes and analyses of Labor operations around the world, with variation on seeing factors internal to or external from the labor movement as being responsible for these operations.

The first stage, which began in the mid-to-late 1960s and continued into the late 1970s, began with a series of exposes.⁴ This period ended with George Schmidt’s (1978) expose of the AFT’s (American Federation of Teachers’) involvement in Labor’s foreign operations, and Jack Scott’s 1978 study of the history of U.S. Labor’s operations in Latin America. Most important in this period, however, was Ronald Radosh’s 1969 book, *Labor and United States Foreign Policy*, which tried to explain why Labor had such a terrible foreign policy, which Radosh had explicated. Radosh’s claim was that Labor was acting as an agent of the U.S. Government, that external forces were driving this reactionary foreign policy. Radosh’s claim had a long influence on the field of critical labor foreign policy studies, which for many years accepted this claim in some form

or the other.

Critical labor foreign policy studies entered a resurgent second stage in the mid-to-late 1980s, and this extended into the early 1990s. Stimulated by efforts of the U.S. Government to overthrow the revolution in Nicaragua, and to counteract revolutionary processes in Guatemala and especially El Salvador, there was an explosion of interest and publication of studies on Labor's foreign policy, particularly in Latin America but elsewhere as well.⁵ This work paid off during the mid-1980s as the National Labor Committee was able to prevent the AFL-CIO leadership from endorsing President Reagan's apparent plans to invade the region (Battista, 2002).

This second period was largely a period of expose, and the understanding of Labor's efforts was greatly expanded. Like the first period, this one had a summarizing book: Beth Sims' 1992 book, *Workers of the World Undermined: American Labor's Role in U.S. Foreign Policy*, tried to explain why these efforts took place, why Labor's foreign policy had been so bad. She, too, focused on external forces, but with a more sophisticated effort: Sims focused on actors within Labor's foreign policy "establishment" and their ties with rightwing political networks, basically suggesting that Labor had been infiltrated and, because of the success of these efforts, had acted against its own efforts. (See Scipes, 1993, for a review of Sims' important book.)

The third period, which continues today but which overlaps with the end of the second, begins with the publication of an article by this author on the origin of Labor's foreign policy (Scipes, 1989). This author rejected the argument that external factors were responsible for Labor's foreign policy, and through a careful examination of the development of business unionism under Samuel Gompers, not only focused on internal factors but argued that Labor's adoption of business unionism in an imperialist country led to at least passive and, later, active support for U.S. imperialism (see chapter 1, below).

Writing independently, four other authors subsequently came to the same conclusion that internal factors were responsible for Labor's foreign policy: Ronald L. Filipelli (1989) studied U.S. Labor's activities in Italy between 1943 and 1953; Gregg Andrews (1991) studied the role of the AFL in the Mexican Revolution; Anthony Carew (1998) studied the interjection of CIA funding into the post-World War II Labor operations in Europe; and David Nack (1999) focused on the role of internal conflict within the AFL between progressives and reactionaries around events in Russia beginning with the 1905 Revolution, and demonstrated how the reactionaries' victory then became a force in determining U.S. foreign policy in response to the Soviet Revolution of October 1917. These four works, along with Scipes' 1989 piece, have conclusively established that U.S. Labor's foreign policy and operations are developed internally and not externally.

This third period has seen the emergence of a new twist in critical labor foreign policy studies. Following John Sweeney's election as the President of the AFL-CIO in October 1995, there was the hope that Labor would play a positive role internationally. Instead of just criticizing what Labor has done, there were several articles published by people in or close to the AFL-CIO who argued for

the need for international labor solidarity with workers around the world: see Banks, 1998; Blackwell, 1998; Figueroa, 1998; Mantsios, 1998; Shailor, 1998; and Shailor and Kourpias, 1998.

Yet activists had been arguing the need to build international labor solidarity for years. Prior to these writings by folks in and around the AFL-CIO, this author—while a shopfloor activist working in the printing trades—argued for the necessity of building a new grassroots labor internationalism. This argument was based particularly on his experiences in meeting with workers and labor organizations in Western Europe in late 1983 and again in late 1985, and then the Philippines during very early 1986 (Scipes, 1988).⁶ A considerable number of calls for international labor solidarity were initiated and extensive work was carried out between workers in the United States, Canada and Mexico during the struggle against NAFTA, the North American Free Trade Agreement, which took effect in January 1994 (Dreiling and Robinson, 1998). In 1995, *Labor Research Review* (1995) devoted an entire issue to “Confronting Global Power: Union Strategies for the World Economy,” which focused on building international labor solidarity. In 1996, this author published his monograph on the KMU Labor Center of the Philippines, as part of an effort to see what developed country workers could learn from struggles in developing countries (Scipes, 1996). In 1997, Kim Moody published his very influential book, *Workers in a Lean World*, which brought the concept of international labor solidarity to considerable numbers of labor activists. In 1998, long-time labor and socialist internationalist Peter Waterman (1998) published an important book where he brought together his decades of international experience and extensive writings on internationalism to argue for the development of new internationalisms (plural), specifically including labor. And in 2000, Waterman published an article by this author on his “Global Labour Solidarity” web site about how the KMU Labor Center built and communicated international labor solidarity (Scipes, 2000a).⁷

Since the late 1990s, awareness that the U.S. economy has been affected by “globalization” has grown, as has the interest in and accounts of labor around the world.

There have also been exposes of U.S. Labor’s foreign operations in this third period, some historical and some contemporary. This author wrote about the affects of AFL-CIO operations in the Philippines during the 1980s (Scipes, 1986, 1990, 1996), and in Chile in the early 1970s (Scipes, 2000b). Carew (1998) wrote about AFL efforts in Western Europe in the early post-World War II years. Buhle (1999) had some interesting insights in the historical development of Labor’s foreign policy. Ciment and Ness (1999) wrote about the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and its role in funding current Labor operations. Valentine (1999) wrote about the role of drug trafficking in funding at least some of Irving Brown’s work for the AFL in Europe during the late 1940s. And Rachleff (2000) wrote about Labor’s efforts in Mexico during the late 1990s to undercut organizing among railroad workers against privatization.

However, the third period has also seen the intensification of efforts within the labor movement itself to challenge current AFL-CIO foreign policy and op-

erations. Scipes' 2000b piece—which revolved around a detailed account of Labor's operations in destabilizing the democratically elected Allende government in Chile in the early 1970s—actually was questioning whether Labor wanted to expand on John Sweeney's then-more progressive approach to foreign policy, or revert back to the reactionary policies under George Meany and Lane Kirkland? (Scipes, 2000b) Judy Ancel's (2000) response to this article supported Scipes' approach, and argued that we had to recognize that much of Labor's foreign policy was a result of trying to globalize business unionism.

In short, much has been exposed and explained. We know from the literature to date that U.S. Labor's foreign policy program has been initiated from within the labor movement; that this has hurt working people around the world, with at most a five-year (and probably less) interlude; and for over the past 25 years, Labor's foreign operations have also hurt working people in the United States. And we also know the Labor's foreign policy "leaders" have consciously hidden—and distorted when forced to reveal—their foreign policy program from American workers in general and from labor movement members specifically. Yet, this information has not been collected in a single place, nor has there been a specific analysis done of the information accumulated to date concerning Labor's foreign policy program. It is these tasks that this monograph addresses.

Claims and Themes

This book makes three major claims: (1) the foreign policy program of the AFL-CIO (and the AFL before it) tries to dominate foreign labor movements, especially in developing countries and, therefore, is an imperialist foreign policy; since it comes from within the labor movement, it should be understood as being *labor imperialism*; (2) that this labor imperialism began *before* the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia in 1917, so it was not a reaction to the Bolsheviks, but rather preceded their efforts; and (3) while being designed to advance the interests of the U.S. Empire, it comes at the expense of developing country workers and, increasingly, at the expense of American working people—ultimately, U.S. labor imperialism also hurts American workers.⁸

These three claims are at the heart of this book. You, the reader, must evaluate the evidence assembled and presented, and then evaluate how well the evidence supports each claim. In other words, you are not being asked to believe a single thing in this book; you are, however, being asked to critically evaluate the claims and the evidence presented to support them, so as to come to your own conclusion as to whether the claims are established or not.

And then, should you accept the claims, you need to decide what you are going to do in response. This, particularly for union members, is the \$64,000 question.⁹

Quickly, the argument is that the AFL-CIO's foreign policy leaders—a small group—have subverted the larger, desired purpose of any labor movement, and that is to advance the social, political and economic well-being of its members and, by implication, the well-being of workers everywhere. As the

saying goes, “An Injury to One is an Injury to All.”

This is an assault on workers’ democracy, the efforts of working people to control their own organizations to serve their own interests as defined by them. As suggested above, this examination is from one social location only, that of organized workers. Yet, because of workers’ social role in society—it is we who collectively do most of the production, distribution, and consumption in the society—and because union members are the most organized component of working people, it is a crucial social position; not the only one, not necessarily the most important one, but a crucial one nonetheless.

This must be put into a political understanding.¹⁰ To begin, the concept of “Empire” must be addressed. Empire is not a term used widely today in polite company, but is a theme running throughout this book. To understand what is meant, however, one must challenge much established thinking, including thinking on the traditional “left” of American politics. However, Empire cannot be understood without building on “imperialism.” And these are both counterposed to “democracy.” Accordingly, three major themes must be addressed: imperialism, empire and democracy.

Imperialism

The term “imperialism” generally refers to dominative relations between countries that take place at the nation-state level. This is based on the understanding that all nations do not have equal political-economic power, that they have differing levels of power, and that the stronger dominates or tries to dominate the weaker. Traditionally, this has been seen as domination that takes place specifically across nation-state borders—as distinct from domination inside the same nation-state—and has developed for the benefit of the specific nation-state that is dominating one or more other countries. Another way to think about this is as an oppressor—oppressed relationship between different nations. This also suggests that every group within the dominating nation-state benefits from Empire, and benefits at a roughly comparable level.

It has been the Marxists who are generally seen as having developed the concept of imperialism to the greatest degree. Lenin, in his important theoretical understanding, claims that imperialism is “the highest stage of capitalism” (Lenin, 1916). However, this approach collapses the motivation for imperialism to economic gain; i.e., it approaches imperialism economically.¹¹ Additionally, Lenin and subsequent Marxist writers have located imperialism at the level of the nation-state only; they have argued imperialism results when one nation-state dominates another.

This study does not do that; it takes a different approach. Following the path-breaking work of Dutch scholar Jan Nederveen Pieterse (Nederveen Pieterse, 1989), it is argued that imperialism is domination extended across *political community* borders. A political community usually refers to a nation-state; however, while including nation-states in this category, Nederveen Pieterse’s understanding of imperialism is not limited solely to that. He recognizes that because of external domination during past history, groups who share common culture,

traditions, languages, and political organization (i.e., “political communities”) may be incorporated within the boundaries of other political communities, such as Native American nations having been incorporated into the United States, the Palestinians into Israel, the Kurds into Turkey, Syria, Iran and Iraq, and certainly this is also true of the indigenous peoples around the world. Instead of ignoring these peoples or making them irrelevant by confining the understanding of imperialism to only nation-states, Nederveen Pieterse properly broadens the conception of imperialism to include the domination of one political community over another, and this relationship can exist within the current boundaries of an existing nation-state: these cross-political community border relationships are based in unequal power relations, with the stronger dominating the weaker.

In addition, Nederveen Pieterse extends the concept of imperialism “vertically” to include different levels of domination. He includes dominative relations at the supra-state level (at a higher level than nation-states/political communities) such as between the United Nations’ “peacekeepers” and poor slum-dwellers in Haiti, and it can include dominative relations at a sub-state level (a lower level) such as between labor organizations in the United States and labor organizations in other countries. In other words, he not only expands the concept of imperialism on a horizontal axis through broadening, but he also extends it vertically by including different levels of domination.

Further, Nederveen Pieterse’s is not an economistic view of imperialism. It recognizes that the motivation for imperialism has at least two possible origins: yes, like the Marxists have argued, imperialism can be initiated for economic gain. Additionally, though, Nederveen Pieterse recognizes that imperial domination also can be implemented to achieve political power in the global realm, such as through geo-strategic positioning, and he argues that controlling social forces in other countries for the benefit of the imperialist nation-state can be also a motivating factor for imperialism. And, while these two aspects of imperialism can be separated for analytical purposes, in reality, they are usually in some combination. The issue, therefore, is not a dichotomous categorization and choice between economics or politics, but rather is a search for primacy at any one time and/or situation: in some situations, economic motivations may be primary, and in others, political motivations may be primary. And each situation must be examined independently to ascertain which motivation is primary in any particular situation.

At the same time, however, the concept of imperialism is not just limited to politics or economics. It can refer to any activities that seek to dominate other groups across political community boundaries, and this can be on the cultural level, the spiritual level, the social level, etc.

It is argued, therefore, that Nederveen Pieterse provides a much more robust understanding of imperialism and, therefore, this understanding is used herein.

Empire

Empire is based on imperialism, but is more than just imperialism; it extends beyond. While imperialism or, better, imperialist relations refer to a dominative relationship between stronger and weaker political communities, *empire refers to an entire set of imperialist relations, where one nation-state generally dominates or achieves hegemony over all those political communities (including nation-states) with which it comes into contact.*

When considering Empire, many people think of the Roman Empire, which was based on territorial acquisition and control. Roman armies were sent to physically conquer and control a number of lands in Europe, the “Middle East” and North Africa. This approach, of direct physical control, is generally known as “colonialism.”

However, there is another approach to Empire, one much more germane to today’s world. That is Empire based on political-economic-cultural control, a control not necessarily based on territory: “neo-colonialism.” In other words, if one nation-state controls the range of political behaviors of a political community, and especially if the controlling nation-state generally exerts hegemonic control over the other’s external economic relations, then the control can be as effective or even more so than that developed through territorial control—and at a much lower cost, in money and resources, to the dominating nation-state.

Neo-colonialism is the more common form of imperial domination in the world today, and has generally developed after a former colony gained its independence from its colonial master. While controlling a colony, the colonial power shapes the colony’s economy, political system and administration to benefit the colonial power, and this also includes teaching the colonizer’s language and redesigning the colonized education system to teach those colonized the ways of the colonizer. Thus, upon gaining independence, the elites of the newly “independent” country have no other model than the colonial one, which they usually continue, albeit under the “indigenous elite’s” control (which usually is an advance since physical violence against the indigenous often is drastically reduced). (See, among many others, Shalom, 1981; Scipes, 1999.)

Regardless of the form of control—colonial or neo-colonial—the control is intended to benefit the dominating nation-state, regardless of the consequences to the people being controlled.

However, before proceeding, one more point must be made. The fruits of Empire are *not* distributed equally among those living within the dominating nation-state. Just as the Empire is stratified between dominating nation-state and dominated political communities, the dominant nation-state of an Empire is also *internally stratified*, with benefits and opportunities distributed unequally. This internal stratification system is usually organized on the basis of the economic system, but also can revolve around race and gender, and/or on any other axis or combination thereof that the ruling elite select (Nederveen Pieterse, 1989). While any stratification system will generally be primarily based on one social axis, the particular results will vary situation-by-situation, and so each situation must be evaluated on its own and in relation to the established social order.

Within an Empire, and here the broader concept of Empire as political-economic-cultural control is being used, imperialist activities are not necessarily confined to Government actors or their agents: imperialist activities can be initiated by non-governmental organizations (such as labor organizations), based on their own analysis and arising out of intra-organizational dynamics, and they may or may not subsequently subordinate themselves to the desires of governmental actors. In other words, as long as they do not challenge the existence of the Empire itself, groups other than the government within the dominant political community can engage in their own imperialist activities. However, regardless of the intentions of the initiating non-governmental organizations, governmental and/or corporate actors—each with their own imperialist designs on the rest of the world—can act to subsume these activities and further incorporate them into their own foreign policy programs. Ultimately, then, the non-governmental organizations have to choose whether to acquiesce or resist these governmental/corporate encroachments, and these tensions continue to exist as long as the non-governmental organizations continue their imperialist operations within the Empire.

Thus, with this broader and richer concept of imperialism, and our enhanced understanding of Empire, we can label the entire set of dominating relationships across group borders by the United States Government as constituting the U.S. Empire, and note that it extends around the globe (Nederveen Pieterse, 1989; see also Scipes, 1984; Blum, 2000; Johnson, 2000; Nederveen Pieterse, 2004; Grandin, 2007; Klein, 2007; Nederveen Pieterse, 2008).¹²

This understanding of Empire can be used to clarify U.S. history since the landing of the first white colonists at Jamestown, and certainly with the arrival of African slaves in the colony in 1619—*before* the arrival of the Pilgrims. Although it had been established as part of the British Empire, after winning its independence, the United States established its own imperialist nation-state and Empire in 1789. This was based on the theft of land of the Native Americans—and later Mexicans in what is now the southwestern U.S. and Polynesians in Hawaii—and the labor of Africans, and the exploitation of white and later Asian workers in addition to other workers of color. The U.S. Empire took a qualitative leap in development with the 1898 Spanish-American War (and the emergence of yet another “Western” Empire on the global scene); another qualitative leap with the successful conclusion of World War II and the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki (dominance of the U.S. Empire over the entire world save for the those countries confined within the Soviet Empire); and still another with the collapse of the Soviet Empire and the Soviet Union itself between 1989-1991 (world domination by the U.S. Empire).¹³

Providing this context, at last, forces attention on the subject at hand: labor imperialism. As presented in this book, the U.S. labor movement—specifically, the American Federation of Labor (AFL) and then, after 1955, the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO)—has long had a foreign policy program. This foreign policy program has been imperialist and racist from its beginning—the organizational predecessor to the AFL played a key role in building support for the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act, and this op-

position continued after the AFL was established in 1886—and consciously so since involvement in the Mexican Revolution in the early 19-teens.

While this imperialist foreign policy program emerged from within the labor movement, it consciously subordinated itself to the interests of the U.S. Government by 1916. By 1918, this foreign policy program was funded, to a large albeit varying extent, by the U.S. Government. And while this foreign policy program has always been a product of the labor movement itself—so it has ebbed and flowed based on internal labor movement dynamics—the U.S. Government has sought to utilize this program to further its own interests in maintaining, if not expanding, the U.S. Empire. Generally speaking, especially since the early 1940s, Labor’s foreign policy leaders have acquiesced in this and, where they have resisted governmental efforts, it has generally been because Labor did not think governmental policy was sufficiently imperialist; i.e., Labor’s imperialist program has, at times, been even more reactionary than that of the U.S. Government.

This foreign policy, developed by a few labor “leaders” at the very top levels of the labor movement, has been consistently hidden from American union members and, behind their backs, has worked against the interests of workers around the world, particularly those in the developing countries. It is argued that labor’s foreign policy program has also worked against the interests of American workers, and has made a mockery of any real democracy at the national level within the U.S. labor movement itself. Thus, in the name of “solidarity,” U.S. Labor’s foreign policy leaders, in reality, have been sabotaging genuine international labor internationalism and internal organizational democracy.

Democracy

Should the above analysis be correct, then, what does this mean for Americans, and particularly American union members? To answer that question, the issue of “democracy” must be addressed.

We in the United States have been taught that there is one form of democracy, a democracy of one person, one vote; where no one’s opinion is more important than anyone else’s, and where we, the people, get to decide decisions that affect our collective well-being. This type of democracy, following William Robinson (1996), is called “popular” or “bottom-up” democracy.

However, despite what we have been taught and what has been suggested to us, democracy is not monolithic; there is a second form of democracy. This second form is referred to as “polyarchal” or “elite” or “top-down” democracy (Robinson, 1996). This type of democracy is where the elites choose the candidates people can vote for—do we want “Pepsi” or “Coke”?—or the range of solutions to any possible situation that affects the social order, and then once the limits have been imposed, then and only then, do the elites then allow people to vote for the options that they have previously approved.

This is a very cynical development. Developed by the elites and those who work for them, what we see is that when the elites want something in particular—often with which most people would not agree—they argue, “it’s for de-

mocracy.” In reality, their vision of democracy—polyarchal—is almost totally opposed to our “popular” democracy. However, by using the same term as most of the people—*although meaning something qualitatively different*—the elites undercut resistance to and even questioning of their projects.

Certainly we saw this done by President George W. Bush in regard to Iraq: after his stated rationales for invading Iraq—weapons of mass destruction, that Saddam Hussein was seeking enriched uranium from Niger, and that Hussein was involved in the attacks on the U.S. on 9/11—were each shown to be bogus, he argued that the U.S. invaded Iraq to bring “democracy” to the Iraqi people. This was a strange claim for leader of a country that had Saddam Hussein on its payroll—through the CIA—from 1958 to 1991 (Shaikh, 1997; Morris, 2003; Nimmo, 2003). Truthfully, Bush did not care about the Iraqi people; by projecting his version of polyarchal democracy, all he wanted to do was neutralize the American people—and the cynical use of this term help him succeed in minimizing public opposition to his “global war on terror.”

And this also served as a motivating factor to the mass media in this country: of course, the media supported democracy, so therefore, they must support Bush’s invasion of Iraq (see Mitchell, 2008).

The reality is that *polyarchal democracy directly contradicts popular democracy*: they are opposed to each other.

By the logic of popular democracy when applied to the case of the AFL-CIO’s foreign policy program, *if* the AFL-CIO is going to oppress developing country workers, they should take this program directly to their members, honestly present a full accounting of what they have done and what they intend to do in the future, allow for full discussion with everyone who has something substantive to contribute to the discussion, ask the members to decide if the AFL-CIO should do this or not, and allow them to vote in a binding election. That way, whether anyone agrees with the outcome or not, it is an outcome that is based on popular democracy; that means, the members would have responsibility for the activities of their organization.

Yet, the AFL-CIO foreign policy leadership has never taken that approach—and, in fact, they have worked to keep the membership uniformed or, when forced, to misinform them. Thus, the AFL-CIO foreign policy leadership has operated in the name of American workers, but without our informed or even uninformed consent and, arguably, against the interest of American workers as well as workers around the world.

Addressing the issue of the AFL-CIO’s labor imperialism, then, also raises the issue of popular democratic control over *all* U.S. political institutions and, of course, the U.S. Empire. Should the American people have the right to decide whether we want the U.S. Government to try to control the world or not and, if so, how much cost—human, economic, financial, social—are we willing to bear?

Answering that question remains in the future. This book focuses just on the U.S. labor movement’s foreign policy program.

Presenting this story is part of a conscious effort to transform the AFL-CIO’s foreign policy program into a conscious force for genuine international

labor solidarity, while fighting to transform the U.S. labor movement into a genuine force for economic and social justice, in the U.S. and around the globe. The purpose of this project is not to destroy the labor movement, but to help transform it into the moral and organizational force for economic and social justice that it can and should be, while improving the lives and furthering the aspirations of working people in the United States and around the world.

Overview to this Study

Five chapters are used to tell this story, which are presented from three different perspectives to convey the complexity of the issue. The AFL-CIO foreign policy program is first examined by looking at the activities of Labor's foreign policy leadership, historically and contemporarily. Focus then shifts to the activities of activists, primarily within the labor movement but supported and encouraged by other political activists, and their efforts to challenge and reform Labor's foreign policy. Then, the activities of the U.S. Government regarding Labor are examined. The final chapter wraps up this study, presenting the findings in a coherent manner and, then, considering the theoretical ramifications of this study for macrosociology.

Chapter 1 looks at the origins of this foreign policy, which emerged under Samuel Gompers, first President of the American Federation of Labor (AFL) during the early years of the twentieth century—before, not after, the rise of the Soviet Union, and long before the post-World War II period of the late 1940s, when many believe Labor's imperialist program began. This chapter explicates the development of the AFL's foreign policy from internal conflicts within the AFL, examines Gompers' operations regarding foreign policy issues around the Spanish-American and Philippine-American wars, and then looks at three foreign policy issues—the revolution in Mexico, World War I, and the rise of the Soviet Union—to examine how the AFL's foreign policy got put into practice.

Chapter 2 starts with a quick overview of the history of Labor's foreign policy, and then—from a critical analysis of this history—argues that since the end of World War II, U.S. Labor has intervened in a number of countries. These interventions fall into three categories: (1) directly operating to help undermine democratically-elected governments which, in each case, led to the establishment of a reactionary military dictatorship, the death and/or imprisonment of thousands, and decimation of respective labor movements (as in Guatemala during 1954; in Brazil in 1964; and Chile in 1973); (2) supporting reactionary governments and their affiliated labor movements against workers and their organizations seeking democratic changes (Indonesia during the 1970s-late 1990s; El Salvador throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s; the Philippines, 1980s-early 1990s; and South Korea, 1970s-late 1980s); and (3) indirectly operating with local labor movements to attack pro-labor, progressive governments (in Guyana in 1963; Dominican Republic in 1965; Nicaragua in the late 1980s; and Venezuela in the late 1990s to 2002-03). And then, we provide a case study that illuminates each of these labor operations by type of intervention—from Chile, the

Philippines, and Venezuela, respectively.

Each of these interventions, ironically, limited if not destroyed militant labor movements in these countries, providing safe havens for U.S. corporate investment. Thus, the foreign policy activities of the AFL-CIO provided places for U.S. corporations to invest, taking jobs from and/or providing increased competition to companies that had American employees (Cantor and Schor, 1987; Mantsios, 1998). This was part of the escalating assault on working people in this country that this author written about elsewhere (e.g., Scipes, 1984, 2007b, 2009b).

Chapter 3 looks at the political war that has been taking place within the U.S. labor movement over the AFL-CIO's foreign policy program. While not denigrating or dismissing earlier efforts to challenge Labor's foreign policy from within, this chapter focuses on efforts since the 1995 election of John Sweeney to the presidency of the AFL-CIO.

The election Sweeney won had been the first democratic election for president of the AFL-CIO since its founding 40 year earlier, in 1955. Part of the reason for Sweeney's election was repulsion against the AFL-CIO's foreign policy program under George Meany, Lane Kirkland and, very briefly, Tom Donahue. Sweeney's early activities suggested a radically new approach to international labor movements, and activists were excited—until Sweeney betrayed them. Activists have organized to challenge Labor's established foreign policy, and this chapter discusses this and the AFL-CIO leadership's response to being challenged.

In chapter 4, the U.S. Government's efforts to incorporate AFL-CIO leadership into its foreign policy efforts are examined. The spotlight is turned on the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), and the State Department's Advisory Committee on Labor and Diplomacy (ACLAD), each of which the AFL-CIO leadership has worked with closely. Yet, at the same time, the foreign policy leadership has done all it can to hide these collaborations from AFL-CIO union members: we wonder what they are hiding . . . ?

Chapter 5 is where everything is brought together. The entire study is summarized and concluded. There is a return to major concepts running throughout this study—empire, imperialism, and democracy—and the question is asked as to why the AFL-CIO carries out such a reactionary labor foreign policy? It is argued that American Labor needs to reject the U.S. Empire, and join the interests of American workers with counterparts around the world.

The discussion goes further, as maximum mileage is sought for such an in-depth study. The ramifications of this study on sociological theory are discussed, especially focusing on structure and power, arguing that established theory cannot accurately represent findings of this study. Accordingly, a processural (i.e., non-structural) approach to theoretically understanding these findings is advanced, and the argument is made that these theoretical innovations apply much more broadly than to just this study.

In short, this study provides an in-depth examination of U.S. labor imperialism, the foreign policy program of the AFL-CIO. This labor imperialism is,

quite frankly, a despicable part of U.S. labor history; yet it is essential to understand.

The importance of pulling the scab off such history is that until the pus gets out, the patient cannot get well.

American labor leadership has been serving two masters: for whatever reason, it has chosen to support the U.S. Empire while claiming to be representing American workers. As despicable as supporting the Empire was (and still is), as long as the economy was expanding and jobs for unionized working people were increasing, there was at least somewhat of a rationale for that. However, those days are long behind us.

Since the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980, there has been an extensive and sustained attack on Labor by the U.S. Government and its corporate allies. Labor has been hit so bad that the portion of the U.S. workforce that is unionized has dropped down to 12.3 percent overall in January 2010—from a high point of 34.5 percent in 1954—and the private sector workforce was down to 7.2 percent. This later rate is the lowest rate of private sector workers since 1900! (Kelber, 2010).

And what has been the AFL-CIO leadership's response to such an attack? Basically nothing: the panicked look of deer in headlights is the image that comes immediately to mind. The best they can do is to pin their hopes on the Democrats—the party of Bill Clinton, Al Gore, John Kerry and Barack Obama, a weak reed if there ever was one.

The reality is that this is a prescription for failure: the AFL-CIO leadership can either support the U.S. Government as it tries to dominate the world, or it can mobilize its members to fight for the well-being of all American workers and, ultimately, workers around the world. In simple language, this means they must choose to support or challenge the U.S. Empire. The one thing we know is that the U.S. political economy cannot address the needs and interests of American working people *and* try to dominate the world: perhaps it can do one or the other, but it certainly can not do both.

It is argued that U.S. Labor must challenge the U.S. Empire, not only for the sake of its own members and all workers in the United States, but for the sake of men and women around the world. This is why building international labor solidarity is so essential: it is a matter of human survival, not just a nice thing to do.

Accordingly, this struggle to transform the foreign policy program of the AFL-CIO into a global force for economic and social justice is only one part—an essential one, it is argued, but not the only one—of the larger project of transforming U.S. unionism. For unionism to survive in this country, it must fight for the interests and well-being of all workers in this country (see Fletcher and Gaspin, 2008). And that can only have a chance of succeeding if joined with workers around the world.

It is to this larger vision—economic and social justice for all working people around the world—that we pledge ourselves.

Conclusion

The underlying themes of this book—imperialism, empire and democracy—have been laid out. These run throughout this monograph. How they operate from the perspective of the U.S. labor movement is the story to which we now turn.

Chapter 1

Business Unionism, Samuel Gompers and AFL Foreign Policy¹

Solidarity or Sabotage? The title of this book asks this question in light of U.S. Labor's foreign policy.

In the Introduction, Labor's foreign policy was claimed to have been and continues to be an imperialist one, intended to dominate labor organizations and workers in selected countries around the world. The claim is that it has not happened in a vacuum, but that it developed in conjunction with the U.S. Empire.

This is a serious claim that would be irresponsible if only advanced rhetorically or ideologically—to be accepted, it must be substantiated through rigorously developed empirical data that is critically evaluated. To substantiate this claim, however, not only must it be shown that this reality exists currently, but it also must be shown *how* such a foreign policy developed. Accordingly, the question must be asked: if Labor's foreign policy program is an imperialist one, where did it come from; how did it originate? Have forces outside of Labor hijacked it, turning it into the opposite of what most workers think it should be? Or is there another explanation?

This issue is directly addressed in this chapter. It is argued that Labor's foreign policy has *not* been created by factors external to the labor movement, such as the U.S. Government and/or the CIA, as many others have claimed. Rather, Labor's foreign policy has come from *within* Labor, and this chapter establishes this position by demonstrating how this foreign policy emerged from within the labor movement of the United States.

However, by arguing that it comes from within Labor, it is not suggested that it was the result of this labor leader or that labor leader's individual decision being imposed upon the labor movement. Rather, that it was a direct result of the form of trade unionism created by Samuel Gompers and his associates in the last third of the nineteenth century, which was adopted by unions across the American Federation of Labor (AFL): what we now know as "business unionism." Business unionism accepted the established social order based on Empire, race and capitalism (Nederveen Pieterse, 1989; Buhle, 1999); fought to keep immigrants out of the country—starting with the Chinese (Lyman, 2000) and other peoples of color but also working later to exclude those coming from Southern and Eastern Europe (Roediger, 2005); and has tried subsequently to maximize gains within this social order for union members.

As the U.S. expanded overseas—especially with the Spanish-American War that began in 1898—Gompers and the labor movement accepted the economic and political benefits of such expansion of U.S. power overseas (i.e., what is generally referred to as “imperialism”), although they virulently opposed annexation.

And the American Federation of Labor (AFL), led by Gompers, projected its model of trade unionism vigorously against opponents within the U.S. labor movement—whether competing labor organizations, such as the IWW (Industrial Workers of the World), or challengers within AFL unions themselves—and without. During and after World War I, having established its dedication to the established social order by supporting the U.S. Government’s positions and involvement in that War, this “vigorous promotion” also included acting in conjunction with—sometimes leading, sometimes following—the U.S. Government.

Three propositions are argued in this chapter. One, that the particular type of trade unionism chosen by the early leaders of the American Federation of Labor—today known as “business unionism”—meant that any foreign policy developed by labor would, by necessity, be imperialist since the AFL decided it would support the established, imperialist social order of the United States.²

Two, the AFL chose to go beyond mere acquiescence with imperialism (“passive” imperialism), and developed an aggressive foreign policy that was actively imperialist.³ The person central to the development of this active labor imperialism was Samuel Gompers—President of the AFL for thirty-seven of its first thirty-eight years—and to understand *how* the AFL foreign policy developed, it is necessary to understand Gompers’ political development. Understanding Gompers’ role and political development is important because the foreign policy developed under Gompers in the 19-teens and 1920s laid the groundwork for Labor’s foreign policy until 1995—with a pause until, and perhaps a short break after, 1997—and then the resumption of the actively imperialist foreign policy in the early twenty-first century.

And three, while the AFL/AFL-CIO foreign policy program has overwhelmingly supported that of the U.S. Government, this foreign policy is made within the labor movement and not by the U.S. Government, the Central Intelligence Agency, corporate interests or any other external factor. At the same time, however, Labor’s foreign policy program has been deliberately targeted for control by the foreign policy apparatus of the U.S. Government and to this conscious targeting, top-level labor foreign policy leaders have overwhelmingly—but not totally—acquiesced.

This chapter discusses forms of American trade unionism, examines the role of Samuel Gompers in its development and specifically in regard to foreign policy issues, and looks at three foreign policy issues addressed by the American Federation of Labor under Gompers—the Mexican Revolution and subsequent efforts to control labor throughout the Western Hemisphere, World War I, and the Russian Revolution and subsequent Soviet Government—to see if the claims can be substantiated by historical evidence.

Two Forms of American Trade Unionism

American trade unionism historically has featured both radical visions leading to revolutionary transformations of the social order (e.g., organizationally represented by the Industrial Workers of the World or IWW, and the Socialist Trades and Labor Alliance), and non-radical visions that, however critical, have still accepted the existing social order (the National Labor Union, the Knights of Labor, the American Federation of Labor, the Congress of Industrial Organizations and, of course, the AFL-CIO). Among the non-radical visions, there have been two forms of trade unionism: social justice unionism and business unionism,⁴ and sometimes there have been representatives of both forms of trade unionism in the same labor center (e.g., the CIO), although one has been dominant.⁵

Social justice unionism, while accepting the established political-economic-cultural social order, is marked by internal democracy and a willingness to challenge workers' position in the social order. It sees trade unions at the point of production-distribution-exchange as being the most organized sector of, and fighting for, all working people. While fighting for better wages, benefits and working conditions for workers, social justice unionism does not confine its understanding of trade unionism to just these "economistic conditions": it recognizes the need to confront oppression in the workplace, union and community. It sees the necessity for unions to join with those outside the unions to work together for the good of all. Struggles by the unions and their attendant gains are seen as benefiting all workers and their families, and not merely those of a privileged sector.

The other conception of unionism, the one under consideration here, is that of "trade unionism pure and simple," in Samuel Gompers' classic phrase, or "business unionism." It accepts the established social order, fighting only for whatever wages and benefits the market will bear.⁶ Business unionism is a specific product of craft unions within the American Federation of Labor (AFL),⁷ although the majority of industrial unions of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) later adopted it.

Business unionism's approach is to organize workers to fight for their own limited interests—separate from working people in general, and sometimes even opposed to their larger interests—regardless of the effects upon others. Hence, business unionism depends on the ability of unions to win their demands by themselves. As Marc Karson (1958: 65) has pointed out correctly, although writing about it in another context, "Concepts of working class loyalty and solidarity [are] as unfamiliar to many of these unions as they [are] in contradiction to the business union methods and philosophy they [follow]."

There are several problems with business unionism. Besides being isolated from the community and resources outside of the trade union movement, business unions also are dependent upon internal solidarity: their members must identify themselves primarily as "union workers" and act, as a whole, on that basis, if they are to have a chance to succeed. In addition, rank and file democracy is usually limited in their ranks—especially when members challenge their

“leaders”—and business unions do not generally educate their members.

“Worker consciousness” has developed most strongly among white, heterosexual, able-bodied males. It assumes all workers have the same psychological and political philosophy, and approach toward life. False in and of itself, what little connection with reality this assumption has breaks down as the union membership diverges from “white male worker” identification in this society and its attendant psychology.⁸ Women, people of color, gays and lesbians, and the disabled all have other relationships to societal members in addition to the fact that most of them work. This means each person has two or more primary self-identifications which sometimes compete internally; e.g., workers may think of themselves as “people of color” or “women who work only because they have to” rather than seeing themselves as “workers of color” or “women workers.”

These competing self-identifications are real, and they diminish the internal solidarity of the “white male” unions. Much of the racist, sexist, homophobic and anti-disabled exclusions by “white male” unions are based on fear of a breakdown of internal solidarity. To business unionism, this diminished solidarity is a threat to their very existence.⁹

In addition to having no real ties to the community broader than immediate family and friends—ironically, ties that do exist to the community are generally a result of the presence of people of color and women—and the requirement for “worker consciousness,” business unionism demands subservience by the rank and file. Efforts are made to discourage or even block rank and file activity until the leadership wants to use it to support their own efforts. It is paternalistic at best, dictatorial at worst, and the potential for corruption increases as it moves from paternalism to dictatorship.

Popular democracy¹⁰ doesn’t exist in any meaningful sense overall, and while there are some local unions that still have a vibrant internal popular democracy and active member participation, even this dissipates as one goes farther up the national/international union hierarchy. Elections for leaders are held periodically. However, like elections for political office in the larger society, choosing between candidates who have support from higher levels usually offers little real choice. Should an insurgent beat the odds and get elected, that person will probably be co-opted by the institutional limits under which any business union operates.

Regardless, any system that allows limited participation, and only in clearly defined periods, is not based on popular democracy. There is no national or international union in the AFL-CIO that actively encourages rank and file participation in union-wide decision-making, although some unions still have enough democracy remaining that union convention delegates can be mobilized to out-vote their top-level officials at times; but even then, implementation of successful “insurgent” convention resolutions is “iffy” at best.

A clear indication of this is the lack of education programs for members. While some unions train their shop stewards, almost none train their rank and file. The education that takes place is almost always confined to shop floor issues; it does not look at trade unions’ positions and activities within the context

of larger society. And it certainly doesn't consider alternatives to business unionism.

In short, business unionism accepts the existence of the established social order, which means it accepts the U.S. Empire and the continuation of a capitalist economic system (maintaining dominance over society and the unions), and replicates these relations of domination within the unions. A hierarchy exists within each business union with "leaders" on top and worker-members on the bottom; workers are dominated by the leadership and kept as powerless as possible, except when action is intended to support the plans or goals of the leaders. This domination is not always obvious, but it is pervasive. Worker-members do not set any policy or political agendas; at best, they get to choose between any two competing proposals, and usually they are only allowed to ratify or reject a single proposal on any subject. In fact, workers are told only what the leadership decides to tell them. It is a system designed to create a layer of "leadership" over the members, to discourage members' participation, and to maintain the leaders' domination (see Buhle, 1999).¹¹

It is within this context of business unionism, and especially white male business unionism, that the AFL-CIO's foreign operations are conceived and carried out.

American Business Unionism's Foreign Operations

There have been four distinct periods of American business unionism's foreign operations. The first period, to be examined here, involved the efforts of Samuel Gompers and his associates between 1886-1924. There was little or no activity on this front from Gompers' death in December 1924 until 1941. The second period, which began in 1941, focused initially against the fascists and then later the communists; this period extended until 1962 when its approach was deemed insufficient to meet the challenges of "subversion" in the Western Hemisphere. This third period, during the AFL-CIO presidency of George Meany and then continued in whole under Lane Kirkland, began in 1962 with the organization of AIFLD, the American Institute for Free Labor Development, to carry out AFL-CIO foreign operations in Latin America. AIFLD was followed by the African-American Labor Center (AALC) in Africa; the Asian-American Free Labor Institute (AAFLI) in Asia; and the Free Trade Union Institute (FTUI) in Europe: all four "institutes" initiating a much more focused and systematic approach to dominating foreign labor movements.¹² This period lasted until roughly October 1995. Beginning in October 1995, when John Sweeney won the first openly-contested presidential election under the AFL-CIO, Sweeney and his "New Voice" administration began taking a different and improved approach to foreign policy and accompanying operations.

Unfortunately, however, while the Sweeney administration's foreign policy program was seen as a qualitative improvement over the previous three periods (Scipes, 2000b), it was seen to have reverted to the "bad old days" no later than 2001, although probably earlier (Scipes, 2005b).

The focus on US labor's foreign policy program begins here with a focus on the first of the four periods. The importance of the first period is that it establishes the imperialist nature of business unions' foreign policy/operations.¹³

Jack Scott, in an extremely critical and well-documented book, claims that once the trade unions decided in favor of business unionism, which accepts the legitimacy of the established social order, then

Having chosen policies of class collaboration within the context of the established social order, the trades unionists had no option but to work for the stability and general welfare of the system, in order that they might improve their own economic situation by means of a share of the increased profits. Since the ruling class harboured aims of imperialist conquest from the very beginning (in fact imperialist expansion was necessary to the system), the policies they pursued situated the unions in the imperialist camp. It is not accidental, therefore, that the American unions boast an unblemished record of service in support of United States foreign policy. They have consistently sought to improve their own standards within the context of the system, at the expense of working people in other lands (Scott, 1978: 88).¹⁴

However, the question Scott does not satisfactorily answer, although he makes an attempt, is *why* union leaders chose business unionism as their philosophy: why would experienced trade unionists, a number of whom were veterans of the International Workingmen's Association and several who were close friends of Marx and Engels, choose to develop their unions in this manner?

The Development of Business Unionism and AFL Foreign Policy: Samuel Gompers, a Viewpoint

The development of business unionism was the conscious product by a number of white males from the skilled trades.¹⁵ These men tried to develop their organization based on their collective analysis of the situation they faced in the late 1800s-early 1900s. Their decisions had important political ramifications that continue today. One of these men was Samuel Gompers.¹⁶

While initially no more important than any of his colleagues, Gompers was elevated to being "first among equals" by his election as President of the American Federation of Labor. This position gave him unequalled opportunity to think about and develop the Federation. He traveled extensively, creating a wide network of allies, especially volunteer organizers, who played a key role in Gompers' operations. His lengthy term of office—serving for thirty-seven of the Federation's first thirty-eight years of existence—his general high level of energy and productivity, and physical longevity further gave him an institutional impact far in excess of his co-founders (Greene, 1998: 42-43).

Focusing on Gompers' activities and thinking gives an unparalleled viewpoint from which to observe the development of business unionism and particularly the AFL's foreign policy, the latter of which he was almost completely responsible. Gompers provided the practical leadership as well as the ideological

rationale for the AFL's political approach. As Scott wrote, "(H)e best personified and articulated the practice and philosophy of the organization during his long reign as president and official spokesman of the AFL" (Scott, 1978: 273, footnote 11). Gregg Andrews agrees, referring to work by Simeon Larson (1975) in Andrews' study on the AFL and the Mexican Revolution, and reports that Gompers used his control of AFL convention "machinery" such that he could place men whose politics with which he agreed on various convention committees—the results were clear: "Larson finds no instance in which a committee report or resolution on international affairs conflicted with Gompers' views" (Andrews, 1991: 13).¹⁷

Sam Gompers as a Trade Unionist

Although he started his early political life as a socialist, Gompers was at all times a trade unionist. The workers' cause was his church. Trade unionism was his philosophy and his politics.¹⁸ His trade as a cigar maker was a skilled one, and the overwhelming majority—if not all—of his union's members were white males. This defined his vision of trade unionism: Gompers' trade unionism was that of skilled, white male, craft-based trade unionism.¹⁹

His trade unionism was a product of the times. The last quarter of the nineteenth century and the first quarter of the twentieth century were a time of industrialization and intense growth of the industrial power of the United States.²⁰ Despite numerous economic "panics," it was a time of growing confidence and self-assurance among Americans in the power of the United States.²¹ Craft-based trade unionism became somewhat tolerated by the ruling elites—when it could establish itself—as its goal was merely to "smooth-off" the rough edges of capitalism instead of abolishing it, which some of the radical working class organizations such as Socialist Trades and Labor Alliance and the IWW demanded.

Gompers' position was made clear in an editorial he wrote shortly before his death:

The American Federation of Labor is at all times critical of our economic order, seeking always for improvement, for a larger measure of justice, a greater degree of perfection of functioning. But the AF of L stands squarely and unequivocally for the defense and maintenance of the existing order and for its development and improvement (Gompers, quoted in Reed, 1930: 20).

Gompers' politics changed as he grew older. While always a trade unionist, in his early years he was a trade union socialist. As the years progressed, he dropped the socialism and, despite his "radicalism" of trade unionism, became extremely conservative if not reactionary. What accounted for this change?

The Development of Gompers' Politics²²

Louis Reed, in his 1930 book, *The Philosophy of Samuel Gompers*, tried to trace the development of Gompers' politics. Reed believed that the key factor in Gompers' political development was the debate between followers of Karl Marx and Ferdinand Lassalle in the U.S. during 1873-74, over the best way to liberate the American working class. Both positions focused ultimately on economic solutions. Lassalle's followers felt the way forward was for workers to set up private, profit-making cooperatives and out perform the capitalists, enticing workers from capitalism to cooperativism. In order to get the funds necessary to establish these cooperatives, however, workers would have to engage in political action to seize control of the State apparatus. They could then provide these co-ops with low interest loans to get them started. Hence, the establishment of a labor party was the prime focus of the Lasalleans.

The Marxists, on the other hand, condensed Marx's ideas into a desire for economic betterment. They placed greatest reliance on the trade union movement. They saw trade unions as being the natural organization of the working class, and believed the greatest gains could be made in economic fights.²³ Gompers was one of the leaders of this grouping.

The debate became quite intense and had a strong impact upon Gompers:

The antagonisms of the conflict drove both sides to extremes. From merely assigning to the trade unions a subordinate role, the Lassalleans gradually took up a position of outright hostility to the trade unions. The Marxians on the other hand, at the beginning anxious to prevent the subordination of trade union activity to political activity, were gradually jockeyed out of this position, and as the Lassalleans ranged themselves in full hostility to the trade unions, so they ended by condemning political activity entirely (Reed, 1930: 67).

The Lasalleans denigrated the struggle for immediate gains as being distractions from the goal of abolishing wage slavery. The trade unionists claimed this was impossible, and focused everything on winning bread-and-butter propositions: "the trade union socialists lost their ultimate ideals, their socialism, and became trade unionists, pure and simple" (Reed, 1930: 67-68).²⁴

(Although Gompers' philosophy was expressed as "trade unionism, pure and simple," he and the Cigar Makers International Union were forced into the political arena around 1879, fighting for legislation to end competition from tenement house-manufactured cigars. The AFL became interested in political issues around 1893, as they were forced to fight for their right to organize on the shop floor. By 1906, the AFL was getting involved in specific political races, on the basis of "rewarding your friends and punishing your enemies."²⁵)

The conflict between the two groupings became more intense over the years.²⁶ The Lasalleans directly challenged Gompers several times. In one case, their Socialist Labor Party, without nominating a candidate of their own, urged workers not to vote for an established politician who had supported the Cigar Makers Union in its fight against home-made cigars, and whom Gompers was personally supporting. A much more threatening move was the establishment in

1896 of the Socialist Trades and Labor Alliance to oppose the AFL itself.

Gompers fought back. When several workers' organizations, including the Socialist Labor Party, formed a "Central Labor Federation" in New York City and applied for affiliation to the AFL, Gompers rejected the application. Because the AFL was solely an organization of trade unions, he argued—correctly it seems—the presence of an organization in the Central Labor Federation that was not a trade union disqualified it from membership in the American Federation of Labor (Foner, 1970).²⁷

There were two other reasons Gompers became opposed to socialism. The first was out of his direct experiences. The Cigar Makers Union in New York City was nearly destroyed over political conflict in the union.²⁸ Gompers saw "politics" as being the cause of the internal turmoil and felt it was divisive and disruptive to the union, and that anything beyond "wages and hours" should be excluded from union consideration.

Concurrently, the conception of "socialism" put forth by most socialists in the late 1800s was based on nationalizing industry. Gompers saw government control as a threat to workers and their ability to organize and strike.²⁹ Gompers felt workers should not be coerced into either striking or not striking, believing in an ideal of voluntary association as the basis of activity.³⁰

Nonetheless, by 1900, Samuel Gompers had become an enemy of socialism. Reed summarized Gompers' evolution:

Very early in his trade union career, Gompers had been a socialist. But by the eighties, his socialist creed had been relegated to the background, and by 1900 he had become intensely hostile to socialism. Having thus put away his socialist convictions as to the ultimate aim of the labor movement, Gompers replaced that aim with no alternative. It was not the aim of the American trade union movement, he averred, to displace the existing order, to get rid of private enterprise. Another ten cents an hour, another half-hour cut off the working day, better conditions, these immediate objectives, comprised the totality of his program (Reed, 1930: 16).

Understanding that Gompers' politics had evolved from trade union socialist to "business unionist"³¹—selling labor at the highest possible price, and forsaking control of industry for control of industry's labor³²—and all the time, fighting against the "forces of movement" within the organization itself (Nack, 1999), it is time to turn to Gompers' activities regarding international labor.

Gompers and International Labor

Gompers was an immigrant who, as a youngster, came from England during the American Civil War. He brought with him a sense that a larger world existed beyond the United States. *Reed claims that any interest within the AFL about foreign affairs was almost always initiated by Gompers or at his behalf* (emphasis added) (Reed, 1930: 150).³³

Reed claims that Gompers was against imperialism and militarism, and opposed the annexation of Hawaii and the Philippines (Reed, 1930: 151).³⁴ This is

the weakest section of Reed's book; and Jack Scott shows conclusively that this view is wrong. Gompers supported imperialism. He and the AFL supported the U.S. Government in the Spanish-American War and supported the economic and political domination of Cuba, Puerto Rico, Hawaii and the Philippines (Scott, 1978: 87-150).

Bernard Mandel agrees with Scott on this issue, detailing some of Gompers' positions on other situations:

[Gompers] was silent when [Theodore] Roosevelt "took the Panama Canal," when he established a protectorate over Santo Domingo and proclaimed his imperialistic corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. Gompers voiced no protest over Taft's "Dollar Diplomacy" in the Far East or his intervention in the affairs of Santo Domingo, Haiti and Nicaragua. He accepted imperialism as part of the American fabric, working only to improve the conditions of labor within that framework. Thus he extended pure and simple trade unionism from the United States to her colonial possessions (Mandel, 1963: 206).³⁵

Gregg Andrews, writing on developments a few years later, notes in his discussion of AFL intervention in the Mexican Revolution, that, in response to the discussion of the U.S. intervening to oppose the dictatorship of General Victoriano Huerta (February 1913-July 1914), Gompers opposed a resolution by George Berry of the Printing Pressman's Union. Berry's resolution opposed any armed intervention by the U.S. Government. Gompers, like President Wilson, "sought to replace Huerta with a government more acceptable to the United States," and worked to dilute Berry's resolution. Andrews comments,

What is revealing about Gompers' comments is the absence of any explanation of how intervention would serve the interests of the labor movement in the United States and Mexico. *His rationale spoke exclusively to American geopolitical interests* (emphasis added) (Andrews, 1991: 30-31).

Further, Andrews (1991: 11) reports that Gompers' "endorsed American economic expansion abroad," and even supported U.S. military intervention in Mexico, as in the case of Gompers' supporting the U.S. occupation of Vera Cruz in April 1914, and General Pershing's invasion in March 1916 in response to Francisco (Pancho) Villa's raid on Columbus, New Mexico (Andrews, 1991).

In short, Gompers supported US imperialism at least by the turn of the century. But what accounts for the historiographic confusion concerning Gompers' politics? Jack Scott gets to the heart of the controversy when he points out, based on the writings of Hobson and Lenin,³⁶

colonialism is a manifestation, but not the essence, of imperialist power. Economic control without actual acquisition of territory is an equally effective, and more desirable, form of expansion in the view of the imperialists. There is, therefore, a narrow view of imperialism as manifested in colonial possessions, and the broader view that sees economic control as a manifestation of imperialist power (Scott, 1978: 91).

In other words, yes, the AFL opposed annexation, but it did not oppose po-

litical and economic domination.

This analysis is complicated by Gompers' documented efforts regarding Mexico in criticizing U.S. corporate (such as in oil and mining) and financial (banking) interests, especially when they mistreated Mexican workers. He and other leaders of the AFL *did* do that: they were "Sympathetic with the struggles of Mexican workers against domestic and foreign reactionary forces." However, these leaders—and again, first and foremost, Gompers—"refused . . . to repudiate the right of investors to call on American troops to protect their holdings in Mexico" and Gompers "quietly endorsed the military interventions undertaken by President Wilson" (Andrews, 1991: 197).

Therefore, claims that the AFL opposed imperialism are correct only if the narrow—and incorrect—description of imperialism (i.e., colonialism = imperialism) is used. If the more encompassing and correct definition of imperialism is used, where political and economic domination are recognized as central forms of imperialism (see Nederveen Pieterse, 1989), then the AFL was imperialist,³⁷ and this emerged under the direct tutelage of Samuel Gompers. This imperialism has continued since then within the U.S. labor movement (specifically being continued after the merger into the AFL-CIO), and continues today.

Labor Imperialism: Why?

Again, why did Gompers and the AFL take this path? Reed argues, in the context of Gompers' turning from socialism to business unionism, that Gompers decided that the betterment of skilled, white male, unionized, American workers' lives was his most important goal, and that he was willing to do almost anything within his principles to achieve it (Reed, 1930: 69).³⁸

And that by 1899, Gompers publicly supported the existence of "trusts"—large corporations that had merged into even larger, new corporations that were monopolistic—even in the face of significant opposition to his position from within the AFL.

This support by Gompers was reciprocated at least somewhat by top-level leaders of the National Civic Federation (NCF). Shocked by Bill Haywood's speech at the IWW convention in 1907, where Haywood argued that unions should break any contract that they had earlier signed that required them to keep working in case of another union in the same firm going on strike (i.e., requiring that a union should "scab" on fellow workers), the Chair of the NCF's Executive Committee, Ralph Easley, wrote, "The developments in the Haywood and the Industrial Workers' scheme make it imperative and logical at the time for the employers in the United States to stand with the American Federation of Labor in the fight against socialism" (Albert and Palladino, eds., 1999: 245).³⁹

This mutually supportive relationship between Gompers and some of the largest capitalists in the country did not end at the turn of the century; in fact, it developed further, albeit with restrictions. In 1907, in "An Address Before the Chicago Conference on Trusts," after arguing, "clearly that the trust is the logical development of the present economic era," Gompers stated:

The workers of the country have pretty thoroughly mastered the broad economic truth that organization is the watchword of modern industry. *Labor concedes the right of organization among employers.* It is perfectly willing to deal with such associations, provided its own rights are not denied or invaded. To put it more strongly, provided its rights are recognized and conceded (emphasis added) (Gompers in Albert and Palladino, eds., 1999: 262).⁴⁰

In 1908, in a letter to Seth Low, President of the National Civic Federation, Gompers stated, "It is my purpose to be helpful to employers and businessmen, whether organized in corporations or associations, so that they may be enabled to conduct modern business within the law, that they may be not improperly hampered in their development" (Gompers in Albert and Palladino, eds., 1999: 321).⁴¹

Philip Foner summarized the situation:

In a larger sense, however, the policy of the A.F. of L. leadership was part and parcel of a program of class collaboration with monopoly capitalism under which they bought security for the skilled workers at the expense of the unskilled and unorganized workers. . . . These leaders were prepared to come to terms with the trusts—and indeed, to become prominent champions of the trusts—provided that their craft unions of skilled workers were allowed to exist in certain limited areas of the giant monopolies. In return, they agreed to do nothing to organize the vast majority of the workers employed by the trusts—the foreign born, [African American] and women workers (Foner, 1975b: 368).

Berger agrees with Foner, as Andrews notes:

Henry W. Berger emphasizes that Gompers, despite his opposition to colonialism, did not oppose the growth of an informal economic empire or the extension of non-colonial American influence abroad. *Gompers embraced the concept of manifest destiny* and argued that acceptance of the AFL as a partner in the industrial system would promote rather than hinder national greatness. According to Berger, the AFL's endorsement of an American economic empire facilitated the growth of a rudimentary consensus between 'imperialists' and 'anti-imperialists' after 1900 *and weakened American labor's opposition to corporate capitalism at home* (emphases added) (Andrews, 1991: 12).

Thus, acceptance of expansion overseas was combined with acquiescence of capitalism at home.⁴²

Gompers extended this perspective to cover the Federation's views on international affairs. He accepted political and economic domination of other countries, although he opposed direct annexation. Political and economic domination—imperialism—was desirable when it would protect access to natural resources and raw materials that were being imported into this country, or when it protected markets for American products, therefore providing jobs for American workers; or when it ended foreign competition, which threatened American workers' jobs; or when it extended the United States' military power on the world scene.

Thus, imperialism must be seen as other than a desire for annexation. An-

nexation, in fact, was not desirable because that would enable foreign workers in the annexed lands to compete with white male, American workers, threatening their jobs. This competition could be through workers immigrating and working for lower wages, or through the extension of U.S. tariff barriers to include these countries, so goods produced at cheaper costs could be imported tariff-free into the United States. Either way, Gompers' workers would suffer; hence, the AFL consistently opposed annexation.⁴³

One gets a clear picture from reading Gompers' letter to Thomas Reed, Speaker of the House of Representatives, on June 11, 1898 in response to a joint resolution for the U.S. to annex the Hawaiian Islands. Gompers wrote, after referring to the "wisdom" of the Chinese Exclusion Act, "The annexation of Hawaii would . . . obliterate that beneficent legislation and open wide our gates, which would threaten an inundation of Mongolians to overwhelm the free laborers of our country." He then tried to cover himself should Reed challenge him: "Though the number in Hawaii is small in comparison to the people of the United States, yet the dangers and the possibilities are such as to make the workers apprehensive" (Gompers in Kaufman, Albert, and Palladino, eds., 1991: 488).

This was not an accidental "slip of the tongue" by Gompers. Writing in the *American Federationist* in November of 1898, he wrote:

If the Philippines are annexed, what is to prevent the Chinese, the Negritos and the Malays coming to our country? How can we prevent the Chinese coolies from going to the Philippines and from there swarming into the United States, engulfing our people and our civilization? (Gompers in Kaufman, Albert, and Palladino, eds., 1996: 28).

And Gompers', and the labor movement's, position against Chinese immigration was so great that in 1904—after the expiration of the original Geary Act of 1882, and after the end of the 1902 Chinese Exclusion Act had been signaled because a treaty on which it was based would not be extended—they fought and got passed yet another bill to exclude the Chinese. This was even broader than earlier bills. The new bill not only excluded the Chinese from coming to the United States, or from any territories or possessions of the U.S., but it also excluded them from traveling from one group of Islands to another group of Islands under the possession of the U.S.: "In other words," wrote Gompers, "the American labor movement stands committed against the Chinese coming to our country or any possession of our country." And, consistent with that logic, Gompers opposed unionization of Chinese workers already in the United States (Gompers in Kaufman, Albert, and Palladino, eds., 1997: 285-286).

This anti-Chinese racism continued, but the scope was expanded. At the 1907 AFL convention in Norfolk, "The federation today placed itself on record as favoring the absolute exclusion of all immigration from Asia and the islands of the Pacific Ocean to the United States or its possessions." The convention also recommended "that the Chinese Exclusion Act be extended to the Japanese and Koreans" (Gompers in Albert and Palladino, eds., 1999: 267-268).⁴⁴

In a 1914 letter to Ellison D. Smith, Chairman of the U.S. Senate Immigration Committee, Gompers was unequivocal:

In the Western states, the nature of the immigration menaces our racial integrity—Oriental immigrants are of a race whose social, intellectual, moral and religious customs are absolutely foreign to those obtaining in the United States. Because of their lower standards and ideals, these Oriental workers undermine, menace and would ultimately destroy the high standards and ideals of American workers.

The protection of American workers against Oriental immigrant workers involved the larger question of race preservation. Therefore, the workers of the United States inaugurated, endorsed and furthered the American policy of exclusion of Oriental immigration (emphasis added) (Gompers in Albert and Palladino, eds., 2003: 100).

Again, we see these issues arise in examination of the AFL activities regarding Philippine independence between 1923-1935: "While the [labor center] had expressed some concern over the possibility of the importation of Philippine products coming into competition with products produced by American labor, its over-riding concern was the desire to restrict immigration" (Lawrence, 1966: 69). Frank Golay points out that during the 1920s, "organized labor was vocal in urging Congress to halt Filipino immigration to the United States and was willing to free the colony if this step was necessary to achieve that goal" (Golay, 1983: 134). Mandel sums this up succinctly: "Gompers' opposition to expansionism stood revealed as not fundamentally anti-imperialist, but based on opportunistic fears of threats to economic status, and as founded on a sense of racial superiority to conquered peoples" (Mandel, 1963: 203).

Val Lorwin points out the AFL's role on the issue of immigration:

On one international issue the labor movement took a strong stand—immigration. Out of the . . . desire to protect its standards against the competition of the millions of immigrants and potential immigrants from Europe and Asia, it worked for the ban on the import of contract labor, the exclusion of Orientals, and later for the restriction of European immigration. These campaigns succeeded in getting Congress to ban the importation of labor under contract (in 1885), to exclude Chinese (in 1882), and finally to close our great doors to all but a trickle of immigrants after World War I, in 1921 and 1924 (Lorwin, 1951: 145-46).

It is obvious that the anti-black, Latino, Oriental and unskilled worker practices of the AFL were domestic counterparts of this foreign policy. These policies were not unconscious or "oversights." Karson details AFL positions on immigration and its' and Gompers' racism against the Chinese, Japanese and African Americans (Karson, 1958: 136-141). Philip Foner, in one of his several chapters describing the relationship between the AFL and African American workers, stated, "Gompers, for all his eloquent pleas for unity of all workers regardless of race, color or national origin, was basically a bigot" (Foner, 1974: 75). Gompers bragged in his autobiography that the Federation of Organized Trades and Labor Unions in the United States of America and Canada—the immediate organizational predecessor to the AFL—was the first national organiza-

tion to demand Chinese exclusion from the U.S. when it did so at its founding convention in Pittsburgh in 1881 (Gompers, 1925/1967: 228). Sanford M. Lyman points out that "Gompers was perhaps the most important of the advocates of anti-Chinese exclusion and author of some of the most racist demagoguery presented during the anti-Chinese movement," and that "From the mid-1870s, Gompers would make opposition to Chinese immigration a central plank of his labor union platforms" (Lyman, 2000: 19).⁴⁵

Henry Berger ties together the AFL program:

From the beginning, the AFL viewed the international scene in terms of such narrow domestic bread-and-butter issues as overseas competition from cheap labor and cheap goods. Consequently, the Federation habitually endorsed measures that would protect it from competition, including immigration restriction, improved world-wide labor standards and, for much of its history, high tariffs on many items produced by constituent unions. But these goals were tied to an outlook which increasingly emphasized the virtues of business unionism, championed liberal capitalism, espoused a conservative trade union program, promoted the export of an AFL style of union, and resisted alternative labor ideologies (Berger, 1967: 80).⁴⁶

This was in tune with an expanding U.S. imperialism.

As the political-military-economic power of the United States expanded beyond its continental boundaries, its attention was primarily shifted southward to the Caribbean and Latin America. The ruling elites had developed a consensus that prioritized control over the Western Hemisphere. Gaining control over Cuba and Puerto Rico, resulting from the Spanish-American War, were important early steps. Building the Panama Canal and establishing military bases to protect the Canal, in that country and nearby, further advanced American control. Coupled with these operations was the expansion of American capital throughout the Hemisphere, and then, particularly toward Asia.

What did this mean for the AFL regarding international affairs? Scott points out the ramifications:

Having equated American commercial interests with the personal material interests of the skilled tradesmen who constituted the bulk of the organized labour movement in the country, union policy was necessarily dictated by the military and political commitments required for the security of those interests. In consequence of their commitment, unionists in the United States concentrated on the development of an "international" strategy designed to support and advance the ruling class policy of economic and political domination (Scott, 1978: 168).

In light of further development of U.S. imperialism, Gompers' activities at the end of the nineteenth century show him moving, cautiously at first but later without hesitation, from opposing annexation to accepting imperialism in all its forms. Concurrently, his support for big business was solidifying. By the end of 1899, Gompers had even quit *talking* publicly against imperialism.

A brief examination of the major foreign affairs debates in the U.S. around

the turn of the century illustrates Gompers' "evolution."

Gompers and the Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars

Large U.S. corporations began expanding overseas in earnest in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, seeking additional markets, while leading members of the ruling elites sought to replace European domination with American.⁴⁷ To protect overseas investments and, more importantly, to project military power around the world, the U.S. Government began a huge naval buildup. The U.S. began aggressively asserting its new power.

One of the first opportunities to assert this new power was in Cuba. Cuban revolutionaries had revolted against their Spanish colonizers. People throughout the United States were very sympathetic and supported the Cubans. The ruling elites capitalized on this support and forced Spain into a war even after Spain had accepted all of the United States' demands; the ruling elites used the popular furor supporting the revolutionary Cubans to seize Cuba and make it an American neo-colony.

Gompers' position on the war shifted from opposition to support. He spoke out eloquently against any possible war with Spain before the war. He recognized beforehand that the furor that had built up to support the Cubans could be used to provoke a war by the U.S. against Spain. Yet once war was declared, Gompers immediately supported it. Foner quotes him as claiming the war is "a glorious and righteous one as far as the United States is concerned" (Foner, 1975b: 414).⁴⁸

Similar to the Cuban struggle for independence, revolutionaries in the Philippines had liberated all of their country from Spain except for Manila. After Admiral Dewey's destruction of the Spanish "fleet" in Manila Bay in May 1898, the Spanish surrendered to the American military instead of to the Filipino revolutionaries.

Following these events, Spain ceded the Philippines to the U.S. for a price of \$20 million as part of the settlement of the war. A major protest movement developed throughout the United States, with the Boston-based New England Anti-Imperialist League providing much of the leadership, protesting the proposed annexation of the Philippines. (The annexation bill later passed the US Senate by one vote.)

Boone Schirmer, who studied the American resistance to the Philippine war, notes that Gompers joined the Anti-Imperialist League and was chosen as one of its numerous vice presidents, particularly in light of his having spoken out against war with Spain before it took place. Gompers did speak against the war with the Philippines before it started, and even signed his name to some public resolutions. However, Schirmer remarks that Gompers' anti-imperialism "had always been longer on declaration than in practice," and that even these declarations ended by December 1899 (Schirmer, 1972: 212).

Additionally, the Democratic presidential campaign of 1900 by William Jennings Bryan targeted the development of U.S. imperialism, correctly predict-

ing its detrimental impact on subjugated people everywhere—and particularly in the Philippines where the U.S. was waging a brutal war⁴⁹—while benefiting the wealthy and specifically harming the interests of farmers and workers in the United States. Schirmer points out that Bryan's 1900 campaign "exposed the 'secret springs' of modern United States foreign policy, insofar as these lay in the economic interests of the nation's big corporations and banks, in a manner and on a scale not done before, nor since" (Schirmer, 1972: 222-23).

Gompers refused to support Bryan's campaign and, instead, insisted on a policy of neutrality between the political parties. "The leadership of the organized labor movement failed to support the Bryan campaign in any decisive way," concluded Schirmer (p. 212).

But Schirmer went further:

Indicative of what lay behind Gompers' policies in 1900 was the position he had taken the previous fall at a Chicago conference on the trust problem. There the press reported that Gompers 'did not attack the trusts'. Instead, he condemned those who wished to legislate against them and urged trust magnates to be more friendly to organized labor. *It was this policy of conciliation with big business that influenced Gompers' withdrawal from the anti-imperialist struggle and his negative attitude to the Bryan campaign in 1900* (emphasis added) (Schirmer: 212).⁵⁰

Gompers and Three Major Foreign Policy Issues

Gompers and the AFL confronted three major foreign policy issues after the Spanish-American and U.S.-Philippine Wars: the Mexican Revolution and the subsequent attempt to establish the Pan-American Federation of Labor; World War I; and the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia.

Of these issues, ironically it was the AFL's position on World War I that had the least long-term effect on the organization. The AFL supported the war and got some temporary gains from it. For workers as a whole, for the men who fought the war and for the peoples of Europe, this was a critically important decision, but it really did not have a long-term effect on the AFL.

However, two ramifications of the war did have important long-term effects. An effort designed initially to stabilize revolutionary Mexico became transformed into an effort to force Mexico to renounce its neutrality and to join the war on the side of the Allies. Creating the Pan-American Federation of Labor (PAFL) was the AFL's first attempt to dominate other nations by controlling their labor movements, although it was designed supposedly to build international labor solidarity.

Another ramification of World War I was the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution in Russia.⁵¹ Revolutionaries in a relatively poor, backward nation, acting in the name of the working class, seized State power and began a concerted attack on the capitalist base of society. Additionally, they pulled Russia out of the war. This was the first successful assault on a capitalist-dominated State. This threat to capitalism, communism, would become the AFL's "bugaboo" from that time

until after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991.

With this understanding, a look at each of these issues is in order, beginning with Mexico. The situation in Mexico is examined in greatest detail because of the attention Gompers gave it during his life. World War I is briefly discussed. The situation in Russia, while having an important effect upon the Labor Movement from World War II onward, is only glanced at here—despite Gompers' intensive personal involvement in using his position to get the U.S. Government to combat the Bolsheviks, its impact on the labor movement was fairly minimal during Gompers' life.⁵²

Gompers and the Mexican Revolution

The Mexican Revolution of 1910 caused American capitalists, who had invested considerably in that country, much trepidation. The peasant-led uprising spread to the working class:

The 1910 revolution ushered in a phase of political change, popular mobilization, and plebeian optimism. . . . Though it had contributed little to the overthrow of Díaz, the urban working class at once began to display its "marked tendency to associate," taking advantage of the new, liberal political climate. Indeed, even before Díaz fell, working class mobilization was apparent; soon local, regional and national labour organizations were established . . . and strikes proliferated in all sectors of industry. The railways of Yucatán were struck, the factories of Chihuahua, Torreón, and Orizaba; the mines of Coahila, Sonora and San Luis; the smelters of Monterrey, Wadley and Aguascalientes; the docks at Veracruz, Tampico, Frontera, Puerto Mexico, Manzanillo, and Acapulco. As early as July 1911 it was observed in Durango, that "more strikes have taken place in the last two months than in all the history of the district." And though the grievances were almost invariably economic (hours, pay, conditions), it was abundantly clear that these strikes "would not have occurred except for the condition of political unrest" prevailing in the country (Knight, 1984: 72-73).

Along with being worried about the unrest in Mexico, the American ruling class (and Samuel Gompers) was concerned that the unrest could spread to the Mexicanos/Chicanos in the United States, and/or it would encourage the revolutionary syndicalism of the IWW (Industrial Workers of the World), which was especially strong among the miners of the Southwest, and/or it could spread throughout Latin America. None of these possibilities were desirable.

Obviously, American "leaders" desired an end to the turmoil. Finally, following Presidents Madero and Huerta—and with the encouragement of Gompers and the AFL—President Carranza responded to the workers' situation, and was able to gain their support. Carranza made a pact with the radical *Casa del Obrero Mundial* (House of the Workers of the World) labor center. In exchange for a promise to enact progressive labor legislation, *Casa del Obrero* raised six "Red Battalions" of workers who fought under their union banners, helping Carranza consolidate power in his struggle against the peasant revolutionaries, Emiliano Zapata and Francisco "Pancho" Villa (Lorwin, 1953; Andrews, 1991).

Gompers and World War I

During this time, the war clouds that had gathered in Europe broke. In 1914, Germany invaded Belgium, starting World War I.

Gompers, who considered himself a pacifist before the war, became an ardent supporter of the Allies by 1916.⁵³ He saw World War I as a war between “democracy and autocracy,” refusing to acknowledge it was between rival imperialist blocs.⁵⁴ He began devoting considerable efforts to fighting pacifism, a doctrine that he labeled “German propaganda.” And before the U.S. entered the war, President Wilson appointed him to the official Advisory Committee to the Council on National Defense; at that time, Gompers began helping to plan for American war production should the U.S. enter the war.

Once the U.S. entered the war on the side of the Allies in 1917, Gompers’ intensified his actions in support of the war. He devoted considerable time and energy to mobilize war production, sell War bonds and to keep “his” workers productive (Gompers, 1925/1967: 334-386, and Karson, 1958: 93-105).

Gompers also used his position and support of the War to win gains for the AFL. He pointed out to President Wilson the importance of maintaining labor standards while producing for the War; if the country wanted War production, then it had to treat its workers respectfully, especially those unionized defense workers.

President Wilson responded affirmatively. The railroads were nationalized. War Industry and War Labor Boards were set up to supervise production and working conditions. Union membership increased as the government forced industry to accept unionization when workers organized.⁵⁵

It was during this time that the AFL leadership-corporate-government alliance was first formalized.⁵⁶ The AFL leadership’s decision to support the war led to decisions to act as an agent for the government to counter anti-war agitation at home and abroad, and within its own ranks.⁵⁷

President Wilson needed an “independent” body, including labor, to build support for the war. The corporate leaders of the National Civic Federation formed the American Alliance for Labor and Democracy (AALD). Gompers was recruited to be its President, while the Alliance was funded and controlled by the Government. The AALD functioned as the labor subsidiary of the government’s propaganda bureau.⁵⁸ It successfully used its labor and pro-war “socialist” members to help neutralize opposition to the war. Since opposition was substantial, it performed a valuable service for the Wilson Administration (Radosh, 1969: 54-70; Larson, 1975: 153-161).

Gompers and the AFL served the government in foreign operations as well. In May 1917, the Soviets in Russia—before the Bolshevik Revolution—called for an international Socialist conference to be held in Stockholm to allow European workers to ascertain where they stood in relationship to the war; this would include workers from both sides of the conflict, allowing them to meet and confer. Gompers opposed this Conference, believing it would undermine the war effort. Working with his corporate and pro-war socialist allies, they provided President Wilson with sufficient justification to oppose the conference and ban

American participation in it. A number of European governments followed Wilson's lead and the conference never took place.

The AFL sent the "Frey Mission" to Europe during April-May 1918, after the mission was approved personally by President Wilson. Led by John Frey of the Molders Union, it was designed to encourage continued support of the war among European workers, and to argue against contact between Allied and enemy labor movements. The mission failed to convince Allied labor to adopt the AFL's positions, although it helped legitimize the Wilson Administration's foreign policy.

Gompers himself traveled to England, France and Italy during August-October 1918, for the same purpose. He also participated in the Inter-Allied Labor and Socialist Conference in London in September. Again, the AFL approach was rejected by European labor and, again, this labor effort benefited the Wilson Administration. The British, French and Italian governments also viewed Gompers' trip as beneficial (Radosh, 1969: 103-184).

Gompers, the Mexican Revolution, and the Pan-American Federation of Labor

The U.S. and Mexico took different approaches to the War. Before it entered the war, the U.S. was officially "neutral" but, in reality, the Wilson Administration supported the Allies. Gompers' attitude was typical of many: when it was pointed out to him that selling munitions to one side or the other was a breach of neutrality, he replied, "American workmen were not concerned with the destruction of the products they made, but that they were concerned only with the processes of production for which they were paid" (Gompers, 1925/1967: 337).

Mexico, on the other hand, maintained real neutrality. Its independence from the United States caused considerable concern in the U.S., especially when coupled with German agents' ability to reach the U.S.-Mexico border unhampered. At the same time, however, the Mexican government also refused to slavishly allow U.S. investment under any conditions, and its revolutionary nationalism was an irritant to U.S. leaders.

The failure of the U.S. government to blunt Mexico's revolutionary nationalism and the critical international situation encouraged corporate liberals and even 'not-so-liberal' officials to recognize the importance of labor-capital cooperation in foreign policy. As the United States declared war on Germany, policymakers counted on Gompers to ensure the support of American workers on the domestic front and involved him in efforts to prevent social revolutions abroad (Andrews, 1991: 72-73).

During these years, Gompers developed the idea of creating a Pan-American Federation of Labor (PAFL). Initially, this would include U.S. and Mexican unions, but was intended eventually to incorporate unions throughout Latin America. This was the first planned effort to dominate unions in other countries by the American labor movement.⁵⁹

There were probably many motivations for this move. Gompers was apparently concerned for Mexican workers he had met. More importantly, however, he desired to prevent Mexican immigration to the United States, which threatened American workers' jobs, by assisting workers in that country to organize and improve their standard of living. He wanted to undercut any possible support for Germany.⁶⁰ He wanted to counter syndicalist unions, while expanding the power and influence of the AFL, and wanted to demonstrate to the Europeans that he was a world labor leader. And undoubtedly, Gompers wanted a successful effort that would extend throughout Latin America, making the Hemisphere safe for American investment.

Several events led up to the founding of the PAFL. On July 3, 1916, a joint AFL-Mexican labor conference publicly announced there would be a more general American-Mexican labor conference taking place in the near future, and that this conference would lead to the establishment of the Pan-American Federation of Labor. In February 1917, the PAFL Conference Committee Manifesto was issued, outlining its view of "what should be the primary aims of the working people of all countries":

higher wages, shorter workdays, safe and sanitary working conditions, better homes, better surroundings, protection of children, prohibition of child labor, right of free speech, right of free press, and the right to strike (Snow, 1964: 23, 29).⁶¹

In July 1918, the Executive Committee of the AFL issued a call for the Conference to take place in Laredo, Texas during that November. However, the AFL immediately had problems raising the money to finance the Conference and to print a journal in both languages. Quoting Sinclair Snow's 1960 Ph.D. Dissertation from the University of Virginia entitled *Samuel Gompers and the Pan-American Federation of Labor*, Jack Scott shows that Gompers obtained \$50,000 from the U.S. Government to finance a journal promoting the Conference (Scott, 1978: 171-173).⁶²

Delegates gathered in Laredo on November 13, 1918, just two days after the end of the War. Santiago Iglesias spoke as both an AFL representative and as executive officer of the Conference planning body. He stated that he saw the organization supporting the policies of the AFL and that through the Mexican unions involved, "constructive trade unionism can gain the ascendancy in Latin America, thus saving the American trade union movement from a continuing battle at its back door with a most destructive and revolutionary labor movement" (Scott, 1978: 174).

The stated purpose was to unite national labor organizations of all countries of the Hemisphere under one umbrella organization. In reality, only the labor centers of countries economically, politically and geographically close to the United States affiliated; those more distant refused.

Actually, issues concerning Mexico received more attention than those of all the other countries combined. The reason for all of the attention on Mexico, as Andrews illustrates (1991: 72-91), was that the organization of the PAFL was part of the AFL's efforts to recreate the Mexican labor movement in the image

of the AFL; that these developments took place within the context of strained U.S.-Mexican relations over restricted foreign investment opportunities and Mexican refusal to get involved on the Allies side in World War I; and that Gompers was consciously acting to advance U.S. foreign policy objectives as defined by President Wilson.

The PAFL did achieve some successes outside of Mexico, although it wasn't necessarily the decisive factor in any situation in which it intervened. Nonetheless, the PAFL did make important contributions for workers by helping the Nicaraguan liberals achieve victory in the Presidential elections in 1924, by persuading the U.S. to terminate its military rule over the Dominican Republic, and by encouraging the U.S. to recognize the Obregon-led government and oppose the de la Huerta revolt in Mexico. The PAFL also worked in Mexico to elect Calles to the Presidency in 1924 (Snow, 1964: 74, 104, 147).

However, it achieved most of its success through the efforts and position of Samuel Gompers rather than its own efforts on the shop floor. Latin American workers would appeal to the PAFL for support which, when it supported the appeal, would have Gompers contact the relevant people within the U.S. Government. Gompers' power as President of the AFL, and not as President of the PAFL, was the reason recommendations were considered, delegates were received and, sometimes, actions were taken in support of the PAFL resolutions.

Yet, the benefits did not flow just one way. In 1922, Mexican workers made real the potential power of cross-border solidarity by supporting AFL-affiliated railway shopmen in their strike in the U.S., preventing scabs from taking strikers' jobs, demonstrating, calling support meetings and sending money to the American strikers. In Juarez, they held an amateur bullfight to raise money for strikers in El Paso. The Mexican railway union donated a thousand pesos. And railway paymasters on several lines, on orders from the union, "taxed" 35,000 union members two and a half pesos each for strike support (Snow, 1964: 114).

The PAFL had only limited success. It failed to unite workers throughout the Hemisphere. It was only active for ten to twelve years. And towards the end of its existence, the PAFL was challenged and surpassed by a more radical alternative labor organization, the CTAL (*Confederacion de Trabajadores de America Latina*).⁶³

Why was the PAFL unable to unite workers throughout the Hemisphere?

The decline and end of the PAFL were due to a number of causes, chief among which was an ideological difference between the leaders of the AFL and the trade unionists of Latin America. Gompers . . . had adopted the philosophy of co-existence of capital and labor. He had definitely rejected the idea of the destruction of capitalism and he had likewise rejected the idea of a labor party. This philosophy became the common property of AFL leaders during the time of Gompers and has persisted down to the present time; and since the future of the AFL is dependent upon the existence of capitalism, we find that the AFL has been one of the most bitter enemies of those persons and groups who have sought to destroy the free enterprise system. The Latin American trade unionists, on the other hand, tended to support the ideas of the radical left with the ultimate destruction of the capitalist order as their basic objective. This irrecon-

cilable ideological difference was among the reasons why the national labor organizations of Argentina, Chile and Uruguay did not affiliate with the PAFL.

Closely linked to this ideological difference was the fear of . . . the domination of the Latin American trade union movement by organized labor in the United States, specifically the AFL. To many Latin Americans, the PAFL was little more than an arm of the United States government, a view that had been fostered by the moral and financial support given the organization at its inception.

But perhaps most importantly of all was the inability of the PAFL throughout its history to recognize that times were changing and that the radicalism of the Latins was deeply ingrained. The Pan-American Federation of Labor was based on concepts which had made of the American Federation of Labor a powerful weapon in the conflict between capital and labor in the United States during the decades between the 1880s and World War I. But in a new era and in a Latin American environment, an organization based on these concepts could not endure (Snow, 1964: 148-150).

Gompers and the Bolshevik Revolution

Gompers played an important role in determining the U.S. Government's position on the Soviet Union. He supported the first Russian Revolution in February 1917, which overthrew the Czar and established a bourgeois democratic government. Gompers' support was based on the fact that the Kerensky government kept Russia in the war on the side of the Allies.⁶⁴ The Bolshevik takeover in October 1917 was quite another thing: the Bolsheviks pulled Russia out of the war. To Gompers, this was a mortal sin.⁶⁵ The fact that the Bolsheviks came from the same background as the socialists he had been fighting in the United States made his opposition even more adamant. Gompers opposed the Bolsheviks and opposed diplomatic recognition of the Soviet Union (Nack, 1999).⁶⁶

Gompers' anti-Sovietism initially had little impact on the AFL.⁶⁷ However, when challenged by the CIO during the 1930s, whose grass-roots organizers were strongly influenced by the Communist Party of the USA and the Soviet Union,⁶⁸ these policies became much more important. Near the end of World War II, the AFL began concentrating its foreign policy against the Soviets, justifying its support for dictators and other undesirables as being efforts to stop the Communists from their goal of "world domination." The "Cold War," which began in the late 1940s, made this the policy of almost all U.S. trade unions. This is developed in the next chapter.

Synopsis

Gompers' evolution from socialist to business unionist provides an example of one labor leader moving from challenging the existing social order to accepting it. As his institutional position became more secure, his confidence grew, as did his relationships with government and corporate leaders. Along with this, AFL foreign policy—which Gompers initiated and directed—moved from passively accepting U.S. imperialism to aggressively initiating and carrying out its own

foreign operations for its own institutional purposes.

And through examining Gompers' "development," we can see that this foreign policy and its shift from passive to aggressive imperialism was a result of factors *internal* to the labor movement and not from outside sources.

Conclusion

The AFL-CIO's foreign policy originated with Samuel Gompers and the American Federation of Labor. Based on a philosophy of business unionism—resulting in a type of trade unionism that accepts the domination of society by corporate power; that organizes worker-members to fight for their limited interests instead of those of all working people; that is isolated from the community and resources outside of the trade union movement; and that keeps its members subordinated and does not educate them—this imperialist foreign policy "evolved" from being passive to aggressive, being the product of specific decisions made by Gompers and his allies.

Contrary to numerous assertions by its critics, AFL-CIO foreign policy is not developed by the U.S. Government, the CIA, or by corporate interests. The AFL-CIO has a lengthy and well-documented foreign policy. It is based on the principles of (1) protecting American union members' jobs from foreign competition while maintaining or expanding the labor center's power within society, and (2) expanding the political and economic power of the U.S. Empire throughout the world. This foreign policy is made from within the labor center and, in fact, at a very high level.⁶⁹ This foreign policy is designed to further strengthen the U.S. Empire from the perspective of Labor. As such, while generally following the U.S. Government's foreign policies, at times there has been extensive variation.⁷⁰

Close ties do exist between the U.S. Government and the AFL-CIO's foreign policy leadership. Despite Labor's organizational independence, the U.S. Government has found the labor center such a dependable ally that it has funneled millions of dollars to Labor to help fund its foreign operations, as is developed below. Labor has participated in government foreign policy operations, beginning with the Root Commission to Russia, legitimizing the government's foreign policy. There have been CIA operatives working within the labor movement,⁷¹ with at least acquiescence from top leadership if not approval, whose influence is certainly not fully known to those outside of top leadership but it appears that their role is operations not policy.

This foreign policy program has gone beyond supporting this or that practice of the U.S. Government. It has included active intervention in other countries' labor movements for the purposes of controlling them and/or the governments of those countries. These operations began with the Pan-American Federation of Labor under Gompers, and continue to date.

Clarifying these issues has important theoretical and political implications. The foreign policy of the AFL-CIO is confirmed as actively imperialist and is an internal product of the AFL-CIO; it is an aggressively imperialist foreign policy

that is the result of an on-going number of conscious political choices. Although generally aligned with corporate interests and the U.S. Government, and a recipient of large amounts of money from the government, *AFL-CIO foreign policy is created, carried out and controlled by the AFL-CIO*. Therefore, at times, the foreign policy of the AFL-CIO will vary substantially from that of the U.S. Government, while continuing to project U.S. political and economic domination over the peoples of the world.

However, if labor activists are going to confront the global power of capital and the U.S. Government, building international labor solidarity must be an integral part of our strategy.⁷² But we cannot urge labor solidarity with workers on one hand and allow the AFL-CIO to carry out its aggressive foreign policy on the other. We must organize against both the AFL-CIO's foreign policy and its operational institutes *and* the philosophy of business unionism that underlies them.⁷³ From the position of opposing the AFL-CIO's imperialism, we can then seek solidarity comradely with other workers.

Solidarity forever, domination never!

Chapter 2

One Hundred Years of Reaction: From Gompers to Sweeney

The preceding chapter focuses on the development of labor imperialism under AFL President Samuel Gompers. It is necessary to understand for historical accuracy, but to also recognize that Labor's foreign operations began long before they are often said to have begun—supposedly during the late 1940s, in response to challenges from the Soviet Empire. The reality is that American labor imperialism began *before* the Bolshevik Revolution and the new Soviet state, although Gompers did all he could to counter the efforts of Lenin and the Bolsheviks, who arguably were fighting for the well-being of Russian workers, at least initially. Accordingly, we have to end acceptance of this “Communist menace” as justification for American labor imperialism: it is argued that “communism” is a bogus issue, designed only to distract people from understanding what has really taken place.

However, even if this argument is correct—that the “Communist menace” threat as an initial justification for American labor imperialism was bogus—what about cases, such as Italy right after World War II, where there *was* a large Communist Party that had mass support by workers? To consider this, we have to first discuss the use of “communism” in the U.S. labor movement.

The fear of “communism” by labor leaders—beginning with Gompers, and then of subsequent AFL/AFL-CIO leaders¹—has been based on these labor leaders' ideology, and not some rational evaluation of what really was taking place (see also Sims, 1992: 16-18). In other words, these labor officials have tended to believe automatically that anyone who would challenge the status quo (and most especially, capitalism) and sought to fight for the well-being of workers—especially if they took a broader and more militant approach than that of AFL/AFL-CIO leaders—was a communist; these labor officials did it here in the United States, especially in response to the CIO (see Rosswurm, ed., 1992; Lipsitz, 1994; Stepan-Norris and Zeitlin, 2003), and they have done it all around the world, particularly in the so-called “developing countries” of Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Middle East. It has not mattered if that person was a member of a communist party or just a militant trade unionist: a broader vision, militancy, and especially willingness to engage in more than negotiations for collective

bargaining agreements, have been long seen as signs of the communists.

Labor leaders' ideology contained certain assumptions, also false; two have been particularly pernicious. AFL/AFL-CIO leaders have assumed that any time a "communist" got placed into a union's political leadership, it was because they had been imposed on workers from without by the Communist Party of the U.S.A. and/or the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and, therefore, they would follow Moscow's orders unquestionably. AFL/AFL-CIO leaders have never been willing to recognize that workers might vote for this candidate or that based on what s/he had done to date in the union and/or promised to do once elected (see especially Stepan-Norris and Zeitlin, 2003). And in any case where it was shown that workers democratically elected known members of a Communist Party to office—in the U.S. or overseas—it has been assumed that those leaders could automatically demand complete compliance from their members, and get it unequivocally. This has never been the case (see particularly Storch, 2007).

Thus, the fear of "communism," in reality, has been used against anyone or any project that might get out of labor leaders' control. This is different than what has been claimed: labor leaders have claimed that members of a competing political system were trying to impose their control undemocratically upon workers; that, if successful, they would force workers to do whatever these competing political system leaders demanded; and, therefore, they were a threat to the workers' lives, liberty and pursuit of happiness—and that AFL/AFL-CIO leaders were there to ensure that this was not allowed to happen. The reality has been that AFL/AFL-CIO leaders used this "thing," this amorphous threat called "communism," as a tool to ensure *their* continued control over "their" labor organizations and "their" members—and they did this by training their workers to stop thinking once the words "communism" or "communist" were mentioned.² And a key tactic to undercut labor dissidents and activists has been to label them as "communists," and therefore discredit them, no matter how valuable their efforts.

In other words—and we will see this again in the future—efforts to ensure social control in the unions have often *preceded* efforts by the U.S. Government, basically showing the government "how to do it": we have seen this in the United States, and we have seen it overseas (see also Sims, 1992: 42).

Consider what happened in Italy during and after World War II. As Ronald Filipelli (1989) discusses in great detail, American labor policy as carried out by the AFL in Italy was more anti-Communist than that of the U.S. Government from 1943 to the winter of 1946-47, when the U.S. Government shifted toward "hard-line anti-communism." Once this happened, "Italians of all factions understood that AFL policy and U.S. government policy . . . were one and the same" (Filipelli, 1989: 211).

And in evaluating the case of U.S. Labor intervention in Italy, Filipelli writes:

Lovestone, Brown, Meany, Dubinsky, and Woll [leaders of the AFL foreign policy program-KS] . . . had no time for subtle ideological and theoretical grad-

uations that centuries of Italian political tradition had produced. This has always been the flaw in the AFL and State Department labor policy. It had never been based on the realities of Italy, on what was best for Italy in terms of her political and social culture. Instead, solutions in Italy, as well as elsewhere, had to be forced into the apocalyptic context of the Cold War. Such an attempt was doomed to fail. What resulted were unions neither free of domination by political parties, nor strong enough to protect the interests of their members (Filipelli, 1989: 217-218).

In other words, by putting their (mostly personal) interests before those of any workers, U.S. labor leaders have betrayed workers in Italy as well as around the world, as will be shown in this chapter. It has been arrogant, paternalistic and detrimental to workers everywhere, ultimately including those in the United States (see also Sims, 1992).

Where we can better see this is by examining the politics of George Meany, Secretary-Treasurer of the AFL between 1939-52, and who served as the President of the AFL and then as President of the AFL-CIO from 1952 until his death in 1979. Meany played such a large role in the development of the AFL and then the AFL-CIO, but nowhere more than in international affairs: "international affairs stands as the first AFL program that bore the exclusive brand of George Meany" (Goulden, 1972: 137).³ In his biography of Meany, Joseph C. Goulden discussed Meany's approach:

Meany detested the Communists. They were an anathema to him as a trade unionist and a Catholic. Meany said that American workers should recognize Soviet labor "for what it is—a government-controlled, government-fostered, and government-dominated labor front that denies the workers of Soviet Russia the basic human freedoms that Americans hold are prerequisite to a free trade union." This tenet is crucial to understanding Meany's unflinching anticommunism. A nation is not free unless its trade unions are free—such is Meany's litmus test, and Communist regimes fail it (Goulden, 1972: 122).

If Meany had held that position in all cases—a nation is not free unless its trade unions are free—then his actions would certainly have been understandable, defensible, and probably supportable, at least in most cases. However, as demonstrated in numerous studies as well as herein, *Meany only applied that standard to those countries who opposed U.S. foreign policy*; he did not follow it regarding dictators who supported U.S. foreign policy: Meany supported the regimes in South Korea (after 1948), Iran (after 1953), Guatemala (after 1954), Brazil (after 1964), of Suharto of Indonesia (after 1965), of Marcos in the Philippines (after 1972), and of Pinochet in Chile (after 1973). Each of these regimes was unquestionably a dictatorship, and each had committed mass murder—between five hundred thousand to a million people were killed in Indonesia during the coup that ended with Suharto in power—and/or gross human rights violations upon thousands and thousands of workers and other citizens during their rule. Meany also supported apartheid South Africa throughout his presidency.

Additionally, as Serafino Romualdi (1967) points out in his autobiography,

discussing his work for the AFL and the AFL-CIO in Latin America, there were a number of dictatorships in the region that the AFL-CIO might have complained about and maybe even made a formal protest about to international organizations such as the International Labor Organization of the United Nations, but who were otherwise tolerated—perhaps most egregious was AFL/AFL-CIO tolerance of dictatorships in Haiti and the Dominican Republic (Romualdi, 1967: 360-404). Further, as documented below, the AFL, and then the AFL-CIO under Meany's leadership, helped lay the groundwork to overthrow democratically-elected regimes in Guatemala (1954), Brazil (1964) and Chile (1973).

It is particularly interesting to compare AFL/AFL-CIO restraint with the military dictatorship established in Venezuela during 1948 and which continued until 1958—which dissolved the Confederation of Labor (CTV); engaged in mass, long-term imprisonment of trade unionists and other citizens without trials; and utilized extensive torture and considerable assassination, all of which was known at the time (Romualdi, 1967: 443-485)—to the vehement attacks against these democratically-elected regimes in Guatemala, Brazil and Chile, none of which practiced such human rights violations as official policy and, in fact, each promoted the well-being of workers and their unions.

In short, the anti-communism of U.S. labor leaders has *not* been a principled political position, but one to be used against opponents who disagree with the labor leaders' take on how the United States Government and its related foreign policy should operate in the world. U.S. Labor's foreign policy leadership's position can basically be summed up as: the U.S. *should* run the world, regardless of cost; that the U.S.'s "free market" capitalist economic system is the best known form of economic organization possible in the world; and that Labor knows better than anyone else—because it is rooted in the mode of production—how to make this global Empire work. However, because it lacks the resources to carry out this global foreign policy, Labor has been willing to work—at times closely, at other times less so—with the U.S. Government and multinational corporate leaders. But at all times, Labor's foreign policy leadership has run Labor's foreign policy, not the CIA,⁴ not the U.S. Government, not anyone else.⁵

With this understanding comes a shift in focus. Although this book is very historically-based, this account shifts to a sociological perspective; in other words, rather than try to give a blow-by-blow account of the development of American labor imperialism, three types of foreign policy interventions in which the AFL-CIO has engaged have been identified and are focused upon, with one particular example of each being delved into in considerable detail.

Beginning with a "Historical Overview," this chapter then focuses on the AFL-CIO's three types of foreign policy interventions: (1) direct efforts to help undermine democratically-elected governments that have led to military coups; (2) support for reactionary governments and attacks by their affiliated labor movements on progressive workers and their organizations seeking democratic change; and (3) indirect operations with local labor movements to attack progressive, pro-labor governments. These three types of interventions are substantiated by case studies of AFL-CIO operations in Chile (early 1970s), the Philippines (late 1980s-early 1990s) and Venezuela (early 2000s), respectively.

Historical Overview

Although most of Labor's foreign efforts ended with the death of Samuel Gompers in December 1924, they were revived during World War II.

Foreign Operations Under George Meany and Lane Kirkland (1941-1995)

The AFL was particularly active within labor circles in Europe, initially against the Nazis but shortly retargeting Communists, who had been leading forces in the various resistance movements against the Nazis. By 1944, the AFL had established the Free Trade Union Committee,⁶ "to take an aggressive and direct part in reviving the free trade union movement" (quoted in Lodge, 1962: 78); the "free trade union movement" was opposed to Communist-led labor efforts. This "retargeting" took place before the war's end, while the U.S. was still allied with the Soviet Union against Hitler's Germany.⁷

After World War II, during what later became known as the "Cold War," AFL operatives engaged in efforts to undermine Communist electoral efforts in France and Italy in 1947-48 (for France, see Godson, 1974;⁸ for Italy, see Filippelli, 1989), and then in long-term efforts to advance U.S. interests against the Soviet Union on the continent (see Maas, 1986), as well as elsewhere around the world (Langley, 1972; Lens, 1972; Busch, 1983).

Buhle (1999: 136-143) provides another account of AFL operations in Europe during and after World War II that supports these allegations. Buhle quotes from page 91 of Peter Weiler's 1988 book, *British Labour and the Cold War* (Stanford University):

In the years following the war, the AFL expended large sums of money and much energy playing a substantial role in the eventual division of the French, Italian, German and Greek trade union movements. Irving Brown then boasted in late 1947 that "our trade union programs and relations have penetrated every country of Europe. We have become . . . an army . . . a world force in conflict with a world organization in every field affecting international labor as well as American labor" (quoted in Buhle, 1999: 281, f.n. 75).

These efforts were funded through the U.S. Government's Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) (Braden, 1967; Langley, 1972; Lens, 1972; Busch, 1983; Filippelli, 1989; Carew, 1998; Hughes, 2001),⁹ and included involvement in the drug trade, including the notorious "French Connection," when the CIA cut off funding (Carew, 1998; Valentine, 1999).

AFL operations in Latin America were revived after World War II. Initially, they worked through ORIT¹⁰—the Latin American regional organization of the anti-Communist International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) that the AFL helped establish in 1949 (Romualdi, 1967; also Goulden, 1972: 133-134)—and helped overthrow the democratically-elected government in Guatemala in 1954 (Romualdi, 1967: 240-246; Goulden, 1972: 223-225; Busch, 1983:

144-148; Buhle, 1999: 143-145).¹¹

After the successful Cuban Revolution, however, the successor AFL-CIO decided that ORIT was not sufficiently responsive to U.S. desires, and began its own Latin American operation in 1960 (Spalding, 1984: 143), with what became known as the American Institute for Free Labor Development or AIFLD (see Busch, 1983: 158-180). AIFLD became operational in 1962; its purpose as to allow the AFL-CIO to be able to better respond to "challenges" within the region.

AIFLD was a labor-government-corporate operation,¹² joining the AFL-CIO with some of the leading corporate investors in Latin America, including the Rockefeller interests and the Grace Corporation. "The AIFLD is a non-profit institute administered by the AFL-CIO, but backed as well by 60 US business firms, and the U.S. government, which finances or guarantees about 80 percent of its program" (Kurzman, 1966: 22).¹³

AIFLD, in turn, was then incorporated into President John F. Kennedy's Alliance for Progress program, "becoming the organizational basis for American labor's participation in the Alliance" (AIFLD, 1987: 2). But what was AIFLD's allure to the US government? "The AIFLD holds a key position within the U.S. foreign policy team because it alone directly treats labour and the working class" (Spalding, 1984: 157; see also Sims, 1992: 44-46).

This was the beginning of intensified AFL-CIO approaches to social struggles particularly in the "third world," although their efforts were not confined simply to those regions of the world.¹⁴ Because of the pivotal role played by AIFLD—AIFLD was the first of four international "institutes" established around the world—it is worth understanding its purpose in some detail.

George C. Lodge (1966), taking a perspective that it was desirable to undercut any social struggle that might challenge U.S. interests in the region, discussed the importance of workers' organizations as agents of change in Latin America, and how U.S. Labor could position itself most usefully—i.e., against Communist-led revolution.¹⁵ Positioning himself as an advocate of a "positive" revolution, Lodge saw Latin American trade unions as "creators of new political, social and economic systems" (182), with their "political and social functions . . . substantially more important than . . . economic" (183), and serving as "first lines of defense against [international Communism] and other totalitarian forces" (183). He saw "Control of these organizations by democratic leaders is a key factor in hemispheric development" (184). Finally, he discussed the role of the U.S. labor movement in Latin America:

The contribution made by the American labor movement since the end of World War II to establishing strong, effective responsible worker organizations in Latin America has been enormous. Great credit for this farsighted and creative effort belongs to Sarafino Romualdi and, more recently, Andrew McLellan and William Doherty, Jr. The foundation of the American Institute for Free Labor Development by American labor and management . . . indicates the true nature of our economic system by which management and labor work together to resolve problems rather than become irrevocably involved in struggle. It also offers a way in which funds of management, labor and government can be

made available for social action by labor organizations in Latin America (Lodge, 1966: 196).¹⁶

This dovetails with what has been written by Serafino Romualdi (1967), in what has been the most detailed inside account of AFL and then AFL-CIO operations in Latin America to date. Romualdi served as the AFL and then AFL-CIO representative for Latin America from 1946 to 1962, and then served as the Executive Director of the AFL-CIO's American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD) from March 1962 until his retirement in Fall of 1965. Romualdi writes in the Preface of his book,

The main purpose of this book is to highlight the activities and achievements of the United States labor movement in combating the attempts of Communists and other totalitarian forces to gain control of organized labor in Latin America since 1946. . . . It is a personal and first hand account of the objectives and accomplishments over a twenty-year period of struggle: to help the wage earners of Latin America to raise their living standards by assisting in the organization of stable and strong unions; to strengthen the cause of freedom and representative democracy; to combat and defeat Communist and other totalitarian movements; and above all, to assist in the development of a new type of Latin American labor leader who would reject the stale concept of class struggle in favor of constructive labor-management relations in a democratic, pluralistic society (Romualdi, 1967: vii).¹⁷

How was this actually carried out? "AIFLD's greatest effort is in education. To date, 469,067 trade unionists have studied comparative economic systems, union leadership, collective bargaining and theories of democracy under AIFLD teachers in 17 Latin American countries," and AIFLD has also "brought more than 4,000 labor leaders to the George Meany Center for Labor Studies in Silver Spring, Md" (Robinson, 1985: 144). Clearly, AIFLD has been trying to get Latin American labor leaders to accept its view of the world.¹⁸

William Bollinger, however, suggests another interpretation of developments after the Cuban Revolution:

This victory for the socialist forces in Latin America led the AFL-CIO to create a new organization for influencing the labor movements in Latin America—one which could be directly run with the cooperation and funding of the U.S. State Department.

As a result, the AFL-CIO established . . . (AIFLD) in 1962, as the labor affiliate of the Kennedy Administration's Alliance for Progress in Latin America. The Alliance had two aspects. It promised reforms and funds for development in order to give the Latin American masses some minimal relief from their oppression and some hope that the system that supported U.S. economic interests would not have to be overthrown by revolution, as in Cuba. But for those who insisted on revolution, the Alliance also developed extensive counterinsurgency programs.

AIFLD was similar in conception to the Alliance for Progress. On the one hand, it pressed local governments to revise their labor codes and permit the operation of "free" (pro-U.S.) labor unions. But if a radical or pro-socialist

government came to power in Latin America, AIFLD would cooperate with U.S. government agencies to overthrow it and then “clean up” the situation after a coup (Bollinger, 1984: 7-8).¹⁹

Unfortunately for the workers of Latin America, Bollinger’s analysis was the more accurate. As Dan Kurzman wrote, in reference to the AFL-CIO’s reluctance to promote genuinely profound social change, “It is a policy, naturally, that lends itself to the support of dictatorships in the name of anti-Communism, so long as the AFL-CIO is given a free hand in the ‘guidance’ of local unions” (Kurzman, 1966: 20). Hobart Spalding goes even further: “In truth, the AFL-CIO and AIFLD have consistently supported right-wing and fiercely anti-leftist administrations and military governments no matter what their policy toward labour” (Spalding, 1984: 140; see Hirsch, 1974).

Former CIA agent Philip Agee, in the greatest exposure of Central Intelligence Agency operations in Latin America from the inside, goes even further: he claims that U.S. Labor operations in Latin America are under the control of the CIA (Agee, 1975: 68-71). He discusses a “labor operations course” he had to take during his Foreign Service training:

Overall, the course emphasized that Agency labor operations must seek to develop trade unions in underdeveloped countries that will focus on economic issues and stay away from politics and the ideology of class struggle. This is the Gompers tradition of American trade unionism which, when promoted in poor countries, should raise labor costs and thereby diminish the effect that imports from low-cost labor areas have on employment in the U.S. (Agee, 1975: 131).

Additionally, Agee claims that AIFLD itself was “a CIA-controlled labour center” (Agee, 1975: 620)—for more details, see pp. 244-246—and that Romualdi himself was “AFL representative for Latin America and principal CIA agent for labor operations in Latin America” (Agee, 1975: 641).

Whether Romualdi worked for the Agency or not is, in this author’s opinion, basically irrelevant. As Romualdi (1967: 20-30) admits, he worked with the OSS (Office of Strategic Services) during World War II, and the OSS was the organizational predecessor to the CIA. Romualdi certainly carried out AFL-CIO foreign policy in Latin America, which was parallel to that of the U.S. Government and the CIA.

Yet how was AIFLD funded? Serafino Romualdi states that AIFLD was able to get started, “thanks for help from Secretary of Labor Arthur J. Goldberg,” who was able to get a \$100,000 advance from President Kennedy’s “President’s Emergency Fund,” and which “Secretary Goldberg delivered to me in person” (Romualdi, 1967: 420-421). George Meany’s biographer, Joseph Goulden, discussed this issue:

The American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD), the AFL-CIO’s chief operating arm in Latin America, drew most of its funding during the 1960s from AID—ranging from sixty-two percent in 1962 to ninety-two percent in 1967. Much of AIFLD’s work paralleled activities in which the CIA had a strong interest. But Meany insisted firmly, both in public statements and pri-

vate conversations, that AIFLD received “not . . . one cent from the CIA.”

Several AFL-CIO affiliates were not so discriminating. Between 1958 and 1964, the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), the American Newspaper Guild, and the International Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers used CIA money for international purposes. Two CIA agents ran AFSCME’s international affairs department, and spent thousands of dollars supporting a strike that helped topple Cheddi Jagan, the premier of British Guiana. . . . The Newspaper Guild used its money to run seminars and training programs; the chemical workers to provide logistical support for unions of Latin refinery workers. The funds went to the unions through bogus “philanthropic foundations,” which the CIA created especially for use as conduits for covert funding. Meany insisted, however, that these activities should not be confused with those of the AFL-CIO or the AIFLD (Goulden, 1972: 328-329; see also Langley, 1972; Lens, 1972, Busch, 1983).²⁰

In addition to everything else they did, AIFLD helped lay the groundwork to overthrow democratically-elected governments in Brazil (1964) and Chile (1973) by their respective militaries, while also intervening in British Guiana (now Guyana) in 1963, the Dominican Republic in 1965, and Trinidad and Tobago, West Indies, in 1971.²¹ In the 1980s, AIFLD was also active in El Salvador,²² Guatemala (Slaughter, 1986); Nicaragua (Sklar, 1989);²³ and Central America as a whole.²⁴

As Gary Busch (1983: 162) writes, “The fact remains that AIFLD mounted a campaign with the U.S. government in Latin America designed to strengthen anti-communist forces and to weaken or destroy union and political forces opposed to U.S. foreign policy.” The larger problem, however, was that by AIFLD or the U.S. Government deciding who was or was not a “communist,” they were defending their own interests, and not those of workers in these countries, which they have consistently said they were doing.

The ramifications were considerable:

To some degree, the presence of the U.S. and its role as a special protector of the area has contributed to the instability of the political system. The U.S.’s interventionist role in Latin America has been justified as necessary to prevent hostile forces gaining or maintaining a political and economic foothold in the hemisphere. These efforts . . . have often resulted in the maintenance in power of political leaders who have not achieved the confidence of the people and in whom they are reluctant to trust. A principal actor in this U.S. interventionist strategy has been the international trades union movement of ORIT, the AFL-CIO and the AIFLD. *Almost without exception, the result of this intervention to build free unionism has been the creation of a government whose policies are inimical to free unionism* (emphasis added) (Busch, 1983: 177-178).

In turn, these efforts in Latin America were paralleled by AFL-CIO operations in Africa and Asia. The African-American Labor Center (AALC) was established in 1964—and later led to involvement against the anti-apartheid forces in South Africa (Boyer, 1986; Gottfried, 1987; Duke 1991).²⁵ In 1982, the AFL-CIO gave its George Meany Human Rights Award to apartheid collaborator Gatsha Buthelezi, who had created a labor center—United Workers of South

Africa—specifically to undercut the Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU) and the rest of the liberation movement (Boyer, 1986; Baskin, 1991; see *Labor Notes*, 1985, 1986a, b, c; Richards, 2004: 283-305). Although the AALC later established ties with the Congress of South African Trade Unions or COSATU in 1986 (Duke, 1991)—FOSATU’s successor—its efforts were still suspect among activists in South Africa (see Flanagan, 1990).²⁶

In 1967, the Asian-American Free Labor Institute or AAFLI was established in Asia. It was initially created to help a “semi-independent” labor movement in southern Viet Nam (Wehrle, 2001: 295, fn #100). AAFLI fought the anti-nuclear movement in the South Pacific in the early and mid-1980s: initially as the Labour Committee for Pacific Affairs (see Morrison, 1983), and then later out of an office established in Suva, Fiji (Gill, 1986). AAFLI was also active in Indonesia as well (LaBotz, 2001).

AAFLI was particularly active in South Korea, working with the government-incorporated union center. “Since opening an office in 1972, AAFLI has been affiliated with the government-sanctioned Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU)” (Shorrock and Selvaggio, 1986: 171; see also Shorrock, 2003). Soonok Chun (2003) presents extensive evidence and discussion of the operations of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) and its operations in the Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU). She points out that in December 1955,

without any consultation with any of its affiliate members, the FKTU actually became part of [Korean President] Rhee’s Liberal Party. Leading figures of the FKTU hierarchy were appointed *ex-officio* members of the party’s Central Committee. The linkage between state and trade union federation was now complete: the FKTU was an arm of government, and any deviation from the party-line in matters connected with industrial relations was out of the question (Chun, 2003: 111).

AAFLI provided massive funding in the Philippines against the forces challenging the dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos.²⁷ Between 1983-89, the AFL-CIO provided more money to the Marcos-created Trade Union Congress of the Philippines (TUCP) to use against the progressive *Kilusang Mayo Uno* (KMU) Labor Center than it gave to any other labor movement in the world, including Poland’s *Solidarnosc* (*International Labour Reports*, 1989).²⁸ These efforts against progressive labor in the Philippines included supporting the largest affiliate of the TUCP in its efforts against a KMU affiliate at Atlas Mines—and, with no exaggeration, this included active collaboration with a death squad. These efforts continued throughout the 1980s at least (Scipes, 1990, 1996: 116-125, and below). And AAFLI provided \$3.7 million to a TUCP leader, while serving in the Philippine Senate, to get him to vote for retention of U.S. bases when that issue was before their Congress (Eisenhower, 1991).

Now that some idea of where the “institutes” operated and which political forces they supported or did not support has been provided, what is it that they actually did in these countries? Beth Sims has provided the best overall discussion of what the regional institutes (AIFLD, AALC, AAFLI and FTUI) actually

did on the ground (Sims, 1992: 54-61, 71-89; for AALC, see Gottfried, 1987). Basically, through institute patronage and financial resources (overwhelmingly provided by the U.S. Government), institute staff sought to create "influence," so that the institute would be able to get their "allies" (i.e., clients) to do what institute staff wanted them to do when they wanted to do it; to put it another way, they created clientelistic relationships—not solidarity relationships²⁹—with unions and other labor organizations in chosen developing countries to serve the interests of the institute and the AFL-CIO, regardless of impact on their respective society.³⁰

Projects carried out by the AFL-CIO's own institutes or through the international trade secretariats are the primary mechanisms by which the AFL-CIO gains influence in foreign labor sectors. The institutes sponsor projects in several main categories of activities. These include education and training, agrarian union development, social projects, information dissemination and visitor exchanges, and political action. Institution-building is another major activity of the labor institutes and is designed to strengthen national labor federations and individual unions whose interests and methods run parallel to U.S. foreign policy needs. The U.S.-funded labor projects create patronage networks which enhance the appeal of allied unions and school up-and-coming union leaders in the principles and tactics of "business" and "bread-and-butter" unionism. In addition, recent emphasis on directly political activities such as voter registration and get-out-the-vote drives has magnified the political impact of the institutes, as they directly fund and guide programs aimed at selecting political leaders overseas (Sims, 1992: 71).

It is worth a "moment" to consider in more detail the AFL-CIO's educational programs in developing countries. Nathan Gottfried points out:

During the post-World War II era, American organized labour and the international labor institutions influenced by the United States, sought to spread their own particular brand of "bread and butter" and "business" unionism throughout the developing world. The American model, in contrast to the broader initiatives emerging in many developing countries, held that trade unions should function as sectoral interest groups focusing on economic issues. This narrow, non-political view of unionism manifested an acceptance of American corporatist values.

American labor leaders have encouraged societal corporatism and its illusion of balanced tripartite structure. The . . . (AFL-CIO) and the other unions promote the internationalisation of American capitalism and democracy, the spread of productionist over distributionist principles, and the struggle for "bread and butter" benefits over workplace control and democracy. Most important, the AFL-CIO's foreign policy, in conjunction with the activities of the American state and capital sector, perpetuates the acceptance of a theory of collective capitalism in which worker and management are integrated in a state-guided harmony (Gottfried, 1987: 51).

Gottfried continues, discussing U.S. trade union education provisioning as "a purely technical task." However, U.S. labor leaders "assumed that such tech-

nical assistance would lead to one of two desirable results: the reproduction of American trade unionism abroad or foreign labour appreciation of, and support for, American labour's international policies and ideology" (Gottfried, 1987: 53).

It must be kept in mind that the AFL-CIO does not operate alone. Beth Sims writes, "the AFL-CIO has acted as the vanguard of a bipartisan 'democracy-building' strategy that relies on private organizations to carry out certain sensitive government policies overseas. The ultimate goal of that strategy is the extension of the U.S. sphere of influence." And further,

In fact, the AFL-CIO's international institutes were used as a model for both structural and tactical elements of the "democracy-building" activities of the past decade. Although there were other models as well . . . the AFL-CIO and its labor institutes have been especially important because of the global network managed by these organizations and because of the strategic importance of access to and influence over foreign labor (Sims, 1992: 41-42).

Other so-called "private organizations" in this "interventionist network" include the National Endowment for Democracy, the Social Democrats USA, Freedom House, International Rescue Committee and the League for Industrial Democracy (Sims, 1992: 41-52; see also Silver, 2006).³¹

The AFL-CIO carried out these reactionary labor operations around the world, alone and as part of this "interventionist network," throughout the Cold War tenures of Presidents George Meany and Lane Kirkland (Sims, 1992; Buhle, 1999). These programs could not have been successfully operated by the U.S. Government, and the AFL-CIO used them to prove to the U.S. Government that Labor was an essential component of the Empire, and deserved financial and political support. These overseas operations were at least one factor in developments that led to the election of John Sweeney to the presidency of the AFL-CIO in 1995 (Bacon, 1995; Buhle, 1999; Battista, 2002; Shorrock, 2003).

Foreign Operations Under John Sweeney (since 1995)

When John Sweeney was elected to the presidency of the AFL-CIO in October 1995 (see Dark, 1999), one of the issues considered (at least in the background) was Labor's foreign policy. There was considerable hope, at least among labor activists, that Sweeney would radically reform the AFL-CIO's foreign policy (Bacon, 1995; Battista, 2002: 422).

Sweeney's initial efforts looked very encouraging. He "realigned the Federation's foreign policy, seeing unimpeded neo-liberalism as a greater threat to American workers than 'communism'" (Scipes, 2000b: 6; also see Gottlieb, 1997). The AFL-CIO publicly announced that it was "forging ahead with an activist international affairs program focus on organizing, educating members, and building a strong global union movement." It was going to combine the four international institutes into the American Center for International Labor Solidarity (ACILS). Further, in reporting recommendations to the Executive Council by the International Affairs Committee, the issue of external funding was explicitly

discussed: "The committee recommended that ACILS be funded without government supervision, foreign or domestic. Currently, much of the money that funds the institutes comes from the U.S. Agency for International Development and the National Endowment for Democracy" (Parks, 1996).

By 1997, Sweeney had begun implementing this program.³² He had disbanded Labor's series of semi-autonomous regional "institutes"—AAFLI (Asian-American Free Labor Institute), AALC (African-American Labor Center), AIFLD (American Institute for Free Labor Development), and FTUI (Free Trade Union Institute—in Europe)—and replaced them with ACILS, which is also known as the "Solidarity Center." Sweeney removed many of the long-time Cold Warriors from the International Affairs Department. And these changes (Shorrock, 1999; Scipes, 2000b: 6-7; Rodberg, 2001; see also Gottlieb, 1997; Marshall, 2002)—along with some positive efforts to support workers' struggles in several developing countries (Frundt, 2005)³³—were seen as being a qualitative improvement over the preceding regimes of George Meany and Lane Kirkland (Scipes, 2000b; see also Engler, 2002).³⁴

While recognizing the improvements under Sweeney, questions were still being raised. This author listed some still-troubling issues in the field of foreign policy that needed to be addressed, especially insufficient transparency, governmental funding, and the continuing relationship with the National Endowment for Democracy (Scipes, 2000b: 7, footnote 1). In a response to this article (Scipes, 2000b), Judy Ancel pointed out that continued U.S. Government funding for ACILS was extensive, listing offices in Mexico and Honduras that have been funded by them, while a brief search of USAID programs revealed that ACILS' programs in "over thirty countries and regions including Cuba, Indonesia, Nigeria, Latin America and the Caribbean, Bangladesh, Egypt, South Africa, the Philippines, Burma, Croatia, Eritrea, Sri Lanka, India, Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, Zimbabwe, Serbia and Russia" were funded by USAID (Ancel, 2000). Peter Rachleff (2000) detailed the role played by Jack Otero, who he identified as a former staff member of AIFLD,³⁵ in undercutting a rank-and-file led struggle in 1998 against an effort to privatize a Mexican railroad. Further, despite claims that Sweeney had removed all of the "Cold Warriors" from the AFL-CIO, Otero worked for the AFL-CIO's Transportation Trades Department and "continues to broker relationships between U.S. rail unions and their counterparts south of the border" (Rachleff, 2000: 82).

Both Tim Shorrock and Simon Rodberg focused attention on Harry Kamberis, who Sweeney hired to head the Solidarity Center, and who had formerly worked with AAFLI, "one of the Cold War precursors to the Solidarity Center" (Rodberg, 2001). Shorrock noted that Kamberis "served as staff in the Philippines and South Korea" during the 1980s—during times of great labor repression in each country (see Scipes, 1996, and Chun, 2003)—and then as director of AAFLI. He reported that "the institute [AAFLI] refused to openly support independent unions in Korea being attacked by the military government" and that "in the Philippines, it saw its primary mission as undermining a leftist labor federation suffering intense repression" (Shorrock, 1999). The National Endowment for Democracy (NED)—see chapter 4, below—had earlier identified

Kamberis as “From 1991 to 1995 . . . [he] was the Director of AAFLI’s Philippines office and prior to that of the Korea office” (NED, 1998: 11). Rodberg (2001) further identified Kamberis as “a former foreign-service officer and international businessman,” and noted that he “doesn’t share the liberal-left union background of his colleagues at the AFL-CIO.” NED states, “He has also served in Bangladesh, Pakistan and Greece for the U.S. State Department” (NED, 1998: 11). Obviously, Kamberis has a questionable background for such a position, and the reason for his selection has never been publicly revealed to this author’s knowledge.

So while there were positive developments initially under John Sweeney, remaining, troublesome questions and participation in certain events in recent years have called into question the depth of the AFL-CIO’s foreign policy reforms under his regime. Most important was the AFL-CIO’s Solidarity Center’s involvement in events leading to the coup against democratically-elected Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez in April 2002 (Scipes, 2004b)—see below. In fact, by 2005, this author was publicly arguing that the AFL-CIO’s foreign policy had reverted back to “labor imperialism” (Scipes, 2005a, b, d, e).

Synopsis

The general historical research has been significant and conclusive: the U.S. labor movement has been engaged in labor imperialism around the world, especially in the “developing countries” in Asia, Africa and Latin America:³⁶ U.S. Labor has used its power to control labor and/or undercut radical labor movements in countries around the world.

However, this labor imperialism can be better understood when examined in detail. These operations can be identified by type of intervention: (1) direct efforts to help undermine democratically-elected governments that have led to military coups; (2) support for reactionary governments and attacks by their affiliated labor movements on progressive workers and their organizations seeking democratic change; and (3) indirect operations with local labor movements to attack progressive, pro-labor governments. These three types of interventions are documented by case studies by AFL-CIO operations in Chile (early 1970s), the Philippines (late 1980s) and Venezuela (early 2000s) respectively.

Efforts to Overthrow Democratically-Elected Governments: The Case of Chile, 1970-1973

AIFLD’s operations in Chile are the exemplar of this type of operation.

Chile: An Overview³⁷

In Chile, the AFL-CIO joined the Nixon Administration and a number of U.S.-owned multinational corporations in helping to create conditions that led to the

overthrow of the democratically-elected government by a brutal military coup. The overall U.S. attack on the Allende government in Chile is first discussed, followed by a focus on the AFL-CIO's particular role within this process.

Dr. Salvador Allende, a Marxist Socialist, became President of Chile in 1970. Allende, running as the candidate of the Popular Unity coalition, won a plurality of the popular vote (36.4 percent) on September 4, 1970, and then won the run-off vote within Congress. He assumed the presidency on November 3, 1970. This was "the first Marxist-Socialist Government to be democratically elected in the Western Hemisphere" (Hagen, 1975: 397; see also Busch, 1983: 171-177).

The Allende-led Popular Unity government tried to radically restructure Chilean society by transforming the system of production and wealth creation from one owned by a few—with major industries dominated by foreign (mostly U.S.-owned multinational) corporations—to one owned by the many (i.e., the State), and by shifting distribution of resources from the upper and middle classes to workers and the poor. A U.S.-based academic who *opposed* the Allende government's program described it thusly:

Since 1970, the transformation in distribution has been manifold and far reaching. Aiming to change the class, sectoral and international distribution, the government entered all major industries. It assumed ownership of the extractive industries. . . . It nationalized the banking system—the primary source of financial capital. It took control and restricted private ownership of rural land—the alleged major source of political power and Ricardian rents. It also took over all large industrial enterprises—the alleged source of monopoly profits and power.

All of these largely irreversible ownership transfers aimed to wipe out the control of Chile's riches by a few private individuals. Furthermore, elitist education, entertainment and health services, and excessive differences in wages, salaries, pensions, insurance, health and other social security benefits—sources of unequal accumulation of human capital by social groups and intra-labor inequalities—were attacked, constrained and reduced.

No other short-term objective was so important to President Salvador Allende's program in 1970 as the rise in the income share of labor. Virtually all the tools available were used to redistribute income and destroy the usurpers of labor's surplus value. The resulting short-term income distribution was the most spectacular in Chile's history. The participation of wage earners in income, including contributions by employers, rose from 54.9 percent in 1970 to 65.8 percent in 1971 (Mamalakis, 1975: 348).

In short, Allende's program was a serious effort to transfer economic power to the state and resources to workers and the poor.³⁸

The possibility that a program such as this might be implemented peacefully frightened the U.S. Government, and it began acting against Allende long before he was elected. Allende first ran for President in 1958, losing by only 35,000 votes (Fagan, 1975b: 669). Hoping to prevent Allende's success in the 1964 election against Eduardo Frei, the U.S. intervened: CIA Director William Colby testified that the CIA spent \$3 million to block Allende's efforts (Fagan, 1975b: 669; Chavkin, 1982: 44), with other estimates of CIA involvement going as high

as \$20 million (Fagan, 1975b: 669; Petras, 1975: 294). Concurrently, “at least 100 U.S. ‘special personnel’ were posted to Chile from Washington and other Latin American countries to engage in complementary activities” (Petras, 1975: 294-295). During the 1970 election, a very suspicious contribution of six hundred thousand dollars was made to the polling agency of one of Allende’s opponents by someone identified only as “Charlie”—Professor Paul Sigmund concluded that it was “presumably a CIA conduit” (Sigmund, 1975: 252). And between the election on September 4th and the vote in Congress on October 24th that declared Allende president by a 153-35 margin, the CIA spent another \$400,000 to keep Allende from being elected (Sigmund, 1975: 252). However, according to recently declassified notes by former CIA Director Richard Helms, the known amounts for the 1970 efforts were only a small amount of the total monies available: U.S. President Richard Nixon authorized the use of \$10 million before the vote in Congress to prevent Allende’s election.³⁹

But these were not “rogue” activities—they came from the top levels of the U.S. Government.⁴⁰ Just after the September Fourth election, Henry Kissinger—then head of Nixon’s National Security Council and who was to control both the economic operations and the CIA attacks on Chile (reported in Boorstein, 1977: 251)—was already referring to Allende as a “communist” and stating that his election would cause the U.S. major problems in Latin America (Sigmund, 1975: 251; Fagan, 1975b: 666). Robinson (1996: 160) notes “Kissinger himself chaired weekly interagency meetings on Chile in the White House, attended by high-level officials from State, Treasury, the Pentagon and the CIA.” CIA Director Richard Helms testified later before a Senate hearing that Nixon gave the order to go after Allende, and former U.S. Ambassador to Chile, Edward Korry, disclosed Nixon’s emotional response to Allende (Chavkin, 1982: 47).

After Allende’s election, the United States Government launched a massive economic and political attack on Chile’s government. This included diplomatic and political pressures to isolate Chile internationally, an “economic squeeze to provoke economic dislocation and social conflict,” continued aid to Chile’s military, and “maintenance of political and diplomatic relations to collect information, maintain ties with political opposition, facilitate flow of financial resources to allies” (Petras, 1975: 294). One observer summed it up: “U.S. interference in Chilean politics was enormous; it was intended to bring down the government” (Landsberger, 1975: 235). Professor Richard Fagan reported CIA Director William Colby’s statement to Congress that the CIA was authorized to spend eight million dollars to “destabilize” the Allende government in the period 1971-73, and then Fagan noted “Given Chile’s inflation and the black market in dollars, the real purchasing power of the eight million dollars was probably closer to 40 or 50 million” (Fagan, 1975b: 667). It was a massive effort: Fagan concluded in his formal statement to the House subcommittee investigating relations with Chile, “the intervention of the U.S. Government in the internal affairs of Chile was massive, continuous and effective in helping to undermine the elected government” (Fagan, 1975a: 264).

The economic attack was probably the most far reaching. Chile was heavily dependent on foreign investment:

U.S. and foreign corporations controlled almost all of the most dynamic and critical areas of the economy by the end of 1970: machinery and equipment, 50 percent; iron, steel, and metal products, 60 percent; petroleum products and distribution, over 50 percent; industrial and other chemicals, 60 percent; rubber products, 45 percent; automotive assembly, 100 percent; radio and television, nearly 100 percent; pharmaceuticals, nearly 100 percent; office equipment, nearly 100 percent; copper fabricating, 100 percent; tobacco, 100 percent; and advertising, 90 percent (Petras, 1975: 292).

Additionally, U.S. corporations controlled 80 percent of copper production, which was Chile's greatest foreign exchange earner. And Chile was also dependent on U.S. corporations for replacement parts for its equipment: over 95 percent of all replacement parts for the copper industry, its most important, came from the United States (Petras, 1975: 293).

Chile was heavily in debt to foreign lenders, largely due to foreign borrowing by the Christian Democratic-led government under Eduardo Frei that preceded Allende's government. Chile's foreign debt as of December 31, 1971 totaled \$2,960 million (\$2.96 billion). Almost half of that debt—\$1,357 million—was to the United States; another \$414 million was to international organizations; and \$267 million was to the United Kingdom (Crimmins, 1975: 75).

Accordingly, the U.S. Government decided to use Chile's economic dependence on the U.S. as the key target for attack: "the economic policy of the U.S. was the center of its efforts to overthrow the Allende government or tutor it into submission" (Birns, 1975: 533). While the U.S. had provided over \$1 billion of economic assistance between 1964-1970—indirectly through multilateral lending agencies such as the World Bank or the Inter-American Development Bank, or directly—disbursements during the Allende years were minimal. "Chile, one of the heaviest beneficiaries of U.S. aid programs in the world during the 1960s, was reduced to \$15 million in loans from the Agency for International Development in 1970 and has been granted nothing since" (Stern, 1975: 516). The World Bank also drastically cut lending—from \$28.1 million in 1971 to \$6.3 million in 1973, although this seems to be inline with cutbacks begun during the Frei Administration. However, the Inter-American Development Bank's cutback—from \$46 million in 1970 to \$2 million in 1972 (Chavkin, 1982: 59)—cannot be explained in such a manner (Sanford, 1975: 434, 447). Export-Import Bank credits, which were \$234 million in 1967, were zero in 1971. Also, short-term U.S. commercial credit dropped from about \$300 million during the Frei years to around \$30 million in 1972 (Chavkin, 1982: 59).

By mid-1973, the Chilean economy was in shambles (see Morris, 1975). While some argue that the problems were caused by foreign interference (Petras, 1975), others argue that this turmoil was the result of the government's policies and incompetence; i.e., it was due to internal problems, not external actions (Landsberger, 1975; Mamalakis, 1975; Sigmund, 1975). However, even if the problems were primarily internal, the foreign pressure limited options to resolve the problems and external pressures made things much worse.

On September 11, 1973, the Chilean military launched a brutal coup and overthrew the government. Allende was killed during the coup. Fernando Ale-

gria, then the cultural attaché to the Chilean Embassy in Washington who was in Chile during the coup said that 30,000 people were killed in the coup and shortly thereafter (Chavkin, 1982: 76). While this was an early estimate, “The final and most acceptable tally was much less, previously in the range of 3,000” (Hirsch, 2008); nonetheless, the killings, brutalization, and repression instituted by the Chilean military were extensive and handicapped for many years one of the longest living democracies in Latin America.

AIFLD in Chile⁴¹

The truck owners’ strike in October-November 1972 was a key turning point in the campaign to get rid of the Allende regime: “A massive strike last October almost brought the Chilean economy to a halt” (Fascell, 1975: 66).

Professor Paul Sigmund noted that CIA attempts to undermine Allende could have taken place in three particular areas: (1) support for opposition media and media-related activities; (2) the *gremios* or interest groups that took a leading role in opposing Allende; and (3) the right-wing anti-Communist group, *Patria y Libertad* (Fatherland and Liberty), which carried out violent activities against the government (Sigmund, 1975: 243-254). It is the second group, the *gremios*, which is of most interest here.

Sigmund notes the development of the *gremios* in the 1971-73 period:

While these groups had always existed in Chile, they expanded their activities very greatly in 1971-73 and coordinated their actions in a way which led to the rapid spread of truckers’ [truck owners’-KS] strikes to bus and taxi drivers, shopkeepers, lawyers, doctors, dentists, airline pilots, engineers and sectors of the peasantry. Although the CIA has denied financing the strikes, there have been no denials of general support for the *gremios* (Sigmund, 1975: 254).

Further, “Pro-Allende sources had alluded to CIA support for the truckers’ strikes in October 1972 . . . citing the drop in the black market rate for dollars as proof that money was coming in from the outside” (Sigmund, 1975: 253). In any case, the strikes were very effective against, and costly to, the government: one analysis, prepared by the Congressional Research Service of the U.S. Library of Congress, claimed that the strikes had cost the Chilean government “more than \$240 million” (Ryncarson, 1975: 385).

Chavkin put the 1972 strike into the larger context. He quoted Gonzalo Martner, an economist and former Minister of National Planning in Allende’s cabinet:

the situation became desperate when the truck owners went on strike. The long stretches of Chilean territory, which run down the Pacific Coast of South America for some 2,500 miles, depend on motor transport rather than on railroads or ships. Angered by the breakdown of their equipment, unable to secure the needed spare parts because of the Washington blockade (and also [having] many right-wing prejudices anyway), the truck owners went into collusion with the CIA to deliver a body blow to Chile’s economy. The extra-special induce-

ment for the truck owners not to move their trucks was, simply, money. Just how much money was made available has never been disclosed, but in some cases the cash flow must have been substantial since even some trucking company employees were known to have received as much as \$50 for every day they did not work (Chavkin, 1982: 66-67).

The New York Times of September 20, 1974 reported that intelligence sources had disclosed:

the majority of more than \$8 million authorized for clandestine CIA activities in Chile was used in 1972 and 1973 to provide strike benefits and other means of support for anti-Allende strikers and workers. Among those heavily subsidized . . . were organizers of a nationwide truck strike in 1972 (quoted in Boorstein, 1977: 251-252).

In short, the truck owners' role in this strike was crucial, they were heavily subsidized by the CIA, and these strikes were key in both undermining the government and in encouraging the military to act to "restore order."

But one question remains: who organized them? While it is difficult if not impossible to say "AIFLD did this" or "AIFLD did that" regarding any specific situation, it is possible to focus on the leadership that it trained and organizations that it funded. It is here that we can begin to understand how AIFLD worked during this period in general, and how it worked specifically in Chile.

AIFLD ran a major educational program in Chile.⁴² By the end of October 1969, a total of 5,963 Chileans had participated in some kind of AIFLD-sponsored seminar in Chile, and by the end of 1972, another 2,874 people had been trained. At the same time, 108 Chileans had graduated from the advanced AIFLD course in Front Royal, Virginia—and 29 of these people graduated in a six-month period, as compared to the first 79 over a 10-year period. It is clear, from a memorandum dated February 28, 1973, that education processes had intensified in the second half of 1972—Hirsch calculates a four hundred percent increase in student turnout! (Hirsch, 1974: 33).

We do not know for certain which individuals were trained, just that a lot of training was done, but we can make an educated guess as the sources from where those who was trained originated. In light of the fact that the CUT (General Confederation of Workers)—which had a membership of eight hundred thousand in 1970 and two million by 1973 (Hirsch, 1974: 35)—remained a stalwart supporter of the Allende regime to the end and was an opponent of AIFLD, it is logical that most of those trained were not blue collar or lower-level white collar workers. It seems likely that many came from unions such as the Chilean Maritime Federation (COMACH), which was a union of largely maritime officers, and which AIFLD identified as being its major collaborator (quoted in Hirsch, 1974: 35). Also, in light of AIFLD's relationship with professional employees' unions, and with middle class groups such as truck owners—detailed below—it is likely that most of the trainees came from unions and groups such as these.

The intelligence gathering opportunities from AIFLD activities mentioned

earlier would be invaluable to the Chilean coup plotters. Hirsch and Muir report:

The [AIFLD] Chilean Country Labor Team invested heavily in maritime unions. A June 20, 1974 broadcast told of a Valparaíso port union leader “producing lists of unionists to be shot, jailed or fired.” A Chilean magazine mentioned a Pinochet general with “a complete file on workers and unions in the capital.” The military used such lists mercilessly (Hirsch and Muir, 1987: 744).

In her 1988 study, Edy Kaufman provides some important details. She notes that “one can identify a carefully planned effort to integrate sequential actions in order to topple the regime,” and that, “chaos and confrontation evolved from the truck owners’ strike of October 1972, which served as the catalyst for other groups” (Kaufman, 1988: 74). She continues:

The organized expression of middle-class discontent began with reactions of liberal and professional associations. *Professionals were organized with the support of U.S. trade unions . . .* (emphasis added).

The most prominent middle-class group was the truck owners. The industry was privately owned and organized largely by the Chilean Truck-Owners Confederation. Led by Leon Vilarin, this body was made up of 169 unions countrywide and controlled nearly the entire 2,800 mile land transport system, which dispatched such vital goods as fuel, raw materials, and food stuffs (Kaufman, 1988: 77).

Kaufman reports that the Truck Owners Confederation had an estimated membership of forty thousand, and that they owned twenty-five thousand out of the fifty-two thousand trucks in the country, including nearly all of the heavy trucks. She also identified Vilarin: “Initially a self-declared socialist, Vilarin’s connection pointed to ties with the [Christian Democratic Party]. After the coup, he became an important officer in the military regime” (Kaufman, 1988: 107, endnotes 101, 102).

Kaufman’s account lends additional weight to Hirsch’s earlier report that “AIFLD assisted the formation of the Confederation of Chilean Professionals (CUPROCH)” (Hirsch, 1974: 36). However, unknown to Kaufman, this had been previously confirmed by William Doherty, Jr., the Executive Director of AIFLD, when he boasted of AIFLD support of CUPROCH during a July 1974 visit to the Santa Clara County, California Central Labor Council (Hirsch and Muir, 1987: 745). CUPROCH was the coalition of professional unions identified by Allende during his final radio transmission to the people of Chile as leading the destabilization.

AIFLD was also active in the National Command for Gremio Defense. The National Command was a center of different coalitions, including the Confederation of Production and Commerce, the Society of Manufacturers, the National Society of Agriculture, the Chamber of Construction, the Chamber of Commerce, and the Central Confederation of Chilean Professionals (CUPROCH)—Hirsch argues that “Because AIFLD was involved with many of the Gremio people in Chile, it is important to know about the leading organizations and people in the National Command,” and he presents further details. Hirsch was

the first to identify Leon Vilarin as the President of the Confederation of Truck Owners of Chile and as the President of the National Command for Gremio Defense (Hirsch, 1974: 38-40).

The National Command was “the organization which directed the ‘strike’ of truck owners and merchants,” and was “responsible for planning and executing Chile’s internal economic chaos.” It “also set up paramilitary groups to terrorize supporters of the Allende government” (Hirsch, 1974: 38).

Kaufman discusses the activities of AIFLD, tying reports together:

Preaching ‘free trade unionism’ and challenging Chile’s larger, pro-government labor movement, the AIFLD intensified its activities after the 1970 elections, supporting the professional and business associations who opposed Allende. Leadership training was combined with a transfer of funds, and the operation succeeded in providing a more organized and active front against the [Popular Unity government]. In 1972, an umbrella organization, the National Command for Gremio Defense was formed, composed mainly of the Truck Owners Association, merchants, industrialists, landowners and professionals (Kaufman, 1988: 81-82).

Gary Busch (1983: 176) concluded: “The role of the AIFLD graduates in the success of Pinochet was important. In fact, the coup began by industrial action among the newly organized seamen in Valparaíso recently assisted by Jack Otero. It spread through the COMPACH and the COPROACH organizations.”

Synopsis

There can be no question of AIFLD’s involvement in the organization of both CUPROCH (Confederation of Chilean Professionals) and the National Command of Gremio Defense. It was involved with the member organizations of each of these centers, including the Confederation of Truck Owners. In short, AIFLD’s people played a crucial role in creating the economic crisis that led to the military’s coup—and creating the chaos was part of a long-term, coordinated effort to overthrow the government of Chile, planned at the highest levels of the U.S. Government, financed and implemented by the CIA, and with the direct organizational involvement of AIFLD and probably other organizations.

This range of educational programs and work with several organizations cost a lot of money. Most of the money came from the CIA, as was reported above. However, documents obtained from USAID (Agency for International Development), the direct conduit for the government’s money to AIFLD at the time, show that in fiscal year (FY) 1972, the Chile AIFLD program received \$125,000, and another \$118,000 in FY 1973 (AID, no date). This is especially interesting in light of a statement by AIFLD’s Doherty, who claimed in the July 1974 meeting with the Santa Clara Country Central Labor Council, that AIFLD did not have a Country Labor Program in Chile (Hirsch, no date: 3). While the money amount pales in comparison to the CIA funding, it shows that Doherty was covering up the fact that there was an on-going, established AIFLD country program in Chile, before and during the coup (and it continued afterward, under

the dictatorship).⁴³

And how did the military dictatorship benefit Chile's workers? Weinrub and Bollinger give a succinct answer: "The government crushed Chile's labor movement, murdered thousands of unionists, and restored Chile's industry to its former U.S. owners" (Weinrub and Bollinger, 1987:17).

Support for Reactionary Governments and Attacks by Reactionary Labor Movements on Progressive Workers and Their Organizations Seeking Democratic Change:

The Case of the Associated Labor Unions/TUCP in the Philippines, 1985-1989⁴⁴

The Philippines was an American colony, becoming such after the brutal Philippine-American War (roughly 1899-1903), whereby the American military killed somewhere between 10-20 percent of the Philippine population (somewhere between five hundred thousand to one million people).⁴⁵ Like any country that had been colonized, the Philippine social order was organized to benefit people in the colonizing country and not the colonized Filipinos. An extractive agricultural economy (sugar, tobacco, hemp, coconuts) and a political system dominated by members of the various regional elites were the product of three hundred eighty-one years of Spanish, and then U.S., colonization.

When the Philippines was granted "independence" by the United States in 1946, it had been devastated by the Second World War; the United States used this to establish a neocolonial relationship with the now-ruling elites (Shalom, 1981). Economic relief was made dependent on political and economic concessions to U.S. investors, establishment of U.S. military bases across the country, and a currency whose value in relationship to the U.S. dollar could not be changed without the explicit permission of the U.S. President: the Americans demanded the Filipinos keep the extremely overvalued exchange rate of U.S. \$1:P2. (To make it easier to follow below, one dollar would buy 2 *pesos*, or U.S. \$1: P2).⁴⁶ These impositions, in addition to the extractive economy and corrupt political system, were all "grants" to the newly freed nation.

An economic crisis in the late 1940s, when luxury imports by the elites threatened to bankrupt the country (in addition to a peasant revolt in Central Luzon and a newly emerging radical labor movement), forced the ruling elites to try a new economic program, with U.S. permission. Unwilling to implement a genuine land reform program, the elites tried industrializing as a way of restoring the economy, pacifying the peasants and workers, and maintaining their land-based power. And although the repression directed against peasants and workers was massive—for the peasant revolt, see Kerkvliet, 1979; for the direct involvement of the CIA, see Smith, 1976—focus here is on the economic policies implemented.

To implement their new industrialization program, the Philippine government initiated foreign exchange and import controls. The controls provided mul-

tiple economic benefits to the state: they limited both general imports (such as consumer goods for the rich) and repatriation of capital outside the country, and allowed the state to select imports to assist the industrialization process and to protect industry established in the country. This import substitution industrialization (ISI) program was a serious effort to industrialize. By 1960, the Philippines was being seen as “the next Japan” in Asia.⁴⁷

However, the overvalued exchange rate—which allowed the development of industry—caused the restriction of agriculture, making it increasingly difficult for agricultural exporters to find markets for their products. The landed elite demanded a change in the exchange rate—a devaluation of the peso. Diosdado Macapagal was elected President of the country, and one of his first acts after assuming the presidency in January 1962 was to terminate all financial controls immediately. This was supported by U.S. President Kennedy, who arranged for the Philippines to receive an immediate three hundred million dollar loan from the IMF to cover the repatriation of three hundred million dollars of U.S. corporate profits. This was the beginning of the Philippines’ debt dependence.

Ending these controls—deregulation in today’s terminology, and a major component of the neo-liberal program—devastated the Philippine economy.⁴⁸ The *peso* began weakening immediately, and was formally devalued from U.S. \$1: P2.00 to U.S. \$1: P3.9 in 1965. (A simple example: if you borrowed one million dollars at the old rate, you had to repay it with two million *pesos* before devaluation, and 3.9 million *pesos* at the new rate.) This resulted in the bankruptcy and collapse of many businesses. The balance of payments situation worsened: imports increased 68 percent between 1963 and 1967, while exports only increased 7 percent. The foreign debt doubled from two hundred seventy-five million dollars in 1962 to approximately six hundred million dollars in 1965. And the manufacturing share of Gross National Product (GNP) decreased from 17.9 percent in 1962 to 7.1 percent in 1965. In short, this caused massive dislocation in the Philippine economy.

So, by the mid-1960s, the economy that had looked so promising going into the decade was a shambles. Different forces with a belief in neo-liberal economics—including Filipino economists like Gerardo Sicat, and the IMF and World Bank—encouraged the government to launch an export-oriented industrialization program to solve the crisis, which was caused by neo-liberal deregulation in the first place. Their argument was that by using low Filipino wage rates to attract foreign capital, and then basing manufacturing operations on cheap and controlled labor, the Philippines could export enough manufactured products (such as garments and electronic components) into the world economy to improve its balance of payments and employment opportunities. Consequently, poverty and income inequality would be reduced, ultimately enabling the state to “modernize” Philippine society.

Ferdinand Marcos, who was elected to the presidency as a “reformer” in 1965, decided to begin focusing the economy along such lines. Marcos was able to lay some important groundwork in that direction in the late 1960s but because of substantial opposition—both within Congress and larger society—he was unable to operationalize it at that time. It was only when Marcos declared mar-

tial law on September 21, 1972, that the export-oriented industrialization strategy (EOI) could be implemented.⁴⁹

Did the EOI program succeed or fail? James Boyce (1993) provides considerable data that covers the years 1962 to 1986—the period after controls were ended until the end of the Marcos dictatorship. During this period, Philippine external debt grew from 275 million dollars in 1962 to 27.2 billion dollars in 1986. At the end of 1986, the country had a debt-to-GNP ratio of .90, and a debt per capita of 485 dollars.

The impact on wages for urban workers for the period 1962 to 1986 was disastrous. Boyce computed the impact of changes in wages in metropolitan Manila over this period: “In real (1986) U.S. dollars, the daily wage of an unskilled worker fell from \$4.37 in 1962 to \$1.12 in 1986, while that of a skilled worker fell from \$6.18 to \$1.72.” In other words, daily wage rates for a unskilled worker in 1986 were 74.3 percent less than in 1962, while daily wages rates for a skilled worker in 1986 were 72.2 percent less! In fact, in 1986, the daily wage of an unskilled urban worker was substantially below that of an agricultural worker. Boyce concludes: “wage laborers in Metro Manila experienced a collapse in real wages in the 1970s and 1980s on a magnitude with few precedents in modern economic history” (Boyce, 1993: 27-29).

A key to this deterioration of workers’ salaries was the drastic cheapening of the Philippine *peso*. In January 1962, before foreign exchange and import controls were lifted, one U.S. dollar bought two *pesos*; in February 1986, just before Marcos was driven out of the country, one dollar could buy nineteen *pesos*. Thus, imported goods—especially oil, which is sold internationally in dollars, and which is used for everything from powering automobiles to transporting rice, the staple food—became much more expensive to Filipino consumers.

But what has happened since the overthrow of the dictator? Marcos’ successors—Corazon Aquino (1986-1992), Fidel Ramos (1992-1998), Joseph Estrada (1998-2004) and Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (2004 to date)—have continued to follow an EOI strategy. Aquino committed her government to repaying all foreign debts, including the ones that only benefited Marcos and/or his “cronies,” and her successors have followed suit.

One Filipino researcher, Pedro Salgado, put the debt into perspective early in Aquino’s administration. He pointed out that the U.S. \$28.2 billion dollar debt in 1987 was equal to about P564 billion, 4.4 times the national budget (or 81 percent of the projected GNP for the entire year). He then goes on to say, “If a person were to drop a P100 bill into a pit every second, it will take 179 years to drop P564 billion worth of bills into the pit!” (quoted in Scipes, 1999: 9).

Researchers have detailed how recent presidents have gone along with the World Bank and the IMF machinations in exchange for loans. This was true under Marcos, and it has remained true since. Why? I think Temario Rivera is correct when he suggests that there is a larger reason: the ability to obtain foreign loans, no matter how bad for the country, allows political “leaders” to ignore the key issue in the country—political power based on land ownership. And, courtesy of the World Bank and the IMF, foreign loans have been available. Philippine national debt (which was 275 million dollars in 1962 and was

approximately 27.2 billion dollars in 1986), was 35.5 billion dollars in 1993, and 45.5 billion dollars in 1997, according to data from the Central Bank of the Philippines.⁵⁰

At the same time, the shift from traditional agricultural exports to nontraditional, labor-intensive manufacturing exports, particularly in garments and electronics, has continued. By the early 1990s, over 70 percent of total exports were in these nontraditional manufacturers. However, despite this shift (supposedly the key to Philippine economic development), the balance of trade worsened between 1987 and 1996. The trade balance in goods was -1.017 billion dollars in 1987, -8.160 billion dollars in November 1995, and -11.342 billion dollars at the end of 1996. Note that these figures are all from before the so-called Asian Financial Crisis that struck in 1997.

The GNP of the country has generally grown, albeit unevenly: it grew 5.9 percent in 1987, 6.6 percent in 1988, 5.7 percent in 1989, and 3.0 percent in 1990. It declined .05 percent in 1991. The GNP increased 1.56 percent in 1992, 2.02 percent in 1993, 5.1 percent in 1994, 5.7 percent in 1995, 5.8 percent in 1996, and 5.2 percent in 1997.

Roger Daenekindt, using Department of Labor and Employment figures from September 1995, reported that 62 percent of the 29.2-million-member labor force was either unemployed or underemployed. Furthermore, only 10 percent of the labor force received at least the minimum wage, but even this was insufficient, as the minimum wage itself resulted in income below the poverty line. In 1994, according to the government, the daily cost of living was P237.57 (approximately U.S. \$9.50), while the mandated daily minimum wage was only P145 (approximately U.S. \$5.80). Additionally, while nominal wages increased by more than 200 percent between 1983 and 1993, real wages for all workers (based on 1978 prices) actually decreased by 14 percent, and despite nominal wages increasing 32 percent between 1990 and 1993, real wages fell 4 percent.

The Re-emergence of a Radical Labor Movement: KMU

It is within this context of economic devastation, political dictatorship, social disruption and neo-colonial relationship with the United States that a new radical labor center emerged, the *Kilusang Mayo Uno* (KMU-May First Movement) Labor Center (see Scipes, 1996).⁵¹

KMU was the national center of militant labor movements that emerged within different political economies across the country. In other words, there is not just one political economy in the Philippines, but there are a number, located in various regions across the country. Radical labor movements emerged in the different regions, joined together into the KMU at the national level on May 1, 1980, and then used this combined strength to challenge the Marcos Dictatorship and the existing social order—and its neo-colonial relationship with the United States.

KMU emerged in response to the development of the Trade Union Congress of the Philippines (TUCP) by the Marcos Dictatorship in 1975. This served as the mass base for the dictatorship in the workers' sector.⁵² "The TUCP was es-

tablished as labor's voice in a corporatist system, providing economic gains for workers organized into its unions in exchange for political acceptance of the dictatorship and its development policies" (Scipes, 1996: 23).

KMU was a major actor in the struggle to overthrow the Marcos Dictatorship.⁵³ And it had organized so thoroughly in industries and workplaces across the country that it had the ability to seriously affect the entire national economy, making it a potent political power. The number of strikes, number of workers involved and their duration jumped during the last three full years of the dictator's rule: "The number of working days lost due to strike activity increased from 581,291 in 1983 to 1,907,762 in 1984 to 2,440,000 in 1985. And of the 405 strikes led in 1985, 70 percent of them were led by the KMU" (Ortaliz quoted in Scipes, 1996: 33).

The AFL-CIO had an office of its Asian American Free Labor Institute (AAFLI) in the country. Its job was to support the TUCP against the KMU.⁵⁴ Between 1983 and 1988, AAFLI channeled over \$5.7 million to the TUCP (*International Labour Reports*, 1989), and \$3 million of this came between August 1983 and July 1985 (Bronstein and Johnston, 1985), after the assassination of Marcos opponent Benigno Aquino. AAFLI would later provide \$3.7 million to Ernesto Herrera, Secretary General of the TUCP and an elected Philippine Senator, in exchange for his vote to retain the US military bases in the Philippines when that issue came before the Senate in 1991 (Eisenhower, 1991).

Yet AAFLI's funding project did not take place in a vacuum. The U.S. and its Aquino regime allies had a problem: how to get rid of the left. They turned to a program of low-intensity warfare (Klare and Kornbluh, eds., 1987) which, in the Philippines, meant violent attacks on leaders of labor and all kinds of social justice organizations as part of a conscious effort to destroy these socially-embedded organizations (Bello, 1987; see also Collins, 1989). Where we can see this most clearly is in the labor struggles at Atlas Mines, on the island of Cebu.

Atlas Mines⁵⁵

Atlas Mines is a gigantic copper mining complex—the largest in all of Asia—located near Toledo City on the island of Cebu, in the middle of the archipelago. At its height, it has employed as many as ten thousand workers.

Unionism had initially come to Atlas in the 1960s, under the Progressive Labor Association (PLA). However, the conservative Associated Labor Unions (ALU) won control over the mines after scabbing and breaking a picket line launched by PLA in 1966.

Under ALU, which later became the "heart" of the Marcos-created Trade Union Congress of the Philippines (TUCP), there was peace between labor and management between 1966 and 1981. Workers eventually rejected ALU's leadership, and joined another conservative union, Philippine Social Security Labor Union (PSSLU), in protest against ALU's collaboration with management and its suppression of its own members.

However, major changes took place when the Southern Philippines Federation of Labor (SPFL), a KMU affiliate, won the representation election in 1985

by more than two thousand five hundred votes. They established the new local union as PAMA (*Panaghiusa sa Mamumuo sa Atlas*)-SPFL. Roger Cubar, Secretary General of PAMA, detailed the differences under PAMA, which had successfully negotiated a new collective bargaining agreement with the company after a strike:

The union's actions differed from its predecessors during the CBA [collective bargaining agreement] process. Union decisions were made inside the company premises because that was where the workers worked—and they were kept informed of progress in CBA negotiations. Over 4,500 casual workers—men who had worked eight or nine years in the company and still had not been given regular employment—were regularized under PAMA-SPFL. Previously unimplemented legislative wage increases were implemented. Additionally, they got a four-peso a day wage increase the first year, three for the second, and three for the third, plus a six-peso cost of living allowance (COLA), even though copper was selling for only 60 cents an ounce and the company was hurting. Abuses of management personnel were stopped, as were illegal deductions from wages. The “13th month” or “Christmas” bonus was increased to the equivalent to 26 days’ wages, instead of the previously flat 1,000 pesos. This was the best CBA the 10,000 workers had ever won. And perhaps one of the major changes was that PAMA’s leaders were approachable to the workers; under ALU and PSSLU, workers were threatened with losing their jobs if they complained about the union (Scipes, 1996: 117).⁵⁶

The victory had not come cheap: seven workers were killed during the strike to win the CBA.

In response to PAMA’s previous success and prior to the next round of negotiations in 1988, an unholy alliance between corporate management, local government officials, the Philippine Constabulary (similar to the National Guard when federalized, only controlled on the provincial level), ALU-TUCP and a vigilante organization (i.e., death squad) named KADRE,⁵⁷ joined together to ensure that PAMA-SPFL-KMU would no longer represent the Atlas Mines workers after the collective bargaining agreement expired in late 1988.

Their campaign was elaborate. The Company gave some of the vigilantes, who worked in the mine, paid time off for “refresher military training.” The mayor of the nearby town of Toledo was the wife of the Medical Director of the mine and was regional chairperson of the extremely pro-vigilante People’s Alliance Against Communism (PAAC): the police would not protect the workers. The Trade Union Congress of the Philippines’ (TUCP) affiliate in the area, Associated Labor Unions or ALU, broadcasted openly pro-vigilante propaganda on its radio station and sponsored anti-communist and “human rights” seminars for the workers to denounce KMU and to preach the “Christian” values of the TUCP—at least until exposed by Hugh Williamson, writing in *International Labour Reports* during the summer of 1988 (Williamson, 1988).

The repression directed against PAMA was intense. According to documentation presented by members of the PAMA Executive Board during a June 1989 meeting in Cebu City, between March 21, 1987 and April 16, 1989, ten union members were killed and seven others wounded. Three relatives of union mem-

bers were killed, and six wounded. These are in addition to the eight cases where people shot into the union office or members' homes, two stabbings, five attempted murders, 12 shootings, 21 death threats and many forcible arrests (Scipes, 1990: 121).⁵⁸

Perhaps the single event that illustrated the pressures placed on PAMA-SFFL leaders was the attempted assassination of local union president, Tony Cuizon:

KADRE members led by Jun Alamo, Ricardo Mendoza and Rudy Villanueva harassed the officers and members of the union at about 10:15 to 11:00 am while they were conducting their regular board meeting at the union office at Das, Toledo City.

During the board meeting, Alamo fired his gun twice at union president Antonio Cuizon, but his .38 caliber revolver misfired. Seeing what happened, Ricardo Mendoza pulled his own .38 revolver and fired at Cuizon, but his gun also misfired.

Some observers of that incident went to the police station to ask for help. But the police would not respond because they said those men are under the 347 th [Philippine Constabulary] command (PAMA Executive Board Members quoted in Scipes, 1996: 122-123).⁵⁹

The ties between the vigilantes and the Associated Labor Union (ALU) were thick. Jun Alcover—not the same person as Jun Alamo identified above—was a radio announcer on the union's radio station, DYLA, which the PAMA Executive Board members reported was located inside ALU's premises. Alcover was described as an anti-communist leader, and a founder of KADRE. This was confirmed by an independent report in a local research and development agency, Visayas Human Development Agency (VIHDA), through their periodical, *VIHDA Files*.

Alcover was permitted by mine management and the head of the local Philippine Constabulary unit to give seminars to the workers. Most took place inside the compound of Atlas Mines. In a number of seminars, he claimed that PAMA was "communist," and in at least one meeting, he presented a drawing of an "octopus," with "communist" written on it, and with one tentacle labeled "PAMA-SFPL-KMU." But when the mining compound was not available for seminars, "Alcover would provide seminars inside the buildings of the 347th PC Company" (Cubar interview in Scipes, 1996: 122).

Perhaps the most damaging claims were made by Wennie Badayos, the chairperson of the KMU-affiliated regional alliance, AMA-SUGBO, of which PAMA-SPFL was a member.⁶⁰ Badayos previously had been a member of ALU for 13 years, and a vice president of a local union at Visayan Glass. In 1983, Badayos and 65 other militants within Associated Labor Unions (ALU) in Cebu formed AMA-SUGBO, a reform movement within ALU; for that, Badayos lost his job because the union told his employer that he no longer had proper standing within his union, a precondition for continued employment. He was labeled a "communist" and expelled from ALU. In 1984, leaders of AMA-SUGBO shifted their allegiance to KMU. Badayos, then, had extensive experience within

ALU, and at the leadership level (Badayos interview in Scipes, 1996: 113). His charges, then, were all the more serious.

The key person within ALU, reported Badayos, was a man named Cerge Remonde, who headed ALU's education department and who also broadcast on the union's radio station, DYLA. Badayos said Remonde was a leader of PAAC (the regional anti-communist alliance), and served as an international representative of the Trade Union Congress of the Philippines (TUCP—the "parent" organization of ALU). According to Badayos, Remonde formed vigilante unions in all the local factories that were organized by ALU (Scipes, 1996: 123). The links between the vigilantes and the union were strong.

Despite the repression and extreme pressure, PAMA-SPFL ultimately succeeded and won the subsequent representation election on March 21, 1989. "Out of 7,395 valid votes and among 12 competing unions, PAMA won 5,025 votes; the TUCP-affiliated Association Labor Union received 292." The results were certified by the government's Department of Labor and Employment in April (Scipes, 1990: 121).

How was PAMA able to prevail despite this tremendous level of repression?

The PAMA Executive Board Members attributed their victory to a number of factors including, perhaps most importantly, giving the genuine trade union course to their members. Other factors included continual protection of workers' rights through fully using the grievance machinery and implementing previous legislative wage increases. Also, after May 1988, some union officers quit living at home and began living in the sleeping quarters on company premises. The violence against PAMA officers also helped turn workers against the vigilantes and to further support the union. The union also established different committees to serve the workers before the beginning of the harassment, and these committees—such as the grievance committee, education committee, mutual benefit committee, cooperative committee—continued to provide services through the entire period. In short, the strategy of the union was to wage a vigorous, active campaign around fighting for worker rights, enforcing the contract and winning demands, while refusing to be intimidated by the violence (Scipes, 1996: 125).⁶¹

Synopsis

The case of the Philippines illustrates the role that the AFL-CIO's foreign policy contributed to the continuation of a dictatorship, through its support for a reactionary labor organization, the Trade Union Congress of the Philippines (TUCP). The quality of the TUCP can be seen through its activities of its largest affiliate at the time, the affiliate that TUCP President Democrito Mendoza created before being elected to the presidency of the TUCP in 1978, Associated Labor Unions (ALU). ALU's efforts in the struggle to remove a KMU affiliate, PAMA-SPFL, from Atlas Mines have been reprehensible.

Yet, this case study vividly shows more than "mere" supporting of a dictatorship—it shows, through the support and money channeled through AAFLI,

the very betrayal of Filipino workers. And worse, it shows their betrayal in a life or death situation, when the workers were fighting to maintain a union that was fighting for their interests.

PAMA-SFFL-KMU: 5,025

ALU-TUCP: 292

Indirect Operations with Local Labor Movements to Attack Progressive, Pro-Labor Governments: The Case of Venezuela⁶²

In April 2002, a military coup attempt initially deposed democratically-elected President Hugo Chavez Frias from office.⁶³ An article describing what happened started off:

Massive mobilizations, strikes, street conflict, hysterical mass media, social and economic disruption: Chile in 1972-73, Venezuela in 2002-04.

The AFL-CIO is again on the scene, this time in Venezuela, just as it was in Chile in 1973. Once again, its operations in the country are being funded by the U.S. Government. This time, the money is being laundered through the quasi-governmental National Endowment for Democracy, hidden from AFL-CIO members and the American public.

Once again, it is being used to support the efforts of reactionary labor and business leaders, helping to destabilize a democratically-elected government that has made major efforts to alleviate poverty, carried out significant land reform in both urban and rural areas, and striven to change political institutions that have long worked to marginalize those at the lowest rungs of society. And also like Allende's Chile, Venezuela's government under president Hugo Chavez has opposed a number of actions by the U.S. Government, this time by the Bush Administration (Scipes, 2004b).⁶⁴

This coup was launched by parts of the Venezuelan military, following a general strike led by oil company management and collaborating labor union leaders in Venezuela, to remove President Hugo Chavez from office. After physically removing Chavez from the presidential palace in Caracas, Miraflores, the head of the national business confederation, FEDECAMARAS,⁶⁵ Pedro Carmona, was sworn into office.

In response to the coup, literally millions of Venezuelans swarmed to Miraflores, surrounding the palace, protesting the coup.⁶⁶ Faced with the widespread public opposition, frustrated by loyal military forces that supported President Chavez, and condemned by heads of state across Latin America, the coup attempt collapsed. Chavez was returned to Miraflores, unharmed, where he resumed his duties as head of state.⁶⁷

Because of the apparent connection between the oil workers' union—the key union of the labor center Confederation of Venezuelan Workers (CTV in Spanish) and whose leader, Carlos Ortega, was the president of the CTV—and the coup attempt, and the long-standing ties between the CTV and the U.S. labor

center, the AFL-CIO, questions have risen about possible involvement of the AFL-CIO in the coup attempt.

The question of possible AFL-CIO involvement in the coup attempt, trying to confirm or deny any possible involvement, is addressed in this section. This proceeds in the following directions: (A) having previously discussed the AFL-CIO foreign policy program in general, and after examining in detail their operations in Chile and the Philippines, this author now discusses the AFL-CIO's foreign policy program in Venezuela; (B) considers evidence of the AFL-CIO's Solidarity Center staff activities in Venezuela prior to the coup attempt, and the coup attempt itself; (C) reports AFL-CIO statements as well as others' following the coup attempt, and subsequent analyses of the coup and U.S. involvement; and (D) answers the question as to whether the AFL-CIO, through its Solidarity Center, was involved in the 2002 coup attempt.

AFL-CIO's Foreign Policy Program in Venezuela

While the AFL-CIO's foreign policy program has been discussed generally already, what is less well known is its long-standing ties with the Venezuelan CTV. In fact, according to labor journalist Lee Sustar,

Venezuela—a key focus of U.S. foreign policy since the oil boom of the 1920s—became Washington's counterweight to the Cuban Revolution of 1959. The headquarters of the AFL-CIO-initiated Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers (ORIT) was moved to Caracas. In 1962, Venezuela was the linchpin of the AFL-CIO's newly launched American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD); the AIFLD board included both the AD leader Betancourt and his COPEI counterpart, Rafael Caldera. Next, in the mid-1960s, the AFL-CIO even provided funding for a CTV-owned bank. AIFLD chief Serafino Romualdi, later alleged to have been a CIA agent, called his relationship with Betancourt "the most fruitful political collaboration of my life." Romualdi helped engineer the expulsion of the Communist Party and other leftists from the CTV; elsewhere, AIFLD collaborated with the CIA and the State Department to undermine or overthrow Latin American governments opposed to the U.S.⁶⁸

In other words, not only has the AFL-CIO had a long-standing foreign policy program, it long has been active in Latin America, and especially in Venezuela.

Solidarity Center Activities in Venezuela, and the Attempted Coup

The Solidarity Center has been active in Venezuela since 1997. According to AFL-CIO International Affairs Department Assistant Director Stanley Gacek, the Solidarity Center was working to help democratize the CTV and its member unions (Gacek, 2004a; see also Gacek, 2005).

While that might have been true, it is not all the Solidarity Center was doing. After the CTV participated in a management lock-out against the Chavez

government in December 2001, AFL-CIO leaders shepherded officials of the CTV around Washington, DC, to meet with high level AFL-CIO and Bush Administration officials in February 2002. Katherine Hoyt (2002) of the Nicaraguan Solidarity Committee reported that CTV leaders had visited the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and Otto Reich, the Assistant U.S. Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs.⁶⁹

Just before these visits—according to a January-March 2002 quarterly report from the Solidarity Center to NED that was discovered through a FOIA (Freedom of Information Act) request by journalists Jeremy Bigwood and Eva Golinger⁷⁰—Solidarity Center staff members were involved in a series of meetings that were designed to bring together leaders of the CTV and FEDECAMARAS (the national business confederation). These meetings, six in all, took place around the country and culminated in a national meeting on March 5, 2002. At that meeting, the CTV and FEDECAMARAS, supported by the hierarchy of the Catholic Church, came together to discuss their concerns, perspectives and priorities regarding national development and to identify common objectives as well as areas of cooperation. At this meeting, the CTV and FEDECAMARAS were anointed “flagship organizations” in the struggle against President Chavez (Bigwood and Golinger, n.d.)⁷¹

According to the Solidarity Center documents unearthed by Bigwood and Golinger, this national conference was the culminating event of some two months of meetings and planning between FEDECAMARAS and the CTV. The joint action was intended to produce a “National Accord” to avoid a supposedly “deeper political and economic crisis.”

The report continues: “The Solidarity Center helped support the event in the planning stages, organizing the initial meetings with the governor of Miranda state and the business organization, FEDECAMARAS, to discuss and establish an agenda for such cooperation in mid-January.” The report continued to detail more of their efforts, concluding with the comment that, “The March 5 national conference itself was funded by counterpart funds” (Bigwood and Golinger, n.d.)⁷²

Barely more than thirty days after the March 5 conference, the CTV and FEDECAMARAS launched a national general strike on April 9th to protest the firing of oil company *management* on April 7th,⁷³ and the events leading to the coup attempt—in which CTV and FEDECAMARAS played central roles—began. On April 11th, a massive march and demonstration was held to support the union. “About midday on April 11th, speakers at the opposition rally, including Carmona and Ortega, began calling for supporters to march on the Presidential Palace, Miraflores, to demand Chavez’s resignation” (Golinger, 2005: 96). In case there was any doubt of CTV leaders’ active role in events, Lee Sustar wrote, “What is indisputable, however, is that Ortega joined with FEDECAMARAS to call the strike and march that set the stage for the coup” (Sustar, 2005).

When the coup’s military leaders decided to act and depose Chavez, FEDECAMARAS’ Carmona was chosen by coup leaders to become the new president. Carmona was sworn in on April 12, and immediately dissolved “all of

Venezuela's democratic institutions, including the National Assembly, the Supreme Court, the Public Defender's Office, the Attorney General, the Constitution and the 49 laws Chavez had decreed in December" (Golinger, 2005: 105).

The coup was denounced generally throughout the hemisphere (Golinger, 2005: 105, f.n. 23), with two notable exceptions. The President of the International Republican Institute, George A. Folsom, issued a statement publicly praising the coup leaders for their coup (Marquis, 2002).⁷⁴ And then, the Bush Administration supported the coup.⁷⁵

In response to this coup attempt, the people mobilized in the millions, the military split and the coup attempt failed. Chavez was returned to Miraflores on April 14th, where he resumed his duties as President.⁷⁶

Developments After the Attempted Coup

Once the coup attempt collapsed and constitutional order was returned, many efforts were made to "explain" developments. Both the CTV and the AFL-CIO provided their views, as did others.

On April 25, 2002, the *New York Times* published a piece by Christopher Marquis that discussed U.S. involvement in the coup attempt. While Marquis did not provide any specific details about the work of the Solidarity Center, he provided considerable information about NED efforts in Venezuela in the year prior to the coup, such as providing hundreds of thousands of dollars to Venezuelan opposition groups "including the labor group whose protests led to the Venezuelan president's brief ouster earlier this month." Marquis did point out, however,

Of particular concern is \$154,377 given by the [NED] to the American Center for International Labor Solidarity, the international wing of the AFL-CIO, to assist the main Venezuelan labor union in advancing labor rights.

The Venezuelan union, the Confederation of Venezuelan Workers [CTV], led the work stoppages that galvanized the opposition to Mr. Chavez. *The union's leader, Carlos Ortega, worked closely with Pedro Carmona Estanga, the businessman who briefly took over from Mr. Chavez, in challenging the government* (emphasis added) (Marquis, 2002).

Marquis also noted that the NED had quadrupled its annual budget to its Venezuelan clients to \$877,000 in the year before the coup attempt. In addition to the \$154,377 given to the Solidarity Center, the NED also provided the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs \$210,000 "to promote the accountability of local government": \$399,998 to the International Republican Institute for "political party building"; and apparently the balance to Center of International Private Enterprise (Marquis, 2002).⁷⁷

On April 27, 2002, the AFL-CIO issued a statement, "The AFL-CIO and Workers' Rights in Venezuela." In this statement, the AFL-CIO wrote in response to the coup, "there is no evidence that the CTV or its leaders went beyond the democratic expressions of dissent." In this statement, the AFL-CIO detailed its work in Venezuela:

the CTV conducted an impressive process of internal democratization with the assistance of the AFL-CIO and the Solidarity Center. The assistance included: the printing of election materials, the training of CTV election committees, and the sponsoring the forums which brought labor, business, human rights and religious leaders together in defense of freedom of association. All of the AFL-CIO-Solidarity Center funding for Venezuela went for this purpose (quoted in Scipes, 2002).

On May 2, 2002, this author published a piece on *Z Net*, wherein the incredible similarities were noted between the coup in Chile on September 11, 1973, and the April 2002 coup attempt in Venezuela. While this author had no proof to these accusations, the patterns were strikingly similar, and his suspicions had been raised. After including the "AFL-CIO and Workers' Rights in Venezuela" statement in this article that tried to make sense of developments in Venezuela, this author stated that he was willing to consider the possibility that the AFL-CIO had *not* been involved in the coup attempt. However, three questions were advanced: (1) Why is the AFL-CIO doing anything in Venezuela?; (2) Why does the AFL-CIO have any relationship with the National Endowment for Democracy [NED]?; and (3) Why has the AFL-CIO never given a detailed and honest accounting of its past and present operations to its members? These questions had to be answered before the issue could be considered resolved (Scipes, 2002). As far as can be determined, no answers to these questions have ever been provided publicly.

In the Spring 2004 issue of *New Labor Forum*, Stanley Gacek again discusses the AFL-CIO's work with the CTV. He writes, "our total solidarity program with the CTV amounted to less than \$20,000 in support of the Confederation's highly successful internal democratization program" (Gacek, 2004b).

However, Gacek also gives the AFL-CIO's perspective of the 2002 coup attempt, which exonerates the CTV from participating in the coup attempt. Gacek states "The CTV publicly condemned the April 2002 coup, never recognized the short-lived regime of Carmona and, unlike the Catholic Church, refused to endorse Carmona's decree dissolving the National Assembly" (Gacek, 2004a).⁷⁸

Journalist Robert Collier, with many years of experience reporting in Latin America for the *San Francisco Chronicle*, directly contradicted Gacek's statement in the following issue of *New Labor Forum*. Collier wrote that the CTV had worked with FEDECAMARAS not only in the April 2002 attempt, but also in an earlier lockout in December 2001, and a subsequent 63-day oil strike in December 2002-February 2003. Collier reports according to many published reports and interviews that he had conducted in Venezuela, that "the CTV was directly involved in the [April 2002] coup's planning and organization." Further, Collier reported, "For months before, CTV Secretary-General Carlos Ortega created a tight political alliance with FEDECAMARAS leader Pedro Carmona, and they repeatedly called for the overthrow of Chavez" (Collier, 2004; see also Ellner, 2004).

In March 2004, Alberto Ruiz, writing from inside the U.S. labor movement, asked, "What is the AFL-CIO Doing in Venezuela?" In this article, he addresses

the issue as to whether the AFL-CIO knew about the CTV role in the coup:

To deflect criticism about the aid to the CTV, the AFL-CIO has publicly claimed that the CTV did not have anything to do with the coup against Chavez. However, as the Boston Globe reported . . . [August 18, 2002], “the Venezuelan media broadcast a recorded telephone conversation between [exiled former president Carlos Andres] Perez and Carlos Ortega, president of the Confederation of Venezuelan Workers, in which the pair plotted against Chavez.” Moreover, the AFL-CIO has privately conceded that the CTV leadership did have participation in the coup against Chavez (Ruiz, 2004).

In the April 2004 issue of *Labor Notes*, this author again returned to the debate, this time with evidence (Scipes, 2004b). Issues concerning CTV involvement in the coup attempt, Solidarity Center staff members’ involvement in efforts beyond traditional labor movement activities, and outside (of the labor movement) funding of Solidarity Center’s Venezuelan activities were focused upon.

(1) The CTV was involved in the coup attempt.

This author joined accounts of the *Times*’ Christopher Marquis and the *Chronicle*’s Robert Collier with that of Professor Hector Lucena, another labor observer in Venezuela, and then with an account of the coup by Professor Steve Ellner and long-time Latin Americanist Fred Rosen, each who presented evidence of CTV’s participation in the coup attempt, and that the CTV leadership played a leading role, as well as details provided by Hardy (2007). Ellner and Rosen report—based on Hearings of the Special Political Commission of the National Assembly that were broadcast on Venezuelan TV on May 10, 2002—that “[CTV leader] Ortega had publicly called for the immediate dissolution of the [National] Assembly on April 12, *prior* to the announcement of Carmona’s decree” (emphasis added) (Ellner and Rosen, 2002). Additionally, in a personal communication with this author on March 6, 2004, Steve Ellner elaborated on events:

“The CTV promoted a march which was designed to topple the Chavez regime and everybody knew at the time that the idea was to create chaos so that the military would intervene.” Going further, he explained that “Opposition leaders openly called on the military to overthrow Chavez, and the strike leaders—not only Ortega but the supposed ‘moderates’ like Manuel Cova, Alfredo Ramos, Pablo Castro, Rodrigo Penson, Froilan Barrios—none of them stated at least publicly that they were opposed to a military coup (quoted in Scipes, 2004b).

Yet what about Gacek’s claim that the CTV condemned the coup? Yes, he is correct, but the CTV leaders condemned it only *after* they had been betrayed by Carmona and his people. According to Ellner and Rosen, despite the CTV and Ortega being key players in the coup efforts, upon attaining the presidency during the coup, Carmona ignored the labor wing of the opposition, appointing a cabinet of business leaders, military men and conservative politicians (Ellner

and Rosen, 2002).

It was only after this betrayal that the CTV condemned the coup, according to Robert Collier (Collier, 2004). And David Corn, writing in the August 5, 2002 issue of *The Nation*, confirmed this: "The CTV did denounce Carmona—but not until Carmona, on the afternoon of April 12, announced his decree to shutter the National Assembly and the Supreme Court" (Corn, 2002).

Eva Golinger, writing in her book on the US attacks on Chavez, *The Chavez Code*, adds even more detail to the CTV role. She presents the CTV's activities before and during the general strike to support the fired oil managers. She reprints the March 2002 cable from the U.S. Embassy in Caracas to the Secretary of State, in which it reports Ortega's drive for a new "government for democratic unity" (Golinger, 2005: 204). And she reports that Ortega, along with Carmona, called for the general strike to be "indefinite" on April 10th.

More damning, however, was a cable from the U.S. Embassy in Caracas to the U.S. Secretary of State titled "Tale of Two Cities—March on Miraflores Palace," dated April 12. Excerpts include:

2. The Opposition's "Coordinating Committee" met at FEDECAMARAS for two hours to discuss and reach agreement on strategy for the morning's upcoming march from Parque del Este to PDVSA [the national oil company, *Petroleos de Venezuela S.A.*] headquarters in Chacao. It was clear that there was growing support to continue the march from PDVSA on to Miraflores. Several attendees urged caution and expressed the belief the opposition was not ready for that step. Others strongly maintained it was time to directly confront the Executive and demand that the President and his ministers resign. By unanimous voice vote, *the Committee decided to let FEDECAMARAS President Pedro Carmona and CTV President Carlos Ortega make the decision regarding the march at the PDVSA rally—to allow them to judge the temperament of the crowd.* The 80 plus participants broke up the meeting in high spirits and headed out to Chacao.

3. By 11:00 AM, the area surrounding PDVSA headquarters was a sea of humanity. By the time Pedro Carmona spoke, it had become a foregone conclusion: on to Miraflores. With *Carmona, Ortega and former PDVSA President Gueaicaipura Lameda in the vanguard*, the multitude surged onto the autopista for the four-mile march downtown (emphases added) (reprinted in Golinger, 2005: 214).⁷⁹

There cannot be any doubt of the CTV leadership's involvement in the events leading up to and including the coup, despite the AFL-CIO's efforts to deny it—and this conclusion emerged before finding Collier's 2002 report, which is reported below under "Synopsis."

(2) Solidarity Center staff members were involved in something beyond traditional labor movement activities.

The Solidarity Center reports surfaced by Bigwood and Golinger are important. Solidarity Center staffers were detailing their efforts in quarterly reports to the

National Endowment for Democracy (NED) (Bigwood and Golinger, n.d.).⁸⁰

Not only does their existence conclusively prove that Solidarity Center staff members were involved in bringing together disparate groups—the CTV and FEDECAMARAS, most particularly—but they also organized an initial meeting with the governor of Miranda state. Additionally, as they put it, “The March 5 [2002] national conference itself was financed by counterpart funds.” While they don’t detail what they mean, since they talk about this differently than any other funding, it is clear it does not come from “ordinary” processes, but from something “outside.”⁸¹

In other words, they are obviously working in a broader “field” than just the labor movement (Hirsch, 2005). They are using their position “within” the U.S. labor movement for purposes other than to advance the well-being of workers and their organizations, ostensibly the role of any labor movement. Because NED is part of the U.S. Government’s foreign policy apparatus—despite their claims otherwise, and their so-called “private” status (Robinson, 1996; Agee, 2005; Golinger, 2005; Jones and Tayler, 2005; and Scipes, 2005d)—it is clear that the Solidarity Center in Venezuela has been helping to carry out U.S. foreign policy operations in that country.

It’s telling that the NED grants often allocate equal amounts to the Solidarity Center and its counterpart institutions run by the Republican and Democratic parties and business. This allows U.S. unions to project political weight abroad that they never had at home, even in the long-gone days of “Big Labor.” *The reality is that the Solidarity Center’s clout is based not on the strength of U.S. unions, but on government funds from the world’s only superpower* (emphasis added) (Sustar, 2005).

Similar to developments in Chile preceding the September 11, 1973 coup against the government of Salvador Allende—as discussed earlier in this chapter—these “Labor” efforts are part of something larger. As this author wrote,

This destabilization effort in Venezuela is not singular, but is one component of a multiple-track endeavor that includes supporting a peasant organization that opposes land reform; an educational organization that has suggested no education reforms; an organization seeking to incite a military rebellion; a civic association that has worked to mobilize middle class neighborhoods to “defend themselves” from the poor; a civil justice group that opposes grassroots community organizations because they support the Chavez government; a “leadership group” that supports the metropolitan Caracas police, whose behavior has become markedly more repressive over the past year; and a number of other anti-Chavez organizations, each which have received funding from NED (Scipes, 2004b).

(3) *Funding from outside the labor movement.*

This author was able to locate NED funding for Venezuela:

NED has been long active across Latin America. It has been active in Venezu-

ela, the fifth largest oil producer in the world, since 1992. According to accounts gathered from the NED itself, NED provided \$4,039,331 to Venezuelan and American organizations working in Venezuela between 1992-2001; 60.4 percent of that, or \$2,439,489 was granted between 1997-2001. Of that, \$2.4-plus million since 1997, \$587,926 (or almost one-quarter) went to ACILS for its work with the Confederation of Venezuelan Workers (CTV in Spanish). In 2002, the last year for which details are available, NED pumped in another \$1,099,352, of which ACILS got \$116,001 for its work with CTV. Altogether, ACILS received \$703,927 between 1997-2002 for its work in Venezuela alone (Scipes, 2004b).

Eva Golinger (2005) provides extensive funding accounts from the NED to its various grantee agencies in the country, mostly agreeing with these figures.

In short, combining his own research with that of others, this author conclusively demonstrates that the CTV leadership was involved in the coup, that Solidarity Center staff members were involved beyond the field of organized labor, and that all of these operations were funded from outside of the U.S. labor movement.

Interestingly, even with publication of extensive material by a number of authors, the AFL-CIO has stuck to its original position: the CTV was not involved in the coup:

The CTV executive refused to sign the infamous decree of the short-lived Carmona regime that dissolved the National Assembly. The CTV refused any and all offers to serve in the coup-installed government, and made a point of not being present at the inauguration of Carmona's cabinet (Gacek, 2005).

However, Gacek actually made a demonstrably false claim; referring to the series of meetings that led to the March 5 national conference, he wrote, "The five events financed by the Solidarity Center involved the participation of organized labor only, not the national business federation." If that is correct, then why did Solidarity Center staff report that they themselves were involved in a series of meetings that were designed to bring together leaders of the CTV and FEDECAMARAS (the national business confederation)? (Bigwood and Golinger, n.d.)

Synopsis

Despite the protestations and claims otherwise by the then-Assistant Director of the AFL-CIO's International Affairs Department, Stanley Gacek—and, interestingly, as far as can be ascertained, not corroborated by a single independent analyst—the evidence is overwhelming that the AFL-CIO and particularly its Solidarity Center were knowingly involved in events preceding the coup attempt against democratically-elected Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez Frias; that they acted as part of a multi-pronged attack by the U.S. Government and its misnamed National Endowment for Democracy on popular democracy in Venezuela and particularly the administration of President Chavez; that they were

funded by the U.S. Congress through the National Endowment for Democracy; and they lied and tried to cover up their involvement and the involvement of the leaders of their long-time associate, the CTV.⁸²

Yet after writing and publishing the above account in a peer-reviewed article (Scipes, 2007c), with its strong conclusion, this author found something in his files that he had misfiled and forgotten. It is included here because it sheds even further light on the CTV's role in the coup and afterwards, and it addresses the veracity of the AFL-CIO's International Affairs Department on these issues.

The report at hand is an e-mail report by Robert Collier to Stan Gacek and Tim Beatty of the International Affairs Department, dated July 29, 2002.⁸³ This report is quoted extensively because of the details it provides to the AFL-CIO International Affairs Department in late July 2002, which Gacek ignored when writing his later articles about AFL-CIO operations in Venezuela. The relevant points of Collier's report:

The CTV is one of the most hard-line sectors of the anti-Chavez opposition. It was actively, directly involved in the illegal plotting for the April coup. Ortega made a tight alliance with FEDECAMARAS (the Chamber of Commerce led by Pedro Carmona), the Catholic Church hierarchy and rightist military officers. This alliance was overtly political in nature, putting the CTV in bed with Venezuela's conservative old guard, and contained no clear pro-labor positions. Ortega only distanced himself from the coup after the fact, on April 12, when it became clear that Carmona and the rightist military officers had betrayed Ortega and had grabbed power for themselves.

Despite Ortega's last-minute attempts to distance himself from Carmona, after having been excluded from the junta, *the CTV's links with the junta were clear.* CTV executive council member Alfredo Ramos was a co-signer of the coup proclamation, and Solidarity Center labor professor Leon Arismendi was named to the post of Minister of Planning by Carmona. Arismendi has publicly denied accepting the post, although that's easy for him to say because the swearing-in ceremony (scheduled for April 13, Saturday afternoon in Miraflores Palace) never occurred because Carmona had to flee Miraflores by then, chased out by the pro-Chavez masses. I met with Arismendi during my visit and asked him about having been named minister, and he responded, "well, we all thought we had to help with the common effort to get rid of Chavez." He admitted having participated in discussions with coup leaders prior to the coup, but he declined to answer directly whether he had been a co-conspirator. He said that on Saturday, he went from Miraflores to Fuerte Tiuna (the army base where Carmona was holed up) and spent the whole afternoon there with a few other pro-Carmona intellectuals (i.e., Teodoro Petkoff, publisher of *Tal Cual* newspaper) talking to Carmona, trying to get him to soften his decree abolishing the entire constitutional order, and writing a draft of a new decree.

Since the coup, the CTV has irresponsibly rejected the proposals for a dialogue from Chavez and from former U.S. President Jimmy Carter during his June visit to Venezuela. The CTV leadership, including Ortega and CTV Secretary-General Manuel Cova, has repeatedly called for an indefinite general strike/lockout as an insurrectionary measure to overthrow the Chavez government. These calls have fizzled because they have not been supported by FEDECAMARAS, the majority of opposition parties, or the U.S. Embassy. The CTV's position has been exclusively political (demanding the overthrow of

Chavez) and has ignored legitimate labor demands.

Although the government appears willing to engage in political dialogue with the opposition and the CTV, as Carter publicly stated, it continues to view the CTV with great suspicion. The AFL-CIO is viewed with near-equal suspicion because of its apparently unquestioning support for the CTV and its guilt-by-association through the NED and NRI [National Republican Institute-KS] aid programs, much of which go to conservative, hard-line opposition sectors.

The AFL-CIO must understand that its solidarity with the CTV is easily misunderstood as support for the CTV's hard-line, anti-democratic coup mongering.

The AFL-CIO's statement on Venezuela (apparently undated, emailed to me and other labor activists April 26, and attached to this message) contains numerous erroneous or ill-considered statements, such as "It was these very attacks on freedom of association that led to a number of the collective actions and demonstrations that occurred this month" . . . "there is no evidence that the CTV or its leaders went beyond the democratic expressions of discontent." In fact, *all available evidence suggests that the CTV was directly involved in illegal coup plotting and continues to agitate for another insurrectionary, military-led overthrow of the democratically-elected government.* In addition, the statement's claim that AFL-CIO funding helped pay for "the sponsoring of forums which brought labor, business, human rights and religious leaders together in defense of freedom of association" is misleading. In fact, *these forums were explicitly political in nature, serving as the platforms in which Ortega and Carmona forged their conspiratorial alliance that led to the coup* (emphases added) (Collier, 2002).

In short, even if they did not know already—which would seem unlikely, if not impossible—within four months, the International Affairs Department had a first-hand, independent report from a respected American trade unionist and professional journalist regarding these events. This report provided direct information about the April 2002 coup attempt, especially regarding the active and direct involvement of the leadership of the CTV in the coup attempt, the politics that the AFL-CIO ally in the country (CTV) was involved in, and subsequent behavior by its leadership. Nonetheless, the AFL-CIO's International Affairs Department dismissed, disregarded, ignored, or "conveniently forgot" the report, and subsequent articles written by Stan Gacek that were published years later continued to make claims that Collier had reported were false in July 2002.

Conclusion

This chapter has continued the examination of U.S. Labor's foreign policy program, focusing specifically on developments beginning in 1962 with the initiation of AIFLD, the American Institute for Free Labor Development. This has included a review of the extensive literature documenting the reactionary foreign policy program that has been carried out by the AFL-CIO in Africa, Asia and Latin America.

The unique contribution of this chapter has been, however, the identification of three different types of labor interventions with an in-depth case study

from each type: (1) direct efforts to help undermine democratically-elected governments that have led to military coups, with an examination of the case of Chile in the early 1970s; (2) support for reactionary governments and attacks on progressive workers and their organizations seeking democratic change, with an examination of the case of the Philippines and the struggle at Atlas Mines in the mid- to late-1980s; and (3) indirect operations with local labor movements to attack progressive, pro-labor governments, with an examination of the support of the CTV in Venezuela and its efforts to help instigate a coup against democratically-elected President Hugo Chavez (late 1990s-2002).

This approach—identifying three different types of operations⁸⁴—is important for several reasons. First, it demonstrates that AFL-CIO interventions have taken place in a multitude of different situations, and thus cannot be rationalized as defending “freedom of association,” which has been the AFL-CIO’s historical mantra of justification for its foreign operations—there simply was no attack on Labor freedoms in either Chile or Venezuela, and in both cases, the progressive governments attacked had been consciously working to *support* the cause and traditional ideals of organized labor and improve the lives of the large number of working people, overcoming oppression from their past. And, in fact, the one place where there *was* an attack on freedom of association was at Atlas Mines in the Philippines, and in that struggle, the side backed by the AFL-CIO was the one challenging freedom of association, not their opponents. Thus, the AFL-CIO’s traditional justification has been shown to be a complete and utter fraud.

Second, the case of Atlas Mines is particularly pernicious. Here, workers had organized and, at great risk and with a real cost in lives, created a union, PAMA, that was democratically run, worked to improve their working lives, and had increased their economic well-being. These are things that the AFL-CIO claims it wants to help workers achieve around the world. Yet, the largest affiliate of the AFL-CIO ally in the Philippines—Associated Labor Unions/Trade Union Congress of the Philippines (ALU/TUCP), whose leader was President of the TUCP—joined with company management, local government, the Philippine Constabulary, and KADRE, a death squad, to try destroy to destroy PAMA. Fortunately, this reactionary effort was overwhelmingly rejected by the workers at Atlas Mines, who voted by a margin of almost 5,000 votes (out of 7,000 legitimate ballots) to reject ALU/TUCP’s approach to trade unionism—and the AFL-CIO’s.

Third, as can be seen, the AFL-CIO’s labor operations in these cases are exposed for having nothing to do with real trade unionism. In not one of these cases did workers benefit from their efforts; in the case of Chile, a brutal, murderous dictatorship was imposed, “whose very first decree was to outlaw the CUT, the labor [center] which represented some 90 percent of Chile’s organized workers” (Hirsch, 2008). In the Philippines, AFL-CIO efforts supported the Low Intensity Conflict that the Philippine government (with U.S. Government assistance) had initiated to maintain dominance by a conservative, elite democracy against working people and their allies.⁸⁵ The workers in Venezuela benefited from the *failure* of AFL-CIO allies’ efforts. In fact, there has not been a good trade union reason for AFL-CIO involvement in any of these countries, much

less all of them.

Fourth, these operations—initiated by George Meany and continued under Lane Kirkland, past AFL-CIO presidents—were continued under President John Sweeney. The case of Venezuela is especially important: despite some positive interventions to support workers' struggles by the Solidarity Center beginning in 1997 (discussed in chapter 3)—whether out of genuine concern for the workers or efforts to undercut critics' attacks by implementing a more sophisticated program or, probably, some of both—involvement in meetings with U.S. officials in Washington, D.C. and with labor, business and church leaders in Venezuela prior to the coup, and then lying about CTV activities after the coup, shows that the AFL-CIO foreign policy program has *not* changed its stripes, that it continues to act as a conscious part of the apparatus of Empire; that it continues to place the interests of the U.S. Empire ahead of workers.

Altogether, they confirm the charge that the AFL-CIO's foreign policy leadership has been and continues to be engaged in labor imperialism. If anything, labor imperialism is worse than general, "run-of-the-mill" imperialism, because it is being done by worker "leaders" and in the name of workers against workers. It is a betrayal of the highest order.

In short, the evidence developed to date demonstrates that the AFL-CIO's foreign policy program is an overwhelming disaster for workers around the world, particularly for workers in developing countries, but as will be shown in the next chapter, for American workers as well.

Chapter 3

War Within Labor: The Struggle to Build International Labor Solidarity¹

From at least the late 1960s and continuing today, labor activists have been and continue to be engaged in numerous campaigns to change the direction of the U.S. labor movement. This has taken many different approaches, such as national reform movements in unions like the Mineworkers, Steelworkers, Autoworkers, and Teamsters; reform movements in many local unions; efforts to fight plant closures and economic dislocation while providing jobs and economic development; electoral politics reform efforts, efforts to change labor's position on immigration, efforts to develop a labor media, etc.²

Along with all of these projects has been the struggle to build international labor solidarity (Scipes, 1988; Moody, 1997; Waterman, 1998/2001)³ and, within that, the struggle to change Labor's foreign policy.

Ultimately, all of these efforts share a common philosophical approach of trying to transform Labor from being a reactionary force, interested only in its own limited interests, to one fighting for economic and social justice for working people on a national, if not an international, basis. Below, attention is focused only on those working on an international if not global basis, but these efforts must be understood as part of the larger effort to transform the U.S. labor movement.

Interestingly, the struggle to change Labor's foreign policy actually goes back over one hundred years. As David Nack (1999: 33-48) explains, efforts to challenge the leadership developed over how to respond to the 1905 Russian uprising. Samuel Gompers, acting to advance his own interests, vacillated in his support for the Russian workers, and that this was at least in part out of a desire to undercut more radical visions of trade unionism—which included a conscious understanding of the need to build international labor solidarity. In response, a considerable number of members of AFL-affiliated unions opposed Gompers' position. Nack demonstrates that the struggle within Labor to build international labor solidarity actually begins in the early years of the twentieth century.

However, other than efforts largely around building labor support for the Soviet Union during the 1930s and '40s—a controversial project within Labor to say the least—efforts to build international labor solidarity did not seriously re-emerge until the middle 1960s. A number of analysts began challenging AFL-

CIO foreign policy. The most important of these efforts was by Ronald Radosh (1969), who did one of the earliest in-depth studies of AFL foreign policy under Gompers, albeit seeing the source of this foreign policy as being outside of the labor movement.

As these primarily intellectual understandings were developing, an American trade unionist, Fred Hirsch, acted on his own. Hirsch, a plumber, had uncovered the fact that AIFLD—the AFL-CIO’s Latin American “institute,” the American Institute for Free Labor Development—had been actively involved in helping to lay the groundwork that led to the September 11, 1973 coup in Chile against democratically-elected President Salvador Allende. Hirsch published two pamphlets on this involvement. This led to passage of a formal resolution within the San Jose Labor Council in California that condemned AIFLD involvement in laying the groundwork for the Chilean coup (Hirsch, 1974; n.d.[1975]; see also Scipes, 2000b).

This was followed by the efforts of some substitute teachers in Chicago. In 1978, they exposed the links between the American Federation of Teachers, headed by Albert Shanker, and the CIA (Schmidt, 1978).

These “exposes”—along with the analyses from the 1960s and ‘70s—laid the groundwork for the massive explosion in efforts to build international labor solidarity that began in the 1980s.

These understandings in the U.S. were taking place somewhat parallel to the same processes taking place in the United Kingdom and The Netherlands. Don Thomson and Rodney Larson’s classic *Where Were You, Brother? An Account of Trade Union Imperialism* (1978) raised the issue of international labor solidarity in the U.K. in response to such labor imperialism. Shortly thereafter, in 1980, Peter Waterman began NILS, the *Newsletter of International Labour Studies*, from his location in The Netherlands, arguing the necessity of building international labor solidarity (see Waterman, 1998/2001).⁴ And following in late 1983, an international labor journal, *International Labour Reports* (ILR), was launched in the U.K., joining people spurred on particularly by Don Thomson. The purpose of the journal was to inform workers of labor struggles taking place in developing countries so as to build international labor solidarity, and to suggest that developed country workers could learn from these workers’ struggles in developing countries. Just prior to ILR’s initial issue, on the basis of a chance encounter during a short visit to England and extensive conversations over a brief period, as an American trade unionist, this author was brought into the project, serving as ILR’s North American representative for the next five years, from 1984-89.

One of the projects that emerged in the United States during the 1980s was CISTUR, the Committee in International Solidarity for Trade Union Rights. CISTUR, founded by long-time labor lawyer and activist Aubrey Grossman in San Francisco, was an effort to build understanding and labor support for trade unionists around the world who were fighting for economic and social justice.

CISTUR was just one effort that emerged from within the labor movement during the 1980s, recognizing the importance of building international labor solidarity and seeking to build such. While its impact was ultimately small, there

were a number of other efforts.

The key development was the National Labor Committee in Support of Democracy and Human Rights in El Salvador (hereafter, NLC). The NLC, comprised of leaders of a number of national and international U.S.-based unions, emerged in opposition to the Reagan Administration's support for the reactionary government in El Salvador, and later, worked to stop the AFL-CIO from endorsing any possible Reagan effort to invade Nicaragua.⁵ In a detailed analysis of the NLC's work, Andrew Battista made the following evaluation:

[The NLC] was an integral part of the U.S. Central America peace movement that opposed the Reagan administration and influenced congressional action on Central America, the most divisive foreign policy issue of the 1980s. The NLC also challenged the Central America policy and anticommunist international outlook of the AFL-CIO and sought to chart a new foreign policy for the U.S. labor movement, and thereby provoked the most serious and open policy split in American labor in several decades. Further, the NLC contributed to the long and difficult task in rebuilding a strong labor-liberal coalition in American national policies. Last but not least, NLC was part of a larger and ongoing rift in the leadership of American labor that lay in the background of the dramatic 1995 leadership change at the AFL-CIO (Battista, 2002: 422).⁶

In addition to efforts by union leaders, there were also projects that emerged from the grassroots within the labor movement. In 1984, Local 10 of the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union refused to unload a Dutch ship, the *Nedloyd Kimberly*, that was carrying South African cargo when it tied up in San Francisco—the Local finally gave in after 10 days when a U.S. Federal judge threatened to fine the Local \$25,000 a day if it continued. This activity took place after considerable efforts in the Local to build support for liberation struggles in Southern Africa, and included considerable outreach to the various social communities in the Bay Area (Scipes, 1985).

There were other, on-going projects.⁷ One of the most successful and long lasting was the Philippine Workers Support Committee (PWSC) initiated by John Witeck, an AFSCME staffer in Hawaii. Witeck, who had traveled to the Philippines in 1984 for the International Solidarity Affair (ISA) sponsored by the *Kilsuang Mayo Uno* Labor Center (KMU),⁸ had been so inspired that he got others to attend subsequent ISAs, and then set up a nation-wide network to build support for Filipino workers in the KMU and to mobilize people in the United States for speaking tours by Filipino trade unionists. He published the PWSC *Philippine Labor Alert* for years, eventually reaching 40 issues in 1998. One of the strongest PWSC chapters was in Boston, where activists developed extensive efforts to support Filipino workers.

The Labor Committee on the Middle East, developed in San Francisco by Jeff Blankfort and Steve Zeltzer, was a unique effort to look at developments in the Middle East from a rank and file labor perspective, with the goal—unfortunately, yet unfulfilled—of getting Labor to break ties with Israel, and to actively support the liberation struggle of the Palestinians (see also Ray, 2005).

American activists—spearheaded by the United Electrical workers (UE), a

union not affiliated with the AFL-CIO—began making connections with Mexican workers, and most especially with the Authentic Labor Front (the FAT in Spanish) in the early 1990s (Hathaway, 2000: 175-196).⁹ This was joined by workers and organizations in the Coalition for Justice in the Maquiladoras, which united people from the U.S. and Canada with those in Mexico (Bacon, 2004; Vogel, 2006).

Yet these trade unionists were not acting alone: political activists interested in Labor were publishing “exposes” of AFL-CIO foreign operations.¹⁰ There had been earlier accounts published during the 1960s and early ‘70s (see, among others, Snow, 1964; Berger, 1967; Lens, 1967; Morris, 1967; Windmuller, 1967; Langley, 1972; Lens, 1972), and these were joined by a new wave of reports such as that by Lenny Siegel in 1975. Richard Fletcher published a talk given in Scotland by Fred Hirsh (correct-Hirsch) as *CIA and the Labor Movement* in 1977. Jack Scott published a devastating critique of the history of AFL operations in Latin America in 1978. Hobart Spalding (1984) published an important examination of AFL-CIO work in Latin America (and which was republished in 1988). Tom Barry and Deb Preusch (1986) followed with another exposure of AIFLD in Latin America. J. Michael Luhan (1986) wrote about “AIFLD’s Salvadoran Labor Wars.” Tim Shorrock and Kathy Selvaggio (1986) wrote about AFL-CIO operations in the Philippines and South Korea. Al Weinrub and William Bollinger (1987) detailed AFL-CIO work in Central America. Daniel Cantor and Juliet Schor (1987) published a book, *Tunnel Vision*, which was subtitled “Labor, the World Economy, and Central America,” while Robert Armstrong, Hank Frundt, Hobart Spalding and Sean Sweeney (1988) presented an excellent analysis revolving around Central America. Dave Slaney (1988) argued that it was in U.S. unions’ interest to support workers’ struggles in Central America, while Frank Smyth (1987a, b) focused on AIFLD’s work in El Salvador. Hobart Spalding (1988a, b) wrote about AIFLD’s work in Latin America. Lois West (1991) examined the U.S. efforts against militant political unionism in the Philippines (and followed with a monograph on the KMU in 1997 in West, 1997). This was followed by Beth Sims’ 1992 account of the AFL-CIO’s role in U.S. foreign policy. Gregory Mantsios (1998) asked “What Does Labor Stand For?” in regard to its activities around the world. Also that year, Anthony Carew (1998) published an important account about the immediate post-World War II period. Several important pieces were published the following year: Paul Buhle (1999) tied this reactionary foreign policy to a declining business unionism, while James Ciment and Immanuel Ness (1999) wrote about Labor’s relationship with the National Endowment for Democracy, and Douglas Valentine (1999) detailed AFL operative Irving Brown’s involvement in the drug trade to finance operations in Europe after the recently-formed CIA cut off funding in the early 1950s.¹¹

Yet, the trade unionists were writing as well. This author, while still a rank and file activist in the Graphic Communications International Union (AFL-CIO), visited the Philippines for the first time in early 1986 (eventually making six trips between 1986-94), and wrote about the emergence of the militant unions joined in the KMU Labor Center, as well as the work of the AFL-CIO’s

Asian “institute,” the Asian-American Free Labor Institute (AAFLI), that paralleled the work of the AIFLD in Latin America (Scipes, 1986). Sandy Boyer (1986) wrote about AFL-CIO operations in South Africa, while Enid Eckstein (1986) wrote about AFL-CIO work in the Philippines. This author also wrote about AFL-CIO efforts to mislead their members about their international work (Scipes, 1987a), and wrote about San Francisco Bay Area activists’ efforts to challenge AFL-CIO foreign operations (Scipes, 1987b). Fred Hirsch and Virginia Muir (1987) wrote a long piece about AFL-CIO foreign policy. In 1989, this author published a piece about the origins of Labor’s foreign policy (Scipes, 1989). Paul Garver (1989) wrote about the need to build international labor solidarity as opposed to then-current operations. *International Labour Reports* (1989) published one of the earliest reports on U.S. Labor’s relationship with the National Endowment for Democracy. This author wrote about the repression directed against the KMU by AAFLI’s Filipino allies, the Associated Labor Unions of the Trade Union Congress of the Philippines (Scipes, 1990). Kay Eisenhower (1991) wrote about AFL-CIO funneling US \$3.7 million to a reactionary Philippine labor leader and Senator in exchange for his pro-American vote in regard to retaining U.S. bases in that country. In 1996, this author’s monograph on the KMU of the Philippines—with a specific, detailed look at how reactionary labor operations were carried out against more militant unions (Scipes, 1996: 116-125)—was published. And Kim Moody (1997) wrote his book on building international labor solidarity.

With the 1995 election of John Sweeney to the presidency of the AFL-CIO—partially the result of foreign policy activist efforts (see Bacon, 1995; Buhle, 1999; Battista, 2002; Shorrock, 2003)—the labor center appeared to have changed its foreign policy “stripes.” One of the things that Sweeney did was disband the semi-autonomous regional institutes in Africa, Asia, Latin America and Western Europe, and put them under control of the newly established and centrally-controlled “Solidarity Center” (officially known as the American Center for International Labor Solidarity or ACILS) (Scipes, 2000b). It appeared to have changed its international orientation from “anti-communism” to “international labor solidarity.”

The Solidarity Center hired a number of respected trade unionists to fill its ranks around the world. Unlike its’ predecessors—AAFLI, AALC, AIFLD, and FTUI—the Solidarity Center has done some good work in particular situations, such as bringing embattled Columbian trade unionists to the U.S. for a year to relax and rejuvenate, and it has supported various unions and intervened positively in certain struggles, such as in Central America.¹² This author has heard anecdotes about some of its staff actually providing positive support to Iraqi trade union organizations.

The operations conducted by the Solidarity Center are certainly more sophisticated than those in preceding years, and combine some positive efforts in addition to negative efforts such as those in Venezuela, which were discussed in chapter 2. In other words, Solidarity Center operations cannot be seen as all bad; as an unknown reviewer wrote: “it is all much more gray than black and white.”¹³

That being said, critics such as Judy Ancel (2000), Peter Rachleff (2000), and Kim Scipes (2000b: 6-7), each noted specific problems that continued under the Sweeney Administration. (See pp. 39-40, above, for further discussion.)

The biggest problem was the AFL-CIO's continuing relationship with the National Endowment for Democracy or NED (Scipes, 2000b: 6-7). The NED had been established by the Reagan Administration in 1983 to do overtly what the CIA had previously tried to do covertly (Robinson, 1996; Blum, 2000: 179-183; Golinger, 2005; Scipes, 2005d). The AFL-CIO had joined with the international wing of the Democratic Party, the international wing of the Republican Party, and the international wing of the Chamber of Commerce to serve as one of the NED's four "core" institutes, and to advance the interests of the U.S. Empire (Scipes, 2005d). Thus, by continuing their relationship with the NED, AFL-CIO foreign policy leaders reaffirmed that the interests of the U.S. Empire were more important to them than the interests of working people, whether abroad or at home, despite any rhetorical flourishes to the contrary.

Accordingly, Scipes' 2000b article had considerable ramifications. While supporting the apparently new foreign policy of the Sweeney Administration—albeit raising issues still not resolved (see Scipes, 2000b: 7, fn 1)—Scipes called for the AFL-CIO foreign policy leadership to "Come Clean" about their foreign policy operations, both currently and historically (Scipes, 2000b; see also Ancel, 2000). In this piece, which presents the most-detailed examination of AIFLD's role in the 1973 Chilean coup, Scipes specifically credited Fred Hirsch (1974, n.d. [1975]) for first revealing details in his earlier studies (Scipes, 2000b: 16, fn 3).¹⁴

A key development around the issue of AFL-CIO foreign policy was the April 2002 coup attempt against democratically-elected Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez—this is the coup attempt that an Irish film crew captured on tape and was later released as *The Revolution Will Not be Televised*.¹⁵ Within about three weeks after the coup attempt, this author published a piece (Scipes, 2002) questioning whether the AFL-CIO had been involved in this coup attempt, noting its obvious similarities to the events preceding the Chilean coup (see Scipes, 2000b). The AFL-CIO immediately denied any improper activities (Scipes, 2002). This author backed down, having no concrete evidence, but continued seeking evidence with this question in mind.

Around this time, Dean Frutiger (2002) examined labor's campaign against China, and argued it was a continuation of their "Cold War" policies, despite the claim that they had moved beyond them.

Tim Shorrock (2002, 2003) then weighed in with two articles on current AFL-CIO foreign policy. The latter one was particularly important as it detailed the emerging efforts to challenge the AFL-CIO foreign policy program from within Labor.

Meanwhile, Fred Hirsch pushed forward his own efforts to again try to get the AFL-CIO to "Clear the Air" about their foreign operations. He had initiated a resolution at the 2002 California State AFL-CIO Biannual convention, and it appeared about to pass, when California AFL-CIO leaders in attendance offered a compromise to Hirsch and his follow activists: in exchange for "watering

down” the resolution, top-level AFL-CIO foreign policy people would come to California and have a meeting to discuss these issues with the activists. The deal was accepted. In October 2003—fifteen months after the deal was accepted—Stanley Gacek and William Lucy, national-level AFL-CIO foreign policy leaders, had a meeting with over fifty activists from California. These “leaders” basically came and presented a “dog and pony” show instead of a substantive discussion as had been promised, angering the activists (Hirsch, 2003; see also Scipes, 2004a). As they had feared something like this when they accepted the AFL-CIO compromise, the activists retained the right to bring the issue up before the next California AFL-CIO biannual convention.

However, before the convention, this author had been told about some documents regarding developments in Venezuela that had been surfaced through Freedom of Information Act requests by Jeremy Bigwood and Eva Golinger (n.d.). When examined, they provided the “smoking gun” about AFL-CIO activities in Venezuela prior to the coup that he had suspected: among these documents were reports by the American Center for International Labor Solidarity (ACILS, more colloquially known as the “Solidarity Center”) operatives in Venezuela to the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), detailing their operations prior to the coup attempt. Joined with some data Scipes had developed on his own regarding NED funding for ACILS’ operations in Venezuela, this author blew the whistle on these activities in April 2004 (Scipes, 2004b; see above chapter 2).

At the 2004 Biennial California State AFL-CIO Convention in July, the Resolutions Committee pulled together a number of related resolutions into one, “Build Unity and Trust Among Workers Worldwide.” “Build Unity and Trust” included resolutions submitted by Plumbers and Fitters Local 393 (San Jose), the South Bay Labor Council (San Jose), the Monterey Bay Central Labor Council (Castroville), and the San Francisco Labor Council, and was joined by resolutions initially demanding transparency in NED (National Endowment for Democracy) funding by American Federation of Teachers Local 1493 (San Mateo), the California Teachers Federation, and the San Francisco Labor Council. The “Build Unity and Trust” resolution was adopted unanimously by the over four hundred representatives of almost 2.5 million organized workers—approximately one-sixth of the entire AFL-CIO membership at the time (before the 2005 split) (Hirsch, 2004a; see also Scipes, 2004c). This was a powerful rebuke of the AFL-CIO’s national-level foreign policy leaders, and it was transmitted for consideration at the AFL-CIO’s 2005 National Convention in Chicago.

Also later in 2004, Harry Kelber, a long-time trade unionist and perennial thorn in the side of the AFL-CIO’s leadership, published a six-part series on the AFL-CIO foreign policy program. Kelber examined both history and current operations in his critique (Kelber, 2004). Kelber followed this up, just before the National Convention in 2005, with a piece reporting that over 90 percent of the Solidarity Center’s funding came from the Federal government (Kelber, 2005a; see also Kelber, 2005b, 2009).

Also in March 2005, this author published a new article. This one—based

on a tip by Chris Townsend of the United Electrical (UE) workers—exposed the active participation by top-level AFL-CIO foreign policy leaders in the U.S. State Department’s ACLD, Advisory Committee on Labor Diplomacy. Considering that U.S. Government Labor Attachés have been the key operatives within U.S. Embassies around the world to keep an eye on workers in their countries, this collaboration threatened continued repression of workers around the world. Thus, the foreign policy leaders were actively involved in another dubious Bush Administration project, one that continued after being started under the Clinton Administration’s Madeleine Albright (Scipes, 2005a, and see chapter 4, below).

The escalating attacks on the AFL-CIO foreign policy program resulted in efforts by the AFL-CIO leadership to undercut and reverse “Build Unity and Trust” (see Scipes, 2005c). Through its control of the Convention’s Resolutions Committee, the Sweeney administration made the related foreign policy resolution that went to the 2005 National Convention one that *praised* the Solidarity Center for its work instead of condemning it. When delegates attempted to challenge the resolution put forth by the Sweeney-controlled Resolutions Committee—i.e., to support “Build Unity and Trust”—they were undemocratically prevented from speaking by the Chair of the Convention at the time, AFSCME President Gerald McEntee (Scipes, 2005g).

Globalization¹⁶

And now that extensive background has been provided, it is time to focus on efforts within the labor movement to join the alternative globalization movement, the global movement for social justice and economic justice. It is argued that we are part of a globalizing world, people are connecting with more people around the world and on a deeper level than ever before, and that we must have a global perspective; thus, we must be pro-globalization, not anti-globalization.

However, before addressing this issue, the issue of “globalization” must be discussed: just what is meant by that?

The media present “globalization” as one thing, a monolith, a single force. It presents top-down, corporate-military globalization alone as “globalization,” whose purpose is only to ensure that multinational corporations have unimpeded access to the entire planet, regardless of the consequences to and effects upon people and the environment (see, for example, Friedman, 1999). It is this limited and detrimental approach that is presented as “globalization” in the corporate media.

Yet, globalization has two aspects, not just the one that the media presents. The second aspect, the one almost never reported—or when it is reported, it is represented in a distorted, distasteful manner—is *the bottom-up, grassroots globalization of women and men around the world, who are seeking another world, a better world, that is based on global solidarity, ecological and economic sustainability, and economic and social justice*. It is this grassroots globalization, the global social and economic justice movement, that is fighting the values and the future of corporate globalization. Thus, the very values of the two different

aspects of globalization are opposed to each other (see Shiva, 2005; Starr, 2005)—and it is the values and the efforts of the global social and economic justice movement that a growing number of trade unionists are organizing to get the U.S. labor movement to join.¹⁷

There have been two efforts, one well developed but focused primarily on building an anti-Iraq War and now an anti-Afghanistan War movement within the U.S. labor movement—U.S. Labor Against War (USLAW)—and the other struggling to reform the AFL-CIO foreign policy program overall, which is much less developed, the Worker to Worker Solidarity Committee (WWSC). And while these efforts are not opposed or in contradiction to each other—in fact, there are long-time relationships and activities among some of the people involved in both—most of the attention is focused on USLAW, which has made substantial political and organizational gains within the labor movement. However, it is argued that because of WWSC's political challenge to the AFL-CIO's foreign policy program, this must be considered as well.

Alternative Globalization within Labor: U.S. Labor Against War¹⁸

With its initial meeting in January 2003, USLAW was formally founded in Chicago in October 2003, at what was called the “National Labor Assembly of U.S. Labor Against the War.” USLAW was established as an organization based on a network of labor organizations across the country that were opposed to the U.S. war in Iraq (Fletcher, 2003b; see Onasch, 2003; Scipes, 2003a). One of the key decisions, resulting in considerable legitimacy within the labor movement, was that USLAW established itself as an organization based on mandated support from rank and file union members, and not merely the efforts of activists or even progressive elected union leaders. As of mid-2005, USLAW had grown into a coalition of “over 110 unions, central labor councils, state federations and other labor organizations” (Zweig, 2005: 62).

USLAW has been quite active since its founding, playing a key role in getting “unions, central labor councils, and state federations representing more than four million workers [to pass] resolutions since 2003 opposing the war in Iraq and calling for an end to the occupation, withdrawal of U.S. troops, and redirection of resources to domestic social needs” (Zweig, 2005: 61-62). In other words, activists and leaders within USLAW have acted within the parameters of the U.S. labor movement to challenge traditional AFL-CIO support for the U.S. Government's foreign policy.

A major activity by USLAW was its very successful Iraqi labor leaders' tour across the United States in early-mid 2005, and this was followed by subsequent tours in 2007 and 2009. In 2005, USLAW brought labor leaders from the three main Iraqi labor centers to the U.S. and took them to over twenty-five different locations around the country, allowing these labor leaders to tell their stories about labor organizing in Iraq and to provide accounts of the war directly to American audiences. At the same time, Americans—mostly labor activists and

supporters—were able to talk (through interpreters) directly to Iraqis, and to ask questions that they had about the Iraqi labor movement and war.

A key development in USLAW's short but powerful existence has been to get the AFL-CIO's 2005 National Convention to pass a resolution demanding that U.S. troops be "rapidly removed" from Iraq (USLAW, 2005). The significance of this cannot be overestimated: not only did this, in effect, overturn an AFL-CIO Executive Committee resolution (Chicago Indy Media Center, 2005)—impressive in and of itself—but this was the first time in its history that the U.S. labor movement has challenged U.S. foreign policy while at war, and demanded that the troops be brought home rapidly (Zweig, 2005).

Yet, at the same time, and while the National Convention is constitutionally the highest governing body of the AFL-CIO, this resolution was basically ignored by the leadership of the AFL-CIO. The AFL-CIO certainly has not followed up and implemented this resolution.

USLAW, however, has continued to do very important work. In 2009 alone, USLAW sent delegates (including two Iraq war veterans, representing Iraq Veterans Against the War)¹⁹ representing 186 affiliates and participated in the First International Labor Conference in Irbil, Iraq on March 13-14 (USLAW, 2009a). They sponsored a tour of Iraqi labor leaders who ended up attending the National Convention of the AFL-CIO in Pittsburgh in September, and where USLAW was able to win passage of Resolution 16, calling for "Speedy Withdrawal" from Iraq and to defend Iraqi labor rights (USLAW, 2009b). And they sponsored a successful National Assembly in Chicago in December, where they brought labor leaders from Iraq, Pakistan and Venezuela who spoke to the conference (along with a representative of the emerging Iranian labor movement). At the National Assembly, USLAW passed resolutions to end the U.S. wars and occupations in Iraq and Afghanistan, called for a U.S. economy that provides good jobs and promotes peace, opposed military advertising in our schools, endorsed March 20, 2010 antiwar demonstrations demanding the immediate withdrawal of all U.S. military forces from Iraq, expressed solidarity with working people of Palestine and Israel, and demanded an end to settlements in the West Bank and to end the siege of Gaza. They also decided on an extensive 2010 plan of work and action (USLAW, 2009c; see also Lydersen, 2009).²⁰

In short, USLAW is doing excellent grassroots organizing within the U.S. labor movement, while working to build conscious solidarity with workers and unions globally.

Alternative Globalization within Labor: Worker to Worker Solidarity Committee²¹

While recognizing and applauding the success of USLAW, it is argued that the work of the Worker to Worker Solidarity Committee (WWSC) cannot and should not be overlooked. It is important because it emerged and developed out of challenges to the AFL-CIO foreign policy program as a whole, and particularly challenges the AFL-CIO's relations with the U.S. Government's National

Endowment for Democracy (NED). In other words, taking a more pointed ideological approach than does USLAW, WWSC's efforts have complimented and possibly helped advance USLAW's efforts in some small ways. Yet the efforts of the WWSC are important in and of themselves. Nonetheless, the WWSC has been outside of the mainstream labor movement, focusing on mobilizing activists and not confining itself to the parameters of the labor movement; choices that have made it more critical—and, admittedly, much more marginal.

Challenges to the AFL-CIO's foreign policy program have been made by a number of people over the years, although they have lacked an on-going organization. By themselves, however, these activists could be dismissed as mere "gadflies."

It was the actions in California that transformed the struggle against the AFL-CIO foreign policy program: when the California AFL-CIO unanimously condemned AFL-CIO foreign policy leaders' efforts in June 2004 (Hirsch, 2004a; see also Scipes, 2004c), it gave organizational backing to the multiplicity of individual activists' efforts. In other words, the struggle went from being that of involved activists to one where representatives of one-sixth of the entire AFL-CIO national membership repudiated the foreign policy program of the national organization.

It was activists in the Latin American Solidarity Coalition (LASC), however, who took this project to the next level. Appalled by AFL-CIO operations leading to the attempted coup in Venezuela in 2002—and aware of long-time AFL-CIO efforts to control labor throughout the Hemisphere—a number of activists within LASC got the Coalition to allow them to protest AFL-CIO foreign policy at the 2005 AFL-CIO National Convention in Chicago. Bringing some of their own people, and their own determination to build solidarity with the people of Latin America—specifically challenging U.S. foreign policy—LASC members worked to build a demonstration at the Chicago convention. While challenging AFL-CIO foreign policy in general, the Chicago coalition brought together Latin American solidarity activists and contacts—a number from outside of Chicago, from places like Philadelphia and Tucson—together with labor people and other local activists.

In addition to building a local movement,²² there were a number of interviews given, and articles written, to continue the challenge overall. Fred Hirsch went to Geneva and spoke (Hirsch, 2005), while this author wrote several articles (Scipes, 2005b, c, d, e) and gave a number of interviews on radio stations around the United States. At the same time, over five thousand packets were sent to labor organizations across the country, signed by the South Bay Labor Council (San Jose, CA) leadership, encouraging them to support the California resolution at the convention.

As stated above, these activities were such that the AFL-CIO and Solidarity Center leadership felt threatened sufficiently to respond in an anti-democratic fashion, working to subvert the challenge against them.

At the 2005 AFL-CIO National Convention, the Chicago Coalition brought together over one hundred people on the hottest day of the year—103 degrees Fahrenheit—to march over a half mile and then demonstrate outside of the She-

raton Hotel, where Convention delegates were housed. The Coalition demanded that the AFL-CIO adopt California's "Build Unity and Trust with Workers Worldwide" resolution (Geovanis, 2005; Kaufman, 2005).

At the Convention, however, the AFL-CIO leadership decided not to let this resolution be discussed. As stated, the Resolutions Committee—under control by John Sweeney and chaired by his ally, AFSCME President Gerald McEntee—advanced a reactionary resolution to the floor, praising the Solidarity Center for its work. While under consideration, Chair McEntee allowed several speakers to support the reactionary resolution. When opponents—those who supported the California resolution—sought their turn at the microphone, McEntee called out to the audience, "Did I hear someone call the question?" A few delegates responded affirmatively, and McEntee gavelled the matter shut, never allowing any real discussion of the issue on the floor. The reactionary resolution was then passed by the Convention.²³

This author detailed this attack on trade union democracy by the AFL-CIO leadership, but argued that there was some good news, too:

The good news is . . . that this issue got out much farther and wider than it ever has before. Besides our committee members' passing out fliers and talking to many delegates personally, we were interviewed on a number of radio stations around the country. The highlight was when Fred Hirsch and I were interviewed live on DEMOCRACY NOW! by Amy Goodman. Democracy Now! is broadcast to over 350 radio and community TV stations around the country, about half only have audio but half also having video. This report can be heard/seen/read at www.democracynow.org/article.pl?sid=05/07/26/1419259 (Scipes, 2005f).²⁴

Besides feeling successful about what was accomplished at the Convention, it was not until later that the activists decided how to advance. There was a decision to try to formalize this work into an organization called the Worker to Worker Solidarity Committee (WWSC). The decision was later made to meet again at the founding conference of the Venezuelan Solidarity Network in March 2006 in Washington, DC (see Azikiwe, 2006; Kaufman, 2006).

In December 2005, before the March convention, journalist and graduate school student Jeb Sprague revealed that the AFL-CIO had been providing money to Batay Ouvriye in Haiti, a very controversial labor organization in that country. He placed the Solidarity Center's Jeff Hermanson at a meeting with Batay in March 2004, therefore establishing that the U.S. "democracy promotion" process "was clearly at work in Haiti and that the Solidarity Center was involved." Sprague later documented that Batay Ouvriye had received almost \$100,000 from the Solidarity Center (Sprague, 2005, 2006a; see also Scipes, 2006a). Sprague (2006b), working alone, later revealed the AFL-CIO had failed to condemn repression against the pro-Aristide unions in the summer of 2004, and then revealed that the Solidarity Center had again acted as a funding conduit from NED to Batay, providing almost \$450,000. Sprague then confirmed this again in another piece, this time with Joe Emersberger (Sprague and Emersberger, 2006).

At the conference of the Venezuelan Solidarity Network, WWSC members held a couple of workshops and formally launched the organization. But while they were there, they decided to pay their “respects” to the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), and threw a picket line up in front of its offices on Fifthteenth Street on March 6. Approximately fifty activists chanted and made their presence known to the NED, which was not amused.²⁵

However, while at the NED offices, activists decided to go to “another end of the funding pipeline,” and the demonstration moved to the AFL-CIO headquarters on Sixteenth Street, where the activists threw up another picket line.

Members, armed with a bullhorn, conveyed the demand that the AFL-CIO cut off all ties with the NED. Needless to say, no AFL-CIO or Solidarity Center leader spoke to the protestors; all they did was to have a building guard threaten a protestor carrying a Venezuelan flag who had stepped close to the building. Protestors took down their picket line after about 40 minutes of loud chanting and speeches. AFL-CIO leaders were said to be “outraged” and apparently tried to get one protestor fired from his union staffer job in an affiliated union, although to no avail (Scipes, 2006b).

The scene shifted to Detroit in May 2006, where WWSC members organized a very successful workshop about the organization and their work over the previous year. Activists from unions as diverse as AFSCME (American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees), AFT (American Federation of Teachers), CWA (Communication Workers of America), IAM (International Association of Machinists), IBEW (International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers), OPEIU (Office and Professional Employees International Union), SEIU (Service Employees International Union), UAW (United Auto Workers) and UE (United Electrical workers), attended the workshop, expressing considerable interest in building support for challenging the AFL-CIO foreign policy program (Scipes, 2006c).

The WWSC continued to get its views out. In South Africa during July 2006, this author was asked to write about AFL-CIO foreign policy for the *South African Labour Bulletin* (Scipes, 2007a). It was explained to South African unionists how the Solidarity Center had used a COSATU (Congress of South African Trade Unions) representative to try to undermine anti-imperialist work by U.S. trade unionists and labor activists against the Solidarity Center at a conference of the Labor and Labor Movements Section of the American Sociological Association in August 2005.

WWSC-related activists also spoke at important conferences. In Windsor, Ontario, this author presented a paper to “Building Bridges: A Labour Studies Conference” in early February 2007. Then, in late April, this author presented a paper, “Recent Labor Diplomacy and Its Opposition” at a day-long conference of the Wisconsin Labor History Society titled “American Labor, U.S. Foreign Policy and War: From the ‘Cold War’ to the ‘War Against Terrorism’.”²⁶ And between these two conference presentations, in April 2007, James Jordan and this author led a workshop at the forth Latin American Solidarity Committee national conference in Chicago. We introduced our audience to the work of the

WWSC, and encouraged them to join these efforts.

The struggle to challenge the AFL-CIO's foreign policy program has reached a new level politically, although organizationally, the WWSC has seemed to dissipate over the past couple of years. Whether this network will reconstitute itself over the upcoming period or not remains an open question at this time. Nonetheless, key people apparently are in touch with each other, so there is hope that they will continue to influence future discussions.

Conclusion

This is, however, not to claim victory. This account of the extensive efforts combined in this chapter—especially the emergence of U.S. Labor Against the War, the 2004 California “Build Unity and Trust Among Workers Worldwide” resolution, and then the anti-democratic efforts by the AFL-CIO leadership at the 2005 National Convention—show conclusively that an alternative globalization project within the U.S. labor movement has been firmly established. Labor foreign policy activists have successfully challenged the status quo at the cultural level within the labor movement, delegitimizing the traditional AFL-CIO foreign policy program among general rank and file activists. In fact, this foreign policy program has been delegitimized to such an extent that Labor “leaders” had to result to blatantly anti-democratic acts to keep even a discussion from reaching the floor of the 2005 National Convention. This suggests clearly that the Labor “leaders” recognize the power of this challenge.

Yet, these activists have gone beyond mere delegitimization. USLAW has emerged as a significant force within the labor movement, although not yet strong enough to make the AFL-CIO Executive Council—the real decision-making group in the labor center—actively support its efforts. The WWSC, much more marginal from its beginning, has been engaged in on-going efforts to publicly challenge the AFL-CIO foreign policy program as a whole.

Whether these organizations, together or individually, can develop an alternative globalization mass movement within labor remains to be seen. By “mass movement,” this means going beyond passing resolutions to getting the rank and file engaged in actively fighting against the AFL-CIO's foreign policy program.

It will probably require a linking of these international labor solidarity concerns with a program addressing the problems facing working people in the United States that sees the U.S. in a global context (see Scipes, 2009b). But with the cultural delegitimizing of the AFL-CIO foreign policy program, the issue now is whether the activists have the skill and desire to make it happen—not whether it can happen at all.

Chapter 4

The U.S. Government and Labor

*“The political and economic importance of unions in the developing world means that their activities bear directly on the aims of U.S. foreign policy. The fact that in many areas they are the only permanent organizations with any firm roots among the mass of the people gives them an unusual and continuing significance.” Assistant U.S. Secretary of Labor for International Affairs George C. Lodge in his book, *Spearheads of Democracy: Labor in the Developing Countries* (1962: 154).*

“Worker organizations . . . have a central place in the foreign relations of American labor, management, and government” (Lodge, 1962: 237).

But what was AIFLD’s allure to the U.S. government? “The AIFLD holds a key position within the U.S. foreign policy team because it alone directly treats labour and the working class” (Spalding, 1984: 157).

With this chapter comes a shift in perspective. In the first three chapters, focus has been on developments within the U.S. labor movement: chapter one on the origins of Labor’s foreign policy program under President Samuel Gompers; chapter two on its development under the presidencies of George Meany, Lane Kirkland, and John Sweeney; and chapter three on efforts by labor activists, particularly since the 1960s, to challenge and transform Labor’s foreign policy.

This chapter shifts to focus on efforts on the other side of the equation: efforts by the U.S. Government to incorporate Labor into its foreign policy program, thus making Labor’s foreign policy program of direct interest to the respective political administration running the government, and Labor’s foreign policy leadership’s response to those efforts.

For this to make sense, however, requires an initial discussion of the mis-

education of most Americans about the United States Government's activities around the world. We are taught, particularly through our primary and secondary school systems, that the United States is the greatest country on the planet and that, of course, our efforts around the world are benign, when they are not life-affirming. Unfortunately, the historical record challenges this interpretation of reality. It will be argued, again, that a more accurate understanding recognizes that the U.S. is an imperialist nation, and that the entire set of imperialist relations should be recognized as constituting the U.S. Empire.¹

From this perspective—that *the U.S. Government's foreign policy since the middle of World War II has been designed to ensure that the United States exerts hegemonic control over the world*²—we see that Labor has been reincorporated into the U.S. Government's foreign policy efforts. The process by which this has occurred is described, initially by providing an account of the development of Labor's "institutes" in developing countries—with a particular focus on AIFLD, the American Institute for Free Labor Development, in Latin America—and the ideological efforts to get government and multinational corporations to join in support of Labor's efforts. This is followed with accounts of the U.S. Government's efforts to work with Labor through the Agency for International Development (USAID), the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), and the Advisory Committee on Labor and Diplomacy (ACLAD). And through this examination, it will be seen that Labor's foreign policy leadership has acquiesced, if not actively participated, in subordinating the labor movement to the interests of the U.S. elites.

American Citizens and the U.S. Empire

Americans, as the former Chinese Premier Chou En-lai once said, "have absolutely no historical memory" (quoted in Blum, 1986: 11).

There is a lot of truth to this. Americans are not taught about U.S. history in any real manner; instead, we are taught about the activities of a bunch of rich white men who, at different times, were elected President of the United States—obviously in need of a "slight" update now with the election of Barack Obama. It would be hard to imagine a less relevant, or more boring, way to teach the history of this country—and yet, that is the way most Americans learn about the history of this country. The consequences of this are profound: basically, it says all the good things of this country are products of our government and, especially, our presidents. Therefore, following, they know what they are doing. And therefore, if we know what is best for us, then we best not get in their way. "Our's is not to question why, our's is but to do or die," as the old saying goes.

However, one of the very best things to come out of the social turmoil known as "The Sixties"—which, in reality, can be said to have included the years 1964-75—is that some of us have begun to see the world in a new way. We have not been so eager to uncritically accept the stories we have been told by our "leaders." That, of course, was part of what The Sixties was all about.³

A key work in this process was that of the historian and U.S. military veter-

an, Howard Zinn. In *A People's History of the United States*, Zinn argued against only considering the views and activities of these rich white men (Zinn, 1980). Zinn taught us the importance of considering the activities of "ordinary folks," taking the lives of working men and women, of all colors and backgrounds, into consideration.⁴

Ultimately, it is argued that the best way to understand U.S. History is by looking at the interaction between the "bottom" and "top" of the U.S. social order over time. It was this dialectical relationship that Jan Nederveen Pieterse so well captured in the title of his 1989 book, *Empire and Emancipation*.⁵

Yet when most of us think about the U.S. social order, we limit our scope to just the society encompassed within the U.S. nation-state; i.e., the United States of America. However, this is too limited: an examination of world history illuminates the fact that the United States today is—and has been since the Europeans' arrival in North America—a global project. Despite a long tradition in the U.S. of seeing the United States as "exceptional" (i.e., "American Exceptionalism") and, by extension, distinct from the rest of the world, *the reality is that the United States is very much a global project, and thus very embedded in a globalizing world*. The U.S. affects and is affected by other peoples and other countries around the world. Thus, the only way to have a chance to accurately understand this country is to locate it within a global context, while recognizing the specific political-economic and social processes internally, at the national, regional, state and local levels.

What does this mean practically? It means that we must understand what the U.S. has done globally around the world, as well as nationally. This means the U.S. social order, because of how the United States has developed historically, must be recognized as extending around the world. And this means we must use concepts such as "imperialism" and "empire"—both written about in the Introduction—to accurately understand U.S. development, both historically and contemporarily.

Writing in 1984, this author began trying to understand the world order after World War II. He began by describing the bi-polar world of the United States and the Soviet Union:

Since 1945, the world has been divided into two competitive politico-economic-military zones; one dominated by the United States and the other by the Soviet Union. The Soviet zone included the USSR and the countries of Eastern Europe. That of the U.S. included the rest of the world. Each of these two dominant powers controlled the economies of their dependent allies. Each also had the military power both to keep their competitor out of their zone and to keep subordinate nations in. Given this reality, each of these political-economic-military zones will be referred to as "empires." Therefore, both a U.S. Empire and a Soviet Empire exist (Scipes, 1984: 2).⁶

The demise of the Soviet Empire and then the Soviet Union itself in the late 1980s-early 1990s left the United States to try to dominate the world by itself.⁷ Arguably successful until invading Iraq in March 2003, subsequent developments since then have questioned the uni-polar global system dominated by the

United States (see Nederveen Pieterse, 2004, 2008).

The issue of Empire is important: not only does it try to suck countries into its orbit but, so far, it has the military power to keep competitors out, and to keep those within from leaving. And again, this control does not have to be based on territorial occupation; it can often be through hegemonic political, economic, cultural, and/or military relationships.

But why Empire? There are two issues at hand: (1) the U.S. economy, a capitalist economy, is at the heart of the U.S. Empire. Let us be careful here: this author is not saying that the Empire can be collapsed into the economy, because they are *not* the same. But *the economy provides the material means for Empire*, enabling it to expand around the world and to develop and maintain the U.S. military to ensure its continuation that, in turn, provides generally safe havens for U.S. investment around the world.

At the same time, an expanding capitalist economy provides economic opportunities, jobs and (hopefully) a higher standard of living for all of its peoples at home. And by succeeding on this level, it also produces political support for the U.S. Empire.

This capitalist economy has provided economic opportunity for generations of American working people, predominately but not totally white, who are at the heart of the production system. Ultimately, however, the economy must continue to provide sufficient opportunity over time for working people at home to be satisfied, or at least quiescent if not passive, so as to continue providing the political support for the continuation of Empire.

To have a chance to maintain this level of political support from the citizenry, the capitalist economy of the U.S. cannot be limited to the United States: it must be free to expand wherever it wants around the world, so as to be able *to obtain certain raw materials and access to cheap labor*, especially at lowest cost, *to power its manufacturing operations and to meet its* (fossil fuel-based) *energy requirements; to obtain cheap imports* created with low-cost labor so as to allow American working people to try to maintain their established standard of living, even as family incomes decrease; and *to be able to sell the fruits of its incredible production processes in overseas markets* in order to generate the greatest rate of profit.⁸

Although starting long before, this has been especially important across the post-World War II period. Immediately after World War II, there was an incredible need for U.S. goods and services, as the rest of the industrialized world had been devastated by the war, and the need to rebuild was tremendous. Accordingly, in 1947, Americans—approximately six percent of the world's population—produced 48 percent of the world's goods and services; nearly as much as the rest of the world combined! And like mentioned previously, the labor movement forced industrial America to share the wealth.

However, this was an unusual period, and could not last. By the mid-1960s-early 1970s, capitalist economies in Western Europe and Japan recovered from the devastation of World War II, and were again able to compete with the United States, initially at home, then through exports, and then through direct foreign investment in the United States. Subsequently, this competition was enhanced

with the development of individual corporations within developing countries, and by an increasing number of “developing” economies, such as that of South Korea, over time. The result of these processes is that with this increased global competition, *U.S. businesses turned on the U.S. labor movement and American workers in an effort to maintain their global dominance*; and the ability to replace workers with enhanced technology and to shift production around the world has enabled these corporations to have a chance to meet many of the challenges coming from overseas.⁹

This requirement to shift production around the world has meant that U.S. geo-strategic interests have become even more central to U.S. efforts, as the U.S. military must be positioned favorably to help make this happen, even in face of foreign opposition, and in cases where the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has not been able to undercut the opposition beforehand (see Agee, 1975; Johnson, 2000; Nederveen Pieterse, 2008).

Tied to the need for U.S. capitalists to operate globally, and the maintenance of sufficient military force to make it possible, is the second point: the conscious political project of the elites of this country has been the continual effort over time to get Americans to “fear” others. If Americans fear others, then they can be divided and manipulated in ways that benefit the social-political-economic elites in this country and their allies around the world. This means that the American people will tolerate wars around the world as long as they are fought with someone else’s children.

This is not a new project: from earliest days of European settlement, white settlers were taught to fear “Indians.” Protestants were taught to fear Catholics. Protestants and Catholics, as Christians, were taught to fear Jews. The Christians and Jews were taught to fear Muslims, atheists, etc. “Middle class” people were taught to fear workers. “Natives” were taught to fear immigrants. Of course, whites were taught to fear blacks, and then Latinos, and then Asians, and people of color in general. Males have been taught to fear females (even as they are taught to “desire” them); the old, young; the straight, gays and lesbians; the able-bodied, disabled, etc., etc. In other words, we have been taught continuously across this country’s history to fear the “other,” the unknown.

What has held us in this country together over time has been largely economic opportunity: we may fear everyone else, but if we can advance ourselves economically, we can work even with “them.”¹⁰ And if we cannot work with “them,” well, we can move to the suburbs or, if necessary, the country is big enough to move somewhere else. This project of political manipulation has worked so well because this politically-generated fear has kept Americans separated, apart and generally mistrustful of each other, and economic growth over time has generally meant this project has not been questioned by the large majority of the population, especially if they have not been themselves further oppressed.

Now, this fear has been challenged at some times, and even sometimes successfully, as we have seen in the development of the labor movement, the Civil Rights/Black Power Movement, the Women’s Movement, the anti-Vietnam War movement, the environmental movement, the gay and lesbian movements, the

disabled rights movement, etc.¹¹ So, although powerful, this fear has, over time, largely been overcome domestically, although the elites keep trying to recreate this fear.¹²

However, where this fear has not been overcome has been with “outsiders,” of non-Americans—or at least those outsiders who do not want to become Americans. On one hand, this fear of outsiders has been taught to us as “natural” through our “Exceptionalism”: Americans are different, and the political processes at work in this country are different—and better!—than anywhere else.

But the greatest fear operating, and especially since 1917, has been the fear of “communism.” Americans have been taught to fear anyone that does not accept capitalism and the resulting unequal social order, and especially anyone who does not accept capitalism and the U.S. Government as the “best,” and therefore the most-desirable form of social organization in the world, is a threat to our societal well-being and, if foreign, is a potential threat to invade and subjugate us.

William Blum, writing in the mid-1980s, captured this well:

From the Red Scare of the 1920s to the McCarthyism of the 1950s to the Reagan Crusade Against the Evil Empire of the 1980s, the American people have been subjected to a relentless anti-communist indoctrination. It is imbibed with their mother’s milk, pictured in their comic books, spelled out in their schoolbooks; their daily paper offers them headlines that tell them all they need to know; ministers find sermons in it, politicians are elected with it, and *Reader’s Digest* becomes rich on it (Blum, 1986: 4).

And while the post 9-11 (September 11, 2001) U.S. world has focused on President Bush’s “global war on terrorism,” the idea is the same: be afraid, be very afraid.

These matters are delved into because what this has done to the U.S. public over time: it has been to get Americans to accept our “leaders’” view of the world uncritically.¹³ The rhetoric about the wonderfulness of this country is pervasive: even the war in Vietnam—one of the most brutal and destructive wars in the history of the world, where the U.S. military killed approximately three million Vietnamese in their own country, and where people are still dying over 30 years after the end of hostilities from environmental poisoning and unexploded ordinance—is considered an “aberration” to the wonderful work done in the world by the United States.¹⁴

However, there *is* a historical record, and what is being discovered as an increasing number of critical studies are published, is the need to constantly question the rhetoric: as the bumper sticker says, “Question Authority—and Verify Answers”! William Blum puts it more specifically: with his detailed presentation of CIA interventions around the world, he writes, “I am declaring that American foreign policy *is* what American foreign policy *does*” (emphasis in original) (Blum, 1986: 14), as opposed to what it *says* it does.

In his subsequent book, published in 2000, Blum presents the reality of U.S. foreign policy:

From 1945 to the end of the century, the United States attempted to overthrow more than 40 foreign governments, and to crush more than 30 populist-nationalist movements struggling against intolerable regimes. In the process, the U.S. caused the end of life for several million people and condemned many millions more to a life of agony and despair (Blum, 2000: 2).

Blum is not just making rhetorical points: the United States Government has used its power almost without limit to accomplish its foreign policy goals, regardless of impact on peoples in other countries as well as its own military personnel.¹⁵ In both of his books, Blum carefully offers well-documented details that one will not find in the pages of *The New York Times*, much less any local newspaper in the United States.¹⁶

To achieve the “successes” of the U.S. Empire, the U.S. Government has, of course, relied upon the U.S. military. However, since 1947, it has had the help of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), a secret organization that was intended both to provide intelligence to the highest levels of the U.S. Government and operate on the basis of such intelligence.¹⁷ Former CIA Agent Philip Agee, who left the Agency in 1969, repudiated his past activities, and was writing in the mid-1970s to expose the CIA’s operations, stated:

In the past 25 years, the CIA has been involved in plots to overthrow governments in Iran, the Sudan, Syria, Guatemala, Ecuador, Guyana, Zaire and Ghana. In Greece, the CIA participated in bringing in the repressive regime of the colonels. In Chile, The Company spent millions to ‘destabilize’ the Allende government and set up the military junta, which has since massacred tens of thousands of workers, students, liberals and leftists. In Indonesia in 1965, The Company was behind an even bloodier coup, the one that got rid of Sukarno and led to the slaughter of at least 500,000 and possibly 1,000,000 people. In the Dominican Republic, the CIA arranged the assassination of the dictator Rafael Trujillo and later participated in the invasion that prevented the return to power of the liberal ex-president Juan Bosch. In Cuba, The Company paid for and directed the invasion that failed at the Bay of Pigs. Some time later, the CIA was involved in attempts to assassinate Fidel Castro (Agee, 1975: viii-ix).¹⁸

The CIA, unfortunately, did not work alone. Among others, the CIA worked with the foreign policy operatives of the AFL in the post-World War II era, especially in Europe (Braden, 1967; Filipelli, 1989; Carew, 1998; Valentine, 1999; Hughes, 2001; see also Langley, 1972; Lens, 1972; Busch, 1983), with both generally working to stop or roll back the Communists, who had emerged from the war with credentials burnished by their leadership and work against the Nazis (Maas, 1986).

However, this relationship between the AFL and the CIA was not always an “easy” one, as labor operatives such as Jay Lovestone and Irving Brown certainly had their own opinions about what they thought should be done, and these were not always in accord with those of the CIA. In fact, by the mid-1950s, the CIA had refused to fund their activities after Brown and his accomplices rejected CIA domination, ultimately forcing labor operatives to engage in illegal

operations such as involvement with the French drug trade to finance their projects (see Carew, 1998; Valentine, 1999). However, without the unions, this meant that the CIA had no serious ways to operate within the labor sector of a society.¹⁹

At the same time, for Labor, the loss of governmental support was serious. Besides the risk from such illegal operations, Labor's finances were not stable, adding another risk to ongoing operations. In Latin America, Labor's operations were carried out initially through ORIT, the regional operation of the ICFTU. This meant that any clandestine American labor operations were also subjected to the internal politics of the ICFTU, which by the late 1950s, were "iffy" for the Americans (see Wedin, 1974; Thomson, 1978). The labor movement needed to find a way to work in which it was able to advance its own foreign policy and be able to run its own operations, while being given financial support by the U.S. Government.

The Cuban Revolution that came to power in January 1959 provided the "crisis" that re-energized Labor's foreign policy leaders, and strengthened the rationale for Labor to reconnect with the U.S. Government so as to obtain steady funding for their foreign operations. It remained for a governmental official to provide the rationale for the U.S. Government to reconnect with Labor.

Labor, Corporate, Government "Institutes" in Developing Countries

The rationale for getting the U.S. Government to support the work of Labor-led but tripartite labor-government-business organizations—such as the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD) and related regional organizations in developing countries—was advanced by George C. Lodge in his 1962 book, *Spearheads of Democracy: Labor in the Developing Countries*.²⁰ Lodge put events in the developing countries within the context of "total war" against Communism, and chided labor for not doing more: "American labor, divided within itself and at odds with its principal allies abroad, has failed to do all it might to provide effective leadership in the fight against Communist subversion in Asia, Africa, and Latin America" (Lodge, 1962: xiii).

Yet Lodge's real target was not to get Labor on board the interventionist, anti-Communist train—as Lodge knew at the time, and as this author and others have shown, Labor was already on it²¹—but to get the U.S. Government to understand how critically important Labor's work was, and to get the government, especially the Kennedy Administration, and the business community²² to support Labor's interventionist work, particularly in Latin America.

Lodge knew what was going on:

The workers' organizations of the developing world are sustained by the determined desire of the people for an improvement in their way of life, for a square meal where there has been starvation, for a hospital bed where there has been disease and death, for a decent house where there have been filth and squ-

alor, for freedom and dignity where there have been domination and servility. Their roots lie deep in the hearts of the people, and, while their membership may be small, they are the first true, wholly indigenous and national organizations which many of the peoples of Asia and Africa, as well as some in Latin America, have ever known (Lodge, 1962: 13-14).

Yet despite this knowledge, Lodge did not advocate that the U.S. Government help these unions develop on their own terms; he argued that they were “targets of opportunity” (my term) for U.S. foreign policy.²³

He argued that the Communists were trying to take control over these unions, noting that the Communists “have increased substantially their influence in many labor movements in Asia, Africa and Latin America.”²⁴ The problem that allowed the Communists to meddle was rapid industrialization, which was tearing apart stable societies after, in some cases, “thousands of years.” In fact, he went on to claim that, “Unions in the developing countries were *not the result of worker initiative and could not have been*, given the economic and political environment in which they emerged” (emphasis added) (Lodge, 1962: 14-15).²⁵

Lodge was clear on the importance of labor as a battleground, especially in Latin America. “In fact,” he wrote, “it is not too much to say that the future of Latin America will be determined by what direction worker organizations take in the next two or three years.” He recognized that “The class struggle is very much alive in Latin American society and it works against collective bargaining. Mutuality of interest between management and labor is not an easy concept for the Latin American laborer.”²⁶ Further, he noted that Latin American workers see their unions as more than collective bargaining agent or enforcer of contract provisions, “but as the defender and promoter of the interests of the working class in the national society.” Thus, it can be seen that “in many countries in Latin America, *trade unions are of strategic political importance*” (emphasis added) (Lodge, 1962: 22-23, 29).²⁷

After focusing on unions in Latin America, Lodge surveyed quickly the role of unions in the developing countries of Africa and Asia. He noted their crucial role in anti-colonial struggles, particularly in Africa. He also noted the different approaches taken by unions in two Asian countries, India and Indonesia.²⁸ He focused on how anti-Communist unions in Indonesia, along with others in Lebanon and Tunisia, had worked to improve the living standards of their members *as strategies to counter the Communists* (emphasis added) (Lodge, 1962: 31-48).

However, Lodge pointed to an even better example: the General Federation of Jewish Labor in Israel (Histadrut). He suggests this is the “classic prototype for a union directly participating in economic and social development as well as serving as a bargaining agent.” After noting that Histadrut not only is “the largest single employer in Israel,” but that it “has construction projects underway in many countries of Asia and Africa,” he discusses the Afro-Asian Institute for Labor Studies and Cooperation:

I have seen this Institute in operation and there is no question that the Israeli example is extremely compelling to those who face many of the same problems that Israel faced a scant ten years ago, such as making the desert bloom, indu-

strializing rapidly, training for industrialization, and intensifying agricultural production.

Histadrut without doubt is one of the most important arms of Israeli foreign policy. Not only do its construction operations take it all over the world, but its example as a trade union is attracting ever increasing attention from worker leaders in Africa and Asia. . . . Conscious of their political importance, realizing their vulnerability to subversion and overthrow, and desirous of building some measure of independent strength into their organizations, they are looking more and more at Israel and Tunisia. For in these two countries, it has been clearly demonstrated that a trade union can indeed improve the welfare of its members and at the same time advance the total economic and social development of the nation (emphasis added) (Lodge, 1962: 50-51).²⁹

In other words, Lodge saw the need to improve workers' lives without weakening the social orders of the countries in which these workers lived.

How to do this? To his way of thinking, foreign financial support could be channeled from the U.S. Government through U.S. and anti-Communist labor organizations to labor organizations in the developing countries. This would allow money to reach specifically chosen labor organizations—chosen by U.S. labor representatives working on the ground in the region or country under consideration³⁰—for the specific purpose of undermining Communist labor efforts in that country (see Siegel, 1975). This would also require the support of U.S. corporations in these countries to accept strong trade unions where they could be established—especially if they accepted the concept of collective bargaining—because it was this strength, according to Lodge, and the ability to improve the social situations of their members, that was the greatest impediment to Communist infiltration.

Thus, Lodge suggests—although not in these terms—a “top-down” project, financed by the U.S. Government but involving labor and business working together. This would support U.S. foreign policy goals of ensuring the continued rule by friendly, pro-U.S. elites, and of maintaining established political economic relationships with the elites of selected countries (i.e., to undercut revolutionary processes), while advancing labor in the developing countries—but not too much!—and allowing U.S. corporations to proceed making super-profits off of investments in developing countries, restrained only by “free” collective bargaining with developing country unions that could be established.

Former CIA agent Philip Agee recognizes the overall concept: “the interests of the privileged minorities in poor countries lead back to, and are identified with, the interests of the rich and powerful who control the U.S.”:

what counterinsurgency really comes down to is the protection of the capitalists back in America, their property and their privileges. U.S. national security, as preached by U.S. leaders, is the security of the capitalist class in the U.S., not the security of the rest of the people. . . . It is from the class interests in the U.S. that our counterinsurgency programs flow, together with that most fundamental of American foreign policy principles: that any government, no matter how bad, is better than a communist one—than a government of workers, peasants and ordinary people (Agee, 1975: 577).

In turn—and this is the present author’s analysis, although it follows from Lodge’s thinking—this would allow U.S. unions to be able to militantly seek increased wage and benefit packages in the U.S. from increasingly successful multinational corporate employers for their members, helping to continue raising American working people’s standards of living and consumption levels while keeping them materially “satisfied,” providing domestic markets for corporate products and increasing corporate profits and investor financial well-being.³¹ The political battles could be fought domestically over various regulations and government social programs but always within the context of accepting the existing social order of the United States, therefore extending American willingness to fund the military and fight wars/interventions needed to keep the entire global social order (the U.S. Empire) operating for the well-being of the elites of the United States and their global allies.

Using the U.S. labor movement to channel these monies to overseas unions served another purpose: it allowed the U.S. Government to “plausibly” deny any direct payments to developing country unions, something that governments in most countries would oppose, and which has been one of the United States’ chief critiques against the Communists.³² In other words, while the U.S. Government was supporting “anti-Communist” unions in developing countries that were supportive of or amenable to U.S. Government foreign policy and international relations (i.e., U.S. domination)—what any objective analysis would call “imperialism”—the U.S. Government could deny doing such, and could in fact, challenge the Communist project that was doing the exact same thing.³³

With the logic promoted by Lodge, the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD) was launched in 1962 as a labor-corporate-government operation.³⁴ Agee described its purpose succinctly: “The main purpose of AIFLD will be to organize anti-communist labor unions in Latin America” (Agee, 1975: 245). And, as explicated in chapter 2, AIFLD went to work in the region, as Latin Americans were to find out, much to their great dismay.³⁵

U.S. Government and Labor Operations Around the World

Now that the ideological and political groundwork has been laid, it is time to discuss specific operations that united the U.S. Government with the AFL-CIO’s foreign policy program.

U.S. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, U.S. AID, and the Alliance for Progress

Prior to the establishment of AIFLD, the Kennedy Administration had concluded that “foreign aid” was an important part of U.S. foreign policy, and a more supple tool for control than military intervention.³⁶ The Administration updated the government’s foreign aid program with The Foreign Assistance Act

of 1961, emphasizing economic development.

The new directions most emphatically stressed were a dedication to development as a long-term effort requiring country-by-country planning and a commitment of resources on a multi-year, programmed basis. The new focus of development was to achieve economic growth and democratic, political stability in the developing world *to combat both the perceived spread of ideological threats such as communism and the threat of instability arising from poverty*. The economic development theory of W.W. Rostow, which posited “stages of economic development,” most notably a “takeoff into growth” stage, provided the premise for much of the development planning in the newly-formed U.S. Agency for International Development.

In the final analysis, the greatest achievement of USAID and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 was that they addressed the goals of setting up country-by-country planning and long-term development planning mechanisms through solving the organizational problems in the then-existing foreign assistance programs.

One of the first programs undertaken by the fledgling USAID was the Alliance for Progress. The Alliance became the basis for USAID’s programs in Latin America throughout the 1960s (emphasis added) (AID, 2005).

In other words, the Kennedy Administration got Congress to pass the Foreign Assistance Act on September 4, 1961. “The Act mandated the creation of an agency to administer economic assistance programs, and on November 3, 1961, President John F. Kennedy established the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).” Supposedly “freed from political and military functions that plagued its predecessor organizations,” USAID was to help provide economic aid to the developing countries of the world (AID, 2005).³⁷

It is important to recognize the development of USAID because it is the agency through which the U.S. Government channeled millions of dollars throughout the 1960s and 1970s to AIFLD and parallel labor institutes in Africa and Asia.

Yet, USAID did not act just as a financial conduit for AIFLD. In fact, in response to the Cuban Revolution, its major project in the 1960s was the establishment of the Alliance for Progress in Latin America. By understanding the Alliance for Progress, one can better understand how U.S. foreign policy works in a region, and how AIFLD supplemented and extended these operations.

In an important analysis of the Alliance—which was supposedly an effort to modernize Latin American through economic and social development³⁸—Steve Weissman points out that the U.S. goal in these developing countries was social stability, a stability based on “deeper [domestic] military involvement in economic and social activities.” Weissman concludes, “This potential opposition to all violence and the support of the military became the official policy of the Kennedy Administration” (Weissman, 1975: 77).

This emphasis on the military infected the entire Alliance for Progress program. Key to this was a doctrine of counterinsurgency, and this was projected on the individual country through the respective “Country Team” that was

made up of the chief representative of the embassy, the military attachés, the [U.S. Information Agency], AID, the CIA, the military missions or the Military Assistance Advisory Groups, and other agencies in the foreign country. Before assuming field assignments abroad, all of these officials, military and civilian, took specialized counterinsurgency training.

The muscle behind this unified counterinsurgency package was military in a more traditional sense. In mid-1963, the Pentagon changed the primary emphasis of the military assistance program from “hemispheric defense” to internal security, dramatically boosting U.S. arms exports to Latin America. The Alliance also enlarged counterinsurgency training for the Latin American military at the United States School of the Americas in the Canal Zone, the Special Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, and the Inter-American Police Academy at Fort Davis (Canal Zone). U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Groups and Army Missions then conducted on-the-spot training within the Latin American countries themselves, at times participating in actual anti-guerrilla operations. Even in seemingly innocent construction projects, U.S. advisors would gather intelligence and “test and perfect” military doctrines and techniques (Weissman, 1975: 78-79).³⁹

So, despite the rhetoric of the Alliance for Progress, what was behind the “velvet glove” of economic development was always the “iron fist” of military repression. And this was joined by the demand for “free market” economic policies—what would later be called neo-liberal economic policies, which meant no restrictions or regulations on foreign investment⁴⁰—which together had the expected results: “The counterrevolutionary commitment to stability and to U.S.-dominated market policies necessitated a parallel commitment to what Kennedy called ‘men of wealth and power’ in Latin America. And this commitment in large part determined the subsequent lack of reform and economic development” (Weissman, 1975: 84).

And AIFLD’s inclusion was meant to insure that no challenge to the established stability could come from a country’s labor sector.⁴¹ And if, nonetheless, one did emerge, then AIFLD could use its client unions to work against any challenge and, if necessary, work to create economic disruption, which would lead to calls for military intervention to “restore order.” The case of Chile is a perfect example of how this all worked.

Yet, which agency was coordinating all these processes, when things threatened to “get out of hand”? The Central Intelligence Agency.

However, a series of exposes during the late 1960s-early ‘70s led to the CIA’s work being discredited to a very great degree. Both Philip Agee’s 1975 book, *Inside the Company*, and U.S. Senator Frank Church’s investigation illuminated far more than the CIA had ever expected.

By the time the Reagan Administration entered office in January 1981, these exposures were seen as very problematic. Reagan and his people were not upset with what the CIA had done, but rather that these operations had been exposed. Clearly a new operation to overcome such problems was needed—and by 1983, the National Endowment for Democracy was established.

The National Endowment for Democracy (NED)⁴²

The National Endowment for Democracy is a U.S. Government program started in 1983 under the Reagan Administration. NED benignly presents itself as

a U.S. initiative to strengthen democratic institutions throughout the world through private, non-governmental efforts. It is a privately incorporated non-profit organization with a Board of Directors comprised of leading citizens from the mainstream of American political and civic life—liberals and conservatives, Democrats and Republicans, representatives of business and labor, and others with long international experience. The Endowment embodies a broad, bipartisan U.S. commitment to democracy (NED, 1998: 1).

However, William Blum quotes a statement made by Allen Weinstein to the *Washington Post* on September 22, 1991 that suggests that NED efforts were not all that benign. Weinstein had helped draft the legislation establishing NED. “A lot of what we do today,” says Weinstein, “was done covertly 25 years ago by the CIA.”⁴³ Blum concludes, “In effect, the CIA has been laundering money through NED” (Blum, 2000: 180).⁴⁴

An earlier article, initially published by *The New York Times*, further supports Blum’s claim. Joel Brinkley writes that what was called “Project Democracy”—thought initially to be just the effort led by Marine Lt. Col. Oliver North to run secret operations from out of the Reagan White House, ultimately leading to the Iran-Contra scandal of the late 1980s—actually was only one prong of a two prong program. “The public arm of Project Democracy, now known as the National Endowment for Democracy, openly gave federal money to democratic institutions abroad and received wide, bipartisan support. However, *the project’s secret arm* took a different direction” after North took charge (emphasis added) (Brinkley, 1987).

In fact, NED is a product of a shift of U.S. foreign policy from “earlier strategies to contain social and political mobilization through a focus on control of the state and governmental apparatus” to a process of “democracy promotion,” whereby “the United States and local elites thoroughly penetrate civil society, and *from therein*, assure control over popular mobilization and mass movements...” (Robinson, 1996: 69; see also Golinger, 2010).⁴⁵ What this means is that instead of waiting for a client government to be threatened by its people and then responding, U.S. foreign policy shifted to intervening in the civil society of an country “of interest” (as defined by U.S. foreign policy goals) before popular mobilization could become significant, and by supporting certain groups and certain politicians, then channel any potential mobilization in the direction desired by the U.S. Government.⁴⁶

Ciment and Ness elaborate on this:

the NED—though its funding remains a fraction of that still devoted to covert action by the CIA—offers a more subtle, sophisticated, and politically acceptable method for furthering U.S. foreign policy interests. Where the Cold War-era CIA once crushed genuinely democratic movements and organizations in coun-

tries allied with the U.S., the NED attempts to co-opt them by making them dependent on U.S. funding or by recruiting their leaders to—or excluding them altogether from—a political consensus shaped in America's own image (Ciment and Ness, 1999: 66).

This is what the labor movement had been doing, especially from 1962. As Beth Sims points out, "In fact, the AFL-CIO's international institutes were used as a model for both structural and tactical elements of the 'democracy-building' activities of the past decade" (Sims, 1992: 42).

Perhaps another, more accurate way to describe NED's project is "to support [polyarchal] democracy wherever it supports U.S. foreign policy." In other words, for the NED, *democracy is good only when it advances U.S. national interests and when it can be contained by local elites.*

Promoting Democracy, Although Polyarchic NOT Popular

NED's oft-stated goal is to "promote democracy," and it suggests it is merely interested in democracy itself, with no other interests in mind. However, the reality is different: NED promotes democracy as a long-term strategic program intended to benefit the national interests of the United States (i.e., the U.S. Empire), although it is not tied to any particular political administration in Washington, DC: "By its very nature, such support cannot be governed by the short-term policy preferences of a particular U.S. administration or by the partisan political interests of any party or group." Further, "The Endowment will be effective in carrying out its mission only if it stands apart from immediate policy disputes and represents a consistent, bipartisan, long-term approach to strengthening democracy that will be supported through successive administrations" (NED, 1998: 1).

To put it another way, the NED is a project of the U.S. Empire that its leaders do not want any particular U.S. presidential administration to even have the chance to counteract. The ramifications are considerable: the development of NED, supposedly to enhance and extend democracy around the world, is itself based on an anti-democratic formulation that specifically ensures that there can be no democratic oversight of its operations by the U.S. public other than by its self-chosen board of directors—the late Kenneth Lay of Enron must have been envious. It makes the theme of "democracy promotion" all the more hypocritical.

Under the rhetoric of democracy promotion, the NED is, in fact, promoting *polyarchal* or top-down, elite-driven, democracy while using the rhetoric of "popular" democracy—the latter being the "one person, one vote" version that Americans are taught in U.S. civics courses that emerges from grassroots citizens and that supposedly exists in this country. This polyarchal democracy suggests that citizens get to choose their leaders when, in fact, they only get to choose between those presented as possible choices by the elites of that country—do you want "Pepsi" or do you want "Coke"?—or that viable solutions to social problems can only emerge from possibilities presented by the elites. In other words, polyarchal democracy *appears* to be democratic when, in reality, it

is its antithesis, its opposite (Robinson, 1996).

And institutionally, where the U.S. Government projects this polyarchal democracy, is through its “democracy-building programs,” generally through the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development or USAID.⁴⁷ In the case of the National Endowment for Democracy, however, Congress channels its money through the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) to NED (Lowe, 2004).

Major Initiative of US State Apparatus: Not Independent, Despite Its Claims

Despite its benevolent-sounding slogan, “Supporting freedom around the world,” the NED is very clearly a major foreign policy initiative by the U.S. State apparatus to ensure its continued control over and expansion of its Empire. As the Weinstein quote above suggests, NED has nothing to do with real freedom. In fact, when the Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Charles Percy (Republican, Illinois), introduced enabling legislation in the U.S. Senate during 1983, he stated that he thought that the legislation was “*arguably the most important single U.S. foreign policy initiative of this generation*” (emphasis added) (Lowe, 2004).

The history of NED is posted on its web site, and was written by David Lowe, the Vice President for Government and External Relations, National Endowment for Democracy (Lowe, 2004, Endnote 1).⁴⁸ It is obviously a key document for understanding the development and approach of the NED.

NED writes extensively about its “non-governmental” status, and in the history, Lowe talks about NED’s “independence” from the U.S. Government. Yet the study that recommended its development “was funded by a \$300,000 grant from the [U.S.] Agency for International Development (AID).” “Its executive board consisted of *a broad cross-section of participants in American politics and foreign policy making*” (emphasis added). Its existence was enabled by passage of U.S. House of Representatives Resolution (HR) 2915 in mid-1983, and the U.S. Senate’s S. 1342, which was passed on September 23, 1983; after a conference between members of the two houses of Congress, the House adopted the conference report on HR 2915 on November 17, 2003, and the Senate followed the next day (Lowe, 2004). On December 16, 1983, President of the United States, Ronald Reagan, spoke at a White House Ceremony inaugurating the National Endowment for Democracy (Reagan, 1983).⁴⁹

The initial Chairman of the Endowment was U.S. Congressman Dante Fascell (Democrat, Florida), and he was followed after a short term by John Richardson as the first permanent chair, “a *former Assistant Secretary of State* with many years of involvement in private organizations involved in international affairs.” The “chief executive officer” or President chosen by the Board was Carl Gershman, “*previously the Senior Counselor to the U.S. Representative to the United Nations*,” who served under Jeane Kirkpatrick (emphases added) (Lowe, 2004).

And while there has been personnel turnover on the NED Board of Direc-

tors over the years, it has always included people who have served at some of the highest levels of the foreign policy apparatus of the U.S. Government. Notable among these have been former U.S. Secretaries of State Henry Kissinger (Nixon) and Madeleine Albright (Clinton), former U.S. Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci (Reagan), former National Security Council Chair Zbigniew Brzezinski (Carter), former NATO Supreme Allied Command in Europe, General Wesley K. Clark (Clinton), and the recent head of the World Bank, Paul Wolfowitz (George W. Bush). John McCain, Republican Party candidate for President of the United States in 2008, has long headed the International Republican Institute, one of the four “core” institutes of the NED.⁵⁰ Another notable, Bill Brock, served as a U.S. Senator from Tennessee (Republican), headed the Republican National Committee from 1977-80, and then served as a U.S. Trade Representative and U.S. Secretary of Labor in the Reagan Administration, and then became Chairman of the Board of NED in 1988.⁵¹

Also, as Lowe notes, NED has been continuously funded by U.S. Congressional appropriations on an annual basis, although the amount has varied by year. However,

From time to time, Congress has provided special appropriations to the Endowment to carry out specific democratic initiatives in countries of special interest, including Poland (through the trade union Solidarity), Chile, Nicaragua, Eastern Europe (to aid in the democratic transition following the demise of the Soviet bloc), South Africa, Burma, China, Tibet, North Korea and the Balkans.⁵²

Further, “following 9/11 and the NED Board’s adoption of its third strategic document, special funding has been provided for countries with substantial Muslim populations in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia.” In fact, as Lowe points out, “NED is answerable to a wide array of overseers in both the Executive and Legislative Branches” of the U.S. Government (Lowe, 2004).

It is impossible to deny its connection to the U.S. State.

This ambiguous relationship to the U.S. State was consciously intended from the beginning. As Lowe notes,

NED’s non-governmental status has a number of advantages . . . that are recognized by those institutions that really do carry out American foreign policy. As pointed out in a letter signed by seven former Secretaries of State in 1995 [James Baker, Laurence Eagleburger, George Schultz, Alexander Haig, Henry Kissinger, Edmund Muskie, and Cyrus Vance], “We consider the non-governmental character of the NED even more relevant than it was at NED’s founding twelve years ago” (Lowe, 2004).

Role of Labor Within NED Operations

At the same time that it is protected from political wrangling, NED is very clear about the role of trade unions:

Free and independent trade unions play an indispensable role in the process of democratization. In addition to protecting the job-related rights of individual workers, unions represent an organized force for representing the interests of common people in the political, economic, and social life of a country. By giving democratic representation to working people and ensuring their inclusion in the processes by which decisions are made and power is distributed, *unions help developing societies avoid the kind of sharp polarization that feeds political extremism and allows anti-democratic groups to exploit worker grievances*. Unions also represent a major hope for the peaceful democratization of totalitarian societies. *Independent trade unions thus constitute a fundamental part of the Endowment's effort to promote democracy* (emphases added) (NED, 1998: 3-4).⁵³

In fact, the Free Trade Union Institute (FTUI) was one of the four affiliated “institutes” of the Endowment from the beginning, although this was superseded by the Solidarity Center (formally, the American Center for International Labor Solidarity or ACILS) upon the latter’s establishment in 1997 (Lowe, 2004).

A recent critique of the Bush Administration’s foreign operations also pointed out the importance of unions in “democracy promotion” overseas. It is in studies such as this one that we can see the political understanding by those who are in positions of power and/or who write for such actors.

Recognizing the “hard power” (i.e., military force) of the Bush Administration and the concomitant loss of “soft power,” Joseph Siedlecki argued the need for a “more nuanced approach” to spreading democracy: “As an aspect of soft power, the United States should dramatically increase support for labor movements and free trade unions in developing countries” (Siedlecki, 2004: 69). Siedlecki, a former staff member in the U.S. Department of State’s International Labor Affairs Office, is interested overwhelmingly in targeting “autocratic” regimes, which basically means regimes that will not necessarily kowtow to the demands of the United States.

Siedlecki points out a number of desirable attributes of unions, calling them a “natural enemy” of authoritarian regimes. He argues, “History provides no other mass-based organization with such broad social appeal.” Further, “Unions are a natural ally of liberal democracies because they act as models of democracy, they share the goals of free and fair economic development, and they often advocate for democratic rule.” And then, tipping his true intentions, “unions in developing countries and their members share the goals of free and fair economic and social development espoused by many democracies” (Siedlecki, 2004).

Siedlecki then reports the role of labor in the undermining of a number of autocratic regimes in Europe, Africa and Latin America. In Europe, he focuses on the cases of Spain (1977), Poland (1989), and Czechoslovakia (1990). In Africa, he discusses the role of the labor movement in overthrowing apartheid in South Africa—without noting that the AFL-CIO had *opposed* the anti-apartheid unions until at least 1986, when it became obvious a more sophisticated approach was required (see Baskin, 1991; Duke, 1991). He also notes that the labor struggles in Nigeria brought international attention to that country, and the struggles for democracy therein. In Latin America, he focuses on Peru (1978),

Argentina (1983), and Chile in 1990.

Whether one would agree with his analysis of the situation in these particular countries or not, what is most interesting is that he totally ignores the many cases where labor activities do not fit his understanding. (Here's where he reveals his political approach and shows the cynicism of his ideology.) Siedlecki ignores situations where parts of labor—specifically helped by the AFL or the AFL-CIO—played a reactionary role in destabilizing democratically-elected governments, as in Guatemala (1954), Brazil (1964), and Chile (1973). He also fails to mention part of labor's reactionary efforts, again helped by the AFL-CIO, in Guyana (1963), the Dominican Republic (1965), El Salvador (1980s), Nicaragua (1980s and early 1990s), Philippines (1980s and early '90s) and Venezuela (2001-2003).

Additionally, he fails to discuss three of the four cases where unions led the struggles for democracy—in the Philippines (1986), South Korea (1987) and Brazil (1987)—and he mistakenly suggests that the shift of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) in that country (the fourth case) to democracy was a product of external relations with primarily the African National Congress, when the unions that later joined COSATU were democratic from their very beginnings (see, among others, Mac Shane, Plaut and Ward, 1984; Baskin, 1991; Von Holdt, 2003).⁵⁴ This latter failure is the more shocking in that it would seem to strengthen his argument that unions are good democracy promoters. But these cases, we must keep in mind, do not count: these are cases where the unions supported and projected popular democracy as a solution—not the top-down, elite-driven polyarchal democracy that Siedlecki and other “soft power” advocates promote.⁵⁵

Siedlecki focuses on what he calls “mechanisms” for promoting labor movements in other countries. He argues, “The labor attaché program at the U.S. Department of State represents the primary diplomatic avenue for supporting foreign labor movements” (Siedlecki, 2004: 74). Later, he argues, “If democratization is a goal of U.S. foreign policy, the support for labor movements should be an integral part of the policy,” and that “the United States government should dramatically strengthen its international labor diplomacy” (Siedlecki, 2004: 75). Interestingly, in their work with the U.S. State Department's Advisory Committee on Labor and Diplomacy, top level AFL-CIO foreign policy leaders made similar recommendations (see below).

Whatever the specifics decided upon, it is clear that top level foreign policy officials in and around the U.S. Government see trade unions and labor movements as key allies in their efforts to maintain and expand the U.S. Empire.

AFL-CIO Rhetoric of Democracy—Polyarchal as Well: Involvement with NED

It is in the context of working with the NED that we can understand the AFL-CIO's continued emphasis about democracy when discussing foreign affairs. The AFL-CIO's Free Trade Union Institute (FTUI) issued a report on “The AFL-CIO and the National Endowment for Democracy” in 1987 (Free Trade

Union Institute, 1987).⁵⁶ In this report, we find:

This basic understanding—that unions and workers thrive in democratic systems, and must struggle even to survive in non-democratic ones—has traditionally guided the foreign policy views of the American labor movement. In 1983, it led the AFL-CIO to join with three other major American institutions in supporting a significant new venture in international affairs. Along with representatives of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the Democratic and Republican parties, as well as distinguished scholars and others, *leaders of the labor movement helped found the National Endowment for Democracy* (emphasis added) (Free Trade Union Institute, 1987: 5).

The FTUI further connects American workers' moral interests in democracy—"because, above all, it is the morally decent thing to do"—with "improvements in the material well-being of American workers" and argues, "American national interests are advanced by the spread of democracy in the world." FTUI notes that NED is "a private, non-profit corporation, whose politics are determined by its Board of Directors," but that while it gets public (i.e., taxpayers') funds, "Endowment programs do not have to be approved by, nor can they be vetoed by, government." Further, the Endowment finances work that supports "the enduring American commitment to democratic development," and that "The AFL-CIO would not have participated had this guarantee of independence not been assured, leaving all decisions about program and policy in private hands" (Free Trade Union Institute, 1987: 5-7). In other words, while NED is funded by the U.S. Government, the NED runs its own show—and the labor aspect of it is determined by the AFL-CIO foreign policy leaders.⁵⁷

This has been further ensured by the man who has been President of NED since 1984: Carl Gershman. Gershman, identified by Holly Sklar as "former research director, AFL-CIO," has long been part of the U.S. foreign policy apparatus: he was "senior counselor to UN Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick (1981-84), senior counsel to the Kissinger Commission (1984); past resident scholar, Freedom House [identified as Sklar as a "conservative research, publishing, networking, and selective human rights organization"]; and executive director of Social Democrats-USA (1974-80)" (Sklar, 1989: 59, 54).

In short, Gershman and a number of others from the labor movement—including the now-deceased Irving Brown, Sol Chaikin, Sandra Feldman, Tom Kahn, Lane Kirkland, Jay Lovestone and Albert Shanker, and the still-living (as far as I know) William Doherty, Jr., Thomas R. Donahue, John Joyce, Harry Kamberis, Eugenia Kemble, William Lucy, Jay Mazur, Barbara Shailor, and John Sweeney—have been and continue to be part of a small but very powerful group of people who are still in or who have come out of the U.S. labor movement, who operate within a network of reactionary political organizations that often feed their members into especially the more conservative U.S. Government administrations, and who work to further ideologically-based foreign policy goals from their organizational positions (Barry and Preusch, 1986; Sklar, 1989; Sims, 1992). And they do this without any transparency, without any honest reporting to, much less democratic mandate from, the unions and their

members whom they claim to represent.

One of the commonalities that a number of these people share is a common political heritage of the Social Democrats, USA, or SDUSA. SDUSA is the end result of a shift from Revolutionary Trotskyism to the point where they were especially powerful under the Reagan Administration. According to Michael Massing (1987: 21), “group members have helped to popularize Reagan-style diplomacy with constituencies not generally susceptible to conservative proselytizing.” Massing, after describing the political trajectory of the group from Trotsky to Reagan, identifies Gershman, Kahn, and Kemble as members of SDUSA: Carl Gershman, President of NED; the late Tom Kahn at the time was head of the AFL-CIO’s International Affairs Department, and Eugenia Kemble was the Executive Director of the Free Trade Union Institute. Further, although not a member, the late Albert Shanker, then-President of the American Federation of Teachers and a key labor reactionary (see Schmidt, 1978), was on the SDUSA national advisory council. And Tom Donahue, then Secretary-Treasurer of the AFL-CIO—and for a moment between Kirkland and Sweeney was President of the AFL-CIO—was married to “Schactman disciple” (which I believe is another way to write “SDUSA member”) Rachelle Horowitz (Massing, 1987).⁵⁸ Donahue was identified as Treasurer of the Board of Directors of NED by NED in 2000 and Vice Chair of the Board in 2003.⁵⁹

In short, a number of high-level AFL-CIO national leaders—based on the legitimacy of their Labor positions—have been invited into and have joined top-level U.S. foreign policy circles, and actively participated in U.S. foreign policy initiatives without informing their affiliated unions and their members, much less asking for a mandate to do so. They have consciously kept these affiliations secret from their members, and have lied when they have been exposed. In short, they have actively betrayed the trust of workers, American and those throughout the rest of the world.

AFL-CIO Rhetoric versus Reality

The AFL-CIO leadership fetishizes democracy and freedom from government intervention in labor movements in their public statements. In the 1987 FTUI report, for example, the former AFL-CIO President Lane Kirkland is extensively quoted from an article he wrote for the journal, *Commonsense*. Among other things, Kirkland wrote:

Of all the commonly enumerated human rights, we believe the most important is freedom of association—not only because it is the bedrock principle of trade unionism, but because it enables and defends the exercise of all other human rights.

Freedom of association means, simply, the right of ordinary people who share common interests to form their own institutions in order to advance those interests and to shelter them against the arbitrary power of the state, the employer, or other strongholds of self-interest. Absent such sheltering institutions, not only are the people powerless to defend such other rights as they may have against state encroachment, but those rights are inevitably attenuated (quoted in

Free Trade Union Institute, 1987: 9-10).

Were this reality, and not mere rhetoric, then the AFL-CIO would never do anything to support a state, and particularly not one headed by an anti-democratic government. It certainly would have no connection with the National Endowment for Democracy, which, as an operation of the U.S. State, is promoting the interests of the U.S. Empire against all others; real, popular democracy be damned. Conversely, from this statement, we would expect to see the AFL-CIO do all it could to support those governments that expanded the right to association and other freedom-enhancing measures.

Yet what we keep seeing again and again is, despite the rhetoric, the AFL-CIO keeps supporting trade unions that defend state control over the society. We saw this under George Meany and Lane Kirkland, and we see it under John Sweeney—and regardless of whether Washington was headed by Republicans or Democrats.

And should there be any remaining doubt on this issue, it was a man—Harry Kamberis—who had worked in both the Philippines and South Korea during times of incredible labor repression by states and labor movements supported by the AFL-CIO, a former U.S. State Department official, that John Sweeney hired to serve as the head of the American Center for International Labor Solidarity.⁶⁰ That seems a weak foundation on which to build a reform project.

Not only that but, in fact, the AFL-CIO has a long-established history of undermining progressive, democratically-elected governments that try to extend human liberties—such as freedom of association, freedom of speech, and freedom of economic security—to working people. It seems the AFL-CIO really only supports these values in certain cases. Claims of support for universal values, such as freedom of association and speech, are found to be, upon closer inspection, only tools to whip those with which the AFL-CIO disagrees. Freedom of Association belongs only to those who kowtow to the U.S. Empire.

Synopsis

The NED was specifically established by the U.S. State to advance U.S. foreign policy interests and, despite the supposed “non-governmental” nature of the NED, it has functioned on behalf of the U.S. State for almost thirty years. The AFL-CIO was one of the founders and core institutes of NED, and the Solidarity Center continues to play a core role to this day. Long-standing members of Labor play or have played key roles within NED, most notably Carl Gershman, Lane Kirkland, Thomas R. Donahue and John Sweeney.

In short, we have high-level Labor officials participating in activities as representatives of Labor, in which they have certain legitimacy, but yet without informing those in the labor movement of the way they are representing them or even that they are involved in such nefarious activities.

Labor got involved with the NED during the presidency of Lane Kirkland, although John Sweeney has maintained that involvement.⁶¹ Are there any other

projects continuing under Sweeney that show the development of the new out of the toxic waste dump of the old?

AFL-CIO Foreign Policy Leaders and the U.S. State Department's Advisory Committee on Labor and Diplomacy⁶²

Although AFL-CIO leaders almost constantly castigated the George W. Bush Administration for its on-going assault on workers and their unions, AFL-CIO foreign policy leaders were actively involved in helping develop President Bush's foreign policy regarding labor and diplomacy. These foreign policy leaders participated in a U.S. State Department initiative called the Advisory Committee on Labor Diplomacy (ACLD). The ACLD started as an initiative of the Clinton Administration's State Department under Madeleine Albright, but it was continued under Colin Powell, George W. Bush's first Secretary of State. AFL-CIO leaders have been incorporated into the ACLD and have actively participated since its very beginning in May 1999, another compromise of their ability to advance interests of workers in the U.S. and around the world (Stigliani, 2000).

The ACLD is an initiative of the U.S. State Department. Some of what it does used to be found on its Web site, where minutes of meetings and two formal reports were posted, but which has been made inoperable.⁶³ A careful perusal of this material establishes several things:

1. This was an initiative of the U.S. State Department for the purposes of advancing U.S. foreign policy. It began under the Clinton Administration, and was continued by the Bush Administration;
2. Top-level labor foreign policy leaders—including John Sweeney and Linda Chavez Thompson, President and Executive Secretary of the AFL-CIO, respectively; William Lucy, Secretary-Treasurer of AFSCME and the head of the AFL-CIO Executive Council's Committee on International Affairs, which directs the work of the International Affairs Department; Barbara Shailor, Director of the International Affairs Department (IAD); Philip Fishman, Assistant Director of the IAD; and Harry Kamberis, Executive Director of the Solidarity Center (also known as the American Center for International Labor Solidarity)—each *actively* participated in meetings and the work of the ACLD. In fact, of the six meetings held between October 4, 2001 and early 2005 (when this section was initially published), Sweeney and Kamberis each attended all six meetings (100 percent attendance); Lucy, Joyce and Fishman, four out of six (66 percent); Shailor, three (50 percent); and Chavez-Thompson, one out of six (18 percent). The ACLD was obviously a major project for AFL-CIO foreign policy leaders.

Additionally, other Labor-related people have attended as well. Former AFL-CIO President (and long-time Secretary-Treasurer), and Board Member of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), Thomas R. Donahue, chairs the ACLD. Another participant from Labor is the former President (1979-1999) of the Bricklayers, John Joyce. Joyce is President of the

International Construction Institute—an international trade union NGO (non-governmental organization)—headquartered in Rome, a Board Member of Freedom House, and is also a Board Member of the NED.⁶⁴

3. These labor leaders were independent agents in the process and advocated an approach different from that of the administration, especially different from that of President Bush and his administration; and
4. This work has not been reported in any labor publications, as far as I have been able to discover, nor put on the AFL-CIO's web site, despite labor leaders' participation in the Committee's work since at mid-1999.

The ACLD is an effort to restore a process in the State Department known as "Labor Diplomacy."

The Development of the ACLD

The ACLD was established on May 20, 1999, when Under Secretary of State for Management, Bonnie R. Cohen, approved its Charter. The purpose of the Committee is quite clear:

The purpose of the Advisory Committee on Labor Diplomacy . . . shall be to serve the Secretary of State . . . in an advisory capacity with respect to the U.S. Government's labor diplomacy programs administered by the Department of State. The Committee will provide advice to the Secretary and the President. The Department of State will work in close partnership with the Department of Labor to enhance the Committee's work and U.S. labor diplomacy activities. Specifically, the Committee shall advise the Secretary on the resources and policies necessary to implement labor diplomacy programs efficiently, effectively and in a manner that ensures U.S. leadership before the international community in promoting the objectives and ideals of U.S. labor policies now and in the 21st century (ACLD Charter, 1999).

While it is not clear where the initiative that became ACLD developed, a strong argument was later made for the revitalization of labor diplomacy by Edmund McWilliams, the director of international labor in the State Department's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (McWilliams, 2001). McWilliams, recognizing the key service by the labor movement to the U.S. Government during the Cold War, cut to the chase in his first paragraph, despite including some ideological boilerplate:

Labor diplomacy, those aspects of U.S. foreign relations that relate to the promotion of worker rights and, more broadly, democratic society, *was a vital element of a successful U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War*. At the time, *labor offered significant political support to the U.S. Government in its efforts to contain and defeat communism*. In the years after the Cold War, labor diplomacy has been relegated to the sidelines by foreign policy makers; at the same time, the fight for worker rights has become even more important as globalization has produced new challenges for workers. It is time that *a vibrant labor diplomacy can be a valuable component of U.S. foreign policy once again*

(emphases added) (McWilliams, 2001: 1).

McWilliams points out that “During the Cold War, a vigorous labor diplomacy [—] implemented by State Department labor officers, USAID and USIA [—] was critical to U.S. foreign policy.” He notes that the unions “rallied” to the U.S. Government’s call for a struggle against communism, “and offered political support to shore up Western governments.” However, “U.S. labor’s role in U.S. foreign policy and U.S. labor diplomacy more generally lost much of their purpose following the collapse of communism” (McWilliams, 2001: 2).

The idea of a revitalized labor diplomacy policy, however, is seen as alleviating the worse aspects of globalization, which has “produced new challenges for workers.” McWilliams notes that, “The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights established that worker rights are human rights,” although he also recognizes that these goals are still unmet in both the developed and developing countries. He recognizes problems such as “flexible” labor markets, privatization and downsizing—the latter “encouraged by international financial institutions *and our own bilateral assistance programs*” (emphasis added)—leave workers “to adjust to new economic conditions without benefit of social safety nets or job retraining.” Additionally, he notes that “globalization encourages companies to invest in countries where labor standards are lowest, potentially pushing some countries that embrace higher stands for workers right out of economic competition” (McWilliams, 2001: 2). In short, McWilliams recognizes at least some of the serious impacts that globalization is having on developing countries and their workers, and wants U.S. Labor’s voice re-invited into U.S. foreign policy discussion so they can present these concerns.

He argues

today, labor could play just as significant a role in the formulation and implementation of U.S. foreign policy *as it did during the Cold War*. Many of the goals that U.S. foreign policy seeks to promote—democracy, human rights, political stability, and social and economic development—are the same ones that labor also embraces (emphasis added) (McWilliams, 2001: 2).

And McWilliams then elaborates the contributions that unions make in societies around the world. He argues that “Trade unions in many countries are uniquely placed to articulate social as well as labor concerns responsibly and coherently” and, accordingly, “trade unions and workers can be valuable allies for U.S. diplomacy” (McWilliams, 2001: 2-3).

In short, McWilliams recognizes that U.S. foreign policy has weaknesses that must be addressed. In this case, he argues that globalization is causing detrimental effects upon the world’s workers, that it is a mistake to ignore these escalating problems, that U.S. Labor—particularly because of its relations with labor around the world—is uniquely capable of presenting labor’s concerns to U.S. foreign policy makers, and that they should be reincorporated into the U.S. Government’s foreign policy processes:

The U.S. would benefit from engaging international labor in the pursuit of shared goals such as democratization, political stability and equitable economic and social development. An alliance between the U.S. and labor today would focus on worker rights, including ensuring that economic development is not based on the exploitation of child labor, forced labor or employment that discriminates against women and minorities, and on economic justice, ensuring that globalization's benefits flow to all and not simply to the few best placed to profit from it. A revitalized labor diplomacy today would foster democratic freedoms by shoring up fragile democracies, *just as the U.S. labor alliance of the Cold War era did* (emphasis added) (McWilliams, 2001: 5).

Analysis

Now, obviously, there is a contradiction that can be seen specifically in McWilliams' argument, but it actually is advanced throughout almost all of the U.S. Government's foreign policy public documents—especially including ACLD and NED materials—and this must be addressed. The evidence presented above in this book has argued that Labor's role in the Cold War was terribly reactionary, and that it acted *against democracy* in a number of societies, labor movements and internally within the U.S. labor movement itself, while seeking to help maintain and extend U.S. hegemony in the world. McWilliams acknowledges and even celebrates the close ties between Labor and the U.S. Government during that period, arguing for their re-establishment. And yet he claims that the shared interest between Labor and the U.S. Government is to "spread democracy." How can these contradictory claims be resolved?

To do this, it is useful to turn to the work of William Robinson (1996). In an excellent analysis of U.S. foreign policy, Robinson argues that the U.S. Government's foreign policy began shifting in the 1980s from supporting any dictator who promised fealty and control of "his" people as in the past, to actively intervening in the "civil society" of targeted nations for the purposes of building support among the more conservative politicians (including labor leaders) and for developing their relationships with the United States. Key to this—as Robinson so ably demonstrates—is through "democracy-promoting" operations.

However, U.S. Government representatives, while using the rhetoric of "popular" democracy—the one person, one vote version that we are taught in U.S. civics courses that emerges from grassroots citizens and that supposedly exists in this country—are, in fact, promoting *polyarchal* or top-down, elite-driven, democracy. This polyarchal democracy suggests that citizens get to choose their leaders when, in fact, they only get to choose between those presented as possible choices by the elites of that country, or that viable solutions to social problems can only emerge from possibilities presented by the elites. In other words, polyarchal democracy *appears* to be democratic when, in reality, it is not; in fact, it is actively working *against* popular democracy (Robinson, 1996; see also Sorenson, 2003).

And institutionally, where the U.S. Government projects this polyarchal democracy, is through its "democracy-building programs," especially through USAID and the Department of State. State, in turn, channels its money and its

efforts through the National Endowment for Democracy, upon which the report comments: “The National Endowment for Democracy (a government-supported but independent agency) funds its four core grantee institutions, *including the Solidarity Center*, as well as a large number of grantee groups around the world” (emphasis added) (ACLD Report, 2001: 10).

This understanding provides a means to “decipher” the U.S. Government reports. When they promote “democracy” and claim it is one of the four interrelated goals of US foreign policy—along with stability, security, and prosperity (ACLD Report, 2001: 1)—in reality, it is a particular form of democracy, *a form of democracy that has no relation to the popular democracy of which most Americans think*. When labor leaders use the term “democracy” in this manner, they are collaborating with the U.S. Government against workers around the world, both in the U.S. and overseas.

Labor Diplomacy

Key to a program of “labor diplomacy” is the development of labor officers. According to Nicholas A. Stigliani, a retired 14 year U.S. Foreign Service labor officer (formerly referred to as a “labor attaché”):

Labor attachés go beyond the boundaries of traditional diplomacy and complement the work of embassy political and economic officers by developing contacts with “the man in the street,” particularly workers and their trade unions. An underlying motivation for the labor attaché program during the 1940s and 1950s was to thwart or minimize Communist or other totalitarian influence in the labor movements of Western Europe and Latin America. After 1960, the focus shifted to the promotion of free and effective trade unions, as one pillar of democratic development, in the newly independent countries of Africa and Asia (Stigliani, 2000: 178).

The labor attaché program had declined after the end of the Cold War. However, a number of developments combined to revive this program. Included were issues related to economic globalization, including “an emphasis on promoting ‘fundamental’ labor standards worldwide as part of a concerted U.S. effort to ‘put a human face on the global economy’ and to create a ‘level playing field’ in international trade for the benefit of American business and American workers” (Stigliani, 2000: 180); new high level officials in the U.S. Departments of State and Labor who recognized the importance of this; the fast-track debacle of 1997 whereby the AFL-CIO intervened to prevent fast-track trade authority from being given to the Clinton Administration; and the need for the Clinton Administration to improve relations with the labor center. These all came together with the Clinton Administration’s embrace of the AFL-CIO’s international labor affairs agenda to revive this program (Stigliani, 2000: 180-181).

“In mid-1998, the State Department—in collaboration with the Labor Department and with the strong backing of the White House and the urging of the AFL-CIO—began to pursue a series of new initiatives under the rhetoric of ‘labor diplomacy’.” A key component of this was the establishment of the ACLD

(Stigliani, 2000: 181-182).

In reading reports and meeting minutes from a U.S. Government web site www.state.gov/g/drl/lbr/c6732.htm, it is clear that the U.S. State Department has been using U.S. labor leaders to help them target overseas unions for political purposes—and that these labor leaders have readily and actively participated.⁶⁵ This, obviously, is the same State Department through which funding for the so-called National Endowment for Democracy (NED) has been channeled, of which the AFL-CIO is one of the four “core” institutes and beneficiaries.⁶⁶

Secretary of State Madeleine Albright had recognized the strength of the argument for getting Labor involved in State’s labor diplomacy efforts, even before McWilliams published it. After receiving the first report by the ACLD—“A World of Decent Work: Labor Diplomacy for the New Century” (ACLD Report, 2000)—and having a couple of months to evaluate its recommendations as for the need to a revitalized labor diplomacy program within the State Department, Secretary Albright stated at the November 8, 2000 meeting of the ACLD, “I am absolutely convinced after four years of doing this job that we can’t have a successful U.S. foreign policy without effective labor diplomacy.” But she also recognized the incorporation of Labor’s foreign policy leaders: “*And becoming a part of the U.S. Government may not have been something you intended in this way, but I do believe it has been a very important partnership*” (emphasis added) (Albright, 2000: 3).

The ACLD, although initially only expected to last for two years (ACLD Charter, 1999: 5), was continued by the Bush Administration. However, where the first report (ACLD Report, 2000: 1)—during the Clinton Administration—addressed the importance of labor diplomacy in U.S. foreign policy and the promotion of worker rights in the context of economic globalization—by its second report in late 2001 (i.e., after September 11, 2001), the focus had shifted to “the role and importance of labor diplomacy *in promoting U.S. national security and combating the global political, economic, and social conditions that undermine our security interests*” (emphasis added) (ACLD Report, Executive Summary, 2001: 1). This emphasis can further be seen in the title of the second report, “Labor Diplomacy: In the Service of Democracy and Security” (ACLD Report, 2001).

There is a lot of talk in the second report, just like in the first one, about the importance of labor rights and democracy. However, one only has to read a little into the second report to see that workers’ rights are important *only* if they help advance U.S. security:

The war on terrorism provides one more example of why labor diplomacy functions are so important. Working conditions that lead to misery, alienation, and hopelessness are extremely important in the constellation of forces responsible for terrorism, *especially when demagogues blame the United States, globalization or other external forces*. Policies to improve these conditions are necessary components of strategies to prevent and counter terrorist activities. Effective labor diplomacy is important in informing American analysis and shaping its policy to combat the conditions that breed terrorism around the world (emphasis added) (ACLD Report, 2001: 5).

Further, the Report argues, “the promotion of democracy needs to be part of any sustainable U.S.-led effort to combat terrorism, promote stability and ensure national security” (ACLD Report, 2001: 5).

The Report discusses “Trade Unions in Muslim Countries.” It notes, “These unions are a political battleground because they are proxy political institutions and *instruments for controlling the hearts, minds and jobs of workers in these countries*” (emphasis added). Further, they note the role of ACILS in these unions:

As the U.S. Government-supported programs of the American Center for International Labor Solidarity (Solidarity Center) *already demonstrate*, a policy that aims to cultivate union leadership at the enterprise and industrial sector levels represents the most promising approach to inculcate modern economic thinking and democratic political values among workers in Muslim countries (emphasis added) (ACLD Report, 2001: 7.)

So, without beating the issue to death, it is clear that by the second ACLD report, ACLD members are seeing labor diplomacy as a vital part of U.S. foreign policy and national security efforts, and they are encouraging the Bush Administration to address areas of concern that they have identified. This certainly includes conditions that they believe facilitate terrorism, and particularly within the Muslim world. And yet, they state that Labor has already been working within the Muslim world, trying to win “the hearts and minds” of workers in these countries.

There is a lot of talk within these reports of the importance of labor rights and democracy but, as can be quickly seen, workers’ rights anywhere are *only* important if they help advance U.S. security. While great concern is expressed again and again in the report for U.S. national security, concern for the well-being of the world’s workers and any possible expressions of mutually beneficial, solidarity-based action by the AFL-CIO is absent. This is not a good basis for building international labor solidarity.

Synopsis

After having examined Lodge’s *Spearheads of Democracy: Labor in the Developing Countries* to understand the argument for U.S. Government support of Labor’s activities in the “developing world,” and then examining three major operations of the U.S. Government through which these operations have been subsequently supported—U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), and the Advisory Committee on Labor and Diplomacy (ACLD)—two things are clear. One, the U.S. Government has seen Labor’s foreign policy program as an important tool to keep workers around the world generally immobilized, a key project in trying to maintain stability within countries of the U.S. Empire. And two, the foreign policy leaders of the AFL-CIO recognize their importance to maintaining the U.S. Empire, both acquiescing in the foreign policy program’s use and, whenever

possible, actively participating in the process of maintaining the U.S. Empire.

Further, it is argued that U.S. elites, top leaders of the U.S. Government, their foreign policy “leaders” in both formal and informal organizations, and top leaders of the AFL-CIO, do not want “ordinary” Americans to know and especially do not want us to understand how these efforts all tie together in their on-going efforts to dominate the peoples of the world. This makes it all the more important that we untangle their lies, their “distortions,” and their atrocities.

Conclusion

This chapter has shown the long-standing and on-going relationship between the AFL-CIO’s foreign policy program and the U.S. Government’s. The government has actively worked to incorporate Labor’s foreign policy program into its own, and overwhelmingly—behind the backs of their members—the AFL-CIO foreign policy leaders have acquiesced to this, and subsequently became active participants in consciously advancing U.S. foreign policy efforts. The AFL-CIO’s program overwhelmingly serves the interests of the U.S. Government and its corporate allies—at the direct expense of working people around the world, and at the increasing expense of American workers.⁶⁷

Chapter 5

Conclusions, Some Ramifications, and Effects On Sociological Theory

This study has presented an in-depth examination of the AFL-CIO's foreign policy program. It has revolved around several major themes: empire, imperialism, and democracy.

In this final chapter, this study is wrapped up. The overall examination is concluded, with some thoughts about how trade unionists might proceed. Following, a discussion is presented in light of this study on the concepts of imperialism, empire and democracy—in efforts to draw out ramifications of this study. This author then discusses why these labor leaders have shifted from being labor militants to active collaborators with the U.S. imperial project—and while definite answers cannot be provided, an example by Howard Becker suggests a plausible hypothesis that other researchers might usefully address. Finally, ramifications of this study on sociological theory are discussed, particularly questioning the structural basis for macrosociological theory, and challenging the established understanding of power. The richness of this study provides considerable material for theoretical consideration and reflection.

Conclusions from this Study

In light of the extensively detailed history presented herein, and the extensive efforts to undercut those within the labor movement who have challenged AFL-CIO foreign policy leadership, it is safe to conclude that *Labor's foreign policy leadership is wedded to the idea of Empire: they believe that the United States should dominate the world, that unlimited financial resources should be dedicated to ensuring this, and that all other considerations are secondary or less.* That they have been willing to mistreat workers around the world, especially in the developing countries, and disembowel labor democracy within the United States suggests the strength of these convictions.

Yet it must be asked: what are the ramifications of this? What does it mean to the U.S. labor movement?

Ultimately, this belief in the U.S. Empire has prevented AFL-CIO leadership from even attempting to address the worsening economic conditions and resulting social situation that has been developing in this country since the early

1970s, although they have been long aware of them.¹ This belief in empire has been the dagger that has drained much of the lifeblood from the labor movement. The only thing the AFL-CIO leadership has done in response to the worsening economic conditions is to spend millions and millions of dollars to elect Democratic politicians, especially presidents, into political office.² This has been terribly insufficient, as most Democrats, just like the Republicans, believe in the desirability of the U.S. Empire.

AFL-CIO leaders do not question overall U.S. foreign policy at all, nor whether the U.S. should continue to try to run the world. They did not question Bush's unilateralist foreign policy, nor have they questioned the trillions of dollars being spent on the invasion of Iraq, nor have they questioned Obama's build up of U.S. troops in Afghanistan (and its billions of dollars in costs), nor have they argued how that money could be better spent addressing problems in the U.S. or the world. Additionally, there has been no consideration by the AFL-CIO foreign policy leaders of militarism, war or even the financial costs of maintaining the by-far largest military on the planet.³ And they refuse to address the question of how can we maintain social programs at home—including social security and Medicaid—when the “beast” of military spending is driving this country deeper and deeper into bankruptcy.⁴

In fact, AFL-CIO leaders have flatly ignored the resolution presented by U.S. Labor Against the War that passed at the 2005 National AFL-CIO Convention in Chicago, which required them to demand that U.S. forces in Iraq should be “rapidly withdrawn” from Iraq. Considering that the National Convention is the highest decision-making body of the organization, that was not only an insult to members of the U.S. military, but to USLAW, and to each member of every affiliated AFL-CIO union.

AFL-CIO leaders seek, however, to help U.S. foreign policy succeed. As stated above, the AFL-CIO foreign policy leadership accepts the continued efforts to dominate the world by the United States, and this position does not change by administrations or by political party. This has included actively participating in foreign policy projects of the George W. Bush administration, arguably the most anti-labor administration since Herbert Hoover's.

And in one of the most ironic features of AFL-CIO foreign policy—in a field rich in irony—is that the AFL-CIO foreign policy leaders, in collaboration with the U.S. Government, have adopted many of the habits of the former Communist operatives: especially state funding, secrecy, and acting in members' names but not with their consent. The irony is even richer when one remembers these were the reasons advanced by AFL-CIO foreign policy leaders to fight the Communists!

Although they accept the United States running the world, the one place the labor leaders diverge from the neoconservative efforts is over *how* to ensure U.S. dominance. While most of the foreign policy elites want more globalization, more economic market freedoms and do not even consider the social impacts of such continued policies, labor leaders disagree. Basically, labor leaders recognize the terrible social impacts of these policies, argue that this ultimately threatens U.S. security, and instead argue for what could be described as “inter-

national social Keynesianism,” with calls for increased international economic development and established governmental regulations limiting free market capitalism. If workers’ situations improve elsewhere, it is thought, they will be less likely to challenge U.S. dominance. Labor leaders also suggest that the U.S. should increase the money devoted for international development funding which, although they don’t mention it, is at a minute .15 percent of GNP, according to a 2005 article (Dugger, 2005) in *The New York Times*. (The internationally agreed-upon standard for so-called economically developed countries is already only a measly .7 percent of GDP.)

This acceptance of the U.S. Empire means that the AFL-CIO leadership is incapable of fighting for workers here in the United States: such as against the destruction of collective bargaining agreements or the destruction of pensions by bankrupt corporations; against violations of wage and safety regulations; against rising social inequality; against racial and gender oppression; against the subprime mortgage and related credit crisis; against welfare “reform” that is forcing poor mothers into low-paying jobs and dropping the price for labor even further at the bottom-end; or for national health care. It also means that the AFL-CIO leadership will continue to channel discontent into discredited institutional forms, such as NLRB elections, or will try to get Congress to pass the Employee Free Choice Act without mobilizing union members in the streets, and will oppose independent efforts to mobilize working people.

Only the affiliated national and international unions can decide if this is acceptable or not. But at a time when Labor is in crisis, when the times call for truly inspired leadership, toadying for the Bush Administration, the Obama Administration, or any other against workers in the U.S. and around the world, seems to be shortsighted at best, and a guaranteed route to social irrelevancy and/or organizational disintegration at worst.

It is important also to note that, despite their eloquent rhapsodies toward “democracy,” there never has been any public discussion within the AFL-CIO itself about the appropriateness of AFL-CIO foreign policy leaders participating in U.S. foreign policy efforts. In fact, all aspects of the AFL-CIO’s foreign policy program have been consciously hidden from the members of the AFL-CIO. There has never been an honest accounting or transparency in AFL-CIO foreign policy and related operations. This has been true even if the face of repeated demands from AFL-CIO-affiliated labor bodies, such as the California and Washington State AFL-CIOs, the National Writers Union, and the “constituency group” for gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgender members of the AFL-CIO, Pride at Work. *Lack of democracy inside the AFL-CIO makes it impossible for the AFL-CIO to promote democracy in any kind of a real way around the world no matter what the leadership claims.*

Having accepted Gompers’ “fear of radicalism” and then the subsequent “fear of communism,” the labor movement turned on itself. It disemboweled itself in the 1949 purges, relinquished its independence (vis-à-vis the U.S. Government) and, over time, has become a paper tiger for working people who need so much more. These effects were hidden for a long time (1948-1973) by the growth of the U.S. economy, and the ability of U.S.-based multinational corpo-

rations to share surplus with Labor because they were making so much exploiting the world—so when Labor fought, the corporations had something to give, while at the same time, investing resources into technological displacement and outsourcing jobs, ultimately removing workers and, therefore, Labor from much of industry, leading to the current economic situation.

Then, of course, revelations of CIA activities, especially via the Church Committee and Philip Agee's book, raised the need to address these problems; Reagan and NED followed. By then, the AFL-CIO foreign policy leadership was so dependent—both psychologically and financially—on government for its overseas activities that it has been a “kept child,” despite claiming to be independent. The 2005 Convention's treatment of the “Build Unity and Trust” resolution from the California AFL-CIO shows that national-level leadership would disembowel democracy inside the labor movement just to stay on a teat of government: AFL-CIO foreign policy leadership is bankrupt and not able to conceptualize global labor activities on its own because any genuine move to do so would involve working to undermine the post-WW II global social order, AKA the U.S. Empire.

Is this being too melodramatic? *We do not think so.* The empirical evidence, as presented herein, supports this conclusion.

Working people are hurting in this country, and have a crying need for organization and leadership. They need a labor movement that will fight for the best interests of themselves and their families. And yet, as bad as things are, there is no obvious turn to join the labor movement. Yes, the government has done a lot to disembowel agencies such as the National Labor Relations Board, which used to keep employer attacks against unionizing workers under some control. Yes, the courts have generally gotten more and more hostile to Labor's positions and interests. Yes, there is a different culture, if one will, in the United States. There *are* many external hurdles that make labor organizing incredibly difficult in this country. All good reasons, certainly. Yet at the end of the day, American workers have not been willing to challenge them, to join unions, because *they have so little confidence in the leadership of the unions.* In other words, the largest problems of the labor movement are those *internal* to Labor, not external (see also Fletcher and Gapasin, 2008).

That leaves the U.S. labor movement in a quandary: it can continue as it is and become less and less a factor in American life, and matter even less to the lives of working Americans, and especially beyond those who are currently union members. Or it can address its very real problems. Left to its own, AFL-CIO leadership all-but-certainly will opt for the status quo.

There is another way, one that offers some solutions. As said in the beginning of this book, this author believes in unions and collective organization, especially by working people. First and foremost, to change this situation and regain control over the labor movement requires that the affiliated national and international unions turn to their memberships, detail the problems, seek their support, and then act in concert to change AFL-CIO foreign policy: they need to use the Federation's resources to honestly report the full range and extent of Labor's operations, both domestically and abroad. Reveal the amount of gov-

ernment funding for programs and any other “benefits” provided. Allow the widest range of discussion, analysis and persuasive arguments to be transmitted to the membership. Encourage widest discussion. Deliver some of the democracy that is trotted out elsewhere to union members here in the United States.

As important as this is, and it is necessary, it is yet not sufficient. Ultimately, the labor movement needs to develop a vision about where it wants to go, and in what kind of United States it wants to live.⁵ And of what kind of world it wants to be a part. This is all the more important in a world where climate change (aka “global warming”) is real, not contrived, and which is and will continue to qualitatively affect the United States and countries around the world, economically and socially (see Scipes, 2009a).

To do that, leaders of the labor movement must restore democracy within the labor movement itself: let the members decide. If union members want to have a foreign policy, then they should be ones to decide. But if they decide they want one—and it is hoped they do—then they should also decide on what basis it should be developed: do they do it on the basis of trying to dominate workers of the world, subordinating them to the interests of the U.S. Government or of multinational corporations, or do they base it on mutual solidarity, international labor solidarity? And what are the ramifications of each path offered . . . ?

Major Themes of this Study: Imperialism, Empire and Democracy

To remind those readers who have traveled this far, it has been argued that the United States is an imperialist nation (Nederveen Pieterse, 1989; Robinson, 1996; Blum, 2000; Johnson, 2000; Nederveen Pieterse, 2004; Grandin, 2007; Klein, 2007; Nederveen Pieterse, 2008), and that the entire set of the United States’ relations with other countries should be properly known as the U.S. Empire. Accordingly, it was pointed out that between 1945 (at the latest) and 1991, the U.S. Empire included all of the world except those countries that were—whether by choice or by acquisition—part of the Soviet Empire; i.e., this was a bi-polar world, with two “super-powers” dominating their respective areas. After the collapse of the USSR in 1991, the United States then became unquestionably recognized as the most powerful country in the world, the “hegemon” of the entire world, and that the U.S. Empire extended globally, i.e., in political science terms, this was a uni-polar world. And the U.S. elite was quite well aware of this: the Bush Administration’s 2002 National Security Strategy document (NSSD, 2002) established this in no uncertain terms:

We will work to translate this moment of influence into decades of peace, prosperity, and liberty. The U.S. national security strategy will be based on a distinctly American internationalism that reflects *the union of our values and our national interests* (emphasis added).

In pursuit of our goals, our first imperative is to clarify what we stand for: the United States must defend liberty and justice because these principles are right and true for all people everywhere (NSSD, 2002: 3).

In other words, the United States will use universal aspirations such as for liberty and justice, and interpret what they mean, according to its own values and interests, regardless whether others agree with them or not.

While this shows the will to dominate the world, it does not explain how the United States could do it. It suggests that this was done through typical nation-state relationships, such as economic and political—especially including military—power. While that is true, at least to a certain point, there are at least two more aspects to the explanation.

One aspect—and this largely is beyond this study, although in reality, it must be included in any overall explanation—is U.S. cultural power, the ability to transmit the meanings constructed by the U.S. elites around the world (see McChesney, 1999; Croteau and Hoynes, 2003). This includes the cultural/ideological power of Hollywood (movies and TV), uncritical/propagandistic writing, and the US educational system.

This U.S. cultural power is multifaceted. Hollywood has projected an unreal “American” standard of living around the world⁶ so as to suggest that the U.S. has so overwhelmingly “succeeded” (“measured” through its qualitatively higher standard of living, as shown visually) that it demands acquiescence in order for outsiders to ever have a chance to attain such a standard of living.

This has been combined with books and journal articles—especially academic, having the “legitimization” of objective and dispassionate “science” to give them special legitimacy—that have been published and promoted throughout the rest of the world, explaining that the U.S. model of development is the one “real” model that people around the world should strive for; perhaps the classic of these is Walt Whitman Rostow’s *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto* (1960—see McMichael, 2008; Nederveen Pieterse, 1989), along with CIA cultural operations (see Agee, 1975; Saunders, 2000).

And these images have been joined at home with a “class-based” educational system that has separated “education” from the social context of the larger society for the “have-nots,” has taught “captive” students through use of a “passive” education model, has ensured that they not learn to think critically, and then has saturated them with tons of nationalistic propaganda. Much of actual U.S. history is excluded from contemporary textbooks (for a couple of examples, see Brown, 1970; Zinn, 1980). All of this ultimately preparing the have-nots for unquestionably accepting what ever the United States Government has wanted to do around the world, including drafting them and sending them to militarily enforce U.S. dominance on those countries that refuse to follow Uncle Samuel’s directives passively (see Kozol, 1992, 2005; Bageant, 2007).

The second aspect of how the U.S. has sought to dominate the world has been partially illuminated by this study: the active joining of U.S.-based social organizations with the goals of the U.S. Empire; in this case, by foreign policy leadership of the AFL-CIO.

Although labor is not the only non-governmental organization that has actively joined the imperial project, it has a special role that is duplicated by no other: *labor is located in arguably the most important social sphere in any so-*

cial order, the realm of production. If workers refuse to produce—and here, I’m speaking in a larger sense that includes producing goods and services, but also includes acting in an organized manner in providing transportation, governmental administration, energy and communications—then any social order can be brought to a literal standstill. This gives Labor an incredible amount of potential power.⁷

By joining the U.S. imperial project, the labor imperialism of the AFL-CIO qualitatively expands the overall power of the U.S. Empire, reducing the need for military intervention or, when it is still seen as necessary, making military intervention that much more likely to succeed. Without the social and economic sabotage leading to military coups carried out by the AFL-supported ORIT in Guatemala, and especially later by the AFL-CIO’s AIFLD in Brazil and Chile, these coups arguably would not have succeeded and, almost certainly had the coups succeeded nonetheless, the respective militaries would have never been able to maintain their dominance anywhere as long as they did.

Yet, let us be careful. We are not saying that the AFL-CIO could launch a coup and be successful on its own: most nation-states have vastly more resources that can enable them to survive even the most drastic economic disruption—see the Venezuelan oil “lockout” in 2002-03 for an example of this (Ellner, 2008)—without having to mobilize their military and declaring martial law. Obviously, if the economic threat was seen as so threatening, an attacked state could mobilize its military to either produce itself or to force citizens to produce, as long as that state still maintained political legitimacy.

What the AFL-CIO does is add to the weapons in the arsenal of the U.S. Empire. It adds to the non-military efforts of the CIA, the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), USAID and related organizations, reducing the need for U.S. military intervention, which the U.S. elites try to avoid unless deemed absolutely necessary. And should U.S. military intervention be deemed “necessary,” the AFL-CIO’s efforts add to the chances of success, while ensuring the resumption of production when desired, and *all the time helping to legitimize these attacks on sovereign countries.* It is a substantial contribution to the ongoing power of the U.S. Empire.

Yet there is one more “service” the AFL-CIO provides to the Empire that is perhaps even more important: *it undercuts opposition to the imperial project from within the United States, and especially limits the power of the most organized section of American society, organized workers.* In other words, by active collaboration with the Empire, the AFL-CIO keeps the most organized and experienced leaders that have emerged from among working people chained, unable to act against Empire or foreclosed from being won to that position by others in the society. To put it another way, *the AFL-CIO’s foreign policy program neutralizes arguably the key leadership in our society that has the ability to mobilize American workers against the imperial project.* This makes its contribution to the imperial project all that more important.

That the AFL-CIO leadership is willing to do this in light of increasing opposition within the labor movement—see chapter 3—is all the more discouraging for it means that these “leaders” are willing to sacrifice the little democracy

that exists at the national level in the labor movement in order to serve the Empire. Thus, while we have seen the spread of polyarchal or elite democracy particularly in the so-called developing countries, this is another example of this elite democracy spreading *inside* the United States, disemboweling the popular democracy that we are taught governs this country and upon which the legitimacy of elected leaders is based. Thus, the anti-democratic efforts of AFL-CIO foreign policy leaders are another attack both on American democracy and on working people, in a country that has suffered the intensifying effects of elite democracy from both the Democratic and Republican political parties, particularly since the late 1970s-early 1980s (Scipes, 1984, 2009b).

So, while the labor movement is not really fighting the assault on American workers, its collaboration with the imperial project actually impedes their fighting back.

American working people are passively fighting back against this collaboration: they largely are refusing to join the trade unions. And, in many ways, one cannot blame them: they get disrespected regularly at work by their corporate employers, so why should they join organizations that also will mistreat them at work by refusing to fight for them when needed and betray their interests outside of work, too?

However, as much as it could be understood why people might refuse to join unions, this author is against abandoning the unions or letting the unions fall apart. With all of their weaknesses—and there are many—unions still are the one institution in U.S. society that are of the workers, by the workers, and for the workers: there simply is nothing else in our society that even remotely serves the interests of working people, especially in the workplace. In my opinion, they must be defended.

Yet, saying that, working people should not put their energy into repeating mistakes: the only reason to fight for business unions is to transform them. Labor activists have to transform the unions we are now in, and we have to create new unions; we must transform our existing unions and create new unions to fight for the interests and well-being of all working people, here and around the world. We can no longer accept inward-focused, selfish, business unionism (see Buhle, 1999; Weir, 2004: 324-337; Fletcher and Gapasin, 2008).

And that is why this struggle against the AFL-CIO foreign policy program is so very important: we will be unable to change our labor movement until we consciously repudiate the U.S. Empire and break AFL-CIO leaders' collaboration with it. Ending the current foreign policy program of the AFL-CIO is necessary for transformation, but we should be clear that it is not sufficient: we cannot just change Labor's foreign policy program; we must do more.

This requires us to act to transform the American version of trade unionism in general, at least into social justice union forms of economic trade unionism (Scipes, 2003a; Fletcher and Gapasin, 2008), and preferably into social movement unionism (Scipes, 1992a, b). It is a long-term process, but one whose initiation cannot be delayed any longer. And necessarily tied with that, we need to develop a vision of what kind of society we want (Albert, 2003; see Scipes, 1991; 2009a), and begin developing allies who are thinking and working along

the same lines.

Ultimately, that means that working people, and especially AFL-CIO union members, must seize control of our labor movement. Some of us have been trying to do that for decades—and yet our efforts have not been enough.

Reclaiming the Labor Movement⁸

The problem, as this author sees it, is that many of the “reform” efforts have been to replace one set of leaders with another and, while necessary, this has not been sufficient. The limitation of this approach is that if and when the new leaders go bad—whether intentionally or unintentionally—then members are back at “square one,” and have mobilize to do it all over again. Over time, this has proven to not be a successful process; eventually, reform ranks dissipate as people get tired having to address the same old issues. And thus, those who hold institutional positions almost invariably win, simply because inertia is on their side and they can outlast the reformers or, when reformers are able to persevere and achieve institutional positions themselves, they sometimes go off on bizarre tangents themselves.

Ultimately, we have to change the internal culture of the labor movement and every union within. Key to this is changing the very concept of leadership itself. For most union members today, leadership is what is done by those who have obtained certain identified positions on an “organization chart,” certain formal positions of power within the union. And thus, whatever a person in a legitimate position of power does is deemed acceptable; after all, “it’s in the constitution.”

This author argues this is not acceptable: we have to try to develop every union member into a leader. Yet, this implies a different kind of “leadership.” This alternative approach seeks to create an understanding that *anytime a person seeks to make their union or their collective organization act in the way intended—democratically controlled by the membership, and working to collectively enhance the lives and well-being of all members and their communities—then they are, in fact, acting as a leader, whether they are in a formal position of power or not.* And the organizational goal of each organization must be to get every single member to act as a leader for the enhancement and well-being of the organization.⁹

Accordingly, and following, we need to transform each of our unions into member-driven organizations, in fact and not just in rhetoric. That means we must see each member as an asset, not just someone to be “serviced,” and this means we must ensure popular democracy within each organization and encourage the widest range of expression and debate in collective discussions (see Parker and Gruelle, 1999). We need to harness the wonderful thinking abilities of each and every union member for the good of the whole organization, with the idea of deepening and widening the collective decision-making process.

One proven way to do this—enhancing participation while not immobilizing the organization—is to delineate issues as being “action items” or “policy decisions.”¹⁰ Action items are issues such as do we do this, or do we do that—

things that are pretty straight-forward—such as endorse a demonstration, participate in a mobilization, have union elections in May or June. Policy decisions are ones that could have a serious and potentially long-term affect on the members and/or the organization: do we go on strike or do we run an in-plant campaign of “work to rule” in a dispute? Do we accept concession demands, or do we fight them?¹¹

By differentiating between these two types of issues, then different levels of acceptance can be required. While consensus is always desired in any case, the time to achieve it is not always available. Therefore, when consensus cannot be achieved, action items can be decided with a 50 percent plus one vote, where a policy decision requires a “supermajority,” such as 60, 67, or 75 percent acceptance level prior to implementation.

The super-majority requirement must be established before confronting difficult issues, so as to not benefit one side against another. It is intended to require strong agreement—but not total consensus—before initiating major changes. This allows organizations to confront difficult decisions with reduced fear of organizational shattering as a result. Thus, this takes a conservative approach to organizational change without immobilizing the organization, requiring on-going discussion and debate prior to making major decisions. This also helps ensure that any decision by a super-majority will not result in a large number of members leaving the organization in protest.

Along with consciously deciding decision-making processes before difficult issues are confronted, we also need to make structural changes in our unions, and in the AFL-CIO itself. These changes must be preceded by an educational process joined with the widest discussion and most inclusive and democratic decision-making possible within each organization, but when adopted, must include constitutional changes within each organization. In other words, these changes cannot be imposed from above, but must be generated by rank and file union members from below, and they must be institutionalized for the future.

The issue of term limits must be confronted, with the need for term limits stronger as one moves up the labor movement hierarchy from the local union: there absolutely must be term limits adopted for the presidency of the AFL-CIO as well as for the national/international president of each individual unions.

Additionally, direct election by the membership for all formal leadership positions must be implemented, including the AFL-CIO presidency. Open access to all internal union media, including newspapers, journals and web sites, must be guaranteed to all who meet the constitutional requirements for position candidacy, and who file by pre-established deadlines.

Further, the concept of “subsidiarity” must be adopted in the labor movement. Subsidiarity, which this author came across in the Green movement although it apparently comes from Catholic social teaching, is the concept that decisions must be made at the lowest organizational level in which they can be made effectively.

Arguably, one of the most disempowering things for individual union members that has taken place in the labor movement over the past thirty years has been the agglomeration of geographically-limited local unions over a wide geo-

graphical area into what could be called “super” locals, such as state-wide “locals”—or larger. Labor leaders have argued—with some merit—that to confront employers, labor must create sufficient counter-power, and agglomeration is the means to do it.

The problem, that this author has seen first hand, is that with agglomeration comes a drastic reduction in union democracy and responsiveness to member concerns and issues.¹² Members literally lose control—as weak as it might have been before—of their own local unions. It certainly does not enhance individual connection or commitment to the union.

The concept of subsidiarity means is that decisions should be devolved downward toward the rank and file on a local basis whenever possible so that any decision that can be made effectively at a lower level gets made there, not kicked up to or assumed by a higher level.

Yet, all of these ideas combined are not enough. An independent monitoring body, outside of the governing administration and elected by the membership, needs to be constitutionally-established at each level of the labor movement to demand accountability of the leadership, whether elected or appointed, in each union and organization. Membership of this body must be rotated out in a structured and transparent manner.

The goal here is to regularly ascertain whether the formal leadership is acting to enhance the well-being of the general membership or not, and not to require that the leadership act in this particular way or that. This independent body must have unrestricted access to union meetings, executive board meetings, and personnel decisions, and the records of each. This independent body must have unrestricted access to all internal union media, such as organizational newspapers, journals and web sites, with the unhampered ability to issue and distribute reports on a regular basis to the membership. And this independent monitoring body must have the requirement to seek recall of any formal leader who is found not acting in good faith in fulfilling the requirements of their respective position.

It seems clear that should such a body been in existence over the past 100 years—and especially since 1944 with the founding of the Free Trade Union Committee and subsequently—that this body would have directly challenged the AFL/AFL-CIO’s foreign policy program. Besides the particular operations implemented by the foreign policy leadership, it would have at least challenged the dependence on governmental funding, the acquiescence of the foreign policy leadership to governmental entreaties to work with the CIA and other governmental organizations, the absorption of AFL-CIO efforts within the larger U.S. Government foreign relations program, and the overall range of policies, operations and cover-ups that have been engaged in without the knowledge of the membership of affiliated AFL-CIO unions. While the same program might have been ultimately adopted by the membership despite the monitoring committee, this could not have been done without an accurate accounting and discussion of desirability and ramifications to the labor movement, which a monitoring process would have required.

In short, through these and other appropriately-deemed constitutional changes, control of each union, labor organization and the AFL-CIO itself, must

be returned permanently to the membership. These changes must be made at the constitutional level, precluding the requirement that activists must mobilize the membership every time an important issue comes to the fore.

Ramifications for American Democracy

This study has demonstrated the lack of control of a major American institution, the labor movement, by its membership. Considering that this is generally considered a volunteer-based movement/organization, these findings are ominous for American democracy as a whole.

While not wanting to go further, events such as the U.S. invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan in the early twenty-first century—based on conscious lies, torture, manipulation of the media, media acquiescence and promotion of these lies as though they were truthful (Rich, 2006; Mitchell, 2008), lack of accountability, etc.—suggest that the disemboweling of member control and democracy in the labor movement is not confined to the labor movement alone, but arguably extends across the entire U.S. polity. It is argued that this problem needs to be explicitly addressed by the American people.

And to Evaluate Nederveen Pieterse's Conceptualization of Imperialism

Now that findings from this study have been pulled together, one more thing needs to be explicitly addressed before continuing—and that is to specifically evaluate how well the specific model of imperialism used has served this study.

Jan Nederveen Pieterse's (1989) conceptualization of imperialism has been largely confirmed by this study. It has demonstrated unequivocally that imperialism is not confined to the nation-state level, but that it also exists at the sub-national level. It also has confirmed the motivation for imperialism as extending beyond the global search for increased profitability, showing that political dynamics can have primacy in operations of imperialism. The one thing not confirmed is Nederveen Pieterse's claim that imperialism distracts people in the oppressor country from concentrating on problems in the oppressor country—but Frances Fox Piven (2004) has already confirmed that. While this author is confident this is true, it has not been confirmed herein, as addressing this claim has been beyond the scope of this study. What *has* been confirmed in this study, however, is that the involvement of the AFL-CIO in imperialist activities affects working people in the United States because it actually *impedes* their efforts to confront resulting social conditions at home, which is different than simple distraction; thus, this study pushes beyond Nederveen Pieterse's conception, enhancing our understanding of imperialism and empire.

In short, this study demonstrates that Jan Nederveen Pieterse's conceptualization of imperialism is more robust, and can explain much more, than can Marxist-based explanations, while developing this concept even further.

For Future Research—The Great Unknown: Why?

Following this project, but beyond it, there is another question on the table that must be answered; it can only be mentioned here. Why have successive generations of AFL-CIO presidents and their top associates adopted labor imperialism and all that flows out of it as a driving force for the American labor movement? Tied into this, of course, is how did they shift from being advocates of American workers to being militant proponents of the U.S. imperial project, who have betrayed the interests of workers here and around the world?

This is a question this author simply cannot answer: AFL-CIO foreign policy leaders refuse to even be on the same radio or TV programs (see Goodman, 2005), and it is certain they will not meet and provide in-depth, honest answers to any questions this researcher might ask. Hopefully, other researchers will follow-up on this, as it is a bigger problem than just AFL-CIO foreign policy; this issue, the general transformation of worker militants into elite collaborators, is one that affects the entire trade union movement, even though the large majority of labor leaders are good people who have never sold out.

Now, obviously, focus could be made on individual personalities of these leaders to try to answer these questions, and that might provide some of the answer. However, that is not sufficient—several generations of “leaders” have moved from militant to collaborationist, coming from different unions, in different industries, in different sectors of the economy, in different times, with different career trajectories, etc. Individual personalities do not seem to be the most important factor.

That suggests that there are social factors at work, and these need to be understood. How can we proceed?

While not answering the question, this author has a hypothesis. This resulted from reading Howard Becker’s *Tricks of the Trade* (Becker, 1998), a book on how to think about research one is doing. In his second chapter, Becker suggests that not all “deviant” behavior is dysfunctional, that it is not necessarily aberrant but rather that, oftentimes, people do something because they think it is the best thing to do. (“It seemed like a good idea at the time,” as he says.)

Becker, based on Driscoll, suggests that:

At each of these [decision-making-KS] points, our mythical young man finds himself doing some things he had at some earlier time never heard of and, having heard of them, had not imagined he might do. The steps he does take are never so very radical. Each one is simply another small step on a road from which he might at any minute turn to some other of the many roads available. Each small step is intellectually and emotionally understandable to people who themselves are nothing like this young man, *once circumstances are made intelligible to them* (emphasis in original) (Becker, 1998: 27).

This author’s hypothesis as to why AFL-CIO leaders carry out these types of foreign operations is because they were enveloped in a similar process: as they moved up the hierarchy to their positions, they got exposed to “new things,” new ways of thinking by people, and *for those who accepted these new*

things, they got exposed to a new group of people who also thought that way, who often they came to like—or at least desired to be accepted in their respective social networks—and thus adopted these new ways of acting as their own.

Perhaps one way to confirm/deny this is to try to research and find out what happened to labor leaders once they got into new positions—say elected to local president of a large local union or president of a powerful labor council, on up. How did their social circles change, and especially over time? I think this is especially important for those whose salaries in their new position are considerably greater than in their previous one, and I would also say this and relocation to a new city would be an especially interesting combination to examine.

This suggests a way of understanding how people transform themselves from trade union militant to “class collaborationist.” Obviously, not all of those elected/appointed/promoted to a higher position go through this process, but a significant number of people do, so this process is clearly more varied than say just a rigid Trotskyist “bureaucrat” thesis, claiming all backward positions on the fact that one occupies a position within a bureaucratic work environment. Most “bureaucrats” do not go bad, while some do.

This changing social network hypothesis can serve as the basis for ongoing research.

But why would American labor leaders, men who have come up from “working class” backgrounds and who have worked mostly blue-collar jobs, accept this entire process? Individual responses have varied, so we cannot get far by focusing on personality-related issues, as there has been an overall acceptance by a considerable number of men over particularly the last 40 years. To try to understand this, it is suggested that focus must be made on social processes.

Since the overall societal acceptance of unions by the 1940s, the attainment of leadership of a trade union has been a position of some social status in the society (Mills, 1948/2001). At the same time, it has enabled blue-collar workers dissatisfied with their working lives and having leadership skills to escape the oppression, alienation and exploitation of the capitalist workplace. The combination has meant that those who have escaped generally have not wanted to return to the workplace, and those with initiative continued working their way up through the labor bureaucracy.

While these labor leaders have not been puppets to the government—in fact, since 1989, this author has vigorously argued that the AFL and then the AFL-CIO foreign policy program has *not* been initiated from outside of the labor movement but has been a product of internal labor movement processes (Scipes, 1989, 2000b, 2005a, b, d; see also Filipelli, 1989; Andrews, 1991; Carew, 1998; Nack, 1999)—they have usually responded favorably to government entreaties to work together “for the good of all” when these entreaties have been made.

And, as Alex Carey (1997) has so clearly shown, by accepting the dualistic, Manichean world-view of “darkness” and “light” that so dominates U.S. culture—in this case, “Americanism” versus “evil” (known in various forms as “radicalism,” “communism” or, today, “terrorism”)—U.S. Labor’s leadership has acquiesced to, if not initiated, oppression directed against “the other,” in-

cluding toward workers and their unions that approach their social reality in a manner different than U.S. labor leaders think they should. Focusing particularly on anti-communism but applicable to all types of “evil,” Alex Carey writes:

The manipulation of patriotic and nationalist sentiments has, above all else, given American anti-communism its remarkable psychological force as a means of social control. Fear of communism as Satanic is largely derived from hypersensitive nationalism. In popular consciousness, it comes largely from the representation of communism as threatening the cherished, the secular-sacred idealized “American Way”: threatening, in a word, “national security”—a term conceived of as broadly as the Middle Ages conceived of defense of the faith against threats and seductions from heretical ideas and agencies (Carey, 1997: 16).

Yet, ironically, this idealized “American Way” was not something that has emerged organically from American society. As Carey shows, this Americanism was a social creation by American *business* that, through massive propaganda campaigns, got Americans to accept as their own a form of “Americanism” that was propagated by business. And this “business Americanism” was in response to the franchise, the vote, being “extended from around 10-15 percent of the populace to 40 or 50 percent” between 1880 and 1920 [Carey (quoting Walter Lippman, 1955), 1997: 21]. In other words, this business Americanism emerged in reaction to the emergence of popular democracy, of which the union movement was central.

When Gompers and his associates accepted business Americanism and made it their own, they subordinated U.S. Labor to business, undercut American popular democracy and, as business expanded globally, they accepted the necessity and desirability of Empire (see particularly Scott, 1978). In turn, and trying to advance their self-identified interests in the process, the American Federation of Labor leadership initiated their own imperialist foreign policy, a foreign policy that was designed to further the extent and well-being of the Empire, but carried out from the “workingman’s” perspective; these Labor officials—not “leaders”—thought they knew how to run the Empire better than the corporate elites and/or their government allies, and sallied forth to prove it.

The cost, as has been shown, however, has been great: not only have workers and their organizations around the world been attacked, co-opted and/or destroyed, but acceptance of business Americanism has disemboweled the labor movement in the United States.

And, despite the rise of the CIO in the 1930s-1940s which, for a “moment”—up to the expulsion of the “left-led” unions in 1949—rejected at least an automatic acquiescence to business Americanism, the dominance of the business Americanism-accepting AFL, and later the AFL-dominated unified AFL-CIO, has worked to undermine any efforts to reinstate popular democracy in this country. Thus, the labor leadership overwhelmingly opposed the Civil Rights/Black Power movements, the women’s movement, and the anti-Vietnam War movement: the three popular democratic social movements whose societal impact was greatest between 1955-1975 and which, at their respective best,

problematized racial and gender oppression in this country and U.S. imperialism abroad.

As these business Americanism-accepting labor officials have worked with U.S. Government officials—and Gompers' efforts during World War I set the precedent—Labor's foreign policy program has received these government officials' blessing and, more importantly, their funding. Substantial government funding—at least substantial in comparison to the monies the labor movement has generated on its own for foreign operations—in turn, has enhanced the pull to collaborate. Joined with additional social status gained at least among elite circles for being such valued partners, then the pull for many of these high-level labor officials has been overwhelming.

And for some of Labor's top-level foreign policy officials, their collaboration with the government and the elites in general have earned them membership in the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). The CFR has served as an "Imperial Brain Trust" (Shoup and Minter, 1977/2004), a think tank for the elite. William Domhoff, in the Foreword to Shoup and Minter's book, captured well the importance of the CFR:

capitalists do not easily and automatically deduce their policies and programs from a general reading of the laws of motion of capital. They too must labor to formulate new strategies and try to compromise conflicts among themselves, and in order to accomplish these tasks, they have to develop institutional settings such as the Council on Foreign Relations. As the authors rightly and nicely emphasize, organizations like the Council on Foreign Relations are necessary in helping the capitalist class move from a class-in-itself to a class-for-itself (Domhoff, 1977: ix).

Yet, again without explaining their membership in an organization that has been so dominated by Wall Street financiers and corporate lawyers, which has been so central to the creation of policy to enhance the well-being of especially U.S. big business and so intimately involved in creating U.S. foreign policy, a number of AFL-CIO foreign policy officials have been members—and the list includes Sol Chaikin, William Doherty, Jr., Thomas R. Donahue, Sandra Feldman, Philip Fishman, Carl Gershman, Rachelle Horowitz, John Joyce, Harry Kamberis, Eugenia Kemble, and Jay Mazur, and mostly likely others.

Additionally, as the ruling elites of the United States felt it necessary to join with elites from other countries in the Trilateral Commission to help figure out how to run the world, a number of labor officials were involved at this level as well. As of August 15, 1975, Shoup and Minter identified I.W. Abel, President of the United Steelworkers of America, as not only a member, but on the Executive Committee of the organization. Other labor officials who were a member of the Trilateral Commission included Lane Kirkland, then Secretary Treasurer of the AFL-CIO, and Leonard Woodcock, President of the United Automobile Workers (Shoup and Minter, 1977/2004: 291-293).

This is blasphemy, you say! These labor leaders have overwhelmingly acted to advance the well-being of their members.

The point can be argued. There is, admittedly, a logic to the foreign policy

leaders' positions; it makes sense, at least at first glance. But does it hold up to scrutiny—and especially scrutiny over time?

The biggest problem with the AFL-CIO foreign policy program—besides that it has resulted in workers being killed and tortured, societies being torn apart, and labor movements destroyed—is that it is done behind members' backs, without their consent, informed or otherwise; only a very small number of people in the labor movement have any idea that the AFL-CIO is operating internationally, and especially not to the degree that they are. The members have never been honestly told what the foreign policy leaders have been doing around the world "in their name." Members have never been told that these operations have been funded overwhelmingly by U.S. Government money; that these labor operations have not been supported with member dues. And, of course, members have never been told of the death and destruction these foreign policy projects have inflicted on working people in a large number of countries around the world. Just to return to one example: since the 1954 overthrow of the democratically-elected government in Guatemala, it is estimated that some 300,000 people have been killed, and labor leaders and potential labor leaders have been targeted foremost (Hirsch, 2008).

Nor have members been told that the foreign policy leaders in the U.S. labor movement have carried out projects around the world in largely the same manner as those said to be done by the abhorrent Communists: acting behind the backs of the members, manipulating workers, and using state funds, not union dues.

Nor have members been told that when labor activists have challenged this foreign policy program, working within established labor movement processes and procedures, that the leadership undermined what little trade union democracy that still exists at the national level to undercut these challenges.

But there is still yet another problem, in addition to these: governmental and corporate "acceptance" of labor leaders, and its reciprocation, has led to the weakening of the once powerful labor movement within the United States. Not only has the percentage of the unionized workforce declined precipitously—falling from 34 percent of all private sector workers in 1954 to 7.2 percent in 2010 (Kelber, 2010), but the AFL-CIO has lost almost all general social legitimacy that it once held. Yes, unions do still have some public presence and can mobilize their members for electoral participation, but that is about all: the Writers Strike of late 2007-early 2008 is an obvious exception, but it is a rare phenomenon. All one has to do is look at how few American workers are willing to join present-day unions at a time of economic dislocation and worker insecurity when they are needed most, and one can begin to understand their loss of legitimacy among many Americans who are not already union members.

So, top-level American labor leaders have sold their honored heritage for a bowl of cold porridge: accepted by political and corporate leaders and their elite allies, these foreign policy labor leaders have collaborated in oppressing workers around the world while standing dumbstruck as their unions are gutted, workers are discarded and dismissed, and social inequality has reached unprecedented levels in the post World War II USA (see Scipes, 2009b). And they still fight to

keep labor activists from trying to begin the long slog back.

So, again, why?

And now that we have discussed the specific conclusions of this study and suggested further research for the future, it is time to place this into a theoretical understanding, so that these findings can contribute to helping us better understand social reality.

Ramifications on Sociological Theory: Structure and Power

Sociological theorizing is important, as sociologists seek to consciously extend our understanding of “society,” the social order inside our country and around the world. To do this, sociologists engage in a dialectical process between expanding empirical data and deepening theoretical conceptualization. In other words, as sociologists conduct studies and develop empirical data, they use it to enhance or challenge (falsify) their theoretical understanding of how social processes actually operate in the real world. And yet, as theoretical understanding develops over time, this suggests areas of greater sociological concern, helping to identify areas needing increased research attention and further clarification. Thus, this dialectical relationship between theory and practice helps drive the further development of sociology as an intellectual discipline, helping to expand the understanding of our world and the human condition.

Thus, it is not sufficient for sociologists to “just” expand empirical knowledge through critical research but, for maximum impact, they need to use their empirical findings to develop theoretical understandings developed to date.

This requires sociologists to “place” their empirical findings within sociological theory. Thus, at very least, a theoretical perspective should be able to “explain” research findings, and then sociologists should use their findings to extend theoretical understanding.

However, this process being considered only fits for enhancing our theoretical knowledge. What about empirical research that could challenge or falsify theoretical knowledge?

Should this happen—empirical research challenging established theory—then the researcher should try to develop social theory based on her/his research that would explain the findings.

As this author sought to find a theory on which he could base this study, he began looking at macrosociological (i.e., big picture) theories that are well established in sociology, to explain the patterns of activities he has identified. As he explicates below, however, established structural theories could not explain his findings.

Elaborating the process by which the theoretical challenge has emerged is what follows. As detailed, theories fitting into the established structural paradigm were delved into, and then the author has attempted to place empirical results from this study into the proper theoretical “home.” Finding none that could explain his findings—and specifically none that could explain labor imperialism that conducted wars against workers in the developing world and, argua-

bly, the United States—this author advances a processural paradigm and specifically a Polyconflictual representation or model of society that can explain such theoretically contradictory findings so as to provide the theoretical understanding for future sociological development.

Structural Approaches to Understanding Societies¹³

In a graduate course taken years ago at the University of Illinois at Chicago (UIC) with David Rubenstein, Rubenstein argued that structural approaches to society—whether based on functionalist or conflict models—are, in reality, stratification systems, focused around opportunity structures. Stratification is structured inequality. In other words, Rubenstein suggests that structural approaches are implicitly arguing that the ability of everyone in the society to succeed (whether by access to money, jobs, or however success is defined) is structured on different grounds, ultimately limiting access to success in the society.

William H. Sewell, Jr., elaborates on “structure”:

Structure is . . . a powerful, pervasive, and constitutive metaphor in the human sciences; it implies permanence, order, solidity. In its various uses in the human sciences . . . structure signifies the stable principle of order that underlies the surface multiplicity of phenomena. It represents one of the major strivings of the sciences: the attempt to reduce the apparent chaos of the world to relatively simple and comprehensible models or rules (Sewell, 2005: 199).

So, the ordering of society is seen as basically a permanent form of stratification.¹⁴

This can be seen from a quick overview of each of the different models, to which we proceed momentarily. First, however, it is important to note that this author sees four levels of theoretical abstraction in sociology, a nested hierarchy that descends from the broadest level, the paradigmatic or paradigm level, down through the models of societies, approaches, and then to the most narrow and specific level, that of particular theories. To understand structural approaches, it is argued that it is necessary to start first start at the “top,” at the paradigmatic level, before descending to specific societal models.

Basic Understandings of the Structural Paradigm¹⁵

At the paradigmatic level (see Kuhn, 1970), differentiation can be made between a structural paradigm and a processural one. A structural paradigm incorporates models of society that share common attributes: each model of society is based on placing all people in a society into one of at least two socially-based categories—such as leaders/followers, capitalist/worker, male/female, white/person of color, gay/straight, etc.¹⁶ These categories are organized by analysts so that there is one “key relationship” between two categories that is rigid, extends over all times and all places, and is said to determine the further development of society. Alternatively, a processural paradigm rejects pre-established social categories with rigid relationships, but rather recognizes that individuals act in ways that

can vary by situation, and that these individuals can constitute new relationships can lead to the formation of groups. Focus right now is upon the structural paradigm; the processural paradigm is presented below.

The structural paradigm depends upon every individual of a society being placed into a socially-based category. These categories are established by researchers/analysts, and they are an attempt to “locate” or place every person in a society into a particular category for generalization of their activities. Therefore, society is seen as a collection of “groups”—what is being called “socially-based categories” here—and not individuals. However, it should be noted that the “subjects,” the people themselves, may agree or disagree with this categorization; but in any case, people do not necessarily so categorize themselves, and when they do categorize themselves, their categories may agree or disagree with those of the researchers.¹⁷

Of these socially-based categories, analysts argue there is one relationship between two categories that is “key” or primary in any society; and this key relationship is said to be rigid, said to hold at all times and all places, and is said to determine the development of the entire society (see also Rhoads, 1991: 75-116).¹⁸

To understand what is meant by “key relationships,” two different approaches that fit under the structural conflict model can be illuminative.¹⁹ Marxism argues that all people in a society can be categorized as either a member of the bourgeoisie or the proletariat or, more contemporaneously, but less accurately, “boss” and “worker.” Accordingly, to Marxists, the key to understanding social development in any particular society is the “class struggle” between these two production-based social classes (or “categories”). In other words, a Marxist argues that every person in a particular society can be categorized as a “boss” or a “worker,” that these categories have “antagonistic interests,” and that the boss will use “his” political-economic-cultural-social power to try to maintain the subordination of workers, while the workers, in turn, will rebel against the “boss” category. Similarly, feminism argues the key social relationship is gender-based, between males and females, that these categories have antagonistic interests, and that males will use their power to try to maintain the subordination of women while women, in turn, will rebel against the “male” category. Each theoretical abstraction level under the structural paradigm is essentially based on one particular, key relationship.

However, further attention must be paid to these socially-based categories. *For these categories to “work,” they require certain assumptions to be true.* Categorization assumes that every person in the same category shares several important attributes: that they have the same general world view (i.e., the same approach to life), will treat all other members of the same social category with respect, and will act in solidarity at all times with other members of the same category. In other words, when examining racial categories, everyone in the “white” category is the same as all other whites, that they will treat each other with respect and act in solidarity; for gender categories, all females are the same; for “class” categories, all workers are the same; for sexual preference categories, all gays are the same, etc. This commonality may not be explicitly stated; yet,

the assumption is necessary for the paradigm to “work.”²⁰

Accordingly, it is argued that the structural paradigm has three common attributes, and that all levels of theoretical abstraction in this paradigm share these common attributes: (1) there is one key social relationship that orders the society; (2) that this key relationship is rigid, holding in all situations across the social order and at all times; and that (3) these relationships are based on socially-based categories, not individuals. Further, that *within* each category, it is assumed that every person in the group will share the same worldview, that they will treat all other group members with respect, and always act in solidarity with other group members.

To continue: there are three levels of theoretical abstraction beneath the paradigmatic level. The next “lower” level is the *model* level of theoretical abstraction, where the different models representing society are located—in this case, structural functionalism and structural conflict models—and these models differ qualitatively from each other. Below the “model” level is the *approach* level—where differing “key relationships” distinguish between Marxist, feminist, “racialist” and “national position” approaches. Below the approach level is the *theory* level, where specific sociological theories—such as World Systems Theory—are located. Thus, *the structural paradigm includes all levels of theoretical abstraction that are based on one key relationship between two socially-based categories.*

With understanding that a paradigm includes a nested hierarchy of three “lower” levels of theoretical abstraction that share commonalities, it is time to “descend” to the model level, where different models provide qualitatively different understandings of society despite these shared attributes of the structural paradigm.

Models of Society

Descending in scope from the structural paradigm to the next “lower” level of theoretical abstraction, models of society, consideration must be given to the two major societal models that comprise the structural paradigm: structural functionalist and structural conflict models.²¹

These models are critically important in our understanding of society: they provide qualitatively different *representations* of the social order. In other words, although most people are not conscious of either of these two different representations and how they differentially affect a person’s view of the world, *these models/representations provide qualitatively different understandings of what is being observed.* If one uses the metaphor of a camera lens, a red filter will provide a different coloration of the world than will a blue filter. For example: if one sees a collection of people protesting some social policy or another—say the U.S. invasion of Iraq—and one sees “society” as represented by a structural functional model (where all socially-based categories share roughly equal decision-making power), then that person is likely to see the protest as *disrupting* the normal good functioning of society, and give it a negative meaning: “those damn protesters.” Alternatively, if one interprets the “social order” with a

structural conflict model (where the socially-based categories have unequal decision-making power), and one sees her/himself as a member of the less-powerful category, then that person is likely to see the protest as *illuminating and/or challenging* an unjust activity, and give it a positive meaning: “get on, sisters and brothers!”

In other words, viewing the world through the “viewpoint” or “lens” of a structural functionalist model of society will give one a qualitatively different understanding of that society than if it were viewed from a structural conflict model of society. It is from this choice that personal interpretation begins, and that is why these models need to be consciously foregrounded, and themselves understood.²²

Concurrently, there is a very important practical reason to recognize and understand these different representations: commonly-used terms, such as “class,” can mean very different things to one seeing the world through a structural functionalist “lens” than it might mean to someone using a structural conflict one. Accordingly, if for no other reason than rhetorical precision, it is necessary to clarify.

It should be noted that these models are both similar and different. They are similar in ways common to their paradigm; nonetheless, they differ qualitatively from each other. The models differ on how they see society organized, which also affects what is called the key relationship.

(a) A Structural Functionalist Model of Society

Structural functionalists, whose image of society is based on an equilibrium-based biological perspective, see society organized by social sector, such as the health sector, the family/relationship/kinship sector, the economic sector, etc. Within these sectors, often referred to as “institutions,” the sociological focus is on the functions within each that enable each sector of society to carry out its particular “operations” as well as to perform its “obligation” to the whole (see Timasheff, 1957: 221-233).

Lewis Coser and Bernard Rosenberg discuss structural functionalism and write:

‘structure’ in their usage generally refers to a set of relatively stable and patterned relationships of social units, whereas by ‘function’ they mean those consequences of any social activity which make for the adaptation or adjustment of a given structure or its component parts. In other words, ‘structure’ refers to a system with relatively enduring patterns, and ‘function’ refers to the dynamic process within the structure.

This type of analysis arose out of the need felt by sociologists and anthropologists to develop theoretical and methodological tools adequate for dealing with the interrelatedness of various ‘traits,’ ‘institutions,’ ‘groups,’ and so on, within a total social system, and to overcome certain atomistic and descriptive methods that had prevailed in the nineteenth century (Coser and Rosenberg, eds., 1982: 463).

A structural functionalist model is holistic, presenting society as being an integrated whole and stable, or “in equilibrium.” Ultimately, this model is based on a biological model, with an evolutionary approach. Social change, when it comes, is very slow.

Functionalists are interested in maintaining the established social order or, if it has become unstable, to returning it to equilibrium. Functionalist theorists are primarily interested in “the incorporation of individuals into the social order,” and this integration or social solidarity “is important for the maintenance of social equilibrium” (Wallace and Wolf, 1995: 21).

Structural functionalists argue that each sector has roughly equivalent power to shape the society; i.e., that each social sector has roughly equivalent social decision-making power. Accordingly, there is no real need to focus on power within the society: functionalism “neglects the coercive aspects of power and the significance of people’s conflictive objectives” (Wallace and Wolf, 1995: 74). Nonetheless, there *is* division between people within each sector into the social categories of “leader” and “follower,” and it is this relationship that is the “key” within structural functionalism. In other words, structural functionalists see society as organized on a horizontal basis, recognizing the vertical leader-follower relationship within each sector, yet suggesting this leader-follower relationship, this stratification, is good for the well-functioning of any society (see Davis and Moore, 1945/2006).

However, to determine if a structural functionalist model fits within the structural paradigm, the three main attributes of the structural paradigm must be identified. It is argued that a structural functionalist model meets the criteria: the key relationship (although not usually delineated as such) is between leaders (often referred to as “elites”) and followers, although they are each distributed across different sectors of the society; this relationship is a rigid relationship that holds in all situations and at all times, although which particular person is in the specific category can vary (say through electoral processes); and it sees society organized upon these social categories, with all of the attributes listed above, regarding similar world view, etc. Further, it sees the various social sectors as having roughly equivalent power in societal decision-making.

This model has weaknesses, but strengths as well. Functionalists do not problematize power, or question the origin and development of the social order, nor do they even problematize the structuring of the social order. However, these functionalist-based theories do provide a good description of how groups and organizations function when there are no power differentials among the target groups.

(b) A Structural Conflict Model of Society

Conflict theorists do not see society organized by social sectors; they see society organized into specific socially-based categories, and that one key relationship determines the development of the entire social order. These categories have different amounts of power (again, for example, boss/worker, male/female), and that the stronger ultimately uses coercion to maintain control over the weaker.

Thus, conflict theorists see society *ordered*, with differing amounts of power affecting social organization; hence, they foreground the power differential between the social categories that comprise the key relationship. They, in contrast to structural functionalists, see this power differential as being detrimental to the well-being of the social order.²³

There are multiple theoretical approaches under the structural conflict model, but they all share a common perspective. Conflict approaches—whether structured on the basis of class, gender, race, or national position within the global context—challenge established social relationships: they do not see the status quo as being desirable. Each model argues that access to success is limited to those who have both certain attributes (whether ascribed or achieved), *and* the power to define the structure on their own behalf. As Ruth Wallace and Alison Wolf point out:

central to the whole conflict perspective is an emphasis on power as the core of social relationships. Conflict theorists always view power not only as scarce and unequally divided—and therefore a source of conflict—but also as essentially coercive. This analysis leads, in turn, to a concern with the distribution of those resources that give people more or less power (Wallace and Wolf, 1995: 77).

Consequently, the basis of the structure makes the key difference: Marx and Marxist-inspired theorists argue that position in the economic structure is key, and those who own (or at least manage) the means of production have the power to both define and limit success; feminist theorists argue that position in the gender structure is key, with males having the power to define and limit success; “racialists” see race primary, with whites having the power to define and limit success of people of color; and “national positionists” see the national position in the global context primary, with the so-called developed countries having the power to define and limit success of the “developing” countries.

As argued above, the conflict model fits within the structural paradigm. Each conflict approach sees one key relationship around which a society is ordered. This relationship is rigid, and is said to hold true in all situations and in all times. And the society is organized by socially-based categories, with the same attributes as discussed above. However, unlike and opposed to a structural functionalist model of society, a structural conflict model does not see these social groups with roughly equivalent power: a structural conflict model specifically sees these social groups having unequal power, and that the stronger in the relationship uses that power to try to dominate the weaker, if and when the weaker does not acquiesce.

Similar to a structural functionalist model, there are strengths and weaknesses to a structural conflict model. Within all conflict approaches is a recognition that there is at least one hierarchy of power in each society, and the legitimacy of this power hierarchy is problematized. However, conflict models are unable to describe how groups or organizations are able to join together to achieve any particular goal, especially when not in opposition to an external group/organization.

(c) Synopsis

In short, then, the model level of the structural paradigm is divided between structural functional and structural conflict models. These are qualitatively different representations of society. Structural functionalists project society as being organized by sectors that are based on social function, with each sector having roughly equivalent decision-making power, although they are cross-cut by division into leaders and followers. Structural conflict theorists see society as composed of socially-based categories, that these categories have unequal power, with those in the dominant position not only having more power but trying to use that power to dominate the subordinate categories. However, in general, theories developed on the basis of one of these models of society do not incorporate understandings developed by theories developed on the basis of the other.

*Approaches*²⁴

“Approaches” refer to broad sets of theoretical grouping; e.g., Marxism, feminism, “racialism,” and “national position” perspectives. These are located at the theoretical level below models of society, but are relevant only to a structural conflict model of society.

What differentiates each approach is the understanding of the “key relationship” that determines the future development of a social order.²⁵ The Marxist approach argues that the key relationship to any societal “development” is based on the production relationship between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat (“class struggle”) or, in more common but less accurate terms, bosses and workers, with the bosses dominating the workers. The feminist approach argues the key relationship is based on gender, with males dominating females. The “racialist” approach argues the key relationship is based on white supremacy over people of color. And the “national positionists” approach argues the key relationship is based on imperialism, with “developed countries” dominating “developing countries.”²⁶

Accordingly, the approach chosen will vary by the “key relationship” favored by the analyst.

Theories

“Theories” would be the specific theories that lie within the various conflict-based approaches. So, for example, it could be argued that World Systems Theory would be a variant of the Marxist approach.

And now that the levels of theoretical abstraction have been identified and discussed, however briefly—again, paradigms, models, approaches and theories—it is time to examine efforts to overcome the limitations of the structuralist paradigm.

Synopsis

In short, then, the structural paradigm in sociology is divided between functional and conflict models. These are qualitatively different representations of society. Structural functionalists project society as being organized by sectors that are based on social function, and with each sector having roughly equivalent decision-making power, although they are cross-cut by division into leaders and followers. Structural conflict theorists see “society” as composed of socially-based categories, that these categories have unequal amounts of power and with those in the dominant position not only having more power but trying to use that power to dominate the subordinate categories. There is said to be one key relationship between categories that determines the development of the social order. Along with that is the understanding is that this key relationship is rigid, holding in all times and all places. However, the basis for each socially-based category is a set of assumptions: that everyone in the category shares the same world view, always treats other members of the category with respect, and that members of a social category always act in solidarity with other category members.

However, in general, theories developed on the basis of one of these Models of Society do not incorporate understandings developed by theories developed on the basis of the other.

More importantly, *each model is fatally flawed theoretically*. Based on a conception that society is built upon “socially constructed categories,” instead of individuals, *neither can accurately represent the social order* (or “society”): neither model can explain why individuals do one thing or another, and it is argued that personal decision-making takes place at the individual level and not at the category level. Additionally, while structural conflict models *can* explain why one group is mistreated by another—which structural functional models cannot do—*neither model can theoretically explain the emergence of social movements to challenge that oppression or qualitative social change in general*.

Findings from this Study: Where Do They Fit?

This author sought to theoretically place this study. Finding there were differentials in the power accessible to different social groups in this study, he immediately rejected structural functionalist explanations, and turned to the conflict model. Since Marxism is the approach within the conflict model that is arguably most appropriate for studying workers and unions, it seemed likely that some variant of Marxism would be able to explain these labor-focused relationships; i.e., that by taking a “class” approach, developments could be well explained. However, while Marxism is suggestive—and applicable in certain situations—it, too, cannot explain the actual social realities that this research project has illuminated.

To recount quickly: the leading labor center in this country has been the American Federation of Labor (AFL). It merged with the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) in 1955 to create the AFL-CIO. With very few exceptions, labor leadership has always come out of the ranks of its member unions—these

leaders have been workers, at least for substantial periods of their lives.

However, in secret and behind the backs of their members, leaders of the AFL and subsequently, the AFL-CIO, have carried out their own foreign policy program around the world. This foreign policy has undermined worker challenges to foreign—and especially U.S.—corporate investment in their respective countries, and fought any worker challenges to the established social orders in these countries, no matter how oppressive. Further, Labor's foreign policy operations have been initiated in the face of challenges by a society moving against U.S. foreign policy. Labor has done this on its own and, more commonly, in concert with the U.S. Government, either directly or with one of its "independent" operations, such as the misnamed National Endowment for Democracy.

In any case, a Marxist analysis simply cannot explain this labor imperialist foreign policy, nor can it explain how labor leaders—men who generally come from traditional "working class" homes, backgrounds and unions—can act against the efforts of workers in other countries around the world. Did not the *Communist Manifesto* end with the stirring call for all workers around the world to unite? Or did it say that workers in imperialist countries should attack workers in developing countries . . . ? In short, once understood that Labor's foreign policy program has been developed internally by Labor's foreign policy leaders, and not externally by the U.S. Government, the White House, and/or the CIA, a Marxist analysis simply cannot explain the labor imperialism of the AFL-CIO foreign policy program.

The failure of established theory to explain findings in this study suggests weaknesses and/or shortcomings of established theory. *A structural model*—which is rigid and unchanging—*cannot explain changing or contradictory behavior* such as shown in this study.

Process-based Approach (es) to Understanding Society

Structural-based models of society—and, in fact, the entire structural paradigm—have two major deficiencies: one, they do not accurately represent the social order (aka "society"), and two, they cannot theoretically explain social change.

Any model based on socially constructed categories (traditionally referred to as "groups") cannot accurately represent the social order. The reason is simple: if one argues that society varies by social category (e.g., "class," gender), then this requires that individuals must act on the basis of the entire category, and not on the basis of individual decision-making; so, everybody in the category makes the same decision, or none make it. And a momentary consideration simply recognizes that this is not how any social order works: individuals make their own decisions, which can agree with or disagree from others, but no one gives us their own personal decision-making to a larger category with millions of other people in the category.

Additionally, structural-based models of society *cannot theoretically explain social change*. They can allow for social change that has happened, but *they cannot theoretically explain the processes by which social change has tak-*

en place. Further, they cannot theoretically explain why something developed that contradicts established theory; thus, they cannot explain how falsification of their own theoretical model could take place.

This author argues that to understand social development theoretically, we must create a process-based, “processural” paradigm. In other words, a static explanation is not an accurate representation of society; each society in the world is dynamic and, therefore, theory must represent that dynamism. Yet to serve as the platform for the further development of sociological theory, any new paradigm must not only be able to explain why some new development took place, but also why it did not; it must be possible to explain research findings, whether they confirm or falsify our theory.

Basic Understandings of the Processural Paradigm

There are several basic understandings that must be explicated at the paradigmatic level. By processural paradigm, we are referring to societal models that focus on the *processes* by which a social situation²⁷ develops within a particular social order. In other words, a processural paradigm rejects the idea that there is just one “key” relationship within a society on which that society is ordered, and that this key relationship determines the further development of society. In fact, a processural paradigm *rejects* the idea that the social order is based on socially-constructed categories, and argues that any understanding of social relations must be based on individual relationships, although they can be combined into larger and larger groups for efforts seeking social change.

A processural paradigm sees the possibilities of a multiplicity of relationships across a social order, and recognizes that these relationships vary situation-by-situation. To put it another way, there is more than one possible way to understand any social situation, but the relationships between possible alternatives are flexible, not rigid. This means that these relationships are interconnected and interpenetrated, and can be transient, emerging, and/or deteriorating, all at the same time; i.e., they are in flux.

In other words, the argument is that sociologists must recognize that there are *not* rigid relationships between two particular social categories that extend across the social order (say workers-bosses, males/females) that determine further social development of the social order: that possibility is rejected (see Nederveen Pieterse, 2004, 2008). In fact, because of flexible social relationships, it is argued that we can only understand developments within a social order on a situation-by-situation basis. To again put another way, a processural paradigm counterposes a *situational* approach to the *categorical* approach of a structural paradigm.

Accordingly, because of the situational approach, sociologists can no longer represent society as being based on a series of externally-imposed categories—such as those based on race, gender or class.²⁸ We must recognize that the social order is based on socially-connected individuals, not externally-imposed categories. (Individuals may choose to create or join groups based on whatever criteria the individual accepts, but this is not relevant here; this is discussed further be-

low.)

Below, this author presents a theoretical model of society he calls "Polyconflictualism." This model is a process-based model, which places it under the processural paradigm. However, this author sees Polyconflictualism as only one model, leaving room for possible future development of competing processural-based theoretical models; this is not an attempt to try to colonize the processural paradigm with only his own theoretical conceptualization.

Polyconflictualism

The work on Polyconflictualism has been directly inspired by John Fiske's 1993 book, *Power Works, Power Plays*. Fiske was writing to overcome what he considered the theoretical hopelessness bequeathed us by Foucault's (1979) analysis of disciplinary practices.

One of Fiske's key points is that the current social order today (the status quo) is based on hierarchy and domination and, accordingly, is oppressive. However, he argues that it is at least theoretically possible for there to be a non-oppressive social order or at least a qualitatively less oppressive social order, based on equality and solidarity. He argues that there has been an oppressor/oppressed relationship in most if not all societies in the past, and that there is an oppressor/oppressed relationship in each currently-established social order. However, while the oppressor generally gets "its" way, it almost never gets this without resistance from "below"—active or passive—or even, at times, without efforts to create a positive alternative to the oppression; i.e., the birthing of a new social arrangement.

Fiske argues that to theoretically understand this effort from below, we must recognize that there is not just one type of power as sociology, following Weber,²⁹ has long proclaimed. Fiske argues that there are two types of power: one from the top-downward, or dominative power (i.e., Weber's conceptualization), and one from the bottom-up, or emancipatory power, based on socially-constructed social power.³⁰ Dominative power is therefore seen as oppressive, and used to maintain or extend societal oppression. Emancipatory power, as a counter, both challenges oppression and works to prefigure non-oppressive social relationships. And, at least theoretically, this emancipatory power could ultimately prefigure new, non-oppressive social arrangements.

Accordingly, an established social order is recognized as having a multiplicity of social situations that are each loaded with conflict, whether potential or actual. (This is why the present author has advanced the term, "Polyconflictualism.")

There are two aspects to Polyconflictualism. The first is the necessity to understand how individuals are affected by society: it is argued that it is not sufficient to remain at the level of socially-constructed categories; that analysts need to "descend" to the individual level. Yet, focusing on individuals is not sufficient, especially to fight social oppression. Many of us have heard the old expression, "You can't fight City Hall," suggesting it is futile to challenge authority. However, it is suggested that to change the saying, to "You can't fight City

Hall *alone*,” opens up new ways of thinking. So, the second aspect of Polyconflictualism requires us to understand how individuals come together to form groups and larger conglomerations of people, which can serve as the base to fight oppression. Engaging in both processes—devolving from socially constructed categories to individuals, and then aggregating from individuals into consciously created groups—is important to understand human behavior in any situation, especially in regard to social change. It is to the first aspect we now turn.

For a situation to be consciously recognized as oppressive, however—and therefore, the conflict be made actual—people in the situation must interpret it as such: a situation cannot be seen as oppressive, and thus more than potentially conflictual, without those affected seeing it as such. Outside analysts can identify potential conflict by identifying antagonistic interests in any particular situation. Yet, potential conflict cannot become realized as actual from the outside. This means that just because “outsiders” see conflict as such, “objectively,” it cannot be so classified as actual conflict on that alone: the situational definition of oppression, and therefore, of actual conflict, must be made by those conscious of it from the inside of the situation, or by those located outside but operating in active solidarity with people on the inside of a particular situation.

Each person who is in an oppressive situation must interpret it as such on their own, and this means this must be done on an individual-by-individual basis, and cannot be assumed to be the product of a group coming as a whole to a particular understanding, at least initially. Yet it does not matter whether a situation has actually changed—presumably for the worse—or if simply an individual’s interpretation of a stable situation changes: the point is that it becomes defined as being “oppressive” by an individual.

Accordingly, however, this situational definition of oppression can only be made initially by individuals, and not collectively by members of socially-based categories, although a collective definition of oppression can be constructed through social processes (see below) once individuals have come to define their situation as such. The important point here, however, is that the initial starting point of understanding social reality and then interpreting it can only be done by individuals, and not with collective categories.

Once a person defines a situation as “oppressive,” there are four basic possible responses: (1) accept it (especially as it is felt to be impossible to change, or that the risks are too great to even try, an understanding that is what oppressors seek); (2) seek options that at least seem to reduce or mitigate the oppression for an individual and/or her/his immediate family; (3) respond to the oppression by trying to project it on other people/groups that are even in a less advantageous position than oneself; or (4) challenge the oppression. While options one, two and four are fairly obvious, an example of the third approach is where poor whites transform their personal feelings of oppression and project them as systematic oppression onto African-Americans, as has historically been done by the Ku Klux Klan.

To put these options in a theoretical framework, it is argued that once a situation is defined from the inside as being oppressive, then people have to choose

whether to support the top-down, dominative power that maintains or extends the oppression, or they have to support the bottom-up, emancipatory power that challenges the oppression. So, in the list of possible responses to oppression, 1, 2, and 3 would be seen as supporting dominative power, while 4 would be seen as supporting emancipatory power.

The important thing to recognize, however, is the process by which these positions are taken: they are the result of individuals *choosing* which side they are on in any particular situation and not to choose is, ultimately, a choice to accept the existence of dominative power. In other words, a white woman does not take an anti-racist position because she is white or female, but because she has *chosen to challenge this particular oppression*. Again, we argue that individuals choose which side they are on, and that these choices are individually chosen, not a product of particular social positioning by analysts, no matter how brilliantly done.

Recognizing that people choose which side to be on has a number of important ramifications. First, it demolishes any privileged position of any group; e.g., it destroys the idea that workers are going to transform the current social order simply because they are workers; that women are going to save us simply because they are female, etc. Second, it destroys any privileged oppression: racial oppression is not worse than gender oppression or class oppression; it sees any oppression as being bad, although it recognizes that there may be strategic and/or tactical reasons to prioritize challenging one set of oppressions in any particular situation. And third, it brings individual responsibility into sociology, which means that individuals are responsible for their social behavior.

Basically, this first of two steps reorients sociology from imposed categories to "individuals." Yet, Polyconflictualism goes even further.

Polyconflictualism recognizes that human beings are not generally consistent internally: we can be progressive (challenging oppression, while acting to develop emancipatory power) in some situations, while being reactionary (acting to extend oppression and supporting dominative power) in others.

What does this mean? A very simple example might illuminate this. Say there are two male workers, one black, one white. Say they work in a factory, and the boss is on them hard, trying to get them work faster than is safe. The two workers band together, and refuse to speed-up. This is an example of both workers acting to develop emancipatory power, resisting the dominative power of the boss.

Yet, later, they leave the factory. The white worker returns home, and then goes to a neighborhood meeting called to figure out how to keep African-Americans from moving into the area. The black worker goes home as well. His child support payment is due to his ex-wife. He mutters, "Screw her," and refuses to mail the check.

In the two examples subsequent to these workers acting to develop emancipatory power, both the white male worker and the black male worker act to maintain dominative power: they are extending or maintaining oppressive situations. Yet, only a short time previously, they had been acting to develop emancipatory power.

What this illuminates is that people can be internally inconsistent: just like the fact that members of any group are not all good or all bad—some of the finest people I have met in the world have been white, as have been some of the biggest jerks; some of the finest people I have met have been lesbians, as have been some of the biggest jerks—individuals are not all good or all bad. And Polyconflictualism recognizes this theoretically, not assuming they will act one way or the other in any situation, yet recognizing that they can act consistently across situations or can act contradictorily in different situations, or even act differently in the same situation at other times. In other words, with Polyconflictualism, we recognize that we cannot predict beforehand how any one will act in any particular situation: only by observing the processes by which people make decisions over time can we understand the process by which social change develops or does not develop. By understanding that individuals make specific choices to act/not act in any situation, and that they can act contradictorily in different situations, focus has shifted from the category level “down” to the individual. This process—moving from category to individual—is the first aspect of Polyconflictualism.

This leads us to the second aspect of Polyconflictualism: the need to understand how individuals coalesce into groups. This begins with a focus on culture, and then the focus shifts to processes that lead to collective identity and action.

Fiske sees *mobilization of cultural resources as being key to resistance*. He sees culture as being multifaceted:

I understand culture . . . to encompass the struggle to control and contribute to the social circulation and uses of meanings, knowledges, pleasures and values. Culture always has both sense-making and power-bearing functions. Its sense-making function contains concerns such as those of knowledge, discourse, representation, and practice; within its power-bearing functions are those of power, control, discipline, struggle, resistance, and evasion (Fiske, 1993: 13).

It is this sense that culture has both sense-making and power-bearing functions that is interesting to this author.

Fiske discusses this in considerable detail. He explains the use of knowledges (plural) instead of knowledge (singular), pointing out that discourse activates knowledge, and that discourse represents the world through each knowledge; hence, discourse exerts power over the world. He notes, “There is a physical reality outside of discourse, but discourse is the only means we have of gaining access to it” (Fiske, 1993: 15). Further, though, discourse is a site of social contestation: “discourse also represents the social relations and power relations involved in knowing the world in [a particular] way” (Fiske, 1993: 15).

And while Fiske is ultimately interested in showing how individuals resist “imperializing” power—in my terminology, dominative power—nonetheless, he places most of his emphasis on how culture has imperializing power-bearing functions:

Knowledge, discourse and representation are agencies of power and control. Because the knowledge of reality involves the social relations involved in

knowing it that way, the power to control ways of knowing is a power over what is accepted as reality and over those among whom that acceptance circulates (Fiske, 1993: 16).

Yet, despite this emphasis, Fiske gives a clue that is very provocative, especially in light of this author looking at the processes of developing group solidarity through developing collective identity: "The importance of never forgetting that events and objects exist outside of discourse, despite the inaccessibility of that existence on its own terms, is that they can always be placed into discourse differently" (Fiske, 1993: 15). In other words, different groups and individuals do not have to accept the dominant, imperializing (dominative) power version of reality; they can interpret events and objects outside of imperializing discourse, developing knowledges of their own, and put them into a localizing (emancipatory) discourse that disagrees with and ultimately challenges the imperializing one.

Fiske said that culture was not only sense-making but that it was also power-bearing. He also said that because events and objects exist outside of discourse, this means that groups and individuals can interpret events and objects outside of dominant discourse, ultimately allowing them to create their own discourse that disagrees with the dominant one and, theoretically, create one that challenges the dominant one.

The limitation of Fiske's work seen here is that he only theoretically conceives resistance on an individual level: he never considers how a group of people come together, much less decide how to resist jointly, or to join to challenge the oppression through building a social movement, such as was done by the Civil Rights/Black Power, anti-Vietnam War, and Women's movements. Expanding his thinking to specifically include group solidarity is important, since resistance and challenges can only be sustained over time by groups of people, and this is especially true in the face of direct repression.

Hence, this is the second of a two-aspect process: combining individuals into self-chosen groups. How does this happen? A detour must be made here to enable a discussion of the literature on collective identities and behavior, so as to provide a theoretical basis for our explanation. At the same time, a wide range of research is presented from around the world, and particularly from some developing countries, to help us understand these processes.

To understand how people join together in solidarity with one another, it is important to understand how they identify themselves and create their own social identities. First, however, it must be recognized that people have *multiple* identities, and each is equally valid—the salience of any particular identity is not pre-ordained nor made a "master-status" that directs all other choices, but is a result of choices that an individual makes in any particular situation. An example from a study of female factory workers in Nigeria and India illustrates this:

Identities are selectively mobilized in response to economic, social, political and cultural processes. For instance, capital attempts to mobilise the 'feminine' qualities of women workers in world market factories to ensure a docile, dexterous and cheap labour force. Identities are therefore constantly shifting, not

only historically, but also at a given point in time. Faced with North Indian racism, a woman from Kerala asserts her identity as a Malayalee; in the next moment, faced with male chauvinism, she asserts her identity as a woman; and in the next hour, confronted with managerial discipline, she asserts her identity as a working class woman. She possesses all these identities and yet she is not reducible to any one of them (Chhachhi and Pittin, 1991: 25).

And although Chhachhi and Pittin only discuss individual identities, other researchers point out that there are also collective and public identities (Johnston, Laraña and Gusfield, 1994: 12).

But how are these identities mobilized and their resources utilized? James Scott, in his study of "everyday resistance" by Malaysian peasants, focuses on "the symbols, the norms, the ideological forms [created] that constitute the indispensable background to their behavior" (Scott, 1985: 38). In other words, it is the "normative subculture" that exists prior to the situation that helps give meaning and understanding to the new situation (Scott, 1985: 297).³¹ Fantasia's (1988) case study of a workers' wildcat strike in the United States also shows the existence of a similar normative subculture on which a culture of solidarity was constructed.

Another approach, the use of framing processes to help participants make sense of their social world, has been developed by Hunt, Benford and Snow (1994: 190). This approach recognizes that collective action must be constructed and not assumed (Melucci, 1989), and then "collective action frames focus attention on a particular situation considered problematic, make attributions regarding who or what is to blame, and articulates an alternative set of arrangements including what the movement actors need to do in order to affect the desired change" (Hunt, Benford and Snow, 1994: 190); in other words, the framing process also helps develop individual and collective identities (Hunt, Benford and Snow, 1994).

With the above explicated, it is time to turn to considering how groups are constructed for the purpose of engaging in collective action, and then sharing the resulting political perspective with others, in efforts to expand their social impact. To do this, the focus is shifted to research that has been developed generally in the study of social movements.

Attention must be focused on the work of Alberto Melucci. Melucci (1989, 1995, 1996) questions the very basis of much established social movement research, arguing that a major weakness of this research is that movements have been generally treated as empirical realities, as though they already exist. He believes researchers need to recognize the *constitutive processes* by which they are constructed; i.e., that if one wants to understand the emergence and development of social movements, then a movement should not be treated as a given, but rather focus should be on how it has been built. In fact, the central focus of his research has been to understand the processes of how collective action is created (Melucci, 1996).

Melucci uses cultural explanations to do this. Two concepts central to this thinking on how movements emerge are (1) the creation of a collective identity by a group and, then (2), the process by which the group chooses to engage in

collective action. And while these two concepts are not necessarily distinct empirically, it helps to disaggregate them for analytical purposes.

Collective identity

Social movements emerge, Melucci argues, as people recognize the need to think about society and their social experiences differently than they have in the past [see also Mueller (1994)], whether from a change in social situation or from a different understanding of an existing one. Further, individual activity is crucial to the creation of collective identity, and he argues that creation of a collective identity is a precursor for consciously collective action, meaning action that is built on solidarity.

The concept of collective identity is important because it allows one to understand “how social actors come to form a collectivity and recognize themselves as being part of it” (Melucci, 1996: 69). In other words, creating a collective identity is central to helping people establish meaning for themselves and their actions.

Melucci defines collective identity as “an interactive and shared definition produced by several individuals (or groups at a more complex level), and concerned with the orientations of action and the field of opportunities and constraints” in which the proposed action is to possibly take place (Melucci, 1995: 44). He sees this as a process that includes a “notion of unity, which establishes the limit of a subject and distinguishes it from all others,” but he also recognizes that “a certain degree of emotional investment” is required in creating collective identity, which means that participation in collective identity can never be totally negotiable. He continues: “The notion of identity always refers to these three features: the continuity of a subject over and beyond variations in time and its adaptations to the environment; the delimitation of this subject with respect to others; the ability to recognize and be recognized” (Melucci, 1995: 45).

In other words, developing a group collective identity is a process of individuals getting together, finding a common interest/position, deciding to work together, committing to work together for a set period of time (this is the emotional part, which can be extended over longer periods of time, if desired) and then seeing themselves as a group that is more than just the sum of its parts—and recognizing that the group is different and distinct from others.

Creating a collective identity, an on-going process, is important: success allows potential actors to act together in ways that enable them to be in control of their own actions, and that is why it is important to understand on a theoretical level:

one cannot treat collective activity as a “thing,” as the monolithic unity of a subject; one must instead conceive it as a system of relations and representations. Collective identity takes the form of a field containing a system of vectors in tension. These vectors constantly seek to establish an equilibrium between the various axes of collective action and between identification that an actor declares and the identification given by the rest of the society (adversaries, allies, third parties).

Collective identity in its concrete form depends on how this set of relations is held together. This system is never a definitive datum; it is instead a laborious process in which unity and equilibrium are reestablished in reaction to shifts and changes in the elements internal and external to the field (Melucci, 1995: 50).

From the above, we can see that the creation of collective identity is a process by which—though interaction and negotiation (and sometimes conflict)—*individuals together create meaning for themselves by their participation in the group*. This process is both cognitive and emotional, and the emotional component ensures that the process is never only a rational one, but is non-rational—not anti-rational—as well. This process develops a unity, a group, and ensures both the distinctiveness of the group and provides joint recognition to group members, and recognizes that the group is located within a contextual field of opportunities for and constraints against action. This is an on-going process that is never completely “settled,” so the group must always devote at least some energies to ensuring the on-going well-being of the group and its collective identity.

Collective action

Melucci recognizes the interactive process between individuals that leads to collective identity and then, through on-going negotiation and renegotiation, the process that can lead to collective action once the group decides to act. Melucci sees movements not as entities with a “unity of goals” but rather as “action systems”: “They are systems of action, complex networks among the different levels or meaning of social action” (Melucci, 1995: 53). This means that any social movement (or in this case, group) should not be seen as a monolithic whole, but rather should be seen as having a multiplicity of politics, interpretations, possibly ideologies, etc., out of which a common politics is negotiated and from which action is constructed. But he also recognizes the interactive process that occurs between conflicting groups, and then the negotiation and renegotiation within each group as a result of that conflict (Melucci, 1989). Central to this interactive process of collective identity and collective action is ensuring that each works to develop the other. Key to this is engaging in actions that reinforce or enhance the collective identity is that these actions are built on solidarity (see Fantasia, 1988).

In other words, individuals create groups and, at some point in time, take action—at the time, taking some level of personal risk—to further advance the struggle toward attaining their goals. By doing this, they notify the public of their issues and concerns, attempt to neutralize opponents, and to win those in the “middle” of their audience to move to support the protagonists’ side.³² As this process becomes more and more successful, winning more people to the group’s side and, hopefully, enlarging the group, this enhances the group’s social power, making it more likely for them, over time, to attain their particular goal.

By engaging in conflictive collective action, “the internal solidarity of the group reinforces identity and guarantees it.” At the same time, “The solidarity that ties individuals to each other enables them to affirm themselves as subjects of their action and to withstand the breakdown of social relations induced by conflict” (Melucci, 1996: 74). In short, “collective identity is then becoming ever more conspicuously the product of conscious action and the outcome of self-reflection” (Melucci, 1996: 76; Fantasia, 1988).

The above, however, only focuses on how a group comes together, establishes a collective identity, acts and, then, enhances its collective identity.

What, then, is the purpose of such collective action, beyond enhancing its collective identity? Melucci sees social movement actions as “communicative acts,” as exposing power and domination to observation in ways not regularly attained (Melucci, 1996: 79), but generally limited to that. However, this author sees no reason for such a limitation; yes, social movements can expose power and domination, yet social movements have motivated social change in the United States and around the world, ranging from “reformist” to “revolutionary.” So, yes, they might only expose power and domination in some situations, but they can also instigate widespread social change.

With understanding that people have multiple identities; that these identities can be on individual, collective and public dimensions; that they can be developed either through normative subcultures or framing processes; that they can be mobilized to create group solidarity; and that they can be used to initiate widespread social change, the section above in which we delved into group creation obviously becomes salient.

A Polyconflictual Model of Society has been proposed, based on social processes and the rejection of structural categorization, that both foregrounds individual choice and actions in any particular situation, and recognizes the necessity to build collective action based on the development of collective identity, as a way to resist and/or challenge social oppression.

Synopsis

Polyconflictualism is a flexible model of society, and varies situation-by-situation. It does not privilege any one oppression, nor does it place members of society into any one social category. Thus, it requires that in the first step of analysis, analysts must “descend” from the group level to consider the individual.

Recognizing two forms of social power—dominative or top-down power, and emancipatory or bottom-up power—the polyconflictual model argues that in each situation, individuals must choose whether to support dominative power or emancipatory power. However, it also recognizes that individuals can be internally inconsistent, supporting emancipatory power in one situation or even at one time, and dominative power in another.

Yet, this approach does not remain content to remain at an individual level—in the second step of analysis, it is necessary to return to the group level. This means that analysts must “reconstruct” groups, but this time, to reconstruct

them on the basis of understanding how they actually are constructed, from processes *within* the group. This includes looking at the group-building process both internally (at both the individual and group levels) and externally, in how they seek to extend their political analysis and action to the point where they are adopted by others who, hopefully, will then join them in their chosen campaigns/struggles.

“Returning” to the group level is essential—this approach cannot stay at the individual level. While resistance to oppression takes place on an individual level, it cannot be maintained over a long period of time: to have a chance to do that, one must be part of a group. This means that a group must be constructed, whether by using ideological or framing processes to help such construction.

To sum up: Polyconflictualism is a dynamic, process-based model of society. Arguably, it provides a much more accurate representation of any social order than do structural-based models, and it can explain the processes of social change—and why they do or do not take place—which structural models simply cannot. Accordingly, it recognizes that sociologists cannot predict social behavior, although it can be more accurately understood.

It recognizes that individuals choose whether to engage in emancipatory actions or not, that those who wish to engage in emancipatory actions seek like-minded people for the purposes of possibly engaging in collective action, who can take action and, when done, seek to develop an understanding within the active group of what they did, using it to strengthen and enhance the group, while trying to project it outside the group to build support and win adherents while neutralizing opponents’ counter-efforts. Thus, Polyconflictualism can explain why people engage in or do not engage in social change activities, and why some people come to support these activities, while others oppose them.

Bringing It All Back Home: Using Polyconflictualism to Understand the Findings in this Study

In this study, the AFL-CIO foreign policy leadership was found to have acted against workers in a number of other countries around the globe, supporting the U.S. imperial project while disemboweling efforts by American workers to fight when attacked by these same imperial forces.

We have already said that no structural paradigm-based social theory could explain our findings.

However, it is argued that a processual-based model of society can explain these findings; specifically, we have claimed that Polyconflictualism *can* explain our findings. It can explain activities that are counter to everything we have been told about an organization, in this case, the AFL-CIO, supposedly the foremost representative of workers’ interests in the U.S., even as its leaders betray workers around the world, as well as in the United States.

Polyconflictualism can explain these findings because *a polyconflictual approach is flexible, dynamic and, accordingly, allows for change and for contradiction*. It recognizes that things can change, situation by situation, and that individuals can be internally inconsistent. Further, Polyconflictualism can explain

how groups can be constructed for progressive purposes (i.e., challenging oppression) or for reactionary purposes (extending or developing oppression); it can explain more than a singular developmental process.

Thus, this allows us to theoretically understand why a workers' organization, with worker leaders, can join with forces within the U.S. Government to attack workers in other countries.

Implications for Sociology

Polyconflictualism can theoretically explain macrosociological level social behavior—particularly social behavior of the foreign policy leaders of the AFL-CIO—that neither structural functionalist-based or structural conflict-based theories can. Since Polyconflictualism has been developed out of this and previous labor-oriented research (see also Scipes, 1996, 2003a), it seems to be a major challenge for the structural paradigm in the field of labor.

However, does it have any possible theoretical power outside of the field of labor? It is argued that it does.

As this author teaches a course on “Racial and Ethnic Diversity”—among other things—and because this course is taught from a historical-sociological perspective (see Feagin and Feagin, 2008), this author has had to consider the history of immigration into the United States. When the immigration histories of those we refer to as “white ethnic groups” are examined—beginning with the Irish Catholics and including subsequent immigration from Southern and Eastern Europe prior to 1924 (when the US immigration doors were basically slammed shut)—a very contradictory process is seen.

Take Irish Catholics, for example. When they arrived (circa 1845), they were seen as “the niggers of Ireland” and, although they had white skins, they were *not* considered white upon arrival on U.S. shores; they were not given the status of being “white.” In fact, Irish Catholics had generally quite good relations with the free Blacks in northern urban centers for a while, as can be seen by multiracial relationships and children. Eventually, however, to advance as a collective whole, Irish Catholics were forced by the white social-political establishment to decide whether to unite with earlier white immigrants, generally Protestants from northwestern Europe (by then known as “Natives” or “Americans”), to enhance their collective position while maintaining the existent social order on a racial basis, or to unite with African Americans to initiate social change on a class basis. Over time, and with considerable conflict among Irish Catholics over which way to go, the Irish Catholics decided to act on a racial basis (Ignatiev, 1995).

The Irish Catholics were not the only ones to make this choice—they were only the first. In fact, each “white ethnic group” from Eastern and Southern Europe was forced to make this choice over time, and while differing somewhat around their specific histories and situations, each white ethnic group made the same choice as the Irish Catholics: they each decided to unite on a racial basis with their white predecessors, and work to maintain the system of white supremacy, which meant acting to keep African Americans oppressed (Roediger,

2005).

The interesting theoretical challenge these white ethnic experiences raise is this: how can we explain why these immigrants, each group of which had been treated horribly upon arrival, had betrayed African Americans, many fellow workers, and ultimately sided with the oppressors of African Americans? To put it another way, how did these people who were seen initially as “not white” become white? In short, no structural model-based theory can explain this—and yet, Polyconflictualism can.

Without belaboring the point, it is clear that Polyconflictualism—at the macrosociological level—theoretically challenges both structural models of society and the theories based on them. We certainly now have three major studies within labor that Polyconflictualism can theoretically explain while the others cannot. A quick example from U.S. immigration history also can be explained only by Polyconflictualism.

It is argued that sociologists need to examine and test this theory in their respective areas of concern. It is suggested that Polyconflictualism offers considerable theoretical power, and is superior to established structural-based “theories.”

Conclusion

This chapter has focused on understanding the findings of this study. The labor imperialism of the foreign policy leadership of the AFL-CIO has been confirmed and ramifications thoroughly discussed. Jan Nederveen Pieterse’s broader conceptualization of imperialism has been confirmed. At the same time, coming out of these findings, but not included in this study, a hypothesis has been generated for future research, seeking to understand the individual shift from militancy to collaborationist but in a way that has been condoned by the labor movement. In any case, this study has demonstrated that the struggle for a radical reform of AFL-CIO foreign policy is an integral component of the larger project to transform the labor movement itself.

This study also has important ramifications for sociological theory. After considering models of society (structural functionalism and structural conflict) that are components of the established structural paradigm in macrosociology, this study has rejected structural approaches to understanding societies or, more correctly, established social orders. It has posited a processural paradigm that challenges a structural one and, in turn, has suggested a polyconflictual model of society, which both provides a more accurate representation of a social order and allows us to understand the process of social change—something neither the structural functional nor the structural conflict models allow.

The empirical findings of this study have falsified the structural model, while confirming the polyconflictual model. That this is the third major study that this author has successfully completed over the last 14 years (see also Scipes, 1996, 2003a), and each has shown the inability of Marxism or any structural-based model to explain his overall findings, suggests the need to refine

labor and sociological theory; accordingly, it has been argued that the polyconflictual model is the best one to use when representing the established social order and efforts to change it.

In short, this study has not only established that the foreign policy program of the AFL-CIO has served to advance the interests of the U.S. Empire—resulting in torture, death, and destruction among numerous developing country workers while disemboweling labor democracy in the United States—but this study has put forth an alternative macrosociological theoretical paradigm that can explain why social change from the bottom-up of any social order has or has not taken place. The ramifications of such are considerable.

Solidarity forever, domination never!

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Endnotes

INTRODUCTION

1. As will soon be noticed, this study is heavily “footnoted” or, more properly, end-noted. This is done for two reasons: first, to assure the reader that this material is not fabricated, and second, to indicate where this author obtained his information, so it can be checked to ascertain that it is interpreted reasonably. This also allows the author to connect his material to other scholarly and activist discussions, and to make connections between different developments that are not usually made.

However, it is not necessary to read the endnotes unless one desires so to do. In fact, the first time this is read, many of the endnotes should be ignored, and referred back to only subsequently. The point being that no reader should be intimidated by the amount of information in the detailed endnotes.

Also, forbearance is asked of the author’s considerable use of his own works. The problem is that he has published 35 articles on the AFL-CIO foreign policy program alone since 1986, and much of what he’s focused on has not been of interest to others. Thus, quite often, his work is the only source available to be used on a particular issue/discussion/process. When possible, other people’s work is relied upon; but when necessary, he refers to his own. Additionally, he has published widely on a range of other subjects, which are often relevant and connected to the subject at hand, and are used when felt appropriate. (For a listing of Scipes’ publications, by subject, see <http://faculty.pnc.edu/kscipes/Publications.htm>.)

2. What was referred to as the “third world” in the 1960s and ‘70s is now referred to generally as the “developing countries” or sometimes as the “Global South” of Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Middle East.

This author is aware of earlier efforts, particularly by writers/theorists from the Marxist tradition, and is not discounting their importance. Earlier writings, such as trying to understand the global development of capitalism (e.g., Lenin, 1916), are important.

However, much of the understanding of Marxism was rooted out of the United States during the McCarthy period of the late 1940s-early ‘50s, and what remained was generally confined to those in and around the Communist Party USA—whose membership declined drastically after Nikita Khrushchev’s 1956 speech that revealed many horrors of Josef Stalin’s rule—or other very small radical political groups. As critical scholarship re-emerged in the 1960s, most of these younger scholars began without this knowledge, acquiring it only later during their scholarly development. However, to the point at hand: Americans are taught in school, and the U.S. corporate media continue to claim,

that U.S. activities around the world have been benevolent, or at least benign. Contrary evidence—such as the U.S. war in Southeast Asia—is rationalized off as an “aberration.” Fortunately, this rationalization is overwhelmingly refuted by evidence developed to date.

3. The term “imperialist” or “imperialism” is not used rhetorically in this book, but is used to describe a specific relationship or set of relationships; it is a very concrete term, based on empirical reality. It recognizes that not all countries have equal political, economic, military and/or cultural power, and an imperialist relationship—for now (it gets developed further below)—is where a stronger country dominates a weaker country. Further, the stronger country uses its powers to maintain its domination over the subordinate one over time for the specific economic and political benefit of the stronger one. *It is an unequal and oppressive relationship.*

4. Among these were works by Snow (1964), Berger (1967), Lens (1967), Morris (1967), Windmuller (1967), Langley (1972), Lens (1972), Hirsch (1974, n.d. [but obviously 1975]), and Siegel (1975).

5. Among the more important of these studies are the ones by Morrison (1983); National Labor Committee for Human Rights and Democracy in El Salvador [undated, but obviously 1983 and 1985]; Kwitney (1984); Spalding (1984); Alvarez, et. al. (1985); Bernstein (1985); Bronstein and Johnston (1985); *International Labour Reports* (1985, 1986a, b, 1987, 1989); Barry and Preusch (1986); Boyer (1986); Eckstein (1986); Luhan (1986); Maas (1986); Shorrock and Selvaggio (1986); Cantor and Schor (1987); Hirsch and Muir (1987); Scipes (1987a, b); Smythe (1987a, b); Weinrub and Bollinger (1987); Armstrong, et. al. (1988); Slaney (1988); Spaulding (1988a, b); Garver (1989); Eisenhower (1991); West (1991); and Sims (1992).

6. This understanding was developed through this author meeting a number of people who had long been advancing this argument in Western Europe. Most important were people in and around the British-based journal, *International Labour Reports* (ILR), specifically Alice Donald, Stuart Howard, Mike Press, Dave Spooner, and Don Thomson, each who was met during a trip in the Fall of 1983 (as this author was on his way, along with 10 other anti-nuclear weapons activists from the San Francisco Bay Area, to protest the deployment of U.S. Cruise and Pershing missiles in Germany). The following year, this author met Peter Waterman, an Englishman who had relocated to The Netherlands, a long-time *internationalista* who had been publishing the *Newsletter of International Labour Studies* for a number of years but who also was affiliated with ILR. We met when Waterman visited the University of California at Berkeley, near this author's then-home in Oakland. At the behest of the ILR comrades, this author served as the North American representative of the journal between 1984-89.

It was through the connections with ILR that Scipes met Wenilou “Weng” Pradel. Pradel had just helped lead the first general strike in any export processing zone in the world, in the Bataan Export Processing Zone in the Philippines in June 1982. It was this connection, with initial support through ILR, which led this author to take ultimately six trips to the Philippines between 1986-94, and doing the research that led to his first book (Scipes, 1996).

All of this, along with Peter Waterman's support, led to Scipes doing a Master's of Arts degree in Development Studies at the Institute of Social Studies (ISS) in The Hague in 1990-91. It was while at the ISS that he met the woman whom he later married, Hans Buwalda, through mutual Filipino friends, who were living in The Netherlands in exile.

7. All of these writings were in addition to the practical solidarity being done by labor activists around labor struggles in particularly Mexico, the Philippines, and South Africa. Key to the spreading news about these struggles were journals such as *Mexican Labor News*, published by Dan LaBotz; the Philippine Workers' Support Committee's

Alert, published by John Witeck; *International Labour Reports*, a UK-based bi-monthly journal; and NILS, the *New International Labour Studies*, published by Peter Waterman. The rank-and-file focused *Labor Notes* episodically carried news of labor struggles from around the world, and also brought foreign labor leaders to the US for their biannual conferences. See chapter 3, below.

8. Let us be clear: the damage to American workers, while increasing over time, nonetheless is nowhere near comparable to that which has affected workers in developing countries, as is shown herein.

9. A good place to start is by visiting the web site of U.S. Labor Against the War (USLAW) at www.uslaboragainstarwar.org. USLAW is discussed in chapter 3, below.

10. By “politics,” this author goes far beyond the limited conception of *electoral politics*, which is how the term is generally understood in contemporary U.S. society. To this author, politics are the on-going decision-making processes in any society that determine who gets what, how much, and how.

11. Readers will note that this author does not refer to the work of Immanuel Wallerstein and those working under the theoretical aegis of World Systems Theory (WST), despite this being an active and prolific field of work in contemporary sociology. This author has never been convinced of the historical claims of this field, that there has existed a singular world “system,” at least prior to 1991 with the fall of the Soviet Union, and it is certainly growing more questionable with each day of the twenty-first century. However, for a devastating theoretical dismemberment of WST, see Nederveen Pieterse, 1989: 29-45, Chapter 2, “Limits of World Systems Theory.”

12. It should be noted that efforts such as corporate “empires” can extend beyond the range of the recognized U.S. Empire—for example, the Pepsi-Cola Company had extensive operations within the old Soviet Empire. Oftentimes, an Empire will have political operations in process that try to extend its power and reach (through, in the U.S. case, the CIA or the National Endowment for Democracy), but that in times of conflict, the U.S. Empire does not extend beyond what it will defend militarily. It is this state-based politico-military power that ultimately defines the boundaries of an Empire.

13. This is not a stage “theory” of Empire development, but is merely denoting periods of qualitative expansion of the U.S. Empire vis-à-vis other empires around the globe.

CHAPTER ONE

1. This chapter has gone through several versions, and much of the body of it was published initially by international labor scholar Peter Waterman in his path-breaking *Newsletter of International Labour Studies* (NILS) as Scipes, 1989. This author again thanks Paul Garver, Fred Hirsch, Ron Mendel, Alison Miller, Peter Rachleff, Peter Waterman and Åke Wedin for their thoughtful comments and criticisms on the earlier version of this paper, and Ed Jahn, Michael Poulin and Marianne Torres for their editorial assistance. Obviously, the author alone is responsible for the final result.

2. For a discussion of the concepts of empire and imperialism, please refer to the Introduction.

In this book, it is argued that the AFL/AFL-CIO has supported and continues to support the U.S. dominating other countries. In the early years of the AFL, from 1886 to 1898, it is difficult to tell if this was passive or active support of U.S. imperialism. However, since 1898, it has been active. Nonetheless, during most of U.S. Labor’s history, Labor’s foreign policy leadership has actively chosen to carry out foreign operations that were designed to dominate the labor movements of other countries—i.e., they have en-

gaged in “labor imperialism”—supposedly for U.S. Labor’s benefit, as determined by Labor’s foreign policy leaders.

3. In a symposium in response to Buhle (1999), Staughton Lynd makes a comment about John L. Lewis, and suggests the idea that business unionism does not have to be exclusive, a la Gompers; that there can be *inclusive business unionism*. Lynd, unfortunately, does not develop this idea (Lynd, 2000: 95).

However, this is a provocative idea and, in a recent paper (Scipes, 2009c), it is argued that business unionism does not have to be actively imperialist; it can be, or it can be passively imperialist (which, as long as it accepts the existing imperialist social order, it must be). While this is not the time or place to delve further into this idea, the decision as to whether to be passively imperialist or actively so is based on conscious choices, as opposed to an automatic development as this author had previously thought.

4. In response to an earlier draft of the article on which this chapter was based (Scipes, 1989), Paul Garver correctly pointed out that the following descriptions given below tend towards polarization, instead of presenting them as points on a continuum. This author believes there are continuums between left and right within each, but that there is a *qualitative difference between the philosophies of business and social justice unionism, and how they are carried out in practice*.

What is being called “social justice unionism” has been traditionally referred to as “social unionism.” In the late 1990s, however, social unionism began being called “social movement unionism” in North America (Moody, 1997). However, unknown to most authors in North America, the term “social movement unionism” had previously been applied to radical forms of unionism in the Global South (Waterman, 1988, 1991; Lambert and Webster, 1988; Scipes, 1992a, b, 1996, 2001), and this type of trade unionism is *qualitatively different* from what has been called social movement unionism in North America. Accordingly, this author has renamed this more militant form of trade unionism in North America as “social justice unionism” so as to distinguish it from the qualitatively different type in the Global South (see Scipes, 2003a: 26-44).

Vanessa Tait (2005) uses the term “social justice unionism” instead of “social movement unionism,” although she apparently was unaware of this author’s earlier work, and developed her terminology independently.

Bill Fletcher, Jr., and Fernando Gapasin (2008) also use the term “social justice unionism” to suggest a more complex form of unionism than Moody’s version of “social movement unionism” (which is generally based on “greater mobilization”). Although not theoretically developed, Fletcher and Gapasin (2008: 165-185) advance what they see as “the key elements of this framework.” This, too, was developed independently of this author’s earlier work.

5. For a comparative account of the development of both a business union and a social justice union within the CIO—the steelworkers (USWA) and packinghouse workers (UPWA), respectively—see Scipes, 2003a.

At the heart of a labor movement are trade unions and agglomerations of trade unions that are joined by a *labor center* that, in turn, works to further unify and strengthen the member unions. In the U.S. context, but using international labor terminology, the AFL-CIO is a “labor center.” (Traditionally in the United States, it has been referred to as a “Federation.”) The number of labor centers vary by country: some countries, such as Australia, China, Germany, Great Britain, and the United States, currently have only one labor center; other countries—such as Brazil, France, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Philippines, South Africa, South Korea, Sweden, and Venezuela—have at least two, if not more. The number of labor centers in a country can vary by time: in the U.S., the IWW and the AFL existed at the same time (1905 to roughly 1924), as did the AFL and the

CIO (1938-1955).

6. Gittleman provides a useful, although cumbersome, definition of business unionism: "that variety of trade unions which limits its activities to servicing the immediate needs of its members through collective bargaining and political action, and without more than an indirect regard for the following: the structure of, or the distribution of power within, the society in which such unionism exists; the long range interests of union members, regardless of how those interests are defined; and the welfare of workers who do not belong to the organization, except for those who readily fall within the recognized jurisdiction of a union but have not yet been organized" (Gittleman, 1965: 72).

7. For a detailed discussion of business unionism at the beginning of the 20th Century and its overwhelming adoption in the labor movement, see Foner, 1977: 136-173.

David Montgomery documents the ideological and programmatic challenges by workers and trade union leaders to "Gompers-type" business unionism, both inside and outside of the AFL, between 1886-1923. However, he points out that by 1903, the AFL was the dominant labor organization in this country, and Gompers and his allies were the dominant force within the AFL. There were numerous internal challenges to this domination—and oftentimes workers materially benefited from these battles—but by 1923, Gompers' forces had so solidified control over the AFL that they were able to get a trade unionist who had been delegated by his union, William F. Dunne, expelled from that year's AFL convention because of his politics; their ideological control was complete (Montgomery, 1987). For a look at this domination and how it affected Labor's foreign policy, see Nack, 1999.

8. In reality, not even all white males share this common identification; for example, some men identify themselves primarily on the basis of being married, a parent, etc., in addition to working. However, this shorthand is used to suggest a particular identification that does exist among substantial numbers of white males, and is perhaps most commonly found particularly among those who identify themselves as workers and/or part of the "working class"—although certainly not all, and fortunately, it is becoming less common. But that it exists is sufficient for this representation.

9. The problem is not with union members who are people of color and/or women and their multiple identities; the problem is with business unionism itself. A broader vision by the unions would see these different orientations as comprising opportunities to work with and build mutual support among potential allies. However, this understanding is beyond the comprehension of most business unionists.

One could argue that the absorption of the CIO's industrial unions into the AFL-CIO broke down this "white male" unionism in the labor movement. Perhaps it is true if one looks at the numbers of people of color and women the CIO brought into the merged AFL-CIO. However, if one recognizes that all of these unions are very hierarchical and run from the top, then one must look at those in leadership: at the top levels, with few exceptions, business union leaders have been and continue to be almost all white males. (It is only at the local level and sometimes at a regional level that there is any significant leadership participation numerically by women and people of color.)

10. Following William I. Robinson (1996), based on earlier work by Robert Dahl, it is argued that there are two different types of democracy (although we are taught to think of democracy as a monolith): popular democracy and polyarchal democracy. Popular democracy is what is idealized within the United States, and is what we are told exists in reality: this is the idea of one person, one vote; that everyone has an equal say in decision-making; and that everyone who wants gets to express their opinion on any subject that potentially affects them. Polyarchal democracy, also referred to as "elite democracy," refers to the situation where only a few, elite people get to define the situation and/or se-

lect possible candidates for an electoral position, and then “ordinary” people are allowed to choose, but only from the possible options established for them.

Focus here is on popular democracy.

11. There are a wide number of critical analyses of business unionism over the years—one starting place for sources is the on-line “Contemporary Labor Issues Bibliography” at <http://faculty.pnc.edu/kscipes/LaborBib.htm>. Among the most trenchant are works by Stanley Aronowitz (1973), Kim Moody (1988, 2007), Bill Fletcher, Jr. and Fernando Gapasin (2008), and Steve Early (2009).

This does not mean that rank-and-file (or popular) democracy cannot emerge within a union—it certainly can and, fortunately, periodically does. With few exceptions, however, any effort to establish real democracy in the ranks requires extensive struggle by members against current leaders and/or their supporters (see Benson, 2004). For an in-depth examination of one rank-and-file movement, in the United Steelworkers of America during the late 1970s, including oral histories and reports by participants, see Lane and Olszanski, eds., 2000.

At the same time we abhor business unionism, it must be granted its due: from the early 1950s to mid-1970s, it provided its members with one of the highest standards of living of any working class in the world. This was possible because of the post-World War II expansion of the U.S. Empire, and thus an extra share of resources could be shared by Corporate America in light of aggressive business unionism. However, with the recovery of European and Japanese capitalism, as well as development of corporations based in so-called “developing” countries, U.S. corporations faced greater competition for profits and began attacking U.S. workers’ standards of living and then, later, the labor movement itself (for one of the earliest explanations of this, see Scipes, 1984; for a more recent update, including social consequences, see Scipes, 2009b.)

12. Lodge (1962) provides the ideological background for the “Institutes.” His argument is discussed in chapter 4, below.

13. “The main tenets of organized labor’s present foreign policy were established in the early years of the AFL under the leadership of Samuel Gompers,” writes Henry Berger. He goes on to point out that significant changes from these tenets were usually forced by particular situations and were not changes in fundamental or permanent changes in ideals (Berger, 1967).

The extensive literature, particularly Sims, 1992, and additional material—including this author’s personal research in the Philippines that has documented collaboration between the key union of the labor center supported by the AFL-CIO (Associated Labor Unions/Trade Union Congress of the Philippines) and a death squad against the progressive and militant *Kilusang Mayo Uno* (KMU) Labor Center that the AFL-CIO vehemently opposes (Scipes, 1990, 1996: 116-125, see chapter 2, below)—establishes conclusively that the aggressive imperialist foreign policy initiated by Gompers continued until 1995 (Scipes, 2000b). While it appeared that this had ended under the new administration of John Sweeney, subsequent events in Venezuela have proven that the “appearance” of change was little more than that; the AFL-CIO was involved in helping to lay the groundwork for the coup in April 2002 against the democratically-elected government of President Hugo Chavez (Scipes, 2004b, 2005b, 2007c). Again, see chapter 2, below.

14. There is disagreement with Scott on one thing: while U.S. Labor’s foreign policy overwhelmingly has been imperialist and has been at the expense of working people in other countries, it has deviated from U.S. foreign policy at different times and sometimes extensively—see Endnote #70 below. On this point, agreement is with Roy Godson—despite his rabid anti-Sovietism, his distortions and his apologetics for the AFL—that Labor’s foreign policy has been made independently of the U.S. Government (Godson,

1982). For a much more detached and critical view on this point than Godson—based on excellent historical research and compelling analysis—see Nack, 1999. Other works that support this position—in addition to the previously-published version of this chapter (Scipes, 1989)—include Filipelli (1989), Andrews (1991), and Carew (1998).

15. For an excellent account of social struggles in and around the labor movement before the development of the AFL, see Buhle, 1999: 17-40.

Julie Greene provides a good overview of “The Social Roots of the AFL” (Greene, 1998: 20-27). She locates the union activists in the context of businesspeople’s efforts to join in alliances to limit cutthroat, and ultimately destructive, competition among each others, including their efforts to reduce costs by destroying union power and the high wages based on restricted access to skills. Ultimately, business was not as successful at the later efforts as one might expect.

However, beginning in the 1890s, there was a social recreation of the American working class. “New” immigrants from Central, Southern and Eastern Europe entered the workforce in large numbers, as did women, children and, later, African Americans.

“By the late nineteenth century, then, skilled workers emerged as a distinct social group, isolated and different from other workers, due to a dramatic social and economic remaking of the working class. On a daily basis, their wage labor differentiated them from other workers because they possessed a skill that brought both higher wages and power to affect their immediate environment. After 1890, this fundamental difference became overlaid with ethnic, gender and racial dimensions. Increasingly, most unskilled workers were female, south or eastern European, and/or African American, and most skilled workers were native-born or northwestern European whites as well as being almost exclusively male” (Greene, 1998: 24-25).

16. Gittleman claims Adolf Strasser was the key personality in the development of business unionism, downplaying the roles of Peter J. McGuire and J.P. McDonnell. He all but ignores any contribution Gompers might have made to its development (Gittleman, 1965).

On the other hand, Bernard Mandel states, “While this program [business unionism] was not an exclusive invention of Gompers, he played a leading part in it, and an even more important part in securing its adoption by the cigar makers.” Further, Mandel states, “One of Samuel Gompers’ major contributions to the American labor movement was his leadership in the adoption of a plan of action known initially as the ‘new unionism’ and later as ‘business unionism’” (Mandel, 1954).

Part of the different analyses is that Gittleman focuses on the political aspect of business unionism, while Mandel focuses on the organizational development (i.e., more economic) aspect of it.

Nonetheless, it is clear that Gompers, Strasser and others in their political milieu helped develop the concept and practice of business unionism. Foner’s account (1975a: 514-518) supports Mandel’s analysis, as does Julie Greene’s (1998: 29-31); see also Buhle (1999: 40-90). Greene, however, points out that while eventually “their tactics of centralization, protection, and financial efficiency [would] emerge as the dominant model for union organization,” “in the short run, Strasser’s and Gompers’ innovations in the [Cigar Makers’ International Union] remained largely limited to that organization—until, that is, they ascended to prominent positions in the movement to create a nationwide federation of trade unions” (Greene, 1998: 31).

For a view of one white man who started out as a narrow craft, business unionist but who developed far beyond it, Eugene V. Debs—with periodic comparisons to Gompers—see Salvatore, 1982.

17. In this chapter, Gompers is presented as an individual. While this author thinks

emphasis on Gompers is correct, especially on foreign affairs, David Nack (1999) argues that Gompers' importance was as a particularly skilled individual who headed major social forces within the labor movement—which Nack calls “forces of order”—and it was these social forces that kept Gompers in office and, accordingly, allowed him to have such a tremendous impact on the AFL's foreign policy program. While Nack is correct historically, my shorthand approach is sufficient for this effort.

18. See Gompers, 1925/1967. For an overview of his positions on many issues throughout his career as a labor leader, see Greenbaum, 1966.

19. The major challenge to this narrow vision within the Cigar Makers' International Union (CMIU) was the cigar workers' strike during 1877 in New York City. Skilled union workers, unskilled workers and tenement house workers, many of them women and all from a wide range of ethnic groups, joined together to carry out the strike. Unfortunately, despite incredible efforts, the strike was defeated. The defeat “proved” to the skilled workers in the union that strikes would be won or lost on the basis of their organizational strength and not on alliances with other workers: “one of the CMIU's most important conclusions from the last strike was that financial security and economic stability had to take precedence over all other concerns in building a stable trade union” (Schneider, 1985: 352).

20. Stearn gives succinct accounts of the production growth of U.S. manufacturing during this period. For example, production of manufactured goods doubled between 1870 and 1890. Between 1899 and 1929, the value of machinery produced, including transportation, increased twenty-five times; the value of oil products increased almost nine times; and electrical output grew nineteen times (Stern, ed., 1971: 3-4). For a broad social history of the period, although relatively weak on labor, see Painter, 1987; for an excellent history of the changes in the mode of production and its effects on American workers, see Montgomery, 1987; for a history of the American labor movement during the period, see Foner, 1975b. See also Murolo and Chitty, 2001.

21. For a discussion of the popular response to American military operations against Spain and then later in the Philippines, see Miller, 1982.

22. The original version of this chapter was published as Scipes, 1989. In January 1999, David Nack completed a Ph.D. in History at Rutgers University titled “The American Federation of Labor Confronts Revolution in Russia and Early Soviet Government, 1905 to 1928: Origins of Labor's Cold War” (Nack, 1999). Nack's dissertation is, unsurprisingly, much more detailed than is this chapter. Nonetheless, despite recognizing the high quality work by Nack, this chapter has been kept as it was (generally) initially written. There is much similarity in analysis; see particularly Nack, 1999: 17-33.

23. The editor of *The Samuel Gompers Papers* states that Carl Hillmann's pamphlet “*Praktische Emanzipationswinke*” (“Practical Solutions for Emancipation”) greatly impressed Gompers, and that Hillmann's urging workers not to submit their unions to the pure party movement while developing strong unions “became the pillar of Gompers' trade union philosophy” (Kaufman, ed., 1986: 22). A translation of the pamphlet is included on pages 23-44 of Kaufman, ed., 1986.

24. For an account that gives a historical overview of the development of the philosophy that resulted in the AFL, see Kaufman, 1973; for an account of working class self-organization that led to the AFL and then continued to 1900, see Karson, 1958: 3-28; and for an account of the development of the AFL from 1886 to 1915, see Foner, 1975b, 1977 and 1980.

25. For an excellent account of the AFL's electoral work and political lobbying between 1900-1918, see Karson, 1958. For an analysis of campaigns where the AFL tried to mobilize workers to vote against AFL opponents and to support pro-labor candidates in

1906 and 1908, see Greene, 1991. The standard monograph concerning AFL electoral politics under Gompers is Greene, 1998.

26. Nack (1999), following Arno J. Mayer's work, uses the terms "forces of movement" and "forces of order" throughout his dissertation. Nack "roughly equates socialists [and later, communists-KS] and progressive liberals, interested in social reforms, with the forces of movement, and conservatives and moderates, anxious to maintain the social and political status quo, with the forces of order." These roughly correspond to "left" and "right" respectively, and generally developed within the labor movement from the "La-sallists" and "Marxists" positions mentioned herein. Further, Nack notes that "while in general Gompers stood for movement, except when confronted with revolutionary movement, within the confines of the labor movement itself he presided over the established order" (Nack, 1999: 65-66, endnote #41).

27. Foner covers this dispute in much more detail in the 1975 edition of his history of the American labor movement (Foner, 1975b: 281-286). He presents Gompers as being fairly reasonable on this issue, yet only pages later points out "When it came to being 'insincere', Gompers could show the politicians a thing or two" (p. 288). Considering Gompers' attitude and attacks on the 1893 "Political Programme," it is likely that Gompers' "reasonableness" around the Central Labor Federation issue was a political ploy. See Foner, 1975b: 279-299 for an overview of "The Socialists and Labor, 1890-1896."

28. Gompers wrote about the inner-union strife between the "socialists" and the "trade unionists." Whether both sides would agree to his description is unclear, but it is obvious there was major internal strife. See Gompers, 1925/1967: 199-204.

29. While Gompers' fears were later confirmed in the Soviet Union after 1921, when the Bolsheviks consolidated control, the British experience under nationalization after 1945 differed greatly. Obviously, there has been extensive trade union organization and major strikes by the unions in Britain.

30. While a number of authors note the influence of Marxism on Gompers' thinking, George Cotkin argues convincingly that the followers of Auguste Comte and Herbert Spencer—Hugh McGregor and Frank Foster, respectively—had a significant impact as well (Cotkin, 1979).

31. Gompers wasn't the only one of the early AFL leaders who made this particular transition. Adolf Strasser and P.J. McGuire similarly switched from socialist to business unionist, although Strasser preceded and McGuire followed Gompers' evolution (Gittleman, 1965, and Ehrlich, 1983).

32. A crucial factor in the further development of Gompers' transformation was his membership in the National Civic Federation (NCF). The NCF was a private, tripartite organization including employers, labor and the "general public," which was designed to peacefully resolve industrial problems. The NCF was dominated by some of the biggest capitalists in the country, and at least one purpose of the NCF was to control militant labor. Gompers served it by helping to do just that. For a brief discussion of the NCF, see Foner, 1975b: 384-387, and for a much more detailed examination, see Foner, 1977: 61-110. For a discussion of the Socialist efforts to force AFL leaders to withdraw from the NCF, see Karson, 1958: 125-138. For a discussion of the larger issue of "trusts" and the economy, see Foner, 1975b: 369-384.

33. Simeon Larson supports Reed on this point, detailing how Gompers was able to have such an impact on the AFL regarding foreign affairs, although Larson focuses particularly on events related to World War I (Larson, 1975: 33-46).

34. Roy Godson claims the American labor movement—in reality, the AFL—has opposed "imperialism" since its inception, and "colonialism" since the U.S. occupation of the Philippines (Godson, 1975a: 94). But one looks in vain for even a mention of the

AFL, or a positive action by Gompers, opposing the U.S. war against the Filipinos in a book that exhaustively examines the American side of the war (Miller, 1982). In Schirmer's 1972 study of the resistance movement against U.S. annexation of the Philippines and the following war, Gompers was recognized for formal participation in the leading anti-imperialist organization at the time and for making a few speeches before the beginning of the war. Nonetheless, this all ended by December 1899, although the war continued until 1903 (Schirmer, 1972). See also Foner, 1975b: 404-439.

35. Karson also discusses the AFL's foreign policy, describing it as changing from "anti-imperialism to one passively or actively supporting imperialist activities" (Karson, 1958: 145-148).

36. Scott cites Hobson, *Imperialism*, London, 1902, and Lenin, *Imperialism: The Highest Form of Capitalism*, Moscow, 1964/1916 (Scott, 1978: 275, footnote 4).

37. See Radosh, 1964, for a further discussion on this point. See also Nack, 1999.

38. There are multiple strands to Gompers' development and politics that are being drawn out and combined in this section. Choosing not to foreground "race" here, while focusing on the development of labor imperialism, risks downplaying or ignoring racism and white supremacy in this account. As discussed below, all of Gompers' politics, including but not limited to labor imperialism, are infused with white supremacy and racism against people of color, whether at home or abroad, and whether expressed directly or indirectly: he really was trying to better the interests, as he saw them, of skilled, white male unionized workers.

39. "Letter from Ralph Easley," August 19, 1907. Albert and Palladino identify Easley as a founder of the National Civic Federation, and noted that he served as the Chairman of its Executive Committee from 1904-1939 (Albert and Palladino, eds., 1999: 245).

40. "An Address Before the Chicago Conference on Trusts: Labor and Its Attitude Toward Trusts," dated October 23, 1907 (Gompers in Albert and Palladino, eds., 1999: 258-265).

41. "Letter to Seth Low," President of the National Civic Federation (1907-1916), and was dated March 6, 1908 (Gompers in Albert and Palladino, eds., 1999: 321).

Gompers' ties with leaders of the National Civic Federation, over time, became more than merely professional. He stayed at the home of Ralph Easley, apparently between July 3-5, 1914, and afterward wrote a warm letter thanking Easley for his hospitality. See "Letter to Ralph Easley, August 4, 1914" (Albert and Palladino, eds., 1999: 163-164).

42. Larson also ties international and domestic factors: "The theoretical factors underlying the making of foreign-policy decisions within the AFL were a direct outgrowth of its domestic philosophy" (Larson, 1975: 14).

43. In August 1898 and then again in October 1898, Gompers gave talks about U.S. foreign policy that explicate his positions at the time—in both, he forcefully stated his opposition to annexation of other lands. See "An Address at the National Conference on the Foreign Policy of the United States, Saratoga, NY" and "An Address at the Chicago Peace Jubilee" in Kaufman, Albert and Palladino, eds., 1996: 3-11 and 20-30.

44. "Excerpts from Accounts of the 1907 Convention of the AFL in Norfolk," November 18, 1907 (Albert and Palladino, eds., 1999: 267-270).

45. For an overview of the AFL's support of white supremacy, and opposing in practice the organization of African Americans, the foreign born and women, see Foner, 1974; 1975b: 345-368; and 1977: 219-281. Paul Buhle (1999: 42-44) notes, "Gompers' exclusionary attitudes and actions steadily deepened over the years" (42). Stanford Lyman, in a critical review of AFL actions against Chinese workers, devoted several pages to Gompers himself, and after detailing Gompers' positions and activities, concluded

"Gompers' hostility to Asian workers would continue throughout his life" (Lyman, 2000: 23).

46. In a personal letter dated June 15, 1988 to this author in response to a much-earlier draft of this chapter, Åke Wedin, one of Europe's pre-eminent experts on AFL-CIO activities in Latin America, challenged Berger's statement that the AFL worked to "improve world-wide labor standards." Wedin (1988) points out:

"Regardless of how you conceive of it—as protection against competition in the 'narrow bread-and-butter sense' or as a matter of international trade union solidarity—one of the most practical ways to achieve that goal is to help build and strengthen unions abroad. How can one explain that the AFL—and later the AFL-CIO—all the time has taken a greater interest in controlling foreign unions than in strengthening them?"

"I have rather a long experience from Latin America, but I don't know of one single example of the AFL-CIO or AIFLD having strengthened the trade union movement, but various of how they have divided and busted unions."

47. For a detailed look at the domestic U.S. economic and political realities that fueled this expansion, see Francisco and Fast, 1985, which focuses on the sugar industry and its role in provoking expansion overseas. See also Nederveen Pieterse (1989).

48. Though Foner's account has long been the accepted one—and it is used here—a report of a talk by Gompers in Kansas City found in the *Chicago Federationist* dated April 13, 1989, suggests that the analysis of Gompers' evolution over Cuba needs more nuance. The report reads, "'Now do not misunderstand me', said Mr. Gompers. 'If we can avert war, and at the same time preserve our national dignity and honor, well and good. But if such can not be done, then I say war, and an unrelenting one'" (Kaufman, Albert and Palladino, eds., 1991: 464).

49. During this war, U.S. forces killed between five hundred thousand to one million Filipinos (10-20 percent), out of a national population of approximately five million. See Francisco, 1973.

50. Again, see Foner's account of Gompers'—and other labor leaders'—activities as members of the National Civic Federation (Foner, 1977: 61-110).

The analyses of this period by Foner and Schirmer differ somewhat. Schirmer sees the Bryan campaign much more favorably than does Foner, and gives more credit to the Anti-Imperialist League than does Foner. Foner sees the anti-imperialist movement being much stronger among workers than does Schirmer. This author thinks Foner tends to equate anti-annexation with anti-imperialism; they are similar, but the anti-annexationist position emphasizes the interests of the workers in the imperialist country, while the anti-imperialist position emphasizes the interests of the subjugated people. This author finds Schirmer's analysis the more convincing. See Schirmer, 1972, and Foner, 1975b: 404-439.

In examining the three volumes of *The Samuel Gompers Papers* that cover this period—Vol. 4, covering 1895-98; Vol. 5, 1899-1902; and Vol. 6, 1902-06—there is nothing in the excellent index of this series in Vols. 4 and 6 in regards to the Philippines. There are a few references in Vol. 5, but they generally revolve around Gompers' view that the Filipinos were "semi-savage barbarians" and that there would be deleterious effects on American workers should the U.S. try to annex the islands. The majority of his few comments were made even before U.S. soldiers attacked the Filipinos on February 4, 1899—precipitating the U.S.-Philippine War—and the latest comment found was in October 1899, although the war was not officially declared "over" until July 4, 1903 and fighting actually continued sporadically until 1910 (see Francisco, 1973). The larger

point here is that no evidence that Gompers was seriously concerned about what the war was doing or would do to the Filipinos has been discovered: his only concern was the effects upon American workers.

51. Nack (1999) is the pre-eminent study of the AFL's response to revolutionary struggles in Russia. He argues that U.S. Labor's attention to developments in Russia go back to the 1905 Revolution (Nack, 1999: 33-50).

52. David Nack questions me on this because, as he shows (Nack, 1999), Russia was a key issue for labor activists from 1905 onward. Recognizing this, however, I argue that the *direct* effect on the labor movement during Gompers' presidency was limited overall.

53. For a quick overview of Gompers' evolution from pacifist to war supporter, see Nack, 1999: 55-59.

54. For an excellent discussion of the maneuvering among the great powers, especially in Europe, both preceding and during the war, see Kennedy, 1987: 249-274.

55. For a good discussion of the benefits the AFL received in return for support of the war, see Radosh, 1969: 6-18. The problem with obtaining the benefits of "war socialism" is that the unions did not fight to gain them; the unions were given these benefits by the government and, as the unions found out after the war, what can be given can also be taken away. That happened after the war (Dick, 1972: 139). For a discussion of Gompers' and the AFL's positions and activities in support of the war and their opposition to any efforts by socialists to negotiate an end to it, see Karson, 1958: 90-116. See also Grubbs, 1966.

56. This corporate-government-labor alliance, which disintegrated after World War I, was formally revised during World War II and has continued to date, although in forms varying from the formal and the publicized to the denied. The corporate organizational ties are through the Council on Foreign Relations (see Shoup and Minter, 1977/2004; Carey, 1997), and ties with the U.S. Government (during both Democratic and Republican Administrations) have been through particularly the CIA, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the National Endowment for Democracy (Hirsch and Muir, 1987; Scipes, 2005d). See chapter 4, below.

57. For the best discussion of Gompers' and the AFL's activities and outlook regarding the war, see Larson, 1975. Larson points out that Gompers sacrificed even the unions' economic power during the war upon the altar of recognition and legitimacy from the government and big business; a recognition which was withdrawn fairly soon after the end of the war.

58. For a discussion of the AALD's propaganda efforts, see Grubbs, 1966.

59. After the occupation of Puerto Rico, once Puerto Rican unions requested help, the AFL helped subsidize the establishment of some unions there. However, this was not a conscious decision beforehand to attempt to dominate the unions, as was the PAFL, but a response to a situation in which they had been invited (see Scott, 1978: 118-120).

60. Sinclair Snow claims that the secret aim of the PAFL was "the winning of Mexico for the Allies" (Snow, 1964: 51).

61. One is struck by the limited nature of these aims.

62. The founding of the PAFL Conference Committee was announced in a circular sent to the workers of Latin America, dated February 9, 1917. In this was a most peculiar statement for what was ostensibly a labor organization: "Above all things, the Pan-American Federation of Labor should stand as a guard on watch to protect the Western Hemisphere from being overrun by military domination from any quarter" (p. 10). Albert and Palladino, eds., 2007: 9-13.

Snow repeats the assertion of U.S. Government funding in his book (Snow, 1964: 41-46). Mandel also confirms that President Wilson appropriated "several thousand dol-

lars” for the PAFL (Mandel, 1963: 454), as does Lorwin, 1953: 90.

63. The CTAL later played an important role in the founding of the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) after World War II, which the AFL bitterly opposed. For an account of U.S. Labor’s activities in Italy and throughout Western Europe from 1943 to 1953, which including combating WFTU-affiliated unions, see Filipelli, 1989.

64. In the Spring of 1917, the Wilson Administration sent a commission headed by Elihu Root to Russia to determine if the Russians would continue to fight the war, and to urge that they do so. Included in this commission was James Duncan, First Vice President of the AFL. Preceding the Frey Mission, this was the beginning of AFL leaders acting as “labor statesmen” for the government in international affairs. The Root Commission failed to get Russian Socialists to commit to continuing Russia’s participation in the war. Months later, Gompers was trying to send a labor delegation to Russia to show that American workers supported the war, but that effort died when the Bolsheviks seized power (Radosh, 1969: 72-102).

65. As Ronald Radosh details, Gompers engaged in considerable activity after the war to influence events in Europe. He saw all Socialists as Bolsheviks, and refused to work with any, so great was his opposition to the Bolsheviks. His efforts in Europe were closely coordinated with the Wilson Administration, although there were some tactical differences (Radosh, 1969: 274-303). A report by a FBI agent, Joseph Joyce, tells how he protected Gompers at the 1918 St. Paul AFL convention, suggesting that Mr. Gompers had developed some powerful enemies, and that the Wilson Administration wanted to ensure his safety. See Albert and Palladino, eds., 2007: 480-481.

David Nack (1999)—whose position differs from Radosh’s, and sees the AFL’s activities as coming from within the labor movement instead of outside, as does Radosh—also details Gompers’ efforts against the Bolsheviks. However, Nack demonstrates the impact of the role Gompers played as having major influence on the U.S. Government itself. Nack sees Gompers and his ally, the pro-war “socialist” William English Walling—especially through their policy statement, “The Chief Danger of Revolutionary Movements in Eastern Europe: Revolutions in Western Europe”—as being “largely successful in redirecting [President] Wilson’s diplomacy” in regards to the Soviet government (Nack, 1999: 115). A copy of this article is in Albert and Palladino, eds., 2007: 342-344.

In fact, “Gompers and Walling could take satisfaction that their presentation, with its careful logic about the dangers of the spread of revolution, had a real effect on Wilson’s thinking, and though his position toward Bolshevik Russia would continue to vacillate, it did provide an important rationale for the subsequent American military intervention in the Russian Civil War.” Further, “Both Gompers and Walling went on to devote considerable time and energy to expounding their perspective on Bolshevik Russia, and on insuring that United States policy did not for ‘pragmatic’ reasons slip back into a more sympathetic mode in the future” (Nack, 1999: 116).

66. Gompers’ anti-socialism/anti-communism was expressed at home as well. Gompers actively supported the Palmer Raids in 1919, and helped track down and prosecute radicals during the 1919-20 “Red Scare” (Reed, 1930: 95; see also Nack, 1999: 265-268). This is in addition to the support he gave the U.S. Government in jailing members of the IWW who opposed U.S. participation in World War I: “In hoping to neutralize traditional government hostility toward unionization in return for AFL support of the war, Gompers invited government repression of his radical opponents in the labor movement, most especially the Industrial Workers of the World” (Buhle, 1999: 77). Snow reports that at the PAFL conference in Laredo in 1918, when the Mexican trade unionists urged the AFL to pressure the government to release the IWWs from prison, Gompers got very upset at the idea; in fact, his strong opposition killed the proposal (Snow, 1964: 55).

67. Interestingly, although Gompers was very involved in developing and communicating his position on the Bolshevik-led revolution in Russia to the U.S. Government, he did not indicate so in the AFL's newspaper, the *American Federationist*: "Nowhere did the *Federationist* report Gompers' activities in regard to American Russian policy" (Nack, 1999: 146).

68. Roger Keeran details Communist participation in the autoworkers' unions, including the UAW. He argues that they were good trade unionists and that they were not agents of the Soviet Union—their reality and activities were much more complex than that—but he also points out the Communist Party of the United States of America (CPUSA) went through six different political periods between the early 1920s and late 1940s (Keeran, 1986: 1, 7-8). He "fudges" and, while mentioning the relationship between the CPUSA and the Communist International (Comintern), does not state that the Comintern was dominated by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and that these six political periods (with their analysis and subsequent affect on trade union activities) were overwhelmingly determined by the CPSU.

Bert Cochran, in his book examining the role of the Communist Party in the CIO, described the party leadership as "acting for a faction abroad without reference to its own interests and needs." This "faction abroad," as he specifically notes, was the CPSU (Cochran, 1979: 3, 19).

Maurice Isserman noted, while pointing out that the men and women of the Communist Party USA were active participants in the struggles they engaged in and were not agents of the Soviet Union, "The principle outlines of the party's political behavior must, of course, be examined within the general context of the Soviet Union's foreign policy and domestic situation" (Isserman, 1982: vii, viii).

Randi Storch (2007) looks at these issues in great detail, plus has the advantage of obtaining material out of former Soviet archives. Her in-depth, community-based study of Communist Party (CP) activities in Chicago between 1928-1935 show that CP domination over its members was much less than has been recognized in the past, and that while Party leaders wanted to carry out edicts from the CPSU, reaction of the members to particular programs and policies varied by situation, affected by multiple identities, political goals, family situations, etc. Thus, she convincingly shows that the myth of Soviet domination over CPUSA activities simply does not hold water.

69. Godson names those involved in foreign policy-making in an earlier period (Godson, 1975b: 336-337), and everything this author has seen indicates that people of comparable stature monopolize Labor's foreign policy making process today.

70. Examples of AFL-CIO divergence from the policies of the U.S. Government include opposition to the bombing halt against Vietnam initiated by Lyndon Johnson in 1968; opposition to the entire "détente" strategy of Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger toward the Soviet Union; and opposition to Jimmy Carter's "acceptance" of the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua. Interestingly, in each of these non-trade-related cases where the AFL-CIO opposed U.S. Government policy, the AFL-CIO took the more reactionary and aggressive position! However, the AFL-CIO also opposed the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) initiated by George Bush and signed by Bill Clinton, and it opposed the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) project advanced by the George W. Bush Administration. For discussion of this issue and internal conflicts within Labor as to how to best proceed in foreign affairs, see Hero and Starr, 1970: 21-76; Windmuller, 1967; and Godson, 1982.

However, when using Hero and Starr, and Godson, one must be careful. Hero and Starr's history was written before almost all of the accounts of Labor's collaboration with the OSS or its successor, the CIA, were detailed, especially prior to the exposure of

AIFLD, and that part of the story is missing. Again, as noted in endnote #14, above, Godson must be looked at with extreme wariness: he definitely distorts the record and seems to be consciously acting as the AFL-CIO's chief ideological apologist for their foreign operations. Still, he must be seriously considered because he includes accurate information within his articles and books; in using him, the wheat must definitely be separated from the chaff.

71. While there have been many charges leveled and suspicions raised, one example stands out. Edwin P. Wilson, the former CIA operative who was imprisoned on weapons-smuggling charges after working for the Libyan government, served as the European representative of the Seafarers International Union of North America in the early 1960s with his work focused around the docks of Antwerp. After his time in Europe, during which he also carried out "side assignments" such as making CIA payments to Corsican mobsters in Marseilles for controlling Communist dockworkers, he served in the International Affairs Department of the AFL-CIO. He was employed by the CIA while doing his work in Europe and in Washington, D.C., and then in Latin America and Vietnam (Maas, 1986: 28).

72. For the best efforts to understand and advance the struggle to build international labor solidarity, see Waterman, 1988, 1990, 1991, 1998, 2001. For a 1988 report and analysis of efforts to build grassroots international labor solidarity by a number of projects around the world, see Scipes, 1988. For an analysis of how one labor center, the KMU of the Philippines, has been building this solidarity—which includes critical reflection on Waterman's thinking—see Scipes, 2000a; see also Scipes, 1992a, b, 1996. For an analysis of the new type of trade unionism that emerged in a number of "third world" countries in the 1970s and '80s, which is suggestive for unionists and workers around the world, see Scipes, 1992a, b, 1996, 2001.

73. Fletcher and Gapasin (2008), in the best study to date of the contemporary problems of the U.S. labor movement, seek to get unionists to surpass business unionism and replace it with social justice unionism, a task that this author believes would be a substantial advance in American unionism. However, noted in my review of their book (Scipes, 2008b), they must also challenge the AFL-CIO's foreign policy if they want to build international labor solidarity.

CHAPTER TWO

1. The use of "AFL/AFL-CIO leaders" is to indicate that the foreign policy efforts begun under the AFL (American Federation of Labor) were continued after the 1955 merger between the AFL and the CIO (Congress of Industrial Organizations) in the new AFL-CIO.

2. The effects of "anti-communism" on U.S. culture and the political system have been devastating for popular democracy in the U.S. and around the world, and laid the groundwork for the general acceptance by the U.S. population of the U.S. Empire and its efforts to dominate the world (although rarely described so straightforwardly). Although this rabid "anti-communism" got imposed on the larger United States population during the McCarthy period of the very late-1940s and early 1950s, it should be noted that U.S. Senator Joseph McCarthy's campaign began only *after* the "war against communism" had taken place and basically succeeded in the labor movement: at the end of the campaign in labor movement, eleven "left-led" unions were purged from the CIO in 1949 (see Buhle, 1999: 126-130; Lipsitz, 1994, but especially 191-224; Rosswurm, ed., 1992).

Combined with this anti-communist ideology has been the idea that "free market" capitalism is the best way to organize an economy, and that the U.S. Government is gen-

erally working in the best interests of the large majority of the American people. Yet, anti-communism has precluded any critical examination of the other two ideas. Together, this anti-communist, pro-capitalist and pro-government ideology has been subscribed to by U.S. Labor's foreign policy leadership, while these labor leaders have often been more anti-communist than most government and business leaders.

3. The best account of Meany and his impact on the U.S. labor movement is Buhle, 1999: 91-203.

4. Buhle (1999: 136-143), whose work is generally solid, "leans" more toward the "CIA as dominator" than this author thinks is accurate. Buhle has a high regard for the work of Philip Agee, a former CIA agent who operated primarily in Latin America, and who resigned and then exposed CIA operations in the region in great detail (Agee, 1975). While this author finds Agee's work quite strong in general, Agee never operated in the labor movement, and this author is much less accepting of Agee's claims regarding labor than is Buhle; this author thinks Agee's labor-related claims need to be verified by other sources, and not just accepted at face value, as a number of writers have done.

5. Thus, this author places much more centrality on the role of foreign policy in AFL/AFL-CIO development than does Buhle. Buhle (1999: 225) argues, "The aim of AFL-CIO international programs had always been to promote a loyal labor component to the junior partners of U.S. foreign policy and business arrangements." Whether government or corporate leaders would accept Labor as a junior partner or not is obviously arguable, but this author is convinced that AFL/AFL-CIO leaders since at least World War II have always seen their foreign policy work as important and as a better approach to running the Empire than done by others, including the CIA.

6. Lodge (1962: 78) reports that members of the Free Trade Union Committee (FTUC) were George Meany, William Green (from the coal miners, and President of the AFL after Gompers, from 1924-1952); David Dubinsky (President, International Ladies Garment Workers Union) and Matthew Woll, president of the photoengravers union from 1906-1929, and then First Vice President of the AFL from 1929). The executive secretary of the FTUC was former American Communist Party national secretary Jay Lovestone, who turned virulently against the Communist movement after his expulsion in 1929, becoming "a zealous anticommunist" (for Lovestone, see Goulden, 1972: 120-123), and he was assisted by Irving Brown, a long-time Lovestone associate, who was "the key AFL representative in Europe from 1945 to 1952" (for Brown, see Godson, 1974: 227, f.n. 3).

These men were absolutely central to the AFL's and later AFL-CIO's long-time foreign policy program (see also Langley, 1972; Lens, 1972; Filipelli, 1989, and Carew, 1998).

7. Gabriel Kolko (1969) shows that by 1943, the U.S. alliance with the Soviet Union was unraveling, with the Western forces (primarily U.S. and British) refusing to coordinate their wartime efforts in Italy with the Soviet forces in Eastern Europe.

8. In the end notes of Chapter 1, it was argued that Godson is a source that must be used with caution: he tends to present material that supports his perspective, but does not mention points that could lead to different analyses.

In this article, Godson details extensive AFL work in France by Irving Brown, but he "hedges" about who was funding Brown's work. Although he mentions some funding from "the American government" in a number of places, he never provides details or even amounts of this funding (Godson, 1974). He points out that "examination of the [American Federation of Labor] and [Free Trade Union Committee] archives reveals that in the early postwar years, the AFL was desperately short of money for its foreign operations" (Godson, 1974: 219). Nonetheless, Godson concludes, "Far from being insignificant and without political motivation, the AFL, an American nongovernmental organiza-

tion, consciously was able to affect vital security and political and, to a lesser extent, economic issues in postwar France” (Godson, 1974: 225). There is no question that the AFL was getting money from the U.S. Government, at times directly from the CIA and other times through other U.S. Government agencies.

Goulden (1972: 123) points out that the Free Trade Union Committee “became labor’s liaison with the Office of Strategic Services” (OSS), which was the predecessor to the CIA.

There is no mention that members of AFL union knew anything about these operations, much less approved them.

9. These sources are unimpeachable. Braden (1967) identified himself as a former CIA officer and personal paymaster to both Irving Brown of the AFL, and Walter Reuther of the United Auto Workers/CIO. Filipelli’s 1989 work is based on extensive archival research and interviews with relevant officials, particularly focused on AFL activities in Italy between 1943 and 1953. Carew’s 1998 work is based on close archival work at the Hoover Institute, Stanford University, as was Hughes’ 2001 work, although Hughes apparently was not aware of Carew’s published work. The larger point being that these charges of Labor’s collaboration with the CIA in Europe are not speculative, but based on original documents and, in the case of Braden, first-hand experience. Goulden (1972: 128-130), Meany’s biographer, presents additional evidence in addition to Braden that supports that Lovestone was getting money from the CIA. See also Busch (1983: 23-72).

However, while much has been made of CIA funding, I argue this point has been overemphasized. Meany, the AFL and later the AFL-CIO have run their labor operations overseas, taking money from wherever they could get it, and making do when they could not get it. They have gotten massive amounts of money from the U.S. Government since the late 1940s. The key point, however, is that Labor has run its own foreign policy, which has been independent from that of the government, but it has been “close enough” that it has received this money for its “parallel” work.

10. The American Federation of Labor, through the work of Serafino Romualdi, established the CIT (*Confederacion Inter-americana de Trabajadores*) in 1948. In January 1950, after the founding of the ICFTU (International Confederation of Free Trade Unions), the “CIT was abolished and transferred lock, stock and barrel, into what eventually became, from its Spanish language initials, the ORIT (*Organization Regional Inter-americana de Trabajadores*—Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers)” (Romualdi, 1967: 95); in other words, it subordinated itself to the ICFTU, becoming the ICFTU’s regional organization in Latin America. For an account of how ORIT was born, see Romualdi, 1967: 110-121; and for its “Painful Growth to Maturity,” see Romualdi, 1967: 122-139.

11. Goulden, whose biography of Meany is generally quite uncritical—Buhle (1999: 275, f.n. 3) calls it “badly outdated and almost comically hagiographic”—nonetheless writes, “Guatemalan labor more than a decade later had not recovered from the Castillo Armas strictures—a situation for which Meany and the AFL must share the blame” (Goulden, 1972: 225).

Carlos Castillo Armas, supported by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), overthrew the democratically-elected government of Jacobo Arbenz in June 1954; “Within a few months, Castillo Armas dissolved unions representing workers on United Fruit plantations; employees of UFCO subsidiary the International Railway of Central America; and teachers” (Goulden, 1972: 225). Goulden describes this as “The AFL’s most spectacular foreign venture during the 1950s—one run in conjunction with the CIA—was toppling a freely elected Guatemalan government” (Goulden, 1972: 223).

Romualdi (1967: 240-246) gives a little information about the coup; Thomson and

Larson, 1978: 40 give a little; and Busch, 1983 gives more.

Arbenz, following his predecessor Jose Arevala, had previously “instituted Guatemala’s first, if modest, labor code: recognition of unions, a minimum wage, an eight-hour day, labor courts to hear worker-employee disputes, a rudimentary social security system” (Goulden, 1972: 223).

12. This is discussed in considerable detail in chapter 4, below.

13. Hobart Spalding reports, “Between 1962 and 1967, for example, 89 percent of [AIFLD’s] funds derived from U.S.AID (Agency for International Development) and that source continues to provide the vast majority of funding” (Spalding, 1984: 145).

14. This book is not a complete account of AFL-CIO foreign operations around the world: for example, despite long-standing ties to the Israeli Histadrut, these relations are not delved into herein due to insufficient knowledge on this author’s part. Buhle (1999: 157-158) discusses some ties and certainly reports considerable sympathy for Israel. For a more recent account of AFL-CIO-Histadrut relations, see Ray, 2005. Certainly this relationship deserves in-depth examination.

15. Particularly during the period 1962-91, the AFL-CIO consistently projected “Communist subversion” as the source of social upheaval, even though its own people knew it was poverty and misery that was causing people to revolt. Certainly this charge of “communism” helped enable AFL-CIO foreign policy leaders to access great amounts of U.S. Government monies, but it also allowed them to rationalize efforts to undercut progressive struggles for social and economic justice around the world.

16. For Romualdi, see below. Andrew McLellan was initially Romualdi’s assistant, and then replaced him as Inter-American Representative when Romualdi moved to AIFLD. William Doherty, a former Regional Director of the Postal, Telephone and Telegraph Workers’ International (PTTI), was the initial director of the Social Projects Department of AIFLD, and then became Romualdi’s successor as Executive Director of AIFLD upon Romualdi’s retirement in 1965 (Romualdi, 1967).

Agee (1975) specifically names each man—Romualdi, McLellan and Doherty—as working with the CIA, if not being a member of the CIA itself. He claims AIFLD was a “CIA-controlled labor center” (Agee, 1975: 620), and that PTTI was “used by the CIA in labor operations” (Agee, 1975: 639). Whether Agee is totally correct or not, there is no question that Romualdi and Doherty, in particular, worked very closely with the U.S. Government, and especially with its representatives concerned with and/or operating in Latin America.

When reading AIFLD’s account of its “Twenty-five Years of Solidarity with Latin American Workers” (AIFLD, 1987), it is striking how AIFLD incorporated Lodge’s thinking into its presentation of its work in the region. For a more extensive analysis of labor and developing countries, written while he was U.S. Secretary of Labor for International Affairs, see Lodge, 1962, which is discussed in considerable detail in chapter 4, below.

17. Romualdi writes in an engaging style, but the book is really a very sophisticated yet propagandistic account of his work for the U.S. labor movement in the region: he appears to be giving extensive details, but in reality, it is overwhelmingly a one-sided and non-critical account of his work. He does not address in any real detail events such as AFL intervention in Guatemala in 1954, or AFL-CIO intervention in British Guiana in 1963, Brazil in 1964 or in the Dominican Republic in 1965, each which occurred “on his watch.” And interestingly, there is no mention of the CIA’s efforts in the region, and there is no listing in the index concerning the CIA—compare that to former CIA Agent, Philip Agee (1975), who details CIA operations in Latin America in these years.

Also, interestingly, in his 514-page book, Romualdi provides not one single mention

of discussion of the AFL/AFL-CIO foreign policy program with rank-and-file American workers. The most we are given is unchallenged reports to various labor conventions.

18. Robinson's 1985 article is a very sycophantic account of AIFLD's work in Latin America. Nonetheless, he presents some interesting information that gives an idea of the scope of its work: AIFLD has offices in sixteen countries, has fifty-six trade unionists on staff, and an \$8 million annual budget, of which, "Ninety percent of its funds come from the U.S. Agency for International Development" (Robinson, 1985: 143). Interestingly, Robinson never manages to discuss any of AIFLD's work discussed herein.

For AIFLD's own version of their first 25 years of work in Latin America—which also neglects to address the issues addressed herein—see AIFLD (1987).

The education classes are key to the institutes' work: according to AIFLD and referring only to its work in Latin America, "From 1962 to 1989, some 650,000 unionists participated in in-country programs, and some went on to regional classes or to the United States for intensive training." Sims notes, "The courses offered in AFL-CIO trainings have political payoffs for the United States. In addition to defusing the militancy of foreign labor, the classes transmit a generally positive view of U.S. foreign policy, and the U.S. political and economic system. Moreover, courses offered by the labor institutes help the AFL-CIO to gain entry into foreign unions and shape their attitudes toward politics, economics, and the role of trade unions in society" (Sims, 1992: 73, 72).

19. One of the things that AIFLD—and its "sister" institutes in Africa and Asia—have done is prepare misleading accounts about what is going on in specific countries. For example, in 1984, the AFL-CIO released a report, condemning Nicaragua's Sandinista-led government for its treatment of "free unions" in that country (AIFLD, 1984).

In response, the National Lawyer's Guild sent a team to Nicaragua to see if these charges could be verified. The U.S. Labor Lawyer's Delegation to Nicaragua (1985: 6) concluded: "(1) The leadership and many members of the Nicaraguan trade unions supported by the AFL-CIO have close ties with counter-revolutionary groups which have committed numerous atrocities in violation of international law; (2) Virtually every claim of trade union repression made in the AIFLD report is disputed by representatives of the CUS and CTN [AIFLD-supported federations with four thousand out of two hundred sixty thousand trade union members in the country], by respected human rights groups, or by credible evidence provided by the Nicaraguan government. (3) The Nicaraguan labor movement has enjoyed a rapid growth since 1979 and has achieved significant gains for Nicaraguan workers." In short, in a rigorous and detailed report, the U.S. Labor Lawyers decisively disemboweled AIFLD's 1984 report.

This suggests that any AFL-CIO report on workers in developing countries must be read critically: they have prior convictions for misrepresenting the truth (i.e., lying). For another example, see Scipes, 1987a. Another detailed example is provided in this chapter, below, in the section on AFL-CIO involvement in events leading up the coup attempt in Venezuela in 2002, and the cover-up afterwards of their labor ally's (the CTV) active involvement that coup attempt.

20. Altogether, Goulden (1972: 358) reports that AIFLD received \$20 million from U.S. AID between 1960-68. However, Goulden's book was published before the 1973 coup in Chile.

In his second piece on the coup in Chile, Fred Hirsch (Hirsch, n.d. [1975]: 1) provides more information on U.S. union activities in Chile, both before and after the coup. He specifically names the Brotherhood of Railway and Airline Clerks (BRAC) and the International Trade Secretariat it was affiliated with, the International Transport Federation (ITF); Communication Workers of America (CWA)/Postal, Telephone, Telegraph International (PTTI); Retail Clerks International Association (RCIA)/International Feder-

ation of Commercial, Clerical and Technical Workers (IFPCW); American Federation of Teachers (AFT)/International Federation of Free Teachers' Unions (IFFTU); Textile Workers Union of America (TWUA)/Inter-American Federation of Workers of the Textile, Garment and Leather Workers' Unions (FITITUC); and the American Federation of Musicians (AFM)/Inter-American Federation of Entertainment Workers (FITE), as each being involved in Chile. Hirsch's account obviously takes us beyond Goulden.

21. See Goulden, 1972: 328-335; Langley, 1972; Lens, 1972; Hirsch, 1974, n.d.; Scott, 1978; Trade Union Committee of the People's Popular Movement, 1982; Busch, 1983; Bollinger, 1984; Spalding, 1984; Hirsch and Muir, 1987; Sims, 1992; Buhle, 1999: 152-153; Scipes, 2000b; Waters and Daniels, 2005.

22. See National Labor Committee, n.d. [1983]; Labor Notes, 1984; Alvarez, et. al., 1985; Lohan, 1986; Moody, 1986; Smyth, 1987a, b.

23. The AFL-CIO was very up-front and proud of its work against the Sandinista government in Nicaragua, claiming they were defending "freedom of association" from a government they claimed was repressive, and which AIFLD's Executive Director William C. Doherty, Jr., identified as "the communist Sandinista government" (Doherty, 1988a: 2). They published a number of documents with their views on what was going on in Latin America (e.g., Kirkland, 1984; AIFLD, 1984, 1987), took at least two delegations to Central America and subsequently issued reports of the trip (Brown, 1985; Jessup, 1987); published a speech by the General Secretary of the Nicaraguan Confederation of Trade Unions (CUS) who they supported (Guthrie, 1987); challenged critical reports of their activities in the region (Doherty, 1988a, b), and spoke internationally about their work in Central America (Doherty, 1988b). These materials were distributed publicly and picked up by the author at a conference titled "American Labor and International Affairs," sponsored by the California Labor Federation, AFL-CIO, and the AFL-CIO Department of International Affairs, in San Francisco on June 30 and July 1, 1988. (Conference schedule and materials in author's possession.) The conference piggy-backed on an AFT (American Federation of Teachers) convention—the AFT under Albert Shanker was one of the most reactionary unions in the AFL-CIO regarding international affairs (Schmidt, 1978). For an update on AFT activities, see Sukarieh and Tannock (2010).

For the best account of what the United States actually did in Central America, including Nicaragua, during this time, as opposed to what it said it did, see Grandin, 2007. For an earlier, excellent account, see Robinson, 1992.

24. See National Labor Committee, n.d. [1985]; Barry and Preusch, 1986; Cantor and Schor, 1987; Weinrub and Bollinger, 1987; Armstrong, et. al., 1988; Slaney, 1988; Spalding, 1988a.

25. The AFL-CIO was much more involved in Africa, and particularly East Africa, than this account suggests (see Richards, 2004, for example). See also Nathan Gottfried's 1987 piece on "Trade Union Education for Third World Labour," which largely focuses on the African American Labor Center (AALC) and its work in Africa (Gottfried, 1987: 54-61). There have been "one off" types of accounts—Buhle (1999: 227) mentions Irving Brown's work in Kenya with Tom Mboya, and see Zeleza (1987) for more on the work with the Kenyan labor movement—but there has not been the kind of careful, detailed analysis done that is needed to confidently report this work. This is another area where more research is needed.

26. This continues to date. While in South Africa in July-August 2006, and in response to comments made at a labor forum, this author was asked to write an article on AFL-CIO foreign policy for the *South African Labour Bulletin* (see Scipes, 2007a).

27. See Bronstein and Johnston, 1985; Eckstein, 1986; Scipes, 1986; Shorrock and Selvaggio, 1986; Scipes, 1989, 1990; West, 1991; Scipes, 1996; West, 1997.

28. The AFL-CIO has long bragged about its work in support of *Solidarnosc*. However, this author has in his possession an unclassified memo dated June 29, 1982 to The Secretary (i.e., Alexander M. Haig) from H. Allen Holmes (apparently the acting head of the European Desk of the U.S. State Department) regarding “Your meeting in Chicago with Lane Kirkland, AFL-CIO, Saturday, June 30 at Noon.” Apparently, both Haig and Kirkland were to be in Chicago to participate in “Solidarity with Poland Day,” and the program “will visibly demonstrate a rare degree of unity between the administration and organized labor”: the memo was to brief Haig prior to a private meeting with Kirkland. Haig was given three objectives to the meeting, of which the third was “To encourage AFL-CIO influence on foreign labor and public opinion *in support of USG positions* on foreign policy issues” (emphasis in original). It was clear that the State Department saw Kirkland and the AFL-CIO as major allies on this and other foreign policy issues, and Holmes noted in the memo, “Recently, President Reagan asked his administration to establish closer relations with organized labor and to consult regularly with its leaders.”

This was not long after Reagan had crushed the PATCO (air traffic controllers) strike.

Incidentally, should it need to be said, this in no way is meant to create any doubt about *Solidarnosc* as a legitimate labor organization; it does suggest—and obviously, much more detailed research needs to be done on the issue—that some of its closest foreign “friends,” such as the AFL-CIO, were operating out of their own and different interests than was *Solidarnosc*. Paul Buhle (1999: 225-226) also shares these concerns.

29. By “clientelistic relations,” this author means that the client has less power and is dominated by the patron, for the patron’s purposes. This is opposed to “solidarity relations,” where both sides have equal decision-making power and treat each other with respect. When discussing these relationships, the AFL-CIO presents them as though they were solidarity relations, when they always have been clientelistic.

30. The institutes have always been more successful when they could find and ally with leaders whose politics were similar to those promoted by the institute—and less so at creating new organizations.

This is not to say that even with the patronage and financing that the institutes were always successful. Sims notes the problems that AIFLD had in El Salvador in the 1980s when their clients did not do what they wanted. She quoted Adrian Esquino, identified as “an Indian campesino leader” in a *Wall Street Journal* article: “‘AIFLD is a disaster for workers,’ Esquino charged. ‘AIFLD says if you do what we want, we’ll give you money. The institute buys union leaders’” (Sims, 1992: 88-89).

31. While the “private” nature of these organizations vary—the NED, as is argued herein, is a government-funded operation that was created by the U.S. Congress and signed into law by President Reagan in 1983—they seem to each receive considerable financial support from the U.S. Government, and share personnel in overlapping networks. See Barry and Preusch, 1986; Sims, 1992: 41-52.

32. Even more encouraging—showing that the recognition for change was not confined only to the top leadership—was that a number of staff working for the AFL-CIO were writing very positive things about Labor’s emerging understanding and intensifying involvement in the global economy and recognizing the importance of building international labor solidarity. See, for example, Banks, 1998; Blackwell, 1998; Figueroa, 1998; Shailor, 1998; and Shailor and Kourpias, 1998.

33. Wilfredo Berrios of El Salvador’s SUTTEL (telecom union), who had spoken despairingly about AIFLD’s operations in El Salvador in the 1980s at the 2006 Labor Notes Conference in Dearborn, Michigan (see Scipes, 2006b), sent this author an e-mail message on June 22, 2006, responding to the account of his talk at Labor Notes. In the e-

mail, after reaffirming his statement on AIFLD in the 1980s, he stated, however, “that I would like to add that I have seen changes to the AFL-CIO’s foreign policy after the 1992 Peace Accords in El Salvador and, specifically, for my union SUTTEL (Telecommunications Workers Union) after 1997. At this point, there had been real support from the AFL-CIO through their Solidarity Center for union-building in El Salvador.”

Berrios continued: “For example, when the government refused to grant legal status to SUTTEL—after an intense union-busting/privatization campaign—they accompanied our struggle through political pressure. We were finally granted legal status. Also, when different Salvadoran unions have been targets of repression by the Salvadoran government and transnational corporations, the Solidarity Center has provided moral and financial support. When the electric public union, STSEL, was the target of union-busting by the government, AFL-CIO solidarity efforts denounced the repression and financially supported the continued organizing efforts. Specifically, the Solidarity Center was politically and financially involved in the organizing campaign of the Tainan factory. In the same way, they have accompanied the demands of the Central American people in our fight to reject CAFTA (Central America Free Trade Agreement) by lobbying congress in the United States and mobilizing protests.” (Message in possession of author.)

34. Analyst Mark Engler points out that parallel to these developments overseas was the qualitative change in the AFL-CIO’s policy regarding undocumented workers in the U.S., from opposing their existence in this country to actively seeking their involvement in the U.S. labor movement.

One of the key writers arguing that U.S. Labor should organize undocumented workers is long-time labor activist and labor journalist par-excellence, David Bacon (2000; 2004). According to Fred Hirsch (2008), Bacon “was the person who wrote the rank-and-file resolution which circulated through labor councils and unions in the Bay Area. He was a key organizer of the Labor Immigrant Organizing Network (LION), which made that happen and, in rapid time, at the AFL-CIO Convention, reverse the xenographic intransigence of the AFL-CIO.” See Bacon’s extensive writings on immigrant labor at <http://dbacon.igc.org/Immigrants/immigrants.htm>.

35. Fred Hirsch, n.d., [1975] identifies Jack Otero specifically, then Director of International Affairs Department for the U.S. union Brotherhood of Railway and Airline Clerks (BRAC), as being involved in events leading up to the coup in Chile.

36. The term, “developing countries,” is a poor one; it is a right-wing political/ideological term that has been generally adopted for public use and hides the one thing these countries each have in common: colonization by a “Western” country and/or Japan. (As far as I can discover, the only countries in Asia, Africa, Latin America and the “Middle East” that were never colonized were Ethiopia, Persia/Iran, and Siam/Thailand.) Fred Hirsch (2008) tells me that the late Chilean President, Salvador Allende, used the term “deliberately undeveloped countries.”

The term suggests that these countries have much in common when, in reality, they have little: besides differences in location and population size, the colonialization process differed by colonizing country; the impact of colonization varied; their levels of post-colonial “development” have varied, their political systems have varied, too, as have their foreign relations, and many other factors. This is not to say political unity cannot be developed, but it says that political and economic unity does not exist automatically upon independence (however gained) from the colonial country. See McMichael, 2008.

37. This section on Chile was originally published as a peer-reviewed article in *Labor Studies Journal* (Scipes, 2000b).

38. Fred Hirsch (2008) points out that “these achievements resulted not just from top-down governmental action, but through a thoroughgoing program of community or-

ganization” across the country. Further, he notes, “The leader of the CUT [the largest labor center in the country-KS] was [placed] in the Cabinet position of Minister of Labor.”

39. This is from the file on U.S. intervention in Chile at the National Security Archive at George Washington University: www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB8/ch26-01.htm.

40. For a set of documents concerning the 1973 coup in Chile and related U.S. operations and policy options/decisions, see the documents obtained by Freedom of Information Act requests by the National Security Archive, listed under “Chile and the United States: Declassified Documents relating to the Military Coup, 1970-1976” at www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB8/nsaebb8.htm.

41. Our knowledge of AIFLD activities in Chile is primarily due to the work and perseverance of Fred Hirsch. His activities in further challenging the AFL-CIO foreign policy program are discussed below in chapter 3.

42. In an Option Paper on Chile (NSSM 97)—drawn up by the National Security Council, ultimately for the Vice President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and Office of the Director of Emergency Preparedness, dated November 3, 1970—the U.S. labor movement was recognized as a possible major component of the attack. This Option Paper was initially classified as “Secret Sensitive,” but has since been declassified. This copy of the memo was drawn up for Henry Kissinger, Head of the National Security Council, for presentation at the NSC meeting of November 5, 1970. See Option C (6) at www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB8/ch24-15.htm. This document is from the file on U.S. intervention in Chile at the National Security Archive at George Washington University.

43. In a personal communication with this author, Fred Hirsch (2008) remembers seeing a copy of *AIFLD Report*, the AIFLD public relations journal, with a captioned photo of an AIFLD instructor teaching a class. (Hirsch believes it was July 1974, but is not certain.) He writes, “Off to the side of the picture is an armed military person. Pinochet’s rule at the time was that no union people could meet without previously notifying the authorities and having a military person in attendance at the meeting. This includes things such as AIFLD classes, and AIFLD went along with it.”

44. Much of this section has been previously published in Scipes, 1990, 1996 and 1999.

45. Filipinos had risen against the Spanish in 1896, in the first national liberation struggle in all of Asia, and by 1898, had confined the Spanish to the walled city of Manila. During the Spanish-American war, Admiral Dewey of the U.S. Navy sailed into Manila Bay with his modern, steel ships, and on May 1, 1898, destroyed the decrepit, wooden “fleet” of the Spanish, winning one of the “great victories” of U.S. naval history. The Spanish commander of Manila, given the choice of surrendering to the Filipinos or the Americans, chose the latter. American troops were landed, kept expanding into Filipino lines, and on February 4, 1899, the Filipinos fought back. Most of tactics later carried out by the United States forces in Viet Nam and Iraq—torture, rape, poisoning of wells, forced removal, mass murder, etc.—were first implemented in the Philippines in the war that went from 1899 to 1903 officially, although Filipinos continued to fight in remote areas until at least 1910 (Francisco, 1973).

46. The importance of this is that exchange rates are supposedly an accurate representation of the relative strengths of the two economies, but in no way could the Filipino economy be seen as half that of the United States: at the beginning of World War II, the Philippines could not even manufacture toy guns. By keeping the Filipino *peso* at such an overvalued rate, the Philippines could purchase more U.S.-made products, thus benefiting American producers.

47. While this program did not benefit the majority of the population at the time, it was a success as an industrialization program by 1960. A moderate industrial base had been established: the country had food, wood, pharmaceutical, cement, flour, textile, paint, pulp, paper, glass, chemical, fertilizer, telecommunications, appliance, electronic, plastic, refined fuel, intermediate steel, shipbuilding, motor vehicle, machine parts, engineering, and other industries. From 3 percent in 1949, almost 18 percent of the total national income was derived from manufacturing in 1960. And it was largely built by Filipinos: from 1949 to 1961, Filipinos had invested 1.4 billion *pesos* in new activities, as compared to 425 million *pesos* by the Chinese (mostly Chinese-Filipinos) and only thirty-one million *pesos* by U.S. investors (Scipes, 1999: 4-5).

48. The article from which this was drawn (Scipes, 1999) was an examination of the impact of 37 years of neo-liberal economic policies on the Philippines.

49. The U.S. Government knew beforehand that Marcos was going to declare martial law, and did nothing to stop him (Bonner, 1987). Additionally, the U.S. urged the International Monetary Fund and World Bank to support Marcos' economic development policies, which they did: while the World Bank provided only \$326 million in loans between 1950 and 1972, it gave the Philippines more than \$2.6 billion between 1973 and 1981 (Bello, Kinley, and Elinson, 1982; see also Broad, 1988). The U.S. remained a strong supporter of Marcos until late 1985, when fear of social revolution—with the left (perhaps most importantly, the Communist Party of the Philippines, although it most certainly was not the only leftist opponent)—playing a very prominent role (Bonner, 1987). The U.S. began supporting Corazon Aquino as a possible replacement as an effort both to undercut the left and to ensure that the most conservative replacement succeeded him (Robinson, 1996: 117-145).

50. The Philippines' external debt at the end of 2005 was US \$55.5 billion, according to the World Bank, based on data from the Central Bank of the Philippines. Data obtained from <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTEAPHALFYEARLYUPDATE/Resources/55019-1175629375615/3633258-1175787346127/Philippines-April-07.htm> on March 10, 2010.

51. For a theoretical discussion of the KMU's trade unionism, see especially Scipes (1992a, b).

The KMU consciously links its heritage to the struggles in Chicago in 1886.

52. According to Gary Busch (1983: 123-124), "The introduction of martial law led to a reorganisation of the union and of the industrial relations structure. The labour movement was united into a single national centre . . . later called the Trade Union Congress of the Philippines. The TUCP . . . has been tightly under the government's wing. Strikes are banned; compulsory arbitration is the rule. The trades unions are roughly back in the position from which they emerged in 1936. Their international ties consist primarily of bi-lateral assistance between AAFI and the TUC. The political control over the unions by the government is virtually total."

53. The Filipino political situation was—and remains to this date—extremely complex, and includes an active Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP). Some have claimed that the KMU was a front of the CPP, a charge this author rejected after conducting extensive research nation-wide on the KMU (Scipes, 1996). To the contrary, it was argued that the KMU had developed a new type of trade unionism, what this author called (after Peter Waterman, 1988) "social movement unionism" (Scipes, 1992a, 1992b).

Without wanting to delve into these issues herein, the larger point to be made is that the KMU was a key actor in the anti-dictatorship movement—the key actor in the labor movement, despite there being competing labor centers, of which the TUCP was the most important—and the KMU was joined by many other organizations with a wide range of

politics (see Scipes, 1996; West, 1997). For an examination of the Filipino labor movement from the end of World War II to 1990, see Dejillas, 1994.

54. For an example of the union and work supported by AAFI in the sugar industry during early 1986, contrasted with the work by the KMU-affiliated National Federation of Sugar Workers, see Scipes, 1986.

55. This section on Atlas Mines draws heavily from Scipes (1990: 121; 1996: 116-125).

56. This interview with Roger Cubar was conducted by the author in Cebu City on May 13, 1988.

57. KADRE is an acronym for National Movement for Freedom and Democracy.

58. The details of these killings and assaults are provided in Scipes, 1996: 118-121.

59. This interview with members of the PAMA Executive Board was conducted by the author in Cebu City on June 30, 1989. The four men who were part of the interview—and this author could not confidently tell from the tape of the interview which individual specifically said what, and so he refers to the interview collectively—had been long-time employees at Atlas Mines: one had worked there 25 years, two had been there for ten, and the other for nine.

60. The interview with Wennie Badayos, along with AMA-SUGO Secretary General Edwin Tesaluna, took place in Cebu City on May 13, 1988. For information on labor struggles in Cebu and on the origins of AMA-SUGBO, see Scipes, 1996: 111-115.

61. The account of this struggle in Scipes, 1996, is the most detailed report to date that has emerged of the affects of the AFL-CIO foreign policy program on a particular workplace situation.

62. The following section is largely excerpted from a peer-reviewed article that was published in the *Journal of the Indiana Academy of Social Sciences* (Scipes, 2007c).

63. While it does not appear that the United States Government under George W. Bush instigated the coup, it was unhappy with the regime of Hugo Chavez, and sent clear signals to the opposition in Venezuela that it would not be upset should a coup against Chavez take place. Venezuela had long been of interest to the National Endowment for Democracy, which had been supporting projects there since 1992, almost certainly in response to the 1989 “Caracazo” uprising against the implementation of neo-liberal economic policies as promoted by the International Monetary Fund (see Ellner and Hellinger, eds. 2003). Nonetheless, Venezuela was clearly a concern of the George W. Bush Administration, which held at least one inter-agency meeting between the National Security Council, the Pentagon and the State Department in November 2001, where they talked for two days about Venezuela. Katherine Hoyt (2002) notes, “Similar meetings had been held before previous U.S.-organized coups in Iran, Guatemala, South Vietnam, Chile and elsewhere.” She also reported that CIA Director George Tenet told Congress in February 2002 that Venezuela was one of the “main concerns” for U.S. foreign policy. Juan Forero (2004), writing in *The New York Times*, reported on CIA documents that showed that the Bush Administration had detailed information about the coup plans days prior to the coup. See also Eva Golinger (2004).

In her 2005 book, Golinger provides extensive, in-depth documentation and analysis establishing the claim that the U.S. knew about the coup plotting before it took place—see particularly the Senior Executive Intelligence Brief generated by the CIA dated April 6, 2002, and printed on pp. 209-210. Regarding the Bush Administration, which publicly supported the coup, Mark Weisbrot (2004) wrote “... the Bush Administration was not just lying about what it knew, but actively joining the coup leaders in their short-lived attempt to convince the media and the world that a ‘transitional civilian government’ had legitimately seized power in order to defend the public from alleged state violence. And

all the while knowing that this was false, and that the military coup was part of a plan that they knew about in advance.” For the Bush Administration’s public position on the coup at the time it took place, see Ari Fleischer, 2002. Among other things later disproved, Fleischer reported that “President Chavez has resigned the presidency,” which he never did. See also Steve Ellner’s comments on the coup (Ellner, 2008: 198-199).

For analyses of U.S. efforts in Venezuela since the coup, see Bart Jones (2004); Philip Agee (2005); Golinger (2004); and Bart Jones and Letta Tayler (2005).

For an in-depth report of on-going U.S. activities against Venezuela, until January 2006, see Deborah James (2006).

64. The drawing of parallels between events in Chile in the early 1970s and Venezuela were echoed by Steve Ellner (2008: 200): “Not since the U.S. intervention in Chile under Salvador Allende in the early 1970s and in Nicaragua against the Sandinistas in the 1980s had Washington carried out such an intensive campaign on diverse fronts against a democratically elected government.” For an account of U.S. intervention in Central America, see Grandin, 2007; see also Robinson, 1992.

65. FEDECAMARAS would be comparable to the National Chamber of Commerce in the United States.

66. As was discovered by this author during a visit to Venezuela during Summer 2006, this mobilization of the people was spontaneous; Chavez and his people did not have the organizational capability to mobilize them. As Charles Hardy (2007) points out, this was the first time a coup in Latin America had been overthrown by the people. For an excellent, in-depth understanding of what the Chavez regime meant to “ordinary people” and why, see Hardy (2007).

For an understanding and critical evaluation of the institutional changes initiated by Chavez to enhance participatory democracy, especially after 2004, see Wilpert (2007). For an overview and critical evaluation of the political processes leading to and during the Chavez government, see Ellner (2008).

67. Ellner and Rosen (2002).

Events around and leading to the coup attempt, and the coup attempt itself, were captured on film by an Irish film team that had happened to be in Miraflores at the time of the coup, filming a documentary on President Chavez. The resulting film, “The Revolution Will Not be Televised,” was directed and photographed by Kim Bartley and Donnacha O’Brian, and was released in 2004. It can be viewed for free on-line at <http://www.democracyinaction.org/dia/organizationsORG/VIO/Templates//dwt>, although one has to scroll down the page.

Two contemporary reports of the coup are on-line. First, is “Chronicle of a Coup,” produced by the producers of “The Revolution Will Not Be Televised,” which gives a detailed timing of events. It is at www.chavezthefilm.com/html/backgrd/coup.htm. The second is Wilson, 2002.

For an account of the coup, including a first-hand report from his then-wife, Susana, who had been on the bridge at Puente Llaguno on April 11, 2002 when people on the bridge were being killed by opposition snipers, see Hardy, 2007: 52-65. While in Venezuela in June 2006, this author had the honor of meeting both Charlie and Susana, and was present when Susana described events that happened at Puente Llaguno to our delegation while standing on the bridge.

Throughout his book, Hardy (2007) specifically comments on activities by both U.S. and Venezuelan media in covering the Chavez presidency and found them, to say the least, “wanting” (see especially Hardy, 2007: 99-107).

68. Sustar (2005). Sustar cites Paul Buhle (1999: 143) for the source on the alleged CIA involvement of Romualdi; and Serafino Romualdi (1967: 417, 434, 486-511), for

Romualdi's accounts of his relationship with Venezuelan president Betancourt. Both Betancourt and Caldera were later to serve as President of Venezuela.

See also Fred Hirsch (2005).

69. See also Golinger (2005: 85-86). Golinger (2005: 85-87) provides useful background information on Reich and his career. She also cites an e-mail message from Lourdes Kistler of ACILS to Mary Sullivan of the Department of State, "confirming the Ortega delegation visit and meeting with Otto Reich on February 11, 2002." This was obtained under FOIA. Golinger (2004: 86, fn. 2).

70. Documents unearthed by Jeremy Bigwood and Eva Golinger [hereafter Bigwood and Golinger, (n.d.)] have been placed on the Venezuelan Solidarity Committee's website at www.venezuelafoia.info. To access these reports from ACILS to NED, go to the box on National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and click on "ACILS-CTV." There you will find Quarterly Reports from the Solidarity Center (ACILS) to NED, and these extend from July-September 2000 to July-September 2003. Quotes in this paper are from the January-March 2002 Quarterly Report, and are found at <http://venezuelafoia.info/ctva1.html> and <http://venezuelafoia.info/ctva2.html>.

When checking this web site in March 2010, a message was found stating this site had been inoperable since February 2010. Copies of these documents are in possession of this author.

71. These are documents unearthed by FOIA requests and are posted on-line at www.venezuelafoia.info (see 70, above).

72. For details on activities of the hierarchy of the Venezuelan Catholic Church and its involvement with the coup, written by a former Catholic priest, see Hardy (2007: 114-120).

In her book, Eva Golinger discusses this meeting (Golinger, 2005: 90-92) and its importance. More importantly, she prints an unclassified cable, which she identifies as being from March 2002 (the date on the memo is March 2, but from the contents, more likely should have been dated March 12), from the U.S. Embassy in Caracas to the Secretary of State, where this meeting is reported. In this cable, the following is stated: "The existence of this Accord was announced last week and has since drawn much speculation about whether it was intended as the basis for a post-Chavez government or a last-ditch effort to promote a dialogue with the government. In his combative centerpiece address, *CTV President Carlos Ortega dispelled any remaining doubts: this accord is 'a pact for us', he emphasized, 'to guide us through the transition and to establish a 'government of democratic unity'.* The crowd greeted these remarks with rousing anti-Chavez chants" (emphasis added) (Golinger, 2005: 203-205; quote on p. 204).

73. That the strike was to protest the firing of management, and not union members, was confirmed in a personal interview by this author with Dick Juanique, Director of the Department of Informal Economy of the CTV, in Caracas, June 19, 2006. Juanique's explanation was that hiring and promotions had previously all been done within the state oil company, PDVSA, on the basis of merit, and that the workers had launched a general strike to maintain such a standard in response to President Chavez's firing of the oil managers for corruption. Golinger (2005: 94) says "The workers [in reality, managers-KS] were dismissed largely due to mismanagement of the industry, embezzlement of finances and a difference in policy from the Chavez's Government." See also Hardy (2007).

74. Golinger (2005: 64-65) reprinted the IRI Press Release issued by George Folsom that praised the coup. The IRI, like ACILS, is one of the four key institutes of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED).

75. See Golinger (2005, but specifically pp. 103-105).

The role of the privately-owned media in Venezuela in the coup efforts is detailed

throughout Golinger's 2005 book. However, she also briefly comments on the U.S. media's support for the coup, specifically naming the *Chicago Tribune* and *The New York Times*, of which she discusses the latter's April 14th and April 18, 2002 editorials on the coup (Golinger, 2005: 110, fn. 29). See also Hardy, 2007: 99-107.

76. Ellner (2008: 115-117) gives a quick overview of the coup.

77. As stated before, the International Republican Institute is a key institute of NED, as is the National Democratic Institute. The amount going to the Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE) is not mentioned by Marquis, but is speculative on this author's part; CIPE, too, is a key institute of NED.

Fred Hirsch (2008) points out that "While these sums do not appear to be large in U.S. Government terms, they are much more meaningful amounts in Venezuela." He also notes that "funding is one of the few matters open to . . . researchers; such funds indicate highly consequential operational activity which is very difficult to trace."

78. Steve Ellner (2004) responded to the claims in Gacek (2004a). Ellner, Professor of Labor History at the Universidad del Oriente in Barcelona, Venezuela and perhaps the leading authority on labor today in Venezuela, challenged many of Gacek's claims about the CTV.

In responding to Lee Sustar (2005), Gacek (2005) made basically the same claims as he did in his 2004a article. Sustar, in turn, responded to Gacek (2005), and argued that Gacek had not, in reality, addressed the central claim of his (Sustar's) article, while Gacek made himself to appear as though he was doing just that.

79. In haste to finalize the original article, this report was overlooked. Thus, it did not appear in the *Indiana Academy* journal article (Scipes, 2007c). Including this here only strengthens an already-strong piece.

80. Although Solidarity Center activists reported regularly to the National Endowment for Democracy, neither they nor AFL-CIO foreign policy leaders have ever reported their activities to AFL-CIO affiliated unions' members, nor to the public. In fact, AFL-CIO foreign policy leaders have refused to "open their books" about their activities—past and present—even when asked by a unanimously-passed resolution from the 2004 California State AFL-CIO Convention. See Fred Hirsch, 2004a. A copy of the Final Resolution is on-line at www.calaborfed.org/pdfs/Political/FINALResolutions2004.pdf, p. 4-5; see also Scipes (2004c, 2005f), and Chapter 3, below.

For the most complete compilation of all sources on the AFL-CIO foreign policy program, go to http://faculty.pnc.edu/kscipes/LaborBib.htm#AFL-CIO_foreign_operations.

81. Stanley Gacek (2005) of the AFL-CIO stated unequivocally, "We did not finance the March 5 event."

82. In light of AFL-CIO claims that they had not done anything improper in Venezuela, this author subsequently examined the issue from all sides to see if his initial findings had been incorrect. Unfortunately, Solidarity Center involvement was confirmed in this peer-reviewed article: "through discovering a number of independently-produced accounts and analyses—and after seriously considering the AFL-CIO's version of what happened, conveyed through the writings of Stanley Gacek—I came to the conclusion that the AFL-CIO, and specifically its Solidarity Center, played an active and conscious role in helping to create the conditions that led to the April 2002 coup attempt, and also played a similar role in trying to deny the now-established involvement of the CTV leadership in the planning and participating in at least the initial efforts that led to the coup" (Scipes, 2007c: 143).

A resolution was unanimously passed at the 2006 annual convention of the National Lawyers Guild—"Resolution on the Misuse of U.S. Government 'Democracy Promotion'

Initiatives to Undermine Progressive Governments and Movements in the Americas”—on October 22, 2006. Regarding events in Venezuela, the resolution reads, “Whereas, these ‘Democracy Promotion’ activities include support for the discredited *Confederación de Trabajadores Venezolanos* (CTV) and other groups that organized and promoted the attempted coup against Venezuela’s elected government in 2002. . . .” (National Lawyers Guild, 2006).

83. A copy of this report sent by Robert Collier to Fred Hirsch was forwarded to this author by Hirsch on August 3, 2002. This report had been initially sent to Beaty and Gacek at the AFL-CIO’s International Affairs Department, with copies to a number of other people in the labor movement. Collier identified himself as a member of the Northern California Media Workers Guild of the Communication Workers of America, an AFL-CIO affiliated union, and “I’m writing to share my conclusions from my June trip to Venezuela as a member of the delegation of the International Federation of Journalists” (see International Federation of Journalists, 2002). In this message, Collier said he had not done “an exhaustive investigation of the CTV or the role of AFL-CIO solidarity in Venezuela,” but that his observations “are those of an informed generalist, one who has extensively covered Latin America as a wire-service and newspaper reporter and editor for 15 years, and one who followed Venezuelan affairs for 25 years, ever since I lived there as a teenager in 1978-79.”

84. Although three different types of AFL-CIO operations have been advanced herein, it is almost certain there are even more types that will be found by researchers in the future: there are operations going on in many more countries around the world than reported on, and yet evidence sufficient enough to utilize knowledgeably has not been developed. The cases of Histadrut in Israel, and especially its foreign operations, is one that raises many questions, as does AFL-CIO operations in Poland on behalf of Solidarnosc in the 1970s-80s; while Solidarnosc was genuine, there are serious questions about the related efforts by the AFL-CIO. ACILS’ operations in Russia after the fall of the Soviet Union have been worrisome. And the “colored” revolutions of Eastern Europe in the late 1990s-early 2000s were each “influenced” by the imperialist National Endowment for Democracy (NED)—and since ACILS is a core institute of NED, efforts must be continued to seek information about their activities in and around these countries.

There has been extensive work by the Solidarity Center in Iraq. Again, understandings have not developed significantly enough for knowledgeable comment by this author. Some information appears to have been developed by USLAW from its Iraqi contacts. See chapter 3, below.

The big problem with understanding what ACILS is doing in other countries is not only obtaining accurate information, but also being able to understand the local cultures and languages, and being able to translate these understandings into English. Until a detailed understanding of what they are doing in each particular country in which they are operating can be developed, evidence developed to date suggests that any overseas operations by the AFL-CIO, ACILS or any other operation related to the AFL-CIO, the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and/or the U.S. Government must be considered “guilty” of labor imperialism until proven innocent.

85. Although not delved into in the discussion of the Philippines in this chapter, according to KMU leaders, the human rights violations in the country were actually worse under President Corazon Aquino than they were under dictator Ferdinand Marcos—Aquino could not control her generals, even when she wanted to. This is extensively documented in the first monograph on the KMU (Scipes, 1996).

CHAPTER THREE

1. Radically reforming the AFL-CIO foreign policy program is a major, but certainly not the only, component of building international labor solidarity, which, as argued herein, is a necessity. Thus, while this author focuses on the foreign policy program, it is to advance the larger project of building international labor solidarity, while seeing the AFL-CIO's foreign policy program as a major impediment to the success of this larger project.

2. See, for example, Moody, 1988; Brecher and Costello, eds., 1991; Tillman and Cummings, eds., 1999; Bacon, 2000; Turner, Katz and Hurd, eds., 2001; Clawson, 2003; Bacon, 2004; Benson, 2004; Lopez, 2004; Milkman and Voss, eds., 2004; Weir, 2004; Jamieson, 2005; Tait, 2005; Fones-Wolf, 2006; Milkman, 2006; Moody, 2007; Turner and Cornfield, eds., 2007; Fletcher and Gapasin, 2008; and Early, 2009. For a set of papers that focus on Labor's electoral politics since 2006, see the March 2010 issue (Vol. 35, No. 1) of *Labor Studies Journal*.

It is impossible to cover the literature on conditions within the U.S. labor movement and efforts to change it with only a few citations: the range is extensive, and much of it is of high quality. The most extensive listing of references on-line, organized by subject, is this author's "Contemporary Labor Issues Bibliography," which is at <http://faculty.pnc.edu/kscipes/LaborBib.htm>. This, incidentally, is updated fairly recently, and links to items available on line are included whenever possible.

Some of the better books regarding labor's current situation include Michael Goldfield (1987) on the decline of the U.S. labor movement; Ray M. Tillman and Michael S. Cummings, eds. (1999) on grassroots efforts to change the labor movement for the better; Stephanie Luce (2004) on expanding the conceptualization of labor to include the fight for a "living wage"; Fred Rose (2000) and Dan Clawson (2003) on building coalitions with organizations not usually considered in the labor movement; Lowell Turner, Harry C. Katz and Richard W. Hurd, eds. (2001), and Ruth Milkman and Kim Voss, eds. (2004) for collections of articles on rebuilding and rethinking the labor movement; and Steven Henry Lopez (2004) for an in-depth study of efforts to reform SEIU (Service Employees International Union) local unions in the Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania area. Vanessa Tait (2005) provides a rich overview of efforts to create new forms of trade unionism in the U.S., generally from outside the established labor movement. Special mention must be made of Bill Fletcher, Jr., and Fernando Gapasin's (2008) *Solidarity Divided*, although this author's review should also be read (Scipes, 2008b). An earlier collection that brought together research on union strategies, and is still valuable, is Kate Bronfenbrenner, Sheldon Friedman, Richard W. Hurt, Rudolph A. Oswald, and Ronald L. Seeber, eds. (1998).

Particularly valuable on-going resources on the U.S. labor movement from a rank and file perspective are the monthly newsletter, *Labor Notes* (www.labornotes.org), and the daily labor-focused news headline service, WIN (Workers Independent News) at www.laborradio.org, which focuses on both rank and file as well as established labor efforts. An important effort in providing communications and training for union stewards is by Union Communication Services (www.unionist.com). For an excellent site on educational reform—from a pro-teacher, pro-social justice unionism perspective—see www.substanceneeds.net. For excellent efforts to advance workers' education, in the unions and in university-based programs, see the United Association for Labor Education (<http://uale.org>).

3. For a much more complete listing of references on building international labor solidarity, go to <http://faculty.pnc.edu/kscipes/LaborBib.htm#Grassroots>.

It should be recognized that while these different efforts can be differentially catego-

rized, in reality, individual activists cross back and forth over these category “boundaries.” Thus, it is not uncommon for activists to be active in multiple projects over their political “lives,” both within labor and across labor and non-labor activist projects.

4. Waterman has made at least a couple of interventions in the U.S. debate about AFL-CIO foreign policy; see Waterman, 1999, 2002.

5. For a recent, in-depth analysis of the Reagan Administration’s efforts in Central America, see Grandin, 2007. An excellent, earlier book on Nicaragua is Robinson, 1992.

6. The development of the NLC illustrates an important point: the AFL-CIO is not a monolith; it is a labor center comprised of a number of national/international unions, each made up of local unions from all over the country and, sometimes, from outside the United States. (“International” unions usually have Canadian and American members, although some have members in Puerto Rico and other U.S. “dependencies.”) There is a range of positions of unions at various levels, including at the national/international level. In addition, political positions among national/international union leaders vary across a wide spectrum, from conservative to liberal to progressive.

This is illustrated by three key developments over the years. Walter Reuther of the UAW led his union out of the AFL-CIO during the late 1960s in opposition to the AFL-CIO’s support for the war in Southeast Asia (Hero and Starr, 1970). The development of the NLC and, subsequently, the election of John Sweeney to the presidency of the AFL-CIO in 1995 show considerable differences among top-level labor leaders (Battista, 2002; Dark, 1999). And as the development of U.S. Labor Against War (USLAW) today shows, as is discussed below, this remains true. Thanks to an unidentified reviewer of this manuscript who suggested that this specific point be included.

Thus, the foreign policy program of the AFL-CIO is all the worse because it consciously ignores and/or undercuts differing positions and opinions even among top-level labor leaders. This is done through established organizational structure, history and culture. This leaves “international affairs” under basically the sole purview of the labor center’s specific administration in power and its allies, through its ability to control membership of the AFL-CIO Executive Committee; their ability to appoint chosen Executive Committee members to head key committees like “International Affairs”; and their ability to appoint/hire top-level directors of the International Affairs Department.

7. There were many other local projects, most of which have never been documented, that were active during this period. In the most detailed account available on labor efforts in support of democracy and human rights in El Salvador during the mid-1980s to early 1990s, Andrew Battista (2002: 432) claims that “there were 27 local labor committees” that were carrying out this work across the country, “mainly in larger cities on the two coasts and in the Great Lakes states, although only fifteen or so were well organized and effective.” Thus, these listings herein are limited, merely suggestive, but give some flavor of work that was done during this period. Nonetheless, to this author’s knowledge, there has not been any systematic effort to develop and compile accounts of this work.

8. The KMU’s International Solidarity Affair (ISA) is one part of a very conscious six-part program to develop and communicate international labor solidarity. As far as can be determined, the KMU’s program is the most developed effort of its type in the world. For an analysis of the ISA, within the context of the larger program, see Scipes, 2000a.

9. Since 1996, the UE and FAT have been producing *Mexican News and Analysis*, with support from the Resource Center of the Americas in Minneapolis, Minnesota. Dan LaBotz edits this news magazine, with the strong support of the UE’s Robin Alexander, who has long headed its international department. It can be found on-line at www.ueinternational.org/Mexico_info/mlna.php.

10. By distinguishing political activists from trade unionists, this author inadvertently may not be giving sufficient credit to those activists who are also trade union members.

However, having shifted from the “trade unionist” side to the “activist” side, the point is to recognize those trade unionists who have to work and do their activism in *addition* to their regular work, rather than as part of their regular work. This is not meant to discredit any contribution, no matter at what level, but rather is trying to promote the work of those whose efforts are extraordinary.

The larger point here, incidentally, is that whether working together in active alliance or not, trade unionists and political activists have been stimulating and reinforcing efforts by folks on the “other side” with their efforts.

11. There were also a limited number of excellent exposes within the mainstream media about AFL-CIO foreign operations during the mid-1980s—see, in particular, Kwitney (1984) on AFL-CIO foreign policy in general; Bernstein (1985) on AFL-CIO operations globally; Bronstein and Johnston (1985) on AFL-CIO operations in the Philippines; and Maas (1986), who, in an article on spook Edwin Wilson, writes about Wilson’s work within the labor movement in Western Europe for the CIA.

12. For an account from El Salvador, see the statement of Wilfredo Berrios, reported above in Chapter 2, endnote #33.

13. This same anonymous reviewer—who appears to be someone in a fairly high-level staff position in the labor movement, although that is pure speculation on this author’s part—made an extended comment that is worth including (with only minor editing) because he/she appears to have inside knowledge that adds perspective to this account: “The labor movement has mixed feelings about the Solidarity Center because post 1995, a lot of really good people went to work for the Center—they recruited respected organizers, researchers and strategic campaigners from unions around the world who sincerely believed they were part of something different and hundreds of bright young organizers from [United Students Against Sweatshops]. Some of the staff from the Solidarity Center are former staff from U.S. unions who worked within cross-border alliances before they went to work for the Solidarity Center, [and who] had already established trust with unions in the region. And at international conferences on cross-border campaigns, you will hear from U.S. unions and their counterparts in the Global South how the Solidarity Center staff have been extremely helpful to them in their cross border campaigns. They have provided interpreters for them, they have helped them get people visas to get in and out of the country, they have worked in support of organizing campaigns and strikes by independent unions such as the FAT, the CUT, Pengassan, and the Liberian Rubber Workers, that have been opposed by US government or corporate interests. And so universities across the country have sent out interns to work with unions around the world who have had very positive interactions with the Solidarity Center. But, of course, at the end of the day, *everyone working for the Solidarity Center still has to turn in their lists of everything they did that day and everyone they met with and, as vague and generic they try to make those lists be, those lists still must be sent by the Solidarity Center to the U.S. government*, and the U.S. government does have the ability to send them to any corporation of army or political leader they want and union leaders can then get targeted for murder. And there are all the other much more disturbing stories the author does not tell about the role of the Solidarity Center in Iraq or in propping up weaker government unions in Haiti” (emphasis added).

14. Although Hirsch and Scipes had drifted apart from when they had first met in CISTUR in San Francisco during the late 1980s, Scipes sent a copy of his “It’s Time to Come Clean: Open the AFL-CIO Archives on International Labor Operations” (Scipes, 2000b) article to Hirsch. By doing this, they reconnected, and re-established a friendship and working relationship that continues to this day—a relationship that would help stimulate developments beginning in 2005.

15. This 75 minute movie can be viewed on-line for free at <http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=5832390545689805144>.

16. This section on “globalization” is drawn from Scipes, 2009a.

17. For a much more extensive listing of works on “globalization,” go to http://faculty.pnc.edu/kscipes/Course_references.htm#---GLOBALIZATION_.

18. The best place to get on-going and regularly-updated information about U.S. Labor Against the War is their excellent web site at www.uslaboragainstarwar.org.

19. IVAW’s website is at www.ivaw.org.

20. These references are just a few of the important entrees on the USLAW web site. For a more complete and up-to-date account of their activities, along with movies they endorse and/or help develop, go to www.uslaboragainstarwar.org.

21. The website for the Worker to Worker Solidarity Committee was at www.workertoworker.net, but has been discontinued. For the most complete on-line compilation of works regarding AFL-CIO foreign policy, which incorporates those items previously located on the WWSC site, go to http://faculty.pnc.edu/kscipes/LaborBib.htm#AFL-CIO_Foreign_Operations.

22. To build for the July 24, 2005 rally at Navy Pier in Chicago, with the following march to and demonstration at the Sheraton Hotel, the Chicago activists coalesced as the “Organizing Group to Say No to the NED.” Local sponsors of the rally included a number of solidarity, religious and activist groups, including Pan African Roots, Nicaragua Solidarity Committee, Chicago Cinquera/El Salvador Sister City, Columbia

Solidarity Committee/Columbia Action Network, Freedom Road Socialist Organization, Chicago A.N.S.W.E.R., International Socialist Organization, New World Resource Center, Voices in the Wilderness, Bolivarian Circles of Chicago, Chicago Black United Front, Chicago Greens, Labor Beat/Labor Express, La Voz de Los Abajo, Veterans for Peace, Zimbabwe Solidarity Network, and Eighth Day Center for Justice.

23. Details of this can be found in Scipes (2005g), and in the video produced by Chicago’s rank-and-file oriented cable-TV program, *Labor Beat*. The video produced by the *Labor Beat* crew, titled “The AFL-CIO’s Foreign Policy and N.E.D. Money,” can be obtained for \$15 from *Labor Beat* (indicate VHS or DVD version), at 37 S. Ashland, Chicago, IL 60607. According to *Labor Beat*, this video “includes scenes of floor discussion on foreign policy resolution and reactions of supporters of ‘Build Unity and Trust Among Workers Worldwide’ resolution, including Jeff Crosby, North Shore (Massachusetts) Central Labor Council and member of AFL-CIO Convention Resolutions Committee.” This can also be ordered on-line at <http://www.laborbeat.org/lb/lb-vids.htm>.

24. Amy Goodman had invited AFL-CIO International Affairs Department head Barbara Shailor to appear on the TV/radio broadcast with Fred Hirsch and Kim Scipes, but Shailor refused. Goodman reported this in the actual broadcast. For a more in-depth analysis of what happened, see Scipes, 2005f.

25. *The Washington Post*, whose offices sit literally across the street from the NED offices, and which had been advised numerous times of the picket line, failed to send a reporter to cover the protest. The protest was, however, covered by the Associated Press, although only on its Latin American wire. See Ikeda, 2006.

26. Carol Weidel, a member of AFT-Wisconsin, spoke for U.S. Labor Against War on “What Have the Bush Wars Cost Wisconsin Labor, and What Can We Do About It?,” and David Nack spoke on “The Origins of Labor’s Cold War and Interventionism.”

CHAPTER FOUR

1. Again, you, the reader, are advised not to believe a single word written herein. You *are*, however, being asked to consider the claim and the evidence on which it is based, and evaluate how well the evidence supports the claim. And then, on the basis of such a process, to proceed.

For an excellent book that argues that Americans are kept in a “bubble,” separate from the rest of the world and thus without real knowledge of what the U.S. Government is doing in the world, see Nederveen Pieterse, 2008.

2. This process did not “just happen.” It is a result of conscious efforts by elite think tanks—most importantly, the Council on Foreign Affairs (see Shoup and Minter, 1977/2004)—that drive the process among elites to come to a common understanding of how they want the United States Government to act in the world to best ensure elite interests in the United States and around the world. These socially-constructed understandings are transmitted into the government by high level political leaders—both elected and appointed—who have been invited into the think tank organizations and processes directly, and by accounts representing such processes that are transmitted through major news institutions such as *The New York Times*, *The Wall Street Journal*, and *The Washington Post*, as well as others. Further, support for these elite interests is also generated through liberal foundation support for political organizations and particular non-governmental organizations (see Arnone, ed., 1982; Roelofs, 2003)—and thanks to Michael Barker for these sources.

Following Gramsci (Hoare and Nowell-Smith, eds., 1971), the term “hegemonic” refers to the processes that enable control without requiring total domination.

3. Obviously, there were many who preceded us, although much of Americans’ knowledge about that got destroyed during the McCarthy era in the United States. This is an extremely truncated “cultural approach” to post-World War II U.S. history, as it is not desired to get off on a tangent. For a couple of excellent efforts to develop these ideas, see Stanley Aronowitz, 1973, and George Lipsitz, 1994.

As a university professor, this author is astounded both by the explosion of historiography and research on social movements/social change in the United States and around the world that has emerged since the late 1960s-early 1970s, and how little of that has been incorporated into the history text books read by most U.S. high school students, which is the primary site through which the historical record and understanding of this country gets transmitted to most Americans. This certainly has not “just happened.”

4. As a U.S. military veteran (enlistee, U.S. Marine Corps, 1969-73), this author found the need to try to understand real U.S. history, not the fairy-tale history that we have been taught. Being a white Marine who rebelled against the racism of the Marine Corps while on active duty (see Short and Seidenberg, 1991: 67), and like many of us in the military who rebelled (see, for example, Short and Seidenberg, 1991; Moser, 1996; Stacewicz, 1997; Nicosia, 2001; Zeiger, 2005), this author has been subsequently trying to understand the processes by which the U.S. got into Vietnam and the development of U.S. foreign policy overall. An excellent recent source has been the 2009 movie, *The Most Dangerous Man in America*, which is about Daniel Ellsberg and his release of *The Pentagon Papers*. This was a 7,000 page top secret study that was supposed to never be seen by the American public.

This is not to suggest that only those of us within the military who rebelled have been asking ourselves these questions, and examining our world. Many others have preceded us, and (hopefully) many will follow. The point is that for many Vietnam and Vietnam Era vets—and especially for those of us who rebelled—this has been a personal issue in addition to whatever intellectual path we have taken. This is similar to the experiences of many civilian political activists from “The Sixties,” albeit from an overwhelmingly “working class” viewpoint.

5. Although not wanting to get off on a tangent, this author argues this approach gives us another way to understand the American experience: it has been the struggles of “ordinary” women and men to make real the ideals of the American Declaration of Inde-

pendence that has driven the development of this country over its existence. Obviously, these efforts have varied according to social location at times, and have supported both dominative and emancipatory power (see chapter 5, below), but it is argued this is a more accurate understanding of the overall American experience than is the story that we have been systematically told over the last 150 years or so.

6. Obviously, this does not address the position and role of China after 1949—and especially after 1963—but accounting for that here is not important.

7. Captured in the Bush Administration's National Security Document, NSSD 2002.

8. One of the great myths of U.S. society is that American workers' incomes increase automatically along with productivity; hence, as productivity increases, supposedly so do incomes and, accordingly, standards of living. While this may accurately describe what happens in a limited number of cases, it does not accurately describe the overall situation. What raised "working class" Americans' standards of living in the 1950s, '60s and early '70s—making what I call a "working middle class" (in addition to the traditional, college-educated "professional" middle class, and thus creating "the great American middle class")—was a strong labor movement, based on militant unions: they had the power to force corporations to share their wealth with their workers (among others, see Renshaw, 1991; Metzgar, 2000; Murolo and Chitty, 2001; Scipes, 2009b).

In the face of this challenge by Labor, U.S. Business fought back, ultimately seeking to root organized Labor out of the production-distribution-exchange processes in the economy. U.S. Business history of the post-World War II period era—to paint with a very broad brush—has been a combination of the re-establishing the idea of "free enterprise" and its desirability (Fones-Wolf, 1994); the degrading and deskilling of work through technological displacement (Braverman, 1974)—stronger in some industries than others; deindustrializing (Bluestone and Harrison, 1982); and industrial restructuring, both domestically and globally (Peet, ed., 1987; Harrison and Bluestone, 1988).

This, in turn, has led to the destruction of millions of jobs over the years, especially in manufacturing, and the drastic weakening of individual unions and the labor movement as a whole (see, among many others, Bluestone and Harrison, 1982; Scipes, 1984; Goldfield, 1987; Harrison and Bluestone, 1988; Greenhouse, 2008; Scipes, 2009b). Consequently, this has had social ramifications of widespread impoverishment and social disruption (Wilson, 1996; Ehrenreich, 2001; Kitwana, 2002; Eitzen and Eitzen-Smith, 2003; Lipper, 2004; Barnes, 2005; Bageant, 2007); racially-segregated schools (Kozol, 1992, 2005); escalating assaults on the family (Rubin, 1976, 1994); and structured inequality overall (Aguirre and Baker, 2008), with escalating income inequality that is worse than some of the poorest countries in the world such as Bangladesh, Uganda and Vietnam (Scipes, 2009b). This inequality, in turn, has intensified health disparities in the country, drastically shortening life spans of those with lower incomes (see Kawachi, Kennedy and Wilkinson, eds., 1999), as well as led to the highest imprisonment rate in the world (Walmsley, 2005; Hartney, 2006). The utter failure of U.S. labor movement leadership—and most specifically, the leadership of the AFL-CIO—has allowed all of this to take place without any serious, on-going mobilization of its membership to fight it, which has left Labor with a smaller percentage of the workforce unionized and with a huge loss of social legitimacy. The percentage of unionized workers in the private sector of the economy is lower in 2010 than it was in 1900 (Kelber, 2010).

9. In 1984, this author published an article from a global perspective in response to various "industrial policy" proposals in response to economic stagnation. This analysis realized that U.S. corporate survival depended on attacking and undermining their workers. In this article, this author wrote:

The economy of the United States is in bad shape. We have had two major recessions during the last ten years. Unemployment remains at a post-World War II high. Less than one-half of the number of steel workers employed in 1953 are employed in 1984. One-third of the autoworkers employed in 1978 will never work in the auto industry again.

The cause of these and related problems is that the international economic system is undergoing massive restructuring. It is changing from being centralized and dominated by the United States to one which is much more decentralized and competitive.

Concurrently, within the manufacturing industries still producing in the U.S., other major changes are taking place. Workers are being replaced through increasing use of automated equipment, robots and computers. For those workers still employed, escalating attacks on their wages, benefits and working conditions are the price they must pay for continued employment (Scipes, 1984: 1).

It was further noted, “rather simple, labor intensive production such as assembly operations have been moved from the United States to Third World countries like Malaysia where wages are kept low” (Scipes, 1984: 11).

And, finally, the situation for workers was summed up: “Every way, workers are going to loose. Either they will lose their jobs to foreign competitors—oftentimes subsidiaries of U.S. corporations—or lose them to robots and computerized machines, or have their wages and benefits severely reduced” (Scipes, 1984: 22).

Arguably, this foretold the cause of the current global financial crisis, beginning in the United States in 2007, although obviously not the timing (see Scipes, 2009b; see also Foster and Magdoff, 2009).

10. Obviously, there is more to American life than just “economic opportunity”; being a sociologist, this author cannot reduce social life to just economics. At the same time, however, if we look at places of concentrated poverty where large numbers of people cannot get adequately remunerated work—whether black or white—we see how central economic opportunity is to the well-being of Americans. See, among many others, Wilson (1996), Ehrenreich (2001); Kitwana (2002); Eitzen and Eitzen Smith (2003), Lipper (2004), Barnes (2005) and Bageant (2007). This was captured so vividly in Michael Moore’s 1989 film, *Roger and Me*, with a 2009 update in his *Capitalism: A Love Story*.

11. Ray and Anderson (2000: 115-116) identify twenty kinds of new movements—most revolving around primarily social and political issues, with some mixing of political, social and consciousness issues, and some combining consciousness and cultural issues—that have emerged in the U.S. and around the world since the 1960s.

12. Particularly since the end of the 1970s, and especially with the advent of the Reagan Administration in 1981, this author argues that a conscious political program by at least a significant part of the American elite has been the effort to keep Americans separated from each other; in other words, to try to ensure that the collectivity of the Sixties never re-emerges (see Carey, 1997—and thanks to Michael Barker for introducing me to his work; see also Trend, 2007). Thus, we have been told that as long as we and our close loved ones are ok, we should not worry about any one else: it’s what I call the “I got mine-screw you, jack” culture. The results of this have been the great downfall of our collective organizations, such as our unions and the labor movement in general, and the increased social inequality that has subsequently developed. This argument is expanded and developed in Scipes, 2009b.

13. Goldman and Douglas (1988) argue that the U.S. has been an “evangelical” nation throughout its history, promoting democracy instead of any religious ideology; thus, U.S. foreign policy has historically been based on promoting democracy. However, they

recognize that sometimes there have been “blemishes.” Goldman (1988), writing alone, provides “A Brief History” of the “democratic mission,” which requires some fancy footwork, sometimes more than others. He has difficulty in explaining how or why, after World War II, “the United States found itself serving as policeman for the world, a role that sometimes put its democratic mission into jeopardy or in reverse, for example by giving aid to Franco and other dictators in exchange for access to strategic military bases” (Goldman, 1988: 13-14). In short, this collection puts forth an understanding of U.S. foreign policy based on leaders’ rhetoric—and which makes considerable sense within the context of what Americans have been taught in schools around the country—but that cannot withstand critical scrutiny.

14. In a 2007 end-of-the-year editorial, in which they denigrated the activities of the Bush Administration, a *New York Times* editorial writer included a rather bizarre statement: “Out of panic and ideology, President Bush squandered America’s position of moral and political leadership, swept aside international institutions and treaties, sullied America’s global image, and trampled on the constitutional pillars that have supported our democracy through the most terrifying and challenging times” (New York Times, 2007). In this statement, we find, repeated yet again, the idea that the United States provides moral leadership to the world, that we have this unsullied global image, and this unchallengeable and perfect democracy at home.

How can one reconcile this with the historical record that so many researchers have detailed? See the movie *Sir, No Sir!* (Zeiger, 2005), about the anti-Vietnam War movement inside the US military, or see William Blum’s report below on the reality of US foreign policy, as well as what has been presented (directly and through references) throughout this manuscript.

The art of propaganda has perhaps been developed most against the American people (see Herman and Chomsky, 1988; Carey, 1997; McChesney, 2006; Rich, 2006).

15. This is the truth spoken by U.S. military veterans when they have turned against the U.S. Empire and organized collectively to help stop the violence. See the on-line testimony from the March 2008 “Winter Soldier” hearings at the National Labor College in Silver Spring, Maryland, where Iraq and Afghanistan U.S. military veterans testified as what they did and saw personally while deployed (www.ivaw.org). As this author wrote in his review of *Solidarity Divided*, “In addition to the medical problems of returning vets, there are accompanying moral problems. War is hell, and urban guerrilla warfare is about the worst: no one comes out unscathed. And people can do incredibly vile things in their efforts to get themselves and their ‘buddies’ home again safely. That might even make sense at the time and place. But once they are again ‘safe,’ they have to come to grips with what they and their friends did and saw: and being imperial ‘storm troopers’ tends to contradict the moral and ethical values of most Americans. Massive ‘self-medication’ through drugs and alcohol are common, as is domestic violence against lovers, spouses and children. Veterans will be dealing with these issues for the rest of their lives” (Scipes, 2008b).

For on-going work with U.S. military veterans, see the web sites of Vietnam Veterans Against the War at www.vvaw.org, and Iraq Veterans Against the War at www.ivaw.org.

16. Michael Barker, who graciously read an earlier version of this chapter, refines my position a little when he points out that oftentimes the information *is* available in the mainstream media, although it is usually presented in such a way as to encourage feelings of hopelessness. Barker also points that the mainstream press does not connect the “dots,” so even when information is presented, it is provided out of context and without critical understanding. That is correct for some of the leading mainstream newspapers, but most

Americans do not read these papers—and the situation is much worse at the regional level (e.g., *Chicago Tribune* [see Scipes, 2008a]) or more local papers. For excellent analyses of the mainstream media, see McChesney, 1999; Croteau and Hoynes (2003), and Mitchell (2008).

17. This is ably communicated by the political commentator Dave Lippman through his arch-nemesis George Shrub of the Committee to Intervene Anywhere (CIA). Shrub, the world's only known singing CIA agent, can be reached through Lippman at <http://davelippman.com/>.

Goldman (1988: 16), despite his claim that the U.S. has been on a “democratic mission” throughout its history, argues that most U.S. foreign aid was military and economic prior to the Alliance for Progress, which began in 1961. However, he notes, “What little political aid the United States has attempted in the past 35 years has been more or less covert, largely financial, and most often administered through the CIA.”

18. Agee himself states that most of his work was in Latin America, but that the Agency operates around the world, so obviously, this is not a complete list (Agee, 1975: x). For a more complete list of CIA operations, see Blum, 1986, with an updated account in Blum, 2000, along with descriptions of how these operations are carried out.

The best source of declassified Federal government documents especially on foreign operations is the National Security Archive at George Washington University in Washington, DC. It is a non-governmental research institute and library, and they place copies of original documents on-line. The web site is www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/. See relevant documents there.

19. Philip Agee, the former CIA Agent who had worked for about twelve years in Latin America for the Agency, makes a number of claims about the Agency “controlling” labor operations in the region—see, for example, Agee, 1975: 245 and 307—but while there was undoubtedly extensive collaboration between AIFLD and the CIA, this author questions the Agency's control over labor operatives. Agee himself does not seem to have experience within labor, so his claims regarding labor need additional verification before being accepted.

20. This book was published for the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). The CFR is arguably the most important of all elite think tanks in this country. For a detailed critical analysis of CFR, see Shoup and Minter, 1977/2004.

Lodge served in the U.S. Department of Labor from 1954 to 1962, and had been appointed by President Eisenhower to be the Assistant Secretary of Labor for International Affairs in 1958; he was subsequently reappointed to the post in 1961 by President Kennedy. He left the Department to engage in electoral politics in Massachusetts. He later served as a Professor of Business Administration, ultimately gaining an endowed chair at the Harvard Business School. He retired in 1997 (Harvard Business School, 2001).

As readers will soon see, this author is very critical of Lodge's book. It is a very sophisticated undertaking, supposedly concerned about workers around the world and how the U.S. can help them. However, it is, in fact, a very ideological work, arguing for vastly increased work and funding within the labor field around the world by U.S. government, labor and business, *not to help workers, but to advance U.S. foreign policy*, regardless of any ramifications on workers around the world.

Lodge's views of “Communism” and especially work by Communists within the labor movement is very much reflective of anti-Communist ideology of the time in which he worked for the U.S. Government and wrote this book. Whenever he writes about communist-led or -influenced unions, he sees the members as automatons, marching in lock step in response to their leaders' every whim, instead of a collection of workers who generally act to further their own interests as they perceive them (as is the case of Ameri-

can workers). (For a much more contemporary, historically informed study of how Communist organizations actually acted, based on an in-depth community-based study of Communist efforts in Chicago between 1928-1935, see Storch, 2007.)

In short, despite its measured, dispassionate tone, it really cares nothing about workers around the world and their well-being; it is an anti-Communist diatribe, however measured its tone and sophisticated its presentation.

21. Lodge knew of these operations at the time: “The American labor movement is now joined with its brother organizations around the free world, seeking to help workers in newly developing countries build strong trade unions, capable of addressing the welfare of workers and withstanding the pressures of communism from without or dictatorship within” (Lodge, 1962: 54). He discusses these operations in more detail (pp. 78-86).

Incidentally, the American trade union operations were not widely appreciated by particularly Scandinavian labor leaders as well as by a considerable number of Dutch and British unionists. See, for example, Wedin, 1974; Thomson and Larson, 1978. Lodge (1962: 67-73) himself discusses the differences between the Europeans and the Americans within the ICFTU (International Confederation of Free Trade Unions), the global labor center of pro-capitalist and anti-communist trade unions.

22. Lodge starts off chapter 5, “The Challenge to American Business,” with “American labor is by no means the only group in our country with an interest in the affairs of worker organizations abroad; nor is it the only group whose foreign operations have a direct bearing on U.S. foreign policy. American management has, if anything, a greater cause for concern and a greater obligation to review its policies and practices, having in mind the special importance of foreign labor organizations, not only to continued well-being of American companies overseas, but also to the achievement of our national aims” (Lodge, 1962: 126).

23. It is interesting to note that nowhere in his book does Lodge argue for international labor solidarity to help advance American workers’ interests and the well-being of workers around the world—his entire approach is to advance the foreign policy interests of the United States Government. In fact, Lodge specifically states, “To be more effective in accomplishing its international objectives, American Labor should, in my opinion, undertake certain new kinds of work, intensify some of its present activities, and expand and reorganize its international staff. Labor should be aware of *its importance to the fulfillment of United States foreign policy* and of the precise role that labor is playing in the political as well as economic development of the countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America” (emphasis added) (Lodge, 1962: 112).

As suggested, above, Lodge was critical of U.S. Labor’s foreign activities, and spends several pages telling labor how it should be working; he especially urges U.S. unions to work through the International Trade Secretariats instead of focusing so much on the ICFTU (Lodge, 1962: 111-12). As shown by Hirsch and Muir (1987: 732) and Agee (1975), the U.S. unions actively worked through these International Trade Secretariats.

24. There are few accounts of actual Communist practices in labor around the world from within the Communist movement; for one account, see Waterman, 1986. Much of writing on this has been by outsiders who have been ideological opponents, and while their descriptions may be accurate, their analysis is usually quite suspect; and many of the descriptions are one-sided and painted in the worst possible light. Lodge, in this author’s opinion, is certainly guilty of this. Supporters of “communism,” on the other hand can also be guilty, only approaching things from the opposite side. Obviously, great wariness must be the standard from which this subject is approached; most accounts seem interested in gaining political advantage for their side against their ideological opponents, instead of helping working people and their families.

From extensive efforts to untangle “reality” (what is really going on) from competing claims by multiple perspectives in the Philippines (see Scipes, 1996), this author has found that militant trade unionism can be the result of workers dealing with oppressive social conditions and having the leadership that supports their struggles. This leadership can be of any political persuasion: communist, social democratic, militant trade unionist, even Christian. The point trying to be made here is that workers attempt to deal with their social reality as they understand it, and this is different from militancy being “caused” by outsiders, Communist or not.

Lodge, despite knowing the conditions faced by workers in a wide number of developing countries, blames their militancy on “outside forces,” the Communists. However, it must also be kept in mind that most members of any Communist Party are members of the home society—again, see Storch, 2007—and are not “outsiders.”

25. The arrogance and ignorance of his statement, hopefully, is obvious to all. For detailed examples of how workers were able to create dynamic labor movements in conditions such as this, see, among many others, Mac Shane, Plaut and Ward (1984) and Baskin (1991) for South Africa, Koo (2001) and Chun (2003) for South Korea, Scipes (1996) and West (1997) for the Philippines, and Seidman (1994) for a fascinating comparative study of the emergence of radical unions in both Brazil and South Africa as a by-product of the rapid industrialization processes in these two countries.

26. Lodge was a sophisticated student of labor—he was no hack. He recognized these ideas of “mutuality of interests” were the attributes of the then-contemporary labor movement in the United States—thinking generally of the AFL unions, although this described most of the former CIO unions by this time—and was clear that this was very different from the early years of American labor. In short, he was arguing that the experiences of labor in developing countries were much more similar to the early years of labor—before, say roughly, 1948—than subsequently, and was warning his readers to recognize the need to relate to the early years rather than the latter years of American labor (Lodge, 1962: 16-20).

27. As can be seen by a number of statements in Agee’s 1975 book, the CIA in Latin America certainly saw them as being of strategic importance.

28. It is interesting to notice which countries he ignored: South Africa, with the largest economy on the continent, stands out for its absence from African trade unionism, and the Philippines stands out for its absence from the commentary on Asian trade unionism—surprisingly so, in light of the former American colony having adopted U.S. labor law generally for its “post-colonial” labor relations system in 1954.

29. Lodge later reports that, “In 1960, the AFL-CIO gave \$180,000 for the establishment of the Afro-Asian Institute for Labor Studies in Israel, one of the most effective centers for helping trade unionists from less-developed countries in the world today” (Lodge, 1962: 84).

30. As Agee (1975) discusses, often in consultation with the CIA.

31. This was to work until about 1973, when increasing global economic competition began seriously affecting working people in the United States (Bluestone and Harrison, 1982; Scipes, 1984). Since then, income growth has slowed drastically for the bottom 40 percent of the population and became distributed much more unequally across the social order, with the bottom 80 percent losing income absolutely (not relatively) during the first four years of the Bush Administration. These processes are detailed in Scipes, 2009b. See also Greenhouse, 2008.

32. It is especially interesting to read today Lodge’s three factors, explaining Communist successes in their trade union work in developing countries: flexibility, financial support, and opportunism. His condemnatory description of “financial support” by the

Communist movement is particularly ironic in light of the past and contemporary efforts of the foreign policy leadership of the AFL-CIO to conceal its operations in developing countries from its own membership, as well as its connection to and funding from the U.S. Government. Lodge writes, “The [World Federation of Trade Unions] and other Communist labor groups receive funds, training and close support of all sorts from Sino-Soviet bloc countries, especially the USSR and China. *This money, of course, is state money, not the dues of union members.* It comes fast when it is needed and its expenditures is clearly connected and coordinated with the fulfillment of over-all Communist foreign policy. *Its expenditure does not have to be debated, voted, accounted for democratically, or publicly announced*” (emphases added) (Lodge, 1962: 65).

33. According to Philip Agee, in 1966, “this year, [AIFLD’s] cumulative cost will pass the 15 million dollar mark with almost 90 percent paid by the U.S. government through [Agency for International Development] and the rest from U.S. labor organizations and U.S. business. Since 1962, the annual AIFLD budget has grown from 640,000 dollars to almost 5 million dollars” (Agee, 1975: 502).

34. There is something about Labor’s adoption of a formal structure that included the U.S. Government that this author can never recall seeing commented upon: after the 1955 merger that created the AFL-CIO, it was clear that the AFL was the dominant partner. As a number of writers have shown, the AFL had been much more active in foreign operations before the merger than the CIO ever was (see Carew, 1998; Buhle, 1999; Valentine, 1999; and Hughes, 2001). Yet, adopting this formal structure was a rejection of the AFL’s traditional “voluntarism” that eschewed governmental alliances (except perhaps during war time)—the AFL even rejected a minimum wage or unemployment benefits because of their linkages to the government—and adopted the governmental partnership that had developed under the CIO’s Philip Murray. The “anti-communist purges” of 11 “left-led unions” during the 1949 by the CIO, the 1949 withdrawal of the CIO from the World Federation of Trade Unions (which included the Soviet labor center) and its joining the newly created and anti-Communist International Confederation of Free Trade Union (ICFTU) along with the AFL, the 1955 merger between the AFL and CIO, and then the development of government-corporate-labor alliances by the early 1960s would seem all of a part—and it appears that one key person tying these all together is Arthur Goldberg. (Thanks to Fred Hirsch for drawing my attention to Goldberg.) Goldberg was a lawyer for the United Steel Workers of America (Murray’s union) and then of the CIO, generally recognized architect of the merger, and later U.S. Secretary of Labor under President Kennedy when Lodge (1962) wrote his book (and whom Kennedy later appointed to the Supreme Court). Certainly an in-depth examination of his participation in these events might be a fruitful use of time.

35. Greg Grandin argues that Latin America “has long served as the workshop for empire, the place where the United States elaborated tactics of extraterritorial administration and acquired its conception of itself as an empire like no other before it” (Grandin, 2007). AIFLD was part of the larger picture: “By the end of the Cold War, Latin American security forces trained, funded, equipped and incited by Washington had executed a reign of blood terror—hundreds of thousands killed, an equal number tortured, and millions driven into exile—from which the region has yet to fully recover” (Grandin, 2007: 4).

36. It was not that Kennedy was against military force and/or intervention—as he showed in Vietnam—but he recognized its limitations, particularly regarding public support in the United States, and he wanted to preclude sending in the Marines unless deemed absolutely necessary.

37. Yet, U.S. development assistance has always been intended to benefit the United

States, despite whatever rhetoric about “concern for the world’s peoples” might be used. For USAID’s latest statement, see “Foreign Aid in the National Interest: Promoting Freedom, Security, and Opportunity” (AID, 2002). The role of foreign aid has been enhanced: “In September 2002, President Bush introduced his National Security Strategy. For the first time, development has been elevated as the third pillar of U.S. national security, along with defense and diplomacy.” Further, “The main message of this report: foreign assistance will be a key instrument of foreign policy in the coming decades.” These statements were in the “Forward” to the report, written by Andrew S. Natsios, Administrator, USAID. Also in the report, it lays out clearly that “development assistance” around the world is done with the conscious effort to benefit the United States: “U.S. efforts to strengthen democracy and governance most often fall short because they lack unified support from the entire U.S. government. *Such programs cannot succeed if they are inconsistent with U.S. objectives and priorities*” (emphasis added) (AID, 2002: 9).

38. Goldman (1988:17) claims, “It was the express national interest of the United States to help Latin America evolve a new set of political institutions that would be capable of coping with and even promoting social and political change.”

39. The “School of the Americas” was moved to Fort Benning, Georgia after U.S. President Jimmy Carter returned control of the Canal Zone back to Panama in the late 1970s. This school has trained thousands of soldiers from Latin American countries, and a number of its graduates have been implicated in major human rights abuses across the continent, including the assassination of Archbishop Cesar Romero of El Salvador in 1981. Activists renamed this the “School of the Assassins,” and have been working for many years to close it down. For more information, go to the School of the Americas Watch at www.soaw.org.

40. For one analysis of the impact of these policies, on the Philippines, see Scipes, 1999; for a more global study, see Klein, 2007.

41. Roy Godson (1988) gives a quite explicit account of “how labor has been and can be used to affect the stability of a polity and influence the forces within it,” although he ascribes its purpose to “building democracy.” This quote is on page 119.

42. This section draws heavily from Scipes, 2005d. A more recent report that details the NED’s work is Clark, 2007. Clark points out that much of the research on NED has been done from a group of organizations that are part of the NED “family”; i.e., that the research is tainted by their own associations. He points out, “Democracy building becomes the cover for a policy goal that has always been surrounded by an enormous amount of deception” (Clark, 2007: 1).

43. According to Ralph Goldman, “The Reagan administration gave an initial grant of \$300,000 to the American Political Foundation for a six-month study to develop proposals for a democracy program,” which led to the creation of the NED. Lane Kirkland, President of the AFL-CIO, was a member of the executive board for planning the project. “Professor Allen Weinstein of Georgetown University was selected to be project director” (Goldman, 1988: 20-21). Thus, Weinstein’s role was much more than just one who helped draw up the legislation, he was at the center of this process; and, as such, his statement is more meaningful than even Blum recognizes.

44. Blum’s analysis of the NED can be found on-line at www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Blum/TrojanHorse_RS.html.

45. For a volume that supports these processes of “democracy promotion,” see Goldman and Douglas, eds., 1988. Robinson (1996) is the established critical analysis of U.S. “democracy promotion” programs. Golinger’s recent article (2010) does not mention the role of Labor in “democracy promotion” projects, but as shown herein, it is often involved—and certainly has been in Venezuela, as was detailed in chapter 3.

46. Without delving into it, the “color” revolutions in Eastern Europe during the late 1990s-early 2000s, along with efforts in the former Yugoslavia, were efforts supported, if not initiated, by the National Endowment for Democracy and its assorted allies such as Freedom House. So, the NED could be also used to help overthrow “undesired” governments; that is undesired by the U.S. elites and not necessarily their respective populations.

47. For a contemporary look at how this works—in this case, “to advance the cause of a more democratic Iran”—see Azimi, 2007.

For a quick overview of the “democracy promotion” field, see Silver, 2006.

48. For a discussion of the processes that led to the development of the NED—albeit from the perspective that the NED was the latest development in the United States’ historic “democracy mission”—as well as a listing of the “general purposes of the NED,” see Goldman, 1988: 16-22.

49. One of the people President Reagan gave “heartfelt thanks and warmest congratulations” for their work at the founding of the NED was Lane Kirkland (Reagan, 1983), President of the AFL-CIO.

50. For a couple of reports on the IRI under John McCain, see Leight, 2004; Hamburger, 2008. Hamburger notes that under the 13 year chairmanship of John McCain, “the board has played a very active role in coordinating IRI activities” (Hamburger, 2008: 5).

51. Sims points out that “Brock was the chairman of the American Political Foundation’s Democracy Program, which recommended that Congress establish NED” (Sims, 1992: 121, f.n. 3).

52. It is interesting that Lowe does not mention the \$5.7 million dollars NED gave between 1983-88 to the AFL-CIO’s American Institute for Free Labor Development (AAFLI—AIFLD’s parallel institute in Asia) that was channeled to the Marcos Dictatorship-created Trade Union Congress of the Philippines (see *International Labour Reports*, 1989). There are other cases not mentioned as well.

53. Roy Godson (1988), writing in support of Labor’s involvement in “democracy promotion,” presents a very specific argument for the inclusion of Labor in such efforts. He points out “The very nature and structure of labor movements provide them with the capacity to be important elements in shaping national politics and influencing the course of history.” Further, “... the organization is located in strategic sectors of the economy. It is organized usually among workers in transportation, communications, energy and government. If the functioning of any one of these sectors is jeopardized, the entire society grinds to a halt.” Godson points out that Labor can lend stability to, or destabilize, a political system. Additionally, it can serve as part of a major political force, and can influence whoever is in power. His is a very pragmatic and non-rhetorical explanation of what Labor can do, especially in developing countries.

Godson concludes his argument for including Labor in “democracy promotion” projects: “Free labor has an important role to play in the development of democracy. To promote democratic systems abroad, the United States can be of help to this strategic sector with political, material, and educational assistance. While the existence of an effective democratic labor movement may be neither necessary nor sufficient for democracy to flourish, it certainly can be an important contributing factor. Where democratic labor leaders are struggling against heavy odds to develop democratic values in their societies, the United States and its labor movement are in a crucial position to provide much-needed and perhaps vital assistance” (Godson, 1988: 137).

54. There is an extensive amount of literature on the labor movement in South Africa. For the most complete listing on-line, go to the section on South Africa in the “Con-

temporary Labor Issues Bibliography” at http://faculty.pnc.edu/kscipes/LaborBib.Htm#SOUTH_AFRICA.

55. And, for the record, EACH of the labor movements fighting for democracy and regime change were opposed for a significant number of years by the AFL-CIO, which supported reactionary labor movements against these democratic labor organizations.

56. The FTUI had been established in 1977 to work with European trade unionists in Southern Europe, especially in Spain and Portugal after the dictatorships fell, but “In 1984, FTUI was given the assignment by the AFL-CIO of coordinating Labor’s involvement with the National Endowment for Democracy” (Free Trade Union Institute, 1987: 8).

57. This is the reason that this author has been so long interested in AFL-CIO foreign policy: if the AFL-CIO is participating in and helping to determine a major initiative of U.S. foreign policy, then it is argued that the ramifications of this are profound, and must be honestly presented to and discussed and decided by the members of the unions affiliated to the AFL-CIO. Such participation must have the *knowledgeable* ratification by union members, based on *transparency* and *continued honest reporting* by the leaders to members.

This, as shown herein, has never been done. AFL-CIO foreign policy leaders have compromised the integrity of the entire U.S. labor movement without the consent of their members, acting in their name and with the legitimacy derived there from, and all the time either not telling the members of their acts and decisions and/or lying about what they reported on these issues (see chapter 3).

Besides the blatant disrespect and betrayal of their own members by so doing this, these “leaders” have made a mockery of the very values of “freedom of association” and “independent trade unionism” they so fervently claim to be advancing.

And these actions violate even the words of their own FTUI, which wrote in their 1987 report (after getting grants from NED over the previous three years) on the AFL-CIO and NED, “It is appropriate . . . to provide an account of how that money has been spent and what the program has accomplished—not least because the men and women of the American labor movement are U.S. citizens and taxpayers, too, and so should be apprised of what is being with their money and in their name” (FTUI, 1987: 10). Too bad FTUI didn’t even meet their own standard, but they at least get credit for recognizing that they should meet such a standard.

58. The Interhemispheric Resource Center of Albuquerque, NM, established “Profiles of U.S. Private Organizations and Churches,” focusing on issues related to U.S. foreign policy in Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean (Group Watch, 1989). This included a profile of the Social Democrats, USA, dated November 1989. Principals of the organization at that time involved in or came out of the AFL-CIO included the president of SDUSA, Donald Slaiman, while David Jessup and Tom Kahn were on the 1989 National Committee, and Sol C. Chaikin, Sandra Feldman, Leon Lynch, Jay Mazur, Joyce D. Miller, and Lynn R. Williams were on the 1989 National Advisory Committee.

The closely referenced report notes, “SD/USA is a small organization with fewer than 1,000 active members; however, its influence has been extensive in the ‘upper-middle’ levels of government and organized labor. SD/USA is the driving force behind the policies of the International Affairs Department of the AFL-CIO, and cooperates with affiliates of the AFL-CIO in ‘democracy building’ projects around the globe. Similarly, Social Democrats hold influential positions in the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), a quasi-governmental organization formally established by legislation introduced by the Reagan Administration in 1983” (Group Watch, 1989: 3)

Further, the report notes that the “real strength and importance of SD/USA lies” in

the “overlapping memberships between SD/USA board of directors and national advisory council and the League for Industrial Democracy (LID), Freedom House, the A. Philip Randolph Institute (APRI), and the AFL-CIO and its affiliates are numerous. SD/USA also has close ties with the American Federation of Teachers (AFT)” (Group Watch, 1989: 5). People they specifically identify include Carl Gershman (research director for APRI and a resident scholar at Freedom House), Tom Kahn (head of the AFL-CIO International Affairs Department, who had no previous work experience with labor unions but was tapped by Slaiman for the position), Norman Hill (President and Executive Director of APRI), Bayard Rustin (long-time chair of APRI), Albert Shanker (president of AFT), Sol Chaikin, Jay Mazur (President of the International Ladies Garment Workers Union, a vice president of AFL-CIO, on the boards of AIFLD, FTUI, AALC, and AAFLI, and served on the boards of the National Committee for Labor Israel-Histadrut, LID, and APRI) (Group Watch, 1989: 5-6).

A 2006 tribute to the late Penn Kemble, written by Joshua Muravchik, a resident scholar at the (right wing) American Enterprise Institute includes some interesting details about the late Tom Kahn, who had headed the AFL-CIO’s International Affairs Department, as well as others in and around the SDUSA who worked around or in the AFL-CIO: Rachelle Horowitz, Carl Gershman, David Jessup, and Sandy Feldman.

59. Donahue was identified as Treasurer of the Board of Directors of NED in NED, 2000 (“National Endowment for Democracy Board of Directors, 2000”), and Vice Chair of the Board in NED, 2003 (“Thomas R. Donahue, Vice Chair”), which was on-line at www.ned.org/about/board_bios/donahue.html. However, in double-checking at the end of 2007, this link was inoperable and he was no longer listed as being on the Board of the NED. His position of Chair of the Board had been taken by Richard A. Gephardt, former member of the US House of Representatives and long-time AFL-CIO ally.

Patricia Friend of the Flight Attendants’ union currently (2010) represents Labor directly on the NED Board, although Leon Lynch of the Steelworkers (USWA) long served in this position.

It is also interesting to note that when the AFL-CIO recreated the International Affairs Department (IAD) in 2006, Barbara Shailor—the previous head of IAD who had been “demoted” to head of the Solidarity Center in 2005—was returned to the head position of IAD. Elly Larson of the Flight Attendants was then selected to head the Solidarity Center (American Center for International Labor Solidarity). Noting the important international position of the Flight Attendants union, it is not surprising that two of their key leaders have been so incorporated into the AFL-CIO foreign policy program, and largely neutralized.

60. For a book-length report of repression in the Philippines—and labor’s efforts to overcome it—see Scipes, 1996; for a similar book regarding labor in South Korea, see Chun, 2003. For material on Kamberis himself, see Tim Shorrock (1999) and Simon Rodberg (2001).

61. In September 2009, Richard Trumka, formerly President of the United Mine Workers of America (UMWA) and Secretary-Treasurer of the AFL-CIO from 1995-2009, was elected President of the AFL-CIO to replace the retiring John Sweeney. It is too early to tell what Trumka’s foreign policy program will involve, but since he’s been a key member of the Sweeney Administration for the past 14 years, it seems logical to expect a continuation of the Sweeney program for at least a while.

62. This section draws heavily from Scipes, 2005a. Once again, thanks to Chris Townsend of the United Electrical (UE) workers for drawing attention to the ACLD.

63. Material on ACLD was available at www.state.gov/g/drl/lbr/c6732.htm, but the site is no longer operable. At this site, which is for ACLD under the Bush Administration,

were minutes for meetings of October 4, 2001; November 14, 2001; December 19, 2001; September 18, 2002; May 2, 2003; and November 17, 2003, along with the ACLD's Charter. When one clicked on the "Archive" button on this page, it took one to ACLD material developed during the Clinton Administration at www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/labor/acld_index.html, but that, too, is no longer operable. However, by putting Advisory Committee on Labor and Diplomacy (no quotes) into Google, considerable material is available on-line. See also specific listings under ACLD in the references herein.

The involvement of Labor's foreign policy leaders was first reported in Scipes (2005a), with a subsequent report in Scipes (2005b).

64. Joyce has a documented reactionary history in addition to this, so this institute in Rome is certainly "questionable." According to Sims, Joyce was a board member of PRODEMCA (Friends of the Democratic Center in Central America), "A NED grantee for anti-Sandinista projects inside of Nicaragua...." He was also a member of the League for Industrial Democracy. Further, she identifies him as being on the Board of the Free Trade Union Institute (FTUI), the African American Labor Center (AALC), the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD), and the Asian American Free Labor Institute (AAFLI), which means he served on the board of all four of the AFL-CIO's international institutes, as did John Sweeney under Kirkland (Sims, 1992: 49-50, 104-107).

65. Sometime after this author published an article about the ACLD (Scipes, 2005a), this web site was made inoperable. Whether it was because of this article or something else, it is no longer available.

66. For some strange reason, there is no mention of this connection on the AFL-CIO web site.

67. One of the related problems has been identified by Gary Busch (1983: 258-263). "If there is one area of current problems in international labour relations which is likely to serve as the catalyst for political change, *it certainly will be the deep involvement of the world's intelligence services in the field of international trades unionism*" (emphasis added).

To put this in a larger context: by accepting the desirability of the United States dominating the world, the AFL-CIO foreign policy leadership puts itself and our labor movement in bed with some of the worst scoundrels imaginable, both in the United States and around the world. These include intelligence operatives, but are not limited to them. American trade unionists must decide if this is something we want for our labor movement.

CHAPTER FIVE

1. Much of this worsening economic condition has been hidden by massive amounts of credit granted, so consumption levels have increased despite the considerable reduction in earnings, but the sub-prime mortgage and credit collapse that began reaching public consciousness in 2007 is tearing the scab off. For the declining socio-economic situation of U.S. workers *before* the financial crisis, see Scipes, 2009b; for the best work to date on the financial crisis itself, see Foster and Magdoff, 2009; see also Schechter, 2008; Baker, 2009.

2. The payoff, at best, has been less than stellar, even when successful: it was the Democrat, William Jefferson Clinton, who signed NAFTA, the North American Free Trade Agreement, which has been a disaster to workers in the U.S., Canada and Mexico (see Robert Scott, 2003; Bacon, 2004). Clinton also signed the welfare reform law that led to TANF, Temporary Assistance to Needy Families, another disaster (see Eitzen and

Eitzen Smith, 2003). Obama's lack of support for the terribly-named Employee Free Choice Act (ECFA), which was Labor's #1 priority, is still another case in point (see Ear-ly, 2010).

3. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (Stalenheim, et. al., 2006), in 2005, the direct United States military-related expenditures were 48 percent of the world's total military expenditures, which totaled \$1.118 trillion; i.e., that the U.S. alone spent almost as much money as all the other countries on Earth *combined*! Its closest competitors—the UK, France, Japan, and China—each spent about 4-5 percent of the world's expenditures.

4. Every year, the U.S. Government submits a Federal Budget: this is the government's idea of how much money it will require to run the government, and all of its various programs, and how these expenditures will be funded. (This is very similar to a personal budget, with a *lot* more zeros!) At the end of the year, the Government determines whether it ran a surplus (took in more money than spent) or a deficit (spent more than they took in). Ultimately, this surplus or deficit is added into a cumulative account of all surpluses and deficits since 1789—when the U.S. was officially established as an independent nation—and this cumulative total is known as the National Debt.

First, it should be known that the U.S. budget has run a deficit every year since 1970, with the only exceptions being the four years of the second Clinton Administration (1997-2000).

Second, the National Debt when Jimmy Carter left office in 1981 was \$907 billion, or \$.9 trillion. (That covers all the surpluses and deficits from George Washington to the end of Carter's administration, including costs of two world wars, the civil war, etc.) After eight years of no major wars under the "fiscal conservative" Ronald Reagan, the National Debt went from \$.9 trillion to \$2.7 trillion! With the exception of the four years of Clinton's second term, it has continued to grow (Scipes, 2009b). In 2010, it is over \$12 trillion: as of 3:59 pm of March 14, 2010, based on U.S. Department of the Treasury data, the U.S. National Debt was \$12,586,441,946,149.46, or approximately \$40,864.18 for every man, woman and child in this country. And since September 28, 2007, the National Debt has increased an average of \$3.98 billion every day. Source: U.S. National Debt Clock at www.brillig.com/debt_clock/. It has been the incredible war spending—I refuse to call it "defense"—that has driven this massive indebtedness of this country; and our "leaders" want to cut social programs in this country so they can continue feeding this beast.

5. For one example, see Albert, 2003; see also Scipes, 1991, 2009a.

6. If you question this, look at the houses of "ordinary people" that are used in almost any Hollywood production—and ask yourself if they represent the houses of you and your friends . . . ?

7. Although he was focusing on Labor's power in developing countries, Godson (1988) made a similar point.

8. As discussed in chapter 3, this has been an on-going project of considerable numbers of labor activists since at least the 1960s. Because this author is trying to pull ideas from this study to put into the larger mix, he does not generally discuss others' efforts here. Nonetheless, it should be remembered that these comments are contributing to a long-standing and on-going discussion/debate, and not that this author sees his efforts as separate or, worse, singular.

9. One the best embodiments of this by a national union after the IWW—originally a member of the CIO when founded in 1937, and then a member of the AFL-CIO until its demise in 1968—was the Packinghouse Workers Organizing Committee until 1943, when it became the United Packinghouse Workers of America. For an in-depth examina-

tion of organizing and organizational development processes of this union between 1933-1955 in the Chicago area, with a particular focus on how it addressed racial oppression in the workplace, union and community, and in comparison with the Steel Workers Organizing Committee/United Steelworkers of America in the same region, see Scipes, 2003a. See also the excellent studies on this union by Paul Street (1993), Rick Halpern (1997) and Roger Horowitz (1997).

10. This process was developed by the anti-war veteran's organization in the San Francisco Bay Area, the Veterans Speakers Alliance (VSA), which this author belonged to in the late 1980s. VSA is still active against war and militarism today.

11. *Labor Notes*, a monthly newsletter that seeks to "Put movement back in the labor movement" (www.labornotes.org) and the people in and around their network, have been 30-plus year proponents of rank and file democracy and activities such as these, and have published a number of books and pamphlets over the years to promote such efforts; see, for example, LaBotz (1991), Parker and Gruelle (1999), and Slaughter (2006).

While folks associated with *Labor Notes* have been unable to suggest a radical vision for a new society beyond "greater mobilization by democratically-organized members," this certainly would be part of any alternative project.

For a recent book on a local union that built this kind of rank and file power as key to their strategy in confronting their employer and with the idea of helping to rebuild the American labor movement, written by two labor activists, see Ashby and Hawking (2009).

12. While a member of Graphic Communications #388 in Oakland, California in the late 1980s, this author's local was "merged" into a statewide GCIU "local." Although an active member for a number of years, when this author ran into a conflict at work, he could not even get a local union leader—based in Los Angeles, if remembered correctly—to take his phone calls so he could discuss possible options for response. To say this was disheartening is to say the least: we local union members previously had easy access to our union officials in Oakland.

Steve Early (2009) has been a particularly strong advocate of member democracy, especially in his discussions of internal problems within SEIU over the past couple of years.

13. The material in this section is being developed for submission to a theory-focused academic journal. It has not yet been submitted to date, so it should not be given more credence at this time other than as the author's "best thinking." Nonetheless, it is argued that it is worthy of serious consideration by readers.

14. Sewell, however, tries to have his cake and eat it too. Further on in this chapter that discusses Marshall Sahlin's "Possible Theory of History," Sewell discusses whether "structure" is singular or should be seen as plural. He rejects the singular conceptualization, and argues for the plural: "Cultural structures, in my opinion, should not be seen as corresponding to distinct 'societies' ... but rather as corresponding to spheres or arenas of social practice of varying scope that intertwine, overlap, and interpenetrate in space and time" (Sewell, 2005: 206). As this author reads this, the ideas of "variance" and intertwinement, overlapping and interpenetration all contradict his previously stated definition of "structure," which is based on stability, order and permanence.

15. Kuhn does not provide a definition of "paradigm." The closest he comes is, "These I take to be universally recognized scientific achievements that for a time provide model problems and solutions to a community" (Kuhn, 1970: viii).

This author, following Kuhn, defines a paradigm as "A set of scientific efforts and achievements that share the same set of general assumptions and approaches to respectively identified research problems in a widely-defined but common focused aspect of the

social/scientific order.” Thus, for purposes herein, the paradigmatic level is the broadest level of theoretical abstraction in sociology.

Kuhn argues that science advances through “scientific revolutions,” whereby a new paradigm challenges the established paradigm, and ultimately replaces the established one (Kuhn, 1970).

16. This author uses the term “socially-based categories” instead of the more common “group” to recognize that people are placed into specific categories by social theorists, based on the theorist’s purposes and not necessarily by decisions consciously made by the affected people. These categories are organized on social bases, and are not the results of only intellectual processes, but people so placed are acted-upon in this process and, therefore, are passive, and are not engaged actors who have made their own decisions.

17. This would cause them to prioritize one of their “identities”—as male, parent, worker, etc.—over another. Most people recognize that they have different identities and responsibilities, and that they vary over time and situation, but whether they would prioritize one over all others, and especially in the manner done by a theorist, is questionable.

18. As should be immediately obvious, this author does not address the work of Max Weber, which could be considered a fatal weakness. However, it argued that Weber’s work, while brilliant in what he focused on, is actually based only on a partial understanding of any society: Weber focuses on what this author considers the dominative aspect of society, and not the emancipatory aspect. For example, while providing a much more complete analysis of the dominative aspect of society than does Marx, Weber does not provide any analysis of social change from the “bottom-up” (see Bendix, 1960; Gerth and Mills, eds., 1946; Morrison, 2006). Accordingly, his work is not considered herein.

19. In what follows, focus is on the essentials of particular theoretical approaches. It is recognized that writers have combined approaches—Patricia Hill Collins’ *Black Feminist Thought* (2001) arguably is the most sophisticated to date—to overcome limitations of the essential theories themselves, but the argument herein will be more clear if the essentials are addressed, not subsequent modifications.

20. The author assumes the reader recognizes some problems here; thus, this author is not arguing that this is how the real world works, but rather how macrosociological theories represent social relations.

21. It is argued that sociologists can only “represent” society, and not reflect it. To represent society, we develop “models” that give a general understanding of how a society is organized; it will give a fairly accurate overview, but will not provide details. Think of model ships that many young boys build: while a real aircraft carrier might cover a quarter-mile in length, a model of the same ship may be two feet long; obviously, a model cannot include details, while showing general relationships.

Although the structural conflict model is commonly referred to as “conflict theory,” this author argues that there is more correctly seen as a “model of society” (i.e., a general representation of the social order and not as any particular theory), and should be correctly referred to as a structural conflict model.

22. This author’s work is based on the work of Alfred Schutz (1967), who takes an interpretative approach to society (see also Berger and Luckmann, 1966; Wagner, 1970). The argument is that each person understands physical reality (“objective conditions”) differently from every other person, just as they differentially understand symbolic reality. Based on their particular biography, they give meaning to events/experiences, and then, based on their personal values, value them. This process of giving meaning and evaluation is known as “interpretation.” Interpretation, then, is effected by the model of

society, by the *representation* of society, they personally choose, through which they observe the world and give it meaning.

It is by communicating among people who have these different interpretations, and by socially constructing a common understanding, that people come to understand social reality collectively (Berger and Luckmann, 1966).

23. Much of the terminology in American sociology is a product of structural functionalism, which, prior to the late 1960s, was the dominant model of society. Accordingly, a more neutral term such as “society” can accurately represent organization of the social whole when representations are based on categories having roughly equivalent decision-making power. However, this author feels this is inadequate for a structural conflict model that recognizes unequal amounts of power between socially-based categories; it is argued that the term “social order”—recognizing that decision-making power in the social organization is unequal and that the more powerful category uses its power to maintain control over the subordinate one—is a more accurate term to describe organization of the social whole than is “society.”

24. This section, on “approaches” and the following one, on “theories,” are not essential for this analysis which is overwhelmingly focused on the paradigmatic and model levels of society. They have been mentioned herein to “flesh out” the logic of the argument, but are not developed further herein as it is not necessary for the basic argument.

25. Obviously, subsequent analysis has developed far beyond the “single” relationship approach, with writers often combining two or more approaches together, e.g., Marxist feminism, but the essence of the analysis is based on a single relationship, and it is important to recognize the theoretical “essence” of each approach.

26. The names for the last two approaches are not satisfactory, but they are the best this author can do at this time; the emphasis should be on the relationship described, and not on the “name.”

Incidentally, it should be kept in mind that the “racialist” approach is between whites and people of color, and not just whites and African Americans: a racist approach can be used when other people of color are present even when African Americans are not; such as in the upper plains states of the United States, where the racial relationships would be between whites and Native Americans.

27. A “situation” in this conceptualization is very abstract: there is no one definition of situation. Therefore, in any case, the researcher must herself or himself define the parameters of what is being considered; the researcher must define the situation. While this risks subsequent researchers questioning whether the defined “situation” is appropriate for studying the respective subject, it is felt that this is less of a potential problem than trying to shoehorn all subsequent research into the same situational box regardless of particular circumstances.

28. Social scientists can, however, still recognize that social behavior can penalize or discriminate against groups of people who share similar attributes (such as race or gender), but this must be empirically verified, not just theoretically proclaimed as an essential process. This is why the concept of “social class”—whether as developed by Marx, Weber, Warner, Wright or any others—has never been universally accepted in Sociology: empirical data does not support the concept. Likewise, albeit differentially developed because of (generally) observable physical differences, while empirical research has established oppression and discrimination based on race and gender, this does not explain the diminutions of such oppression subsequent to the Civil Rights/Black Power and Women’s Movements of the 1950s, ‘60s, and ‘70s, and the ramifications of such since then. In other words, the oppression based on race and gender differs qualitatively after these movements than before their emergence and development, although certainly nei-

ther have been eradicated.

29. According to Weber, "In general, we understand by 'power' the chance of a man or of a number of men to realize their own will in a communal action even against the resistance of others who are participants in the action" (Gerth and Mills, eds., 1946: 180).

30. This author has substituted new terminology for Fiske's original terminology: Fiske's "imperializing power" has been superseded with "dominative power," and "localizing power" has been replaced with "emancipatory power." The author believes this terminology is superior to Fiske's, while still maintaining the general idea of Fiske's work.

31. Scott states specifically that his is not a Parsonian approach. See also Fantasia, 1988.

32. It should be noted that it is important that actors in any collective action also "frame" the action for the media and the general public, so that their meaning is more likely to be projected to the public. Opponents will frame their meaning of the action and, without the protagonists' getting their meaning out, this means that the opponents will then define the action, which protagonists never want to allow: it is crucially important that actors frame the action themselves, so as to help the audience understand the meaning that they, themselves, intend.

REFERENCES

1. URLs have been provided herein to facilitate access to materials on which this author has drawn. However, in the publishing process, many of the URLs have been broken, so it cannot be assumed that they will link correctly when copied into a browser. At very least, check to see if spaces have been inserted when copied, and remove them. Also, if that does not help, copy the title of the item in quotes, and place into Google—often times, this approach will be successful. Along with that, of course, please remember that one problem with on-line resources is that they can be removed or moved from their present "site" at any time. Every effort has been made to make sure they are accurate at the time of writing.

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